Myers v. Taylor et al
Filing
115
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT: It is ORDERED that Defendants' 79 Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED on ALL COUNTS of Plaintiff's Complaint as to Troope rs Horne, Taylor, Tomblyn, and Waggamon, and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE thos Defendants from this case; Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Count 1 of Plaintiff's Complaint as to Trooper Saurino is GRANTED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Count 2 of Plaintiff's Complaint as to Troopers Huffman and Saurino is GRANTED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by District Judge Irene M. Keeley on 12/4/15. (cnd)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
JILL D. MYERS, as executrix of the
Estate of ELTON C. WINE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:14CV156
(Judge Keeley)
A.S. TAYLOR, individually; M.S. HORNE,
individually; J.C. SAURINO, individually;
J. TOMBLYN, individually; S.B. HUFFMAN,
individually; and M.E. WAGGAMON, individually,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM ORDER AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 79]
I. INTRODUCTION
Pending before the Court is the defendants’ motion in which
they seek summary judgment on all counts of the plaintiff’s
complaint against them. For the reasons that follow, the Court
GRANTS in PART AND DENIES in PART the motion.
II. BACKGROUND
This case arises from events surrounding the execution of a
search warrant at the home of Elton Wine (“Wine”) that ultimately
ended with Wine’s death. As it must, the Court construes the facts
in the light most favorable to Myers, the non-movant. See Ussery v.
Manfield, 786 F.3d 332, 333 (4th Cir. 2015).
MYERS v. TAYLOR, ET AL.
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PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 79]
A.
Factual Background
Although the story of this case ends with the death of Wine,
it begins with a search for another man, John Bowman (“Bowman”). On
September 13, 2012, West Virginia State Police Troopers (the “State
police” or “troopers”) executed a search warrant on Bowman’s
property in Marion County, West Virginia (dkt. no. 62 at 2-3),
during which they discovered a large marijuana growing operation,
including hundreds of live plants, pounds of harvested marijuana
ready for sale, and other drug paraphernalia. (Dkt. No. 84-3 at 2).
Bowman was well known to law enforcement authorities, having
a long history of violence and criminal arrests. (Dkt. No. 84-3 at
4-5). Previously, he had been arrested for, among other things,
multiple malicious assaults, malicious woundings, batteries and
domestic batteries, assaults, and also obstruction of a police
officer. Id. Bowman also had served time for kidnapping a woman
with whom he was having an affair. Id. at 5. Moreover, troopers
were aware of rumors that, although never charged, Bowman allegedly
may have been involved in the bombing of a local sheriff, for which
his brother later was convicted. (Dkt. No. 86 at 5; Dkt. No. 84-3
at 6). Furthermore, Bowman had been previously convicted as a felon
in possession of a firearm. (Dkt. No. 86 at 5). During the search
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of Bowman’s property, troopers found live and spent ammunition, but
no firearms, something that led them to believe he might have taken
firearms with him. Id.
Based on what they discovered at his property, police obtained
an arrest arrant for Bowman, and several officers began the task of
locating him. (Dkt. No. 62 at 3). During their investigation,
police learned from a neighbor that Bowman might be hiding out in
Doddridge County, West Virginia, at the property of his long-time
friend, Wine. Id. Consequently, Trooper Mark Waggamon (“Waggamon”)
was tasked with securing a search warrant for Wine’s property.
(Dkt. No. 86 at 2). Following up further their lead from Bowman’s
neighbor, police spoke with the Doddridge County Magistrate Court,
which informed them that Wine had previously bonded out Bowman and
that the two men were friends. (Dkt. No. 62 at 3).
Meanwhile, troopers spoke with Bowman’s former wife, Patty
Fetty (”Fetty”), and informed Waggamon that Fetty told them she had
listened in on a phone call between one, or both, of Bowman’s sons
with Wine, during which she overheard Bowman in the background.
Id.; Dkt. No. 86 at 2. Fetty denies that she positively identified
Bowman, claiming she only heard “someone” talking that she assumed
was Bowman. (Dkt. No. 86 at 3).
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With this information, Waggamon completed a search warrant
affidavit and presented it to the Doddridge County Magistrate. Id.
at 4-5. Waggamon was familiar with the Magistrate because the two
had previously worked together and drove the affidavit to her home,
where she signed it in her kitchen. Id.
Notably, Waggamon’s
affidavit did not seek a “no-knock” warrant, nor did it mention any
particularized danger the troopers might confront, or the need for
a “Special Response Team”1 (“SRT”) to execute the warrant. Id.
The Troopers relayed the information to SRT leader, Sergeant
J.C. Saurino (“Saurino”), who gathered his team. (Dkt. No. 84-3 at
8). The team consisted of Trooper J. Tomblyn (“Tomblyn”), Trooper
First Class A. S. Tayor (“Taylor”), Trooper First Class M. S. Horne
(“Horne”), and Sergeant S. B. Huffman (“Huffman”), among others.
(Dkt. No. 84-3 at 6). Waggamon followed the SRT to Wine’s residence
and parked approximately half a mile down the road while the SRT
proceeded to the home. (Dkt. No. 86 at 6).
The SRT stealthily approached the front of the residence.
(Dkt. No. 84-3 at 9; Dkt. No. 86 at 7-8). Based on Huffman’s
1
There are several regional Special Response Teams within the
West Virginia State Police, which are used in potentially
dangerous situations, including high-risk arrests and search
warrants (Dkt. No. 84-3 at 4). SRT members have advanced special
weapons and tactics training. Id.
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judgment, they proceeded on a no-knock entry; Taylor, who was
carrying the necessary device, breached the front door of the home,
after which the troopers announced themselves. (Dkt. No. 84-3 at 910; Dkt. No. 86 at 8). Huffman was the first to enter, immediately
encountering Wine sitting on the couch in the living room holding
a television remote control. (Dkt. No. 86 at 8).
Huffman was aware that Wine was not Bowman, but continued to
point his rifle at him in order to maintain security while other
troopers searched the home. (Dkt. No. 86 at 8). Huffman, who did
not know who Wine was, considered him a direct threat and ordered
him to place his hands on his head. (Dkt. No. 86 at 8). Initially,
Wine complied. (Dkt. No. 86 at 8).
Shortly thereafter, however, another SRT member announced that
the troopers intended to breach a locked interior door. (Dkt. No.
86 at 9). When he heard that, Wine attempted to get up off the
couch and go towards them while stating something about the door.
(Dkt. No. 86 at 9). To prevent Wine from getting up and proceeding
towards the other troopers, Huffman claims he pushed aside Wine’s
coffee table, which caused a glass to fall onto the floor and
shatter. (Dkt. No. 86 at 9; Dkt. No. 84-3 at 11). Huffman grabbed
Wine by the shoulder and forced him back down onto the couch, at
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which point, according to Huffman, Wine grabbed the front of his
rifle. (Dkt. No. 86 at 9). Wine then said “get the F off me,” to
which Huffman responded, “as soon as you let go of my rifle” (Dkt.
No. at 9). Wine let go of the rifle and the two men separated.
(Dkt. No. 8 at 9).
Wine repeatedly asked “what this was about,” and denied
knowledge of Bowman’s whereabouts. (Dkt. No. 86 at 9). At this
point, Huffman was concerned that Wine might possibly access a
weapon and decided to place Wine in handcuffs “for his safety and
our own.” (Dkt. No. 86 at 9). Huffman advised Wine that he intended
to place him face down on the floor and handcuff him, to which Wine
responded by pulling his arm away and proclaiming “no.” (Dkt. No.
86 at 9). Huffman proceeded to grab Wine from the couch and place
him on the floor. (Dkt. No. 86 at 9). According to Huffman, Wine
resisted by pulling his left hand under his body and trying to push
up with it. (Dkt. No. 86 at 9). In response, Huffman restrained
Wine, placing him in an arm hold, and twisting his arm. (Dkt. No.
86 at 10). During this process, Wine received a cut on his wrist,
whether from the glass on the floor or from the handcuffs is not
clear. (Dkt. No. 86 at 10).
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While handcuffed and lying on the floor, Wine began to
complain that he was having trouble breathing. (Dkt. No. 86 at 10).
Huffman grabbed Wine’s inhaler from the end table and administered
it to him, but Wine indicated that it would not be enough and
stated that he had an oxygen tank in the other room. (Dkt. No. 86
at 10). Huffman turned Wine over to two other SRT members, Horne
and Taylor, and began to ask whether anyone had seen Wine’s
breathing machine. (Dkt. No. 86 at 10). After Trooper Horne located
Wine’s oxygen nebulizer in the kitchen (dkt. no. 86 at 10), Huffman
then led Wine to the kitchen, sat him in a cloth chair, and left
him with Horne and Taylor. (Dkt. No. 86 at 10).
Wine asked the troopers to remove his handcuffs but they
refused, telling him, “We’re not going to remove your cuffs until
we clear your house.” (Dkt. No. 86 at 11). As Wine sat handcuffed
in the chair, Horne turned on the nebulizer and held it to Wine’s
face. (Dkt. No. 86 at 10). Horne believes that the nebulizer was
never properly administered because Wine continued to curse at the
officers. (Dkt. No. 86 at 11). Taylor continued to administer the
nebulizer, but as soon as he appeared to improve, Wine would return
to yelling and cursing at the officers. (Dkt. No. 84-3 at 14-15).
At some point, Taylor thought Wine was having trouble breathing
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because he was cursing less and was hunched over. (Dkt. No. 86 at
11). Stating that they may want to remove Wine’s handcuffs and get
some help, Taylor left the residence in search of the handcuff key.
(Dkt. No. 86 at 11). Wine was still seated and breathing at that
time, although he was not talking and appeared unconscious. (Dkt.
No. 86 at 11). Taylor returned and uncuffed Wine. (Dkt. No. 86 at
12).
At that point Trooper Tomblyn, a former paramedic, entered the
kitchen, while Horne went outside to check on the arrival of EMS,
who had been notified. (Dkt. No. 86 at 12). By this time, Wine was
not responding and, although still breathing, he would not or could
not put his mouth on the nebulizer. (Dkt. No. 86 at 14). Tomblyn
held him in the chair until EMS arrived and began attempting to
revive Wine. (Dkt. No. 86 at 15). EMS put Wine on the ground and
inserted a breathing tube. (Dkt. No. 84-3 at 16). After placing
external defibrillator pads on Wine and discovering that he had no
pulse, EMS directed Tomblyn to begin chest compressions. (Dkt. No.
84-3 at 16). The revival efforts were in vain; Wine passed away in
his kitchen. (Dkt. No. 86 at 15).
After Wine’s death, Waggamon secured the home as a crime scene
and began taking photographs. (Dkt. No. 86 at 15). He photographed
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Wine’s body, the blood at the scene, the chair Wine was sitting in,
and the scene around the couch in the living room (Dkt. No. 86 at
15). It appeared to Waggamon that a struggle had taken place in the
living room. (Dkt. No. 86 at 15). Wine’s body was sent to the
coroner for a post-mortem examination.
Ultimately, the SRT never found Bowman on Wine’s property.
(Dkt. No. 86 at 15). Later, the next day, Bowman notified the
troopers where he was and that he intended to turn himself in to
them.
B.
Procedural Background
On
September
12,
2014,
Wine’s
former
wife,
Jill
Myers
(“Myers”), in her capacity as the executrix of his estate, filed a
complaint against Horne, Huffman, Saurino, Taylor, Tomblyn, and
Waggamon individually. Her complaint asserts four causes of action:
(1) excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in violation of the
Fourth Amendment; (2) bystander liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 under Randall v. Prince George’s County, Md., 302 F.3d 188
(4th Cir. 2002); (3) unreasonable search and seizure in violation
of the Fourth Amendment; and (4) wrongful death. The complaint does
not state which counts pertain to each defendant or whether all
counts apply to all defendants.
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Following discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment
on
all
counts
of
Myers’s
complaint.
At
the
final
pre-trial
conference on November 3, 2015, the Court heard oral argument from
the parties on this motion and for the reasons that follow made the
rulings discussed below.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary
documents,
judgment
is
electronically
appropriate
stored
where
the
information,
“depositions,
affidavits
or
declarations, stipulations ..., admissions, interrogatory answers,
or other materials” show that “there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c)(1)(A). When ruling on a
motion for summary judgment, the Court reviews all the evidence “in
the light most favorable” to the nonmoving party. Providence Square
Assocs., L.L.C. v. G.D.F., Inc., 211 F.3d 846, 850 (4th Cir.2000).
The Court must avoid weighing the evidence or determining the truth
and limit its inquiry solely to a determination of whether genuine
issues of triable fact exist. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the
Court
of
the
basis
for
the
motion
10
and
of
establishing
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nonexistence of genuine issues of fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party has made the
necessary showing, the nonmoving party “must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson,
477 U.S. at 256 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” favoring the
nonmoving party will not prevent the entry of summary judgment; the
evidence
must
be
such
that
a
rational
trier
of
fact
could
reasonably find for the nonmoving party. Id. at 248–52.
IV. APPLICABLE LAW
A.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims
The
plaintiff’s
claims
all
stem
inexorably
from
alleged
violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory
or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action
brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission
taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive
relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree
was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For
the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall
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be considered
Columbia.
to
be
a
statute
of
the
District
of
To succeed on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) they
were deprived of a right “secured by the Constitution and the laws”
of the United States, and (2) the individual who deprived them of
the right was acting under color of state law. Lugar v. Edmonson
Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930 (1982) (internal citations omitted).
Generally, a public employee acts under color of law “while acting
in his official capacity or while exercising his responsibilities
pursuant to state law.”
Conner v. Donnelly, 42 F.3d 220, 223 (4th
Cir. 1994) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 50 (1988)).
Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’
but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights
elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, at 393-94
(1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3 (1979)).
In order to determine what standard applies, courts must first
isolate “the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.”
Baker, 443 U.S. at 140. Generally, the Fourth and Eighth Amendments
provide the “two primary sources of constitutional protection
against physically abusive governmental conduct.” Graham, 490 U.S.
at 394.
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The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”
U.S. Const. amend. IV. (emphasis added). It is from the clear
language of the Fourth Amendment that courts derive the standard
applicable to alleged violations of it. See Graham, 490 U.S. at
394-95. Accordingly, courts must look at conduct that allegedly
violates the Fourth Amendment and determine “whether the officers'
actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and
circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying
intent or motivation.” Id. at 397 (emphasis added) (citing Scott v.
United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137–39; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21
1968) (in analyzing the reasonableness of a particular search or
seizure, “it is imperative that the facts be judged against an
objective standard”)).
B.
Qualified Immunity
Defendants assert a defense of qualified immunity as to all of
Myers’s claims. Under the qualified immunity defense, individual
officials
performing
discretionary
functions
are
immune
from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
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which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Covey v. Assessor of Ohio Cty., 777 F.3d
186, 195 (4th Cir. 2015). The qualified immunity doctrine “balances
two
important
interests—the
need
to
hold
public
officials
accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to
shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when
they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555
U.S. 223 (2009).
“Qualified immunity is an entitlement not to stand trial or
face the other burdens of litigation.” Willingham v. Crooke, 412
F.3d 553, 558-59 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted).
“Ordinarily, the question of qualified immunity should be decided
at the summary judgment stage.” Id. at 558-59 (citations omitted).
Moreover, “[a]t the summary judgment stage, once we have viewed the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the question
of whether the officer's actions were reasonable is a question of
pure law.” Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011)
(citing Scott, 550 U.S. at 381, n. 8).
“Qualified
immunity
protects
officers
who
commit
constitutional violations but who, in light of clearly established
law, could reasonably believe that their actions were lawful.”
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Henry, 652 F.3d at 531 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206
(2001), overruled in part, Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223
(2009)). For a right to be clearly established, “every ‘reasonable
official would have understood that what he is doing violates that
right.’” West v. Murphy, 771 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011)).
A clearly established right, however, “need not be one with respect
to which all judges on all courts agree.”
Owens v. Baltimore City
State’s Att’y Office, 767 F.3d 379, 395 (4th Cir. 2014).
“The
qualified
immunity
standard
‘gives
ample
room
for
mistaken judgments’ by protecting ‘all but the plainly incompetent
or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Hunter v. Bryant, 502
U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341
(1986)). Society forgives officers for reasonable errors because
“‘officials should not err always on the side of caution’ for fear
of being sued.” Id. (quoting Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195
(1984)).
Finally, “[t]he protection of qualified immunity applies
regardless of whether the government official's error is ‘a mistake
of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of
law and fact.’” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (quoting Groh v. Ramirez,
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540 U.S. 551, 567 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). Indeed,
“[q]ualified immunity is meant to protect against liability for
‘bad guesses in gray areas.’” Bellotte v. Edwards, 629 F.3d 415,
424 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295,
298 (4th Cir. 1992)).
In Saucier v. Katz, the United States Supreme Court laid out
a two-step sequential analysis courts should apply when determining
whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity. 533 U.S.
194, 200-01 (2001). The first question is whether the alleged
facts, taken in the light most favorable to the injured party, show
that the conduct violated a constitutional right. Id. at 201. The
second question is “whether the right was clearly established.” Id.
at 201. In 2009, the United States Supreme Court overruled the
sequential aspect of Saucier, finding it unnecessarily rigid and
holding that:
The judges of the district courts and the courts of
appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound
discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the
qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in
light of the circumstances in the particular case at
hand.
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Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. Accordingly, courts have discretion to
determine which prong should be addressed first, but if either
prong is met, a defendant is entitled to summary judgment. Id.
V. DISCUSSION
A.
Count One - Excessive Force
In her response to defendants’ motion for summary judgment,
Myers concedes that Trooper Huffman was “the only officer to apply
physical force to Mr. Wine that night.” (Dkt. No. 86 at 21).
Accordingly, the Court FINDS that the remaining defendant troopers
cannot be liable for use of excessive force as alleged in Count One
of Myers’s complaint, and GRANTS defendant’s motion for summary
judgment as to Troopers Horne, Saurino, Taylor, Tomblyn, and
Waggamon. The question remains, however, as to whether Trooper
Hufffman is entitled to qualified immunity on the claim that he
used excessive force when he restrained Wine with handcuffs.
Courts must analyze excessive force claims using the Fourth
Amendment
“‘reasonableness’
standard,
rather
than
under
a
‘substantive due process’ standard.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 395 (1989). “Determining whether the force used to effect a
particular
seizure
is
reasonable
under
the
Fourth
Amendment
requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the
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intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against
the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Id. at 396
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
“The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be
judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,
rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. at
396
(citation omitted). Furthermore, Graham noted that:
Because ‘[t]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment is not capable of precise definition or
mechanical application,’ however, its proper application
requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances
of each particular case, including the severity of the
crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate
threat to the safety of the officers or others, and
whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to
evade arrest by flight.
Id. at 396 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)).
Finally, Graham laid out factors that lower courts should
consider in determining whether officers used excessive force:
Considerations such as the following may bear on the
reasonableness or unreasonableness of the force used: [1]
the relationship between the need for the use of force
and the amount of force used; [2] the extent of the
plaintiff's injury; [3] any effort made by the officer to
temper or to limit the amount of force; [4] the severity
of the security problem at issue; [5] the threat
reasonably perceived by the officer; and [6] whether the
plaintiff was actively resisting. We do not consider this
list to be exclusive. We mention these factors only to
illustrate
the
types
of
objective
circumstances
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potentially relevant to a determination of excessive
force.
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. These points of consideration have become
known as the Graham factors. See also Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135
S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015) (listing the Graham factors and noting
that they are not exclusive).
Here,
Myers
alleges
that
Huffman
“engaged
in
inflicting
violent physical force against [] Wine, causing blunt force trauma,
blood loss, pain, and restriction of mobility . . . .” (Dkt. No.
62 at 8). Huffman, on the other hand, claims that his action in
seizing Wine was objectively reasonable because, under Supreme
Court precedent, the Fourth Circuit allows him to reasonably detain
occupants during a lawful search, including using reasonable force
to effectuate the detention. See e.g. Bailey v. United States, 133
S. Ct. 1031, 1038 (2013) (noting that detention is appropriate to
secure the scene and prevent flight); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S.
692, 702–03 (1981)(noting that “the risk of harm to both the police
and the occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise
unquestioned command of the situation”); Yanez-Marquez v. Lynch,
789 F.3d 434, 471 (4th Cir. 2015) (“[L]aw enforcement officers,
when executing a search, may take reasonable action to secure the
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MEMORANDUM ORDER AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 79]
premises and to ensure their own safety and the efficacy of the
search.”).
Indeed, at oral argument, plaintiff conceded that clearly
established law provides a law enforcement officer with the right
to detain, and handcuff when necessary, occupants of a home in
which a lawful warrant is being executed. Plaintiff contends,
however, that material questions of fact are disputed as to whether
the handcuffing of Wine was warranted and reasonable, inasmuch as
the troopers knew Wine was not Bowman. More importantly, the
plaintiff contends that the methods, manner, and amount of force
used to handcuff Wine, a 71 -year-old man, were excessive.
The
evidence
presented
and
the
parties’
oral
argument
established that disputed questions of material fact exist as to
the plaintiff’s excessive force claim. Among others, these include:
1) why and exactly when Huffman decided he needed to handcuff Wine;
2) whether Wine was reasonably given an adequate opportunity to
comply before force was applied; 3) whether Wine was actively
resisting; 4) whether Huffman was unreasonably violent in his
handling of Wine; and 5) what safety risks did Huffman reasonably
perceive.
20
MYERS v. TAYLOR, ET AL.
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MEMORANDUM ORDER AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 79]
Accordingly, finding that disputed questions of material fact
exist that prevent summary judgment or a finding of qualified
immunity as a matter of law at this stage, the Court DENIES
defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count One of Myers’s
complaint as it pertains to Trooper Huffman.
B.
Count Two - Bystander Liability on the Excessive Force Claim
Myers claims that other troopers besides Huffman should be
held liable for Wine’s injuries and death because they have “an
affirmative duty to intervene when another officer is violating a
citizen’s constitutional rights,” and they failed to do so here.
See Browning v. Snead, 886 F. Supp. 547, 552 (S.D. W. Va. 1995) (“A
police
officer
may
not
stand
by
idly
while
a
citizen’s
constitutional rights are violated by another officer; he has an
affirmative duty to intercede on the citizen’s behalf.”).
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “an officer
may be liable under § 1983, on a theory of bystander liability, if
he: (1) knows that a fellow officer is violating an individual's
constitutional rights; (2) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent
the harm; and (3) chooses not to act.” Randall v. Prince George's
County, Md., 302 F.3d 188, 204 (4th Cir. 2002). Further, the court
noted that “[i]f the bystander lacks such specific knowledge, he
21
MYERS v. TAYLOR, ET AL.
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MEMORANDUM ORDER AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 79]
cannot be a participant in the unlawful acts, and the imposition of
personal liability is impermissible. Id. at 204, n. 24.
Notably, the level of specific knowledge of a bystander is
high. Indeed, in Randall, officers clearly knew that “(1) some of
the Appellees were present at the CID Station, and that (2)
individuals were being detained there against their will.”2 Id. at
205. Nonetheless, the court declined to assess liability because
the evidence failed to show that the officers “also knew that these
two groups (i.e., the Appellees and the persons being involuntarily
detained) were one and the same.” Id.
Here, however, neither evidence presented by the plaintiff,
nor oral argument, have pointed the Court to facts sufficient to
support
a
finding
that
Troopers
Horne,
Taylor,
Tomblyn,
and
Waggamon are liable under the theory of bystander liability. There
is nothing in Myers’s complaint, her response to defendants’ motion
for summary judgment, or oral argument that established even an
2
The court further opined that:
Although either [Officer] Swope or [Officer] Ricker
knew that Plaintiffs Mayhew, Mobley, and Swint were
present at the CID Station, and also knew that there
was no probable cause for any of them to be detained,
there is no evidence that either Swope or Ricker knew
that any of them was being held involuntarily.
Id. at 205.
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MEMORANDUM ORDER AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
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inference that any of these troopers had specific knowledge that
Wine’s rights were being violated yet failed to act when they could
do so.
In addition, there is no scenario under which Huffman is
liable as a bystander. The parties agree that Huffman was the only
person to apply any force to Wine that evening. If he is found
liable
for
personally
using
excessive
force,
he
cannot
simultaneously be a bystander. Conversely, should he not be liable,
then there is no violation to which he could be a bystander.
As a consequence, the Court GRANTED defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on Count Two (Bystander Liability as to the
excessive force claim) of Myers’s complaint as it pertains to
Troopers Horne, Huffman, Taylor, Tomblyn, and Waggamon.
C.
Count Three - Unreasonable Search and Seizure
Myers
alleges
that
the
troopers
violated
Wine’s
Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
by executing a no-knock entry without a warrant specifically
authorizing
such,
and
in
the
absence
of
sufficient
exigent
circumstances. During oral argument, it became apparent that the
plaintiff had no evidence that Troopers Horne, Taylor, Tomblyn, and
Waggamon provided any input that produced the decision to execute
23
MYERS v. TAYLOR, ET AL.
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MEMORANDUM ORDER AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 79]
a no-knock entry. Indeed, there is no evidence that Horne, Taylor,
and Tomblyn ever saw the warrant or knew the contours of the search
authorized. As part of the SRT stack, those troopers were following
orders based not on their own understanding of the circumstances,
but rather on their reliance on Saurino’s and Huffman’s knowledge
and judgment. As a consequence, the Court GRANTED the defendants’
motion for summary judgment on Count Three of Myers’s complaint as
it pertains to Troopers Horne, Taylor, Tomblyn, and Waggamon.
It is axiomatic that, prior to “forcibly entering a residence,
police officers ‘must knock on the door and announce their identity
and purpose.’” Bellotte v. Edwards, 629 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir.
2011) (quoting
Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 387 (1997).
However, the law makes clear that no-knock entries, although
generally disfavored, are allowed in the presence of exigent
circumstances. “Though the ‘knock and announce principle forms a
part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry,’ no-knock
entries
may
still
be
reasonable
by
virtue
of
exigent
circumstances.” Id. at 419-20 (quoting Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S.
927, 930 (1995); see also United States v. Kennedy, 32 F.3d 876,
882 (4th Cir. 1994).
24
MYERS v. TAYLOR, ET AL.
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MEMORANDUM ORDER AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 79]
“In order to justify a ‘no-knock’ entry, the police must have
a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence,
under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile,
or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime
by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence.” Bellotte,
629 F.3d at 420; see also Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 590
(2006) (“We require only that police have a reasonable suspicion
. . . under the particular circumstances . . . .” (citations
omitted) (emphasis added)). The Fourth Circuit caselaw requires a
“particularized basis for any suspicion that would justify a
no-knock entry.” Id. (citing United States v. Dunnock, 295 F.3d
431, 434 (4th Cir. 2002)). “Generic” dangers and threats “raised at
the most general level” are not particularized enough to establish
exigent circumstances. Bellotte, 629 F.3d at 424 n. 2) (agreeing
with that portion of the dissenting opinion); see also Allen v.
Gillenwater, 2012 WL 3475583, at *8 (M.D.N.C. 2012) (quoting
Belotte). “Where ‘neither the prospect of injury nor any other
emergency gave the officers a plausible reason to neglect what the
Constitution
ordinarily
demands,
entry
into
a
home
based
on
‘speculation’ is not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Allen,
2012 WL 3475583, at *8 (quoting Bellotte, 629 F.3d at 423).
25
MYERS v. TAYLOR, ET AL.
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MEMORANDUM ORDER AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 79]
The evidence presented in the briefs and during oral argument
establishes that there are disputed questions of material fact as
to the constitutionality of Huffman and Saurino’s decision to
utilize a no-knock entry of Wine’s home. Among others, these
include: 1) when and under what information was the decision to
make a no-knock entry made; 2) what specific knowledge Saurino and
Huffman had prior to and at the moment of deciding to breach; 3)
what were the exact exigent circumstances, who knew them, and when;
4) were those circumstances sufficient to justify the no-knock
entry; and 5) whether there was a predetermined decision that a noknock
entry
was
going
to
be
executed
regardless
of
whether
sufficient exigent circumstances were present.
Accordingly, because disputed questions of material fact exist
that preclude summary judgment or a finding of qualified immunity
as a matter of law as to Huffman and Saurino, the Court DENIES
defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count Three as to them.
D. Count Two - Bystander Liability on the No-Knock Entry Claim
Under the theory of bystander liability, Myers claims that
other troopers in the stack should be held liable for the decision
by Huffman and Saurino to execute the no-knock entry. (See supra
Part V.B.). Here, it is undisputed that, in the moments just before
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MYERS v. TAYLOR, ET AL.
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MEMORANDUM ORDER AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 79]
the physical breach, it was Huffman who made the decision to
conduct a no-knock entry based on his subjective belief that
exigent circumstances existed. Accordingly, he cannot be liable as
a bystander to a violation he allegedly committed.
Furthermore, as with Myers’s claim for bystander liability on
her excessive force claim, neither evidence presented by the
plaintiff, nor her oral argument, have pointed the Court to facts
sufficient to support a finding that Troopers Horne, Saurino,
Taylor, Tomblyn, and Waggamon are liable. There is nothing in
Myers’s complaint, her response to defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, or offered at oral argument that established even an
inference that any of these troopers had any specific knowledge
that Wine’s rights were being violated, yet failed to act when the
could do so.
As a consequence, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on Count Two (Bystander Liability as to the noknock entry claim) of Myers’s complaint as it pertains to all
defendants.
E.
Count Four - Wrongful Death
Because the Court has granted summary judgment on Counts One,
Two, and Three of Myers’s complaint as they pertain to Troopers
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MYERS v. TAYLOR, ET AL.
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MEMORANDUM ORDER AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 79]
Horne, Taylor, Tomblyn, and Waggamon, they cannot be held liable
for Wine’s alleged wrongful death. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS
summary judgment as to those defendants, and DISMISSES the claims
in Count Four as to Troopers Horne, Taylor, Tomblyn, and Waggamon.
Based on the discussions at oral argument, the Court has
determined that there are disputed material facts that preclude
summary judgment or a finding of qualified immunity as a matter of
law as to Trooper Huffman on Count One and Troopers Huffman and
Saurino on Count Three. Thus, the question of their liability, if
any, for Wine’s wrongful death remains in dispute; should the
plaintiff establish that Wine died as a proximate result of a
constitutional violation of Wine’s Fourth Amendment rights, they
may be held liable under West Virginia law for Wine’s wrongful
death, unless they are qualifiedly immune for those actions.
Consequently, the Court DENIES the plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment on Count Four as to Troopers Huffman and Saurino.
SUMMARY OF THE COURT’S RULINGS
In summary, for the reasons discussed, the Court:
1.
GRANTED defendants’ motion for summary judgment on ALL COUNTS
of plaintiff’s complaint as they pertain to Troopers Horne,
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MYERS v. TAYLOR, ET AL.
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MEMORANDUM ORDER AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 79]
Taylor, Tomblyn, and Waggamon, and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE
those defendants from this case;
2.
GRANTED defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count One
[Excessive Force] of plaintiff’s complaint as it pertains to
Trooper
Saurino
and
DISMISSED
WITH
PREJUDICE
the
constitutional claim of a Fourth Amendment violation against
him in Count One; and
3.
GRANTED defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count Two
[Bystander Liability] of plaintiff’s complaint as it pertains
to Troopers Huffman and Saurino and DISMISSED that claim WITH
PREJUDICE.
SUMMARY OF REMAINING CLAIMS
The following claims remain for trial:
1.
Count One - Plaintiff’s claim of excessive force in the
restraint and handcuffing of Wine as it pertains to Trooper
Huffman and his defense of qualified immunity;
2.
Count
Three
-
Plaintiff’s
claim
of
a
Fourth
Amendment
violation for a no-knock entry as it pertains to Troopers
Huffman and Saurino, and their defense of qualified immunity;
and
29
MYERS v. TAYLOR, ET AL.
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MEMORANDUM ORDER AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 79]
3.
Count Four - Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful death as it
pertains to Troopers Huffman and Saurino.
It is so ORDERED.
The Court directs the Clerk to transmit copies of this Order
to counsel of record.
DATED: December 4, 2015.
/s/ Irene M. Keeley
IRENE M. KEELEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
30
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