Wilson v. U.S. Department of Justice et al

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS: It is ORDERED that Defendants' 9 Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED and DISMISSES the case WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter a separate judgment order and to remove this case from the Court's active docket. Signed by District Judge Irene M. Keeley on 3/31/16. (cnd)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
MELISSA WILSON,
Plaintiff,
v.

//

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15CV18
(Judge Keeley)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS [DKT. NO. 9]
Pending before the Court is the motion to dismiss (dkt. no. 9)
filed by the defendants, the United States of America (“United
States”) and the United States Department of Justice, Federal
Bureau of Prisons

(“BOP”). For the reasons that follow, the Court

GRANTS the motion.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case arises out of alleged actions by several employees
of the BOP, all of whom worked at the United States Penitentiary
Hazelton (“USP Hazelton”). Wilson originally sued those employees
by name, but the Court previously entered an Order substituting the
United States as a defendant pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2).
(Dkt. No. 18).
A detailed account of the factual and procedural background of
this case can be found in the Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order
dated February 29, 2016 (dkt. no. 18), and will not be repeated
here.

WILSON v. DOJ, ET AL.

1:15CV18

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS [DKT. NO. 9]
The only item remaining for the Court’s consideration is the
defendants’ motion to dismiss (dkt. no. 9). On February 29, 2016,
the Court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order in which, among
other things, it granted Wilson an extension of time until March
14, 2016 to respond to the defendant’s motion to dismiss (dkt. no.
18). Wilson never filed a response. The motion to dismiss therefore
is fully briefed and ripe for review.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, a district court
“‘must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in
the complaint.’” Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 188 (4th
Cir. 2007) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)).
However,

while

a

complaint

does

not

need

detailed

factual

allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his
entitlement

to

relief

requires

more

than

mere

labels

and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007). Indeed, courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478
U.S. 265, 286 (1986). In considering whether the facts alleged are
sufficient, “a complaint must contain ‘enough facts to state a

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS [DKT. NO. 9]
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Anderson, 508
F.3d at 188 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547).
“A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency
of

a

complaint;

importantly,

it

does

not

resolve

contests

surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability
of defenses.” Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952
(4th Cir. 1992). “But in the relatively rare circumstances where
facts sufficient to rule on an affirmative defense are alleged in
the complaint, the defense may be reached by a motion to dismiss
filed under Rule 12(b)(6),” so long as “all facts necessary to the
affirmative

defense

‘clearly

appear[]

on

the

face

of

the

complaint.’ ” Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir.
2007) (quoting Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. v. Forst, 4
F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 1993)).
III. DISCUSSION
The motion to dismiss by the United States asserts three bases
warranting dismissal of Wilson’s complaint. It first contends that
Wilson’s state law deliberate intent claim is preempted by federal
law, thus depriving the Court of subject matter jurisdiction to
hear that claim. Second, it argues that Wilson’s discrimination
claims fail because her claims are preempted by Title VII, she

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1:15CV18

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS [DKT. NO. 9]
failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, and she has failed
to adequately plead her discrimination claim under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). Finally, the defendants argue that, as a matter of law,
Wilson is not entitled to punitive damages.
A.

Wilson’s Deliberate Intention Claim
Although Wilson’s complaint asserts a claim of deliberate

intention under West Virginia law, see W.Va. Code § 23-4-2, the
Federal Employees’ Compensation Act (“FECA”), 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c),
is the exclusive remedy for federal employees seeking compensation
for

covered

injuries

and

disabilities

sustained

during

their

employment. In pertinent part FECA provides:
The liability of the United States or an instrumentality
thereof under [FECA] with respect to the injury or death
of an employee is exclusive and instead of all other
liability of the United States or the instrumentality to
the employee ... because of the injury or death in a
direct judicial proceeding, in a civil action, or in
admiralty, or by an administrative or judicial proceeding
under a workmen’s compensation statute or under a Federal
tort liability statute.
Accordingly, “[f]ederal employees’ injuries that are compensable
under FECA cannot be compensated under other federal remedial
statutes....” Wallace v. United States, 669 F.2d 947, 951 (4th Cir.
1982) (noting that FECA was the exclusive remedy and plaintiff
could therefore not recover under the Swine Flu Act); see Borneman

4

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS [DKT. NO. 9]
v. U.S., 213 F.3d 819, 829 n. 3 (4th Cir. 2000) (same with Westfall
Act); Ezekiel v. Michel, 66 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 1995) (same
with FTCA). Notably, there is no provision under FECA that allows
an employee to sue for deliberate intention, or any other state law
worker’s compensation related claim, as a consequence of injuries
suffered during federal employment.
FECA provides benefits for total or partial disability to
compensate federal employees for lost wages and medical expenses
due to job-related injuries. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 8105 et seq. FECA
covers federal employees, including those who, like Wilson, are
employed by the BOP. See id. § 8101(1). FECA’s coverage is broad;
benefits are paid for any injury sustained by the employee, unless
the injury results from the employee’s fraud, willful misconduct,
intentional injury to herself, or intoxication. Id. §§ 8102(a),
8103.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that
“[f]ederal employees’ injuries that are compensable under FECA
cannot be compensated under other federal remedial statutes . . .
.” Wallace v. United States, 669 F.2d 947, 951 (4th Cir. 1982); see
Borneman v. U.S., 213 F.3d 819, 829 n. 3 (4th Cir. 2000); Ezekiel
v. Michel, 66 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 1995); Sowell v. American

5

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS [DKT. NO. 9]
Cyanamid Co., 888 F.2d 802, 805 (11th Cir. 1989).
Here, Wilson concedes that she was an employee of the BOP at
all times relevant to her suit, and that her injuries occurred
during the scope of her employment at USP Hazelton. Therefore,
because Wilson may seek compensation for her injuries only under
FECA, her deliberate intention claim fails as a matter of law.
B.

Wilson’s Discrimination Claims
The defendants next contend that Wilson’s two discrimination

claims should be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
because they are preempted by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
she has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, and has
failed to adequately plead her discrimination claims.
1.

Wilson’s Discrimination Claims are Preempted by Title VII

Title VII provides in pertinent part as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer . . . to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . or
to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as
an employee, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a). Although
6

Title

VII did not originally

WILSON v. DOJ, ET AL.

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS [DKT. NO. 9]
apply to federal employees, Congress extended coverage to them when
it enacted the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (“EEOA”).
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16. Under the EEOA, all federal agencies,
including the BOP, are subject to the prohibitions contained in
Title VII. Id. Further, the EEOA established the Equal Opportunity
Employment Commission (“EEOC”) to oversee compliance with Title
VII’s mandates, and to provide an administrative procedure for
aggrieved employees to pursue claims of Title VII violations. Id.
Finally, the EEOA provided a mechanism for aggrieved federal
employees to seek review of their discrimination claims in federal
court. Id. Nevertheless, the EEOA requires employees to exhaust all
available administrative remedies prior to filing suit in federal
court. Id. § 2000e-16(c); Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 832 (1976);
see also Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 559 (1988) (“[The EEOA]
permits an aggrieved employee to file a civil action in federal
court, provided the employee has met certain requirements regarding
exhaustion of administrative remedies.”).
In Brown v. GSA, the Supreme Court of the United States
concluded

that

Congress

intended

for

Title

VII

to

be

the

“exclusive, preemptive administrative and judicial scheme for the
redress of federal employment discrimination,” and, therefore, it

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WILSON v. DOJ, ET AL.

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS [DKT. NO. 9]
“provides

the

exclusive

judicial

remedy

for

claims

of

discrimination in federal employment.” 425 U.S. at 829, 835; see
also Bullock v. Napolitano, 666 F.3d 281, 283 (4th Cir. 2012)
(citing Brown).
Here, Wilson brought her claim pursuant to the FTCA, not Title
VII.1 However, because the EEOA mandates that Title VII is the
exclusive remedy for Wilson’s allegations of discrimination, her
FTCA claim is preempted.
2.

Wilson Failed to Exhaust her Administrative Remedies

According to the defendants, even if Wilson had brought her
claim under Title VII, that claim must be dismissed because she
failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.
It

is

evident

discrimination

that

cannot

file

“[a]n
suit

employee
until

seeking

she

has

redress

for

exhausted

the

administrative process.” Balas v. Huntington Ingalls Industries,
Inc., 711 F.3d 401, 406 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(b)); see also Chacko v. Patuxent Institution, 429 F.3d 505, 508

1

Although the specific basis of Wilson’s discrimination claims
is not abundantly clear from the complaint, she indicates at the
outset that she previously asserted an FTCA claim and, “has elected
to file [the instant] Complaint rather than resubmit the claim to
the Bureau of Prisons.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 2-3). Accordingly, the Court
construes her claims as pursuant to the FTCA.
8

WILSON v. DOJ, ET AL.

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS [DKT. NO. 9]
(4th Cir. 2005) (citing Sloop v. Memorial Mission Hosp., Inc., 198
F.3d 147, 148 (4th Cir. 1999) (“It is axiomatic that a claimant
under Title VII must exhaust his administrative remedies by raising
his claim before the EEOC.”).
As discussed above, the EEOC is the administrative body
authorized to hear claims of Title VII violations, and an aggrieved
employee must first submit to its procedures before filing suit in
court. See 5 U.S.C. § 2000e (setting forth administrative remedies
procedures);

29

CFR

Part

1614

(same).

Failure

to

exhaust

administrative remedies is a jurisdictional bar. See Davis. V. N.C.
Dept. of Corr., 48 F.3d 134, 137-40 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that
where “[n]either the complaint nor the amended complaint alleges
that the plaintiff has complied with these prerequisites, the
plaintiff has not properly invoked the court’s jurisdiction under
Title VII” (internal quotations omitted)).
It

is

undisputed

that

Wilson

did

not

exhaust

her

administrative remedies. While her complaint acknowledges that, on
an unknown date, she initiated a discrimination complaint with the
EEOC (dkt. no. 1 at 6), Wilson alleges that, on April 9, 2013,
Warden O’Brien “presented [her] with a document that forced her to
withdraw[]” her EEOC complaint. Id. at 9. Her complaint infers that

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS [DKT. NO. 9]
she was pressured into signing the agreement in exchange for Warden
O’Brien turning over the threat assessment that she had been
seeking for some time. Id.
Regardless of her motivation to withdraw the claim, it is
clear that Wilson failed to exhaust the administrative remedies
available to her, and never attempted to re-initiate her claim
through the EEOC. Consequently, this Court lacks jurisdiction to
hear her Title VII claims.
3.

Wilson’s Discrimination Claims are Inadequately Pled

Finally, the defendants maintain that Wilson has inadequately
pled her discrimination claims under the burden shifting framework
provided in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, individuals asserting Title
VII claims bear the initial burden of persuasion to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 802. Meeting this burden
requires the complainant to provide evidence that:
(1) he was a member of a protected class; (2) he was
qualified for the job in question or was meeting his
employer’s legitimate performance expectations; (3) he
suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the
employer treated similarly situated persons not in the
protected class more favorably.
Johnson v. Zema Systems Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 742-43 (7th Cir.
1999). The complainant can meet his burden through direct evidence
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS [DKT. NO. 9]
of disparate treatment or through circumstantial evidence that
creates

an

inference

of

discrimination.

Id.;

see

also

Int’l

Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
If the complainant successfully makes a prima facie showing,
the

burden

then

shifts

to

the

employer

“to

articulate

some

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the challenged employment
decision. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Should the employer
meet this burden, it shifts back to the complainant, who “must then
have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its
true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.” Texas Dept.
of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (citing
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804).
Here, Wilson’s complaint fails to establish a prima facie case
of discrimination. Although Wilson is Caucasian, she makes a
conclusory claim that she suffered discrimination because she is
married to an African-American. She thus does not claim that she
was discriminated against because of her race, but rather because
of the race of her husband. Not only does Wilson utterly fail to
present any additional factual allegations in support of such a
claim, there is no legal construct validating a discrimination

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS [DKT. NO. 9]
claim based on the race of one’s spouse. Wilson therefore has
failed to establish that she is a member of a protected racial
class and, consequently, her race discrimination claim fails.
Although Wilson’s gender discrimination claim clears the first
hurdle of the McDonnell Douglas framework, it ultimately falls
short. While Wilson alleges that she was “treated unfavorably in
her job assignment, as well as the handling of threats made by
Defendant Thomas, and the handling of the threat assessment,” she
has provided no factual support for these allegations, not even a
description of what unfavorable job assignments she received, or
how those assignments might have been discriminatorily based on her
gender. Further, she has failed to demonstrate how other similarly
situated male employees were treated differently. Such conclusory
statements fail to satisfy Wilson’s burden of establishing a prima
facie case of discrimination. See Cifarelli v. Village of Babylon,
93 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that “conclusory allegations”
of discrimination are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss).
Finally, although Wilson may have disagreed with the threat
assessment, or the way in which it was handled, this does not rise
to the level of an adverse employment decision. See James v.
Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 368 F.3d 371, 375 (4th Cir. 2004)

12

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS [DKT. NO. 9]
(noting that “the existence of some adverse employment action is
required”). Such occurs only when the employment action “adversely
affect[s] the terms, conditions, or benefits of the plaintiff's
employment.” Id. Job assignments that are less appealing, or that
do not negatively affect the employee’s “compensation, job title,
level of responsibility, or opportunity for promotion,” do not
suffice as adverse employment decisions. Id.; see also Holland v.
Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 219 (4th Cir. 2007). Her
disagreement with the threat assessment notwithstanding, Wilson has
failed to plead facts establishing that she was subject to an
adverse employment decision. Consequently, she has failed to meet
the second and third prongs of the McDonnell Douglas framework, and
therefore

has

not

established

a

prima

facie

case

of

gender

discrimination.
C.

Wilson’s Punitive Damages Claim
The defendants contend that Wilson is not entitled to an award

of punitive damages under either FECA or Title VII. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2674 (“The United States . . . shall not be liable for interest
prior

to

judgment

or

for

punitive

damages.”);

42

U.S.C.

§

1981a(b)(1) (“A complaining party may recover punitive damages
under this section against a respondent (other than a government,
government agency or political subdivision) . . . .”). Because, as

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS [DKT. NO. 9]
a matter of law, the Court has concluded that Wilson’s claims fail,
it need not address whether punitive damages are appropriate.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Court GRANTS the defendants’ motion (dkt.
no. 9) and DISMISSES the case WITH PREJUDICE.
It is so ORDERED.
The Court directs the Clerk to transmit copies of this Order
to counsel of record and to enter a separate judgment order. It
further directs the Clerk to remove this case from the Court’s
active docket.
DATED: March 31, 2016.

/s/ Irene M. Keeley
IRENE M. KEELEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

14