Haddix v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
18
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION. The Court adopts the 16 Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, Grants the Defendant's 14 Motion for Summary; denies the Plaintiff's 12 Motion for Summary Judgment and dismisses this civil action, with prejudice and orders that it be retired from the docket of this Court. The Clerk is further directed to enter a separate judgment order in this matter. Signed by District Judge Irene M. Keeley on 3/17/15. (mh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
JAIME L. HADDIX,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:14CV12
(Judge Keeley)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B), Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b),
and L.R. Civ. P. 4.01(d), the Court referred this Social Security
action to United States Magistrate John S. Kaull (“Magistrate John
S. Kaull” or “magistrate judge”) with directions to submit proposed
findings of fact and a recommendation for disposition.
When
Magistrate
Judge
Kaull
filed
his
Report
and
Recommendation (“R&R”), he directed the parties, in accordance with
28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1) and Rule 6(e), Fed. R. Civ. P., to file any
written objections with the Clerk of Court within fourteen (14)
days after being served with a copy of the R&R. (Dkt. No. 16.)
Thereafter, the plaintiff, Jaime L. Haddix (“Haddix”), by her
counsel, Michael G. Miskowiec, filed timely objections to the R&R.
(Dkt. No. 17.)
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I.
On
December
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
4,
20101,
Haddix
filed
applications
for
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) and Disability Insurance
Benefits (“DIB”), alleging disability since June 1, 2009, due to
“bipolar, social anxiety, general anxiety, psychosocial.” (R. 16474. 195.) The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) later granted
Haddix’s motion and amended her onset date to March 31, 2009. (R.
190.)
Following
denial
of
her
applications
initially
and
on
reconsideration (R. 93-102, 108-21), at Haddix’s request, the ALJ
held a hearing on August 12, 2012, at which Haddix, represented by
counsel, and with her husband, appeared and testified. An impartial
vocational expert (“VE”) also testified. (R. 41-88.)
On September 26, 2012, the ALJ determined that Haddix was not
disabled. (R. 11-23.) Following that determination, Haddix filed a
request for review by the Appeals Council (R. 261), which denied
her request on December 3, 2013, thereby making the ALJ’s decision
the final decision of the Commissioner. (R. 1-7.) On January 17,
2014, Haddix timely filed this civil action seeking review of that
final decision. (Dkt. No. 1.)
1
The application date noted in the R&R is December 14, 2010.
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II.
PLAINTIFF'S BACKGROUND
On August 12, 2012, the date of the administrative hearing,
Haddix
was
thirty-four
(34)
years
old
(R.
22,
43),
and
is
considered a younger individual, age 18-49. (R. 22.) She completed
the tenth (10th) grade and can read and write in English. (R. 46.)
Her past relevant work history includes employment as a cashier and
telemarketer. (R. 196.)
III.
Utilizing
prescribed
in
ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS
the
five-step
sequential
the
Commissioner’s
evaluation
regulations
at
20
process
C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520, the ALJ found:
1.
Haddix has met the insured status requirements of the
Social Security Act through March 31, 2009;
2.
Haddix has not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since March 31, 2009, the alleged onset date, (20 CFR
404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.);
3.
Haddix has the following severe impairments: bipolar I
disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and posttraumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and
416.920(c));
4.
Haddix’s impairments or combination of impairments do not
meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments in
20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR
404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and
416.926) (R. 32);
5.
After careful consideration of the entire record, Haddix
has the residual functional capacity to perform a full
range of work at all exertional levels with the following
nonexertional limitations: work must involve only simple
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routine and repetitive tasks, cannot perform at a
production rate pace but can perform goal oriented work,
cannot have more than occasional interaction with
supervisors and co-workers, cannot have any interaction
with the public, and can have only occasional changes in
the workplace;
6.
Haddix is unable to perform any past relevant work (20
CFR 404.1565 and 416.965);
7.
Haddix was born on March 7, 1978, and, on the alleged
disability onset date, was 31 years old, which is defined
as a younger individual age 18-49,(20 CFR 404.1563 and
416.963);
8.
Haddix has a limited education and is able to communicate
in English (20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964);
9.
Transferability of job skills is not material to the
determination of disability because using the MedicalVocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that
Haddix is “not disabled,” whether or not the claimant has
transferable job skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part
404, Subpart P, Appendix 2);
10.
Considering her age, education, work experience, and
residual functional capacity, jobs exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that Haddix can perform
(20 CFR 404.1569, 404.1569(a), 416.969, and 416.969(a));
and
11.
Haddix has not been under a disability, as defined in the
Social Security Act, from March 31, 2009, through the
date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g) and
416.920(g)).
(R. at 11-23.)
IV.
MEDICAL EVIDENCE
The Court incorporates the magistrate judge’s extensive review
of both the medical and non medical evidence in the R&R (dkt. no.
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16 at 2-12), as well as his review of the testimonial evidence.
(Dkt. No. 16 at 12-5.) The Court also incorporates the magistrate
judge’s review of the VE testimony. (Dkt. No. 16 at 15-6).
V. SCOPE OF REVIEW
In reviewing an administrative finding of no disability, a
district court’s scope of review is limited to determining only
whether “the findings of the Secretary are supported by substantial
evidence
and
whether
the
correct
law
was
applied.”
Hays
v.
Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990.) Prior to Hays, the
Fourth Circuit had recognized the specific and narrow scope of
judicial review in social security disability cases. “We do not
conduct a de novo review of the evidence, and the Secretary’s
finding of non-disability is to be upheld, even if the court
disagrees, so long as it is supported by substantial evidence.”
Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir.1986.)
The Supreme Court of the United States has defined substantial
evidence as “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept to support a conclusion.’” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S.
197, 229 (1938).) And, in Hays, the Fourth Circuit observed that
substantial evidence “‘consists of more than a mere scintilla of
evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance. If there is
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evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case
before a jury, then there is ‘substantial evidence.’” 907 F.2d at
1456 (quoting Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir.
1968).) A
reviewing court must also consider whether the ALJ
applied the proper standard of law. “A factual finding by the ALJ
is not binding if it was reached by means of an improper standard
or misapplication of the law.” Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517
(4th Cir. 1987).
Furthermore, a district court is obligated to conduct a de
novo review of those portions of a magistrate judge’s R&R to which
objections have been filed. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C.) It need not
conduct a de novo review when a party makes only “general and
conclusory objections that do not direct the court to a specific
error in the magistrate’s proposed findings and recommendations.”
Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982.) In the absence
of a specific objection, the Court will only review the magistrate
judge’s conclusions for clear error. Diamond v. Colonial Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005.) A failure to
file specific objections waives appellate review of both factual
and legal questions. See United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94
& n.4 (4th Cir. 1984); see also Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d
656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
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Here, Haddix’s objections to the findings in the R&R regard
the ALJ’s credibility determination, and particularly the lack of
weight he assigned to the report of Haddix’s therapist at United
Summit Center, Sandra K. Jones. At bottom, these objections simply
reiterate the same arguments Haddix raised on summary judgment.
There, she asserted:
The Administrative Law Judge’s findings that the
testimony of Mrs. Haddix and her husband concerning her
mental limitations was not credible is based on an
inaccurate and selective consideration of the evidence
and is not supported by substantial evidence.
(Dkt. No. 13 at 1.)
Haddix has also objected to the magistrate judge’s conclusion
that the ALJ’s rejection of the opinion of Ms. Jones was harmless
error. She asserts that a court cannot apply harmless error
analysis where “the limitations in Ms. Jones’ opinion were not
included
in
the
Administrative
Law
Judge’s
mental
residual
functional capacity finding.” (Docket No. 17 at 1-4.)
Haddix has further objected to the R&R on the basis that it
adopted
the
ALJ’s
finding
that
her
testimony
regarding
her
symptoms, particularly about medication-induced drowsiness, was not
credible. Id. Again, Haddix has reargued the ALJ’s determination
that her testimony and that of her husband were not credible,
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asserting it “is based on an inaccurate and selective consideration
of the evidence and is not supported by substantial evidence”.
The general rule is that objections to a magistrate judge’s
R&R that merely reiterate arguments already presented “lack the
specificity required by Rule 72 and have the same effect as a
failure to object.” Phillips v. Astrue, No. 6:10–53, 2011 WL
5086851, at *2 (W.D. Va. Oct. 25, 2011) (citing Veney v. Astrue,
539 F.Supp.2d 841, 845 (W.D. Va. 2008.) Nevertheless, out of
consideration to Haddix’s contentions, the Court has undertaken a
de novo review of all the matters considered by the magistrate
judge, and, for the reasons that follow, concludes not only that
there is no clear error, but also that there is substantial
evidence in the record to support the weight the ALJ assigned to
the report of Sandra K. Jones, and also the ALJ’s credibility
determination.
VI. OBJECTIONS
A.
Haddix’s Objections
Haddix contends that the magistrate judge erred in concluding
that the ALJ’s rejection of her therapist’s opinion was harmless
error. She argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of
Ms. Jones by failing to refer to any evidence or consider any of
the factors outlined in the Commissioner’s regulations, and by
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failing to consider that Haddix’s treating physician, Dr. Paul
Davis, concurred with Jones’ opinion. (Dkt. No. 17 at 1.)
Haddix also objects to the magistrate judge’s adoption of the
ALJ’s credibility finding. She contends that the magistrate judge
overlooked important errors in the ALJ’s decision. Specifically,
she references his finding that no substantial evidence in the
record supported her contention that her medications made her
sleepy or drowsy. She also objects that the magistrate judge did
not credit her husband’s supportive testimony, or her own testimony
regarding the daily assistance her mother-in-law and sister-in-law
provided. (Dkt. No. 17.)
VII.
DISCUSSION
A. Opinion of Sandra K. Jones
The magistrate judge determined that, although the ALJ had not
adequately set forth his reasons for rejecting the opinion of
Haddix’s therapist, Sandra K. Jones, that omission was harmless
error. (R&R at 38.)
It is significant to note that Social Security Ruling (“SSR”)
06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939 (Aug. 9, 2006), provides that a therapist,
while a “medical source,” is not an “acceptable medical source.”
Id. at *2.
SSR 06-03p states:
The distinction between “acceptable medical sources” and
other health care providers who are not “acceptable
medical sources” is necessary for three reasons. First,
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we need evidence from “acceptable medical sources” to
establish the existence of a medically determinable
impairment. . . .
Second, only “acceptable medical
sources” can give us medical opinions. . . . Third, only
“acceptable medical sources” can be considered treating
sources . . . whose medical opinions may be entitled to
controlling weight.
Id.
It further notes that:
With the growth of managed health care in recent years
and the emphasis on containing medical costs, medical
sources who are not “acceptable medical sources,” such as
nurse practitioners, physician assistants, and licensed
clinical social workers, have increasingly assumed a
greater percentage of the treatment and evaluation
functions previously handled primarily by physicians and
psychologists. Opinions from these medical sources, who
are not technically deemed “acceptable medical sources”
under our rules, are important and should be evaluated on
key issues such as impairment severity and functional
effects, along with the other relevant evidence in the
file.
Id. at *3.
Information from “other sources,” such as therapists,
“may be based on special knowledge of the individual and may
provide insight into the severity of the impairment(s) and how it
affects the individual’s ability to function.”
Id. at *2.
In Gordon v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 1984), the
Fourth Circuit stated that a court “cannot determine if findings
are
supported
by
substantial
evidence
unless
the
Secretary
explicitly indicates the weight given to all of the relevant
evidence.”
Furthermore, “[u]nless the Secretary has analyzed all
evidence and has sufficiently explained the weight he has given to
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obviously probative exhibits, to say that his decision is supported
by substantial evidence approaches an abdication of the court’s
‘duty to scrutinize the record as a whole to determine whether the
conclusions reached are rational.’” Arnold v. Sec’y of Health, Ed.
& Welfare, 567 F.2d 258, 259 (4th Cir. 1977.)
Title 20, Part 404, Section 1527(d) of the Code of Federal
Regulations provides that, “unless controlling weight is assigned
to a treating source’s medical opinion,” an ALJ must consider
certain factors when deciding the weight to be assigned to any
medical opinion. These include (1) the examining relationship, (2)
the treatment relationship, (3) supportability, (4) consistency,
(5) specialization, and (6) any other factors that tend to support
or contradict the opinion.
20 C.F.R. § 1527(d.)
Although an ALJ must consider these factors when weighing the
evidence, he is not under a mandate to conduct a factor-by-factor
analysis. Pinson v. McMahon, 3:07-1056, 2009 WL 763553, at *10
(D.S.C. Mar. 19, 2009.) He need only be “sufficiently specific to
make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight he gave to the
treating source’s medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.”
20 C.F.R. § 1527(d)(2); and SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *5 (July
2, 1996.) “[W]hen a physician offers specific restrictions or
limitations . . . the ALJ must provide reasons for accepting or
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rejecting such opinions.”
Trimmer v. Astrue, No. 3:10CV639, 2011
WL 4589998, at *4 (E.D. Va. Sept. 27, 2011), aff’d by 2011 WL
4574365 (E.D. VA. Sept. 30, 2011.) Thus, a logical nexus must exist
between the weight accorded to opinion evidence and the record, and
the
reasons
for
assigning
such
weight
must
be
“sufficiently
articulated to permit meaningful judicial review.”
DeLoatch, 715
F.2d at 150.
Here, regarding the weight he assigned to Sandra K. Jones’
opinion, the ALJ stated only:
This opinion has been considered but given little weight.
The residual functional capacity includes limitations
concerning interactions with others and a limitation to
unskilled work with routine and repetitive tasks. These
limitations are consistent with the document [sic] mental
symptoms and limitations and jobs were still found.
(R. at 18.)
Even though the magistrate judge determined that the ALJ had
failed to explain sufficiently why he assigned little weight to
Jones’ opinion, he further determined such inadequacy was harmless
error.
Cf. Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 190 n.8 (4th Cir.
2004) (“While the general rule is that an administrative order
cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which the agency acted in
exercising its powers were those upon which its action can be
sustained, reversal is not required where the alleged error clearly
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had no bearing on the procedure used or the substance of the
decision reached.” (internal quotation marks omitted).)
In
her
opinion,
Jones
concluded
that
Haddix’s
“symptoms
consistently impaired her ability to function in a “work setting
where she would need to interact with people or be able to
concentrate.” (R. at 493.) In his R&R, the magistrate judge noted
that the ALJ’s residual functional capacity finding contained the
following limitations: that Haddix’s work must involve only simple
routine
and
repetitive
tasks;
that
she
cannot
perform
at
a
production rate pace but can perform goal oriented work; that her
work
must
entail
no
more
than
occasional
interaction
with
supervisors and co-workers; and that she should have no interaction
with the public, with only occasional changes in the workplace. (R.
at 15-16.)
Based on these findings, the magistrate judge determined that
the
ALJ,
in
fact,
had
incorporated
Jones’
opinion
into
his
analysis, and that his failure to explicitly explain why he
assigned little weight to her opinion therefore was harmless error.
(“[A]n ALJ’s failure to expressly state the weight given to a
medical opinion may be harmless error, when the opinion is not
relevant to the disability determination or when it is consistent
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with
the
ALJ’s
RFC
determination.”)
Rivera
v.
Colvin,
No.
5:11CV569-fl, 2013 WL 2433515, at *3 (E.D.M.C. June 4, 2013).
Here,
the
magistrate
judge
determined
that
the
ALJ
had
followed the regulations governing the treatment of medical opinion
evidence. Although the ALJ failed to sufficiently explain why he
had assigned little weight to Jones’ opinion, he included the
limitations contained in Jones’ opinions in his RFC determination.
Accordingly, the magistrate judge’s conclusion that substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s treatment of the opinion evidence is
correct. (R&R at 39.)
B.
Credibility Analysis
The Fourth Circuit has held that “[b]ecause he had the
opportunity
to
observe
the
demeanor
and
to
determine
the
credibility of the claimant, an ALJ’s observations concerning these
questions are to be given great weight.”
Shively v. Heckler, 739
F.2d 987, 989 (4th Cir. 1984) (citing Tyler v. Weinberger, 409 F.
Supp. 776 (E.D. Va. 1976).) In Ryan v. Astrue, No. 5:09CV55, 2011
WL 541125, at *3 (N.D. W. Va. Feb. 8, 2011) (Stamp, J.), the
district court found that “[a]n ALJ’s credibility determinations
are ‘virtually unreviewable.’”
When making a credibility determination, however, an ALJ has
a “‘duty of explanation’” regarding a claimant’s testimony. See
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Smith v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1176, 1181 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing
DeLoatche v. Heckler, 715 F.2d 148, 150-51 (4th Cir. 1983)); see
also Hammond v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 424, 426 (4th Cir. 1985.) If the
ALJ meets his basic duty of explanation, “[w]e will reverse an
ALJ’s credibility determination only if the claimant can show it
was ‘patently wrong.’” Sencindiver v. Astrue, No. 3:08-CV-178, 2010
WL 446174, at *33 (N.D. W. Va. Feb. 3, 2010 (Seibert, Mag. J.)
(quoting Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 435 (7th Cir. 2000).)
Here,
complaint
the
of
ALJ
pain
initially
under
the
evaluated
two-prong
Haddix’s
test
for
subjective
credibility
established in the seminal case of Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585
(4th Cir. 1996). The first prong of Craig requires an ALJ to
determine whether the objective evidence of record establishes the
existence of a medical impairment or impairments resulting from
anatomical, physiological or psychological abnormalities that could
reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptom
alleged. Id. at 594. Under the second prong, an ALJ must “expressly
consider” whether a claimant has such an impairment. Id. at 596. If
a claimant satisfies these two prongs, an ALJ then must evaluate
the “intensity and persistence of the claimant’s pain, and the
extent to which it affects her ability to work.” Id. at 595.
This evaluation must consider
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not only the claimant’s statements about her pain, but
also ‘all the available evidence,’ including the
claimant’s medical history, medical signs, and laboratory
findings . . . and any other evidence relevant to the
severity of the impairment, such as evidence of the
claimant’s daily activities, specific descriptions of the
pain, and any medical treatment taken to alleviate it.
Id.
Although the ALJ determined that Haddix had satisfied the two
prongs of Craig, he nevertheless concluded that her testimony
concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects her
symptoms was not entirely credible. (R. 16.) An ALJ “will not
reject
[a
claimant’s]
statements
about
the
intensity
and
persistence of . . . pain or other symptoms or about the effect
[those] symptoms have on your ability to work . . . solely because
the available objective medical evidence does not substantiate your
statements.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(2) (alterations in original.)
Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-7p provides an expansive
list of factors an ALJ may rely on when assessing the credibility
of an individual’s subjective allegations of pain. These factors
include the individual’s daily activities, the location, duration,
frequency,
and
intensity
of
the
individual’s
pain
or
other
symptoms, any factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms,
the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication
the individual takes or has taken to alleviate pain or other
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symptoms, any treatment or other than medication, the individual
receives or has received for relief of pain or other symptoms, any
measures other than treatment the individual uses or has used to
relieve pain or other symptoms, and, any other factors concerning
the individual’s functional limitations and restrictions due to
pain or other symptoms. SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *3 (July 2,
1996.)
An ALJ’s decision, however, “must contain specific enough
reasons for the finding on credibility, supported by the evidence
in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear
to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the
adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements and the reason for
that weight.”
Id. at *2. Here, the ALJ found as follows:
After careful consideration of the evidence, the
undersigned
finds
that
the
claimant’s
medically
determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to
cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s
statements concerning the intensity, persistence and
limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to
the extent they are inconsistent with the above residual
functional capacity assessment.
(R. at 16.)
Regarding Haddix’s daily activities, the ALJ stated:
The claimant testified that she stayed home to take care
of her children after she was fired from a telemarketing
job. She also testified that she lives in her home with
her husband and two children who are now six years old
and nine years old. She stated that in addition to caring
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for the children themselves, they also receive weekly
[sic] from two relatives. Both the claimant and her
husband testified that the claimant is heavily dependent
on her husband for activities of daily living. They both
also testified that they depend on the husband’s
disability pay for their support. Mr. Haddix testified
that he is disabled due to bad back problems and
fibromyalgia. The undersigned has a difficult time
understanding how Mr. Haddix, who is disabled due [sic]
his back and fibromyalgia would be able to deliver such
a complete and comprehensive level of care to the
claimant as she and her husband report. These allegations
distract greatly from the credibility of both the
claimant and her husband. It is noted also that the
claimant has very few years in the work force, even
before her alleged onset date and during the period that
she reported she was doing well without being on
medications[.] (Exhibit 1F)
(R. at 17.)
He also considered the location, duration, frequency, and
intensity of Haddix’s symptoms, and her functional limitations and
restrictions:
The claimant is not entirely credible as to the nature
and extent of her symptoms and limitations. The evidence
of record does not reflect that she is as impaired as she
alleges. Her objective mental status reports consistently
identify her as cooperative, providing good history
information, good eye contact. Her treating source who is
[sic] primary care physician, notes that the claimant has
normal mental status across time[.]
. . .
Records also show that after her arrest for domestic
violence, the claimant was able to successfully complete
an anger management program during the time frame in
which she alleges that she was disabled. It is also noted
throughout the record that the claimant, during mental
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status examinations is shown to have an appropriate
mental status. (Exhibits 1F, and 15F)
(R. at 16-17.)
Haddix contends that the ALJ failed to consider her difficulty
with extreme drowsiness brought on by her medications. In support
of this argument, she relies on the following statements in her
disability reports:
1.
The March 9, 2011 report that she was falling asleep “a
lot” because of her medication. (R. at 218.); and
2.
An undated report that her medications made her drowsy,
very tired, and sleepy.
(R. at 243.)
At the hearing, Haddix testified that she takes her medication
at 9:00 A.M., becomes “sleepy” within fifteen or twenty minutes,
and remains sleepy for the next five or six hours. She further
testified that her medication made her feel “tired and wore out”
and like a “truck ran over” her. (R. at 58.)
The evidence of record establishes the following:
1.
On August 27, 2009, after Haddix complained to Paul Davis
(“Davis”), her primary care provider, that she had been feeling
“sleepy all day” he discontinued her prescription for Trazodone (R.
at 318);
2.
On October 8, 2009, Haddix complained to Davis that she
not sleeping well and asked about resuming Trazodone. He assessed
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insomnia
and
bipolar
disorder,
represcribed
continued her prescription for lithium
3.
Trazodone,
and
(Id.);
On June 4, 2010, Haddix indicated to Brian Hawk (“Hawk”),
BS/PDCC at United Summit Center (“USC”) that the Xanax helped her
anxiety, and that her other medications were “efficient” (R. at
281);
4.
On April 24, 2012, Haddix indicated to Ashley Coontz
(“Coontz”), PS/PD/CC at USC, that she was experiencing “a loss of
sleep” (R. at 488);
5.
On July 5, 2012, Haddix reported to Jones at USC that she
had “poor sleep” (R. at 505-06); and
6.
On July 3, 2012, Haddix reported to Davis that she was
“doing well” on her present medications but was “still having
trouble sleeping” (R. at 525.)
“Drowsiness often accompanies the taking of medication, and it
should not be viewed as disabling unless the record references
serious functional limitations.” Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650,
658 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 131
(3d Cir. 2002).
In connection with his credibility assessment, the ALJ also
considered the following medical evidence that he concluded was
inconsistent with Haddix’s subjective complaints:
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1.
A July 2, 2009, initial evaluation at USC by Ms. Metheny,
indicating Haddix had had a fight with her sister-in-law, and had
not taken the medications that control her mood (R. at 265.) Ms.
Metheny noted that Haddix was oriented as to “person, place, time
and situation” and was cooperative (R. at 266.) She assigned Haddix
a GAF of 55 and assessed bipolar disorder (R. at 268);
2.
A
July
30,
2009,
psychiatric
evaluation
by
Nurse
Practitioner (NP) McPherson at USC indicating Haddix had been doing
“a lot better” since being prescribed lithium, Restoril, Risperdal,
and Xanax. (R. at 283.)
NP McPherson noted that Haddix was
oriented and cooperative, had good eye contact. She assigned Haddix
a GAF score of 50, increased the dosage of Risperdal, and continued
her prescriptions for lithium and Xanax (R. at 284);
3.
A December 8, 2009, review assessment by Ms. Bates,
BS/CM/PO of USC, indicating Haddix had denied acting violently, had
denied
any
suicidal
appropriately.”
thoughts,
and
was
dressed
“neatly
and
Ms. Bates noted that Haddix was “in good spirits”
and was oriented to all four spheres, had “goal directed and
logical” speech, and denied any psychosis (R. at 285-92);
4.
A May 7, 2010, assessment from Vickie Ashcraft indicating
Haddix had been admitted to the Crisis Stabilization Unit at USC
“due to the prospect of being homeless and away from her husband
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and children as a result of domestic violence charges in June
2009.” (R. at 302.) Ms. Ashcraft noted that Haddix was oriented in
all four spheres, had a dysphoric mood and congruent affect, was
appropriately groomed, and that, even though Haddix had racing
thoughts,
the
thought
processes
“appeared
logical
and
goal
oriented.” Haddix denied “obsessions, compulsions, hallucinations,
delusions, homicidal, or suicidal ideations”
(R. at 303-04.)
She
was discharged from the Crisis Stabilization Unit on May 9, 2010
(R. at 312);
5.
On June 4, 2010, Hawk performed a one-year review of
Haddix, indicated that she was taking Xanax for anxiety and that
her medications were keeping her stable. He noted that she was
oriented in all spheres, was cooperative, had an anxious mood and
congruent affect (R. at 274-82);
6.
On
January
11,
2011,
Hawk
again
reviewed
Haddix’s
situation and noted she was oriented in all four spheres, was
cooperative,
had
an
anxious
mood
and
affect,
but
denied
hallucinations and delusions (R. at 269-71);
7.
On June 6, 2011, a staff member at USC completed a
Routine Abstract Form–Mental and noted that Haddix was fully
oriented, had rambling speech and paranoid delusions, had
mildly
deficient judgment and insight, an anxious mood, appeared “fidgety”
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(R. at 388), and had moderately deficient social functioning and
pace (R. at 389.) The diagnosis was bipolar disorder and a GAF
score of 55 (R. at 390);
8.
she
On April 24, 2012, Coontz at USC assessed Haddix, noting
was
oriented
as
to
all
spheres,
was
“cooperative
and
informative,” (R. at 490), was “obviously nervous and anxious, and
shook her leg throughout the entire assessment” (Id.) Coontz
diagnosed bipolar I disorder, most recent episode manic severe
without psychotic features, generalized anxiety disorder, and
posttraumatic stress disorder (R. at 491.)Her “low end treatment
included: individual therapy, care coordination, re-assessments
every 180 days or at critical juncture, medication management, and
utilization of crisis services if needed” (Id.); and
9.
A July 5, 2012 assessment from Jones at USC noting that
Haddix was oriented as to all spheres, maintained “adequate eye
contact,” and denied experiencing hallucinations and delusions. (R.
at 506-07.) Jones diagnosed bipolar I disorder, generalized anxiety
disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder. (R. at 507.) Treatment
included individual therapy every two weeks and pharmacological
management as scheduled. (Id.)
In his assessment of Haddix’s credibility, and based on the
medical evidence of record, the magistrate judge determined that
23
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the ALJ had complied with the factors set out in Craig and SSR 967p. The ALJ discussed Haddix’s daily activities, and the nature and
extent of her symptoms and limitations. While Haddix complains that
the ALJ erred by not considering extreme sleepiness as a side
effect of her medications, Haddix never succeeded in establishing
that her alleged extreme sleepiness resulted in “serious functional
limitations.” Burns, 312 F.3d at 131. Furthermore, as noted above,
the medical evidence that the ALJ did thoroughly discuss does not
support Haddix’s subjective complaints. Accordingly, the Court
adopts the magistrate judge’s recommendation that substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s credibility determination.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In her objections, Haddix has not raised any issues that were
not thoroughly considered by Magistrate Judge Kaull in his R&R.
Moreover, the Court, upon an independent de novo consideration of
all
matters
accurately
now
before
reflects
the
it,
is
law
of
the
opinion
applicable
to
that
the
the
facts
R&R
and
circumstances in this action. Therefore, the Court ACCEPTS the R&R
in whole, and ORDERS that this civil action be disposed of in
accordance
with
the
recommendation
Accordingly, it
24
of
the
Magistrate
Judge.
HADDIX V. COMM’R SOCIAL SECURITY
1:14CV12
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
1.
GRANTS the defendant's motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt.
No. 14);
2.
DENIES the plaintiff's motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt.
No. 12); and
3.
DISMISSES this civil action WITH PREJUDICE; and
4.
ORDERS that it be RETIRED from the docket of this Court.
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 58, the Court directs the Clerk of
Court to enter a separate judgment order and to transmit copies of
both Orders to counsel of record.
DATED: March 17, 2015.
/s/ Irene M. Keeley
IRENE M. KEELEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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