GIAMP v. MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. et al
Filing
8
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION re 3 MOTION to Dismiss for Improper Venue filed by MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., MYLAN, INC. Signed by Magistrate Judge Cynthia Reed Eddy on 9/24/12. (mjl) [Transferred from Pennsylvania Western on 9/25/2012.]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KELLY GIAMP,
Plaintiff,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
v.
MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.,
And MYLAN, INC.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 12-0521
Magistrate Judge Cynthia Reed Eddy
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the Court is defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or Transfer for Improper Venue (ECF
No. 3), pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the exclusive
venue provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). For the
reasons to follow, the Court will deny the motion to dismiss, but grant the alternative relief of
transferring venue to the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).
Plaintiff Kelly Giamp, a Caucasian female, alleges she was subjected to a nasty and
hostile work environment and discriminated and retaliated against by defendants, Mylan
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., (“MPI”) and Mylan, Inc., on the basis of her gender and her relationship
with an African American male co-worker. Plaintiff asserts federal question jurisdiction in this
Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 2000, et seq., and Section 2000(e)2-3 (Title VII), and the
Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1991, and pendent jurisdiction over Count IV of her Complaint
brought under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), 43 P.S. Section 951, et seq. 955.
Although Plaintiff claims that “[a]ll, or substantially all, of the events, facts and
circumstances giving rise to the instant Complaint occurred in the Western District of
1
Pennsylvania and therefore venue is appropriate under Title 28 U.S.C. §1391(b)(2) and (c),”
Complaint, (ECF No. 1, ¶8), defendants aver that she “worked her entire tenure for MPI in
Morgantown, West Virginia, where all alleged acts underlying her Complaint occurred and all
relevant records are maintained.”
Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss or Transfer for
Improper Venue, (ECF No. 4, p. 1). More specifically, defendants assert the following:
This action arises out of Plaintiff’s termination from her position as
a Utility Worker D at MPI’s Morgantown, West Virginia facility. [FN. 1]
[FN. 1] Defendant Mylan Inc. has never employed Plaintiff,
and is not a proper Defendant in this matter.
MPI is a West Virginia corporation with its principal place of business
located at 781 Chestnut Ridge Road, Morgantown, West Virginia.
(Declaration of Sherrie Nelson (“Nelson Decl.”) ¶2.) Plaintiff worked for
MPI from October 5, 2006 until her final termination on November 30,
2010. (Nelson Decl. ¶4, Ex. A.) For the duration of her employment,
Plaintiff worked at the Morgantown facility, where her employment
records also were maintained. (Nelson Decl. ¶6.)
Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts claims for race and sex discrimination
and retaliation under Title VII. (Compl. ¶¶ 24-41.) Plaintiff claims she was
subjected to a hostile work environment throughout her employment and
improperly terminated. (Compl. ¶ 13-23.) Plaintiff’s supervisors and coworkers named in her Complaint are all employed by MPI at the
Morgantown facility. (Nelson Decl. ¶11.) Likewise, the decision to
terminate Plaintiff’s employment was made by management personnel
working at the Morgantown facility. (Nelson Decl. ¶9.) Following her
termination, United Steelworkers Local 8-957, which represented Giamp
and other workers at the Morgantown facility, filed a grievance
challenging her termination. (Nelson Decl. ¶10.) Although the Union
eventually withdrew that grievance, its initial purpose was to seek
Plaintiff’s reinstatement to her bargaining unit position at MPI’s
Morgantown facility. (Nelson Decl. ¶10, Ex. B.)
Id. at 2.
Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or Transfer for Improper
Venue (ECF No. 7) does not dispute these operative facts about her place of employment and
2
place where relevant employment records are kept as being the MPI facility in Morgantown,
West Virginia. Therefore, the Court will accept those operative facts for purposes of deciding the
pending motion.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) permits the filing of motions to dismiss for
improper venue. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), “[t]he district court of a district in which is
filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district, shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest
of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it should have been brought.” 28
U.S.C. § 1406(a). Title VII contains a provision strictly limiting venue for civil rights actions:
[A Title VII] action may be brought in any judicial district in the State in
which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been
committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records
relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or in the
judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for
the alleged unlawful employment practice, but if the respondent is not
found within any such district, such an action may be brought within the
judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(3).
By this venue provision, Congress “intended to limit venue to the judicial districts
concerned with the alleged discrimination.” Kravitz v. Inst. for Intern. Research, Inc., 1993 WL
453457, *2 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Stebbins v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., Co., 413 F.2d 1100, 1102
(D.C.Cir. 1969) (“the intent of Congress to limit venue to the judicial district concerned with the
alleged discrimination seems clear”). The Title VII venue provisions are exclusive. Id. (citing
Thurmon v. Martin Marietta Data Sys., 596 F.Supp. 367, 368 (M.D.Pa. 1984). See also Johnson
v. Payless Drug Stores Nw., Inc., 950 F.2d 586, 587–88 (9th Cir. 1991) (Title VII's specific venue
provision supercedes the general venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391).
3
Pennsylvania is Plaintiff’s state of citizenship and, she alleges, defendants are
Pennsylvania corporations “with registered offices” in Pennsylvania, although defendants
counter that “MPI is a West Virginia corporation with its principal place of business located at
781 Chestnut Ridge Road, Morgantown, West Virginia.” Regardless of defendants’ state of
incorporation or citizenship, however, it is undisputed that Ms. Giamp worked at MPI’s West
Virginia facility, the relevant employment records are maintained at MPI’s West Virginia
facility, and Plaintiff sought reinstatement to her former position, which is at MPI’s West
Virginia facility. Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), therefore, venue properly lies in the Northern
District of West Virginia, and not in Pennsylvania.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), this Court will grant defendants’ motion to transfer
venue to the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia.1 A separate
Order of Court shall be issued.
By the Court:
s/Cythia Reed Eddy
Cynthia Reed Eddy
United States Magistrate Judge
cc: all counsel registered on ECF
1
Because motions to transfer, unlike motions to dismiss, are not listed as dispositive in Local Rule
71.1.4, a Magistrate Judge may rule on such motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). See, e.g.
Silong v. United States, 2006 WL 948048, at *1 n.1 (M.D. Fla. 2006). See also In re U.S. Healthcare, 159
F.3d 142, 145 (3d Cir. 1998) (a dispostive order is one that “terminates the matter in the federal court”).
This is true “because [the ruling] can only result in the transfer of a case to another federal district, not in
a decision on the merits or even a determination of federal jurisdiction.” Adams v. Key Tronic Corp., 1997
WL 1864, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (collecting cases). See also Holley v. Robinson, 2010 WL 1837797, *2
(M.D.Pa. 2010) (since “order transferring a case is not a dispositive final order in that case, this proposed
transfer is a matter which lies within the authority of either the district court, or this [magistrate] court.”);
Berg v. Aetna Freight Lines, 2008 WL 2779294, at *1 (W.D.Pa. 2008) (“A motion to transfer venue
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) involves a non-dispositive pretrial matter which a magistrate judge may
determine pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).” (collecting cases)). Where an appeal is taken from a
Magistrate Judge’s ruling on a nondispositive motion the “clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard
of review applies. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (stating standard of review for nondispositive matters);
Fed. R. Civ, P. 72(a) (same); Local Rule 72.1.3(B) (same).
4
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?