Lutz v. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. et al
Filing
41
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT: It is ORDERED that Defendants' 33 Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED and Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter a separate judgment order. Signed by District Judge Irene M. Keeley on 5/9/16. (cnd)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
SARAH LUTZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15CV28
(Judge Keeley)
TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM,
INC., a Time Warner Company, a Delaware
corporation; HADLEY MEDIA, INC.,
a New Hampshire corporation,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 33]
Pending before the Court is the motion for summary judgment
filed by the defendants, Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. (“TBS”)
and Hadley Media, Inc. (“Hadley”) (collectively the “defendants”)
(dkt. no. 33). For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS the
motion.
I. BACKGROUND
As it must, the Court construes the facts in the light most
favorable
to
the
plaintiff
as
the
non-movant.
See
Ussery
v.
Manfield, 786 F.3d 332, 333 (4th Cir. 2015).
TBS
provides
television
programming
through
one
of
its
subsidiary stations, Cartoon Network, Inc. (dkt. no. 1-1 at 6).
Among Cartoon Network’s programming is a group of late night shows
entitled “Adult Swim,” which is geared toward adult viewers. Id. at
6-7. As part of its marketing campaign, TBS contracted with Hadley
LUTZ V. TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, ET AL.
1:15CV28
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 33]
Media to organize and produce the Adult Swim Fun House Tour (“the
Tour”), which visited ten college towns and hosted roughly 10,000
participants (dkt. no. 33-1 at 17). The Tour’s centerpiece was a
two-story, inflatable house-like structure (the “Funhouse”) (dkt.
no. 33-1 at 17). On April 26, 2014, Hadley set up the Funhouse near
the
Morgantown
Mall
in
Morgantown,
Monongalia
County,
West
Virginia. Id. at 2. The plaintiff, Sarah Leanne Lutz (“Lutz”), saw
the Funhouse on her way to work and, after looking up the event
online, decided to participate after her shift ended later that
evening. Id. at 28.
Hadley required all persons seeking to participate in the
Funhouse to register for the event, electronically sign a waiver
releasing the defendants from liability, show proof that they were
over eighteen years old, and obtain a wrist band (dkt. no. 33-1 at
17-18, 29). Before entering the Funhouse, the operators required
Lutz to stop at two registration tables. At the first table, she
provided her driver’s license to confirm that she was over eighteen
years of age, and, at the second table, she utilized a computer to
access the registration and waiver forms through her Facebook
account (dkt. no. 33-1 at 2-3). Although Lutz did not specifically
recall
registering
remembered
for
the
event
or
signing
a
waiver,
she
utilizing a computer before obtaining a wrist band for
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LUTZ V. TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, ET AL.
1:15CV28
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 33]
entry. Id. During her deposition, Lutz reviewed the “Participant
Waiver
and
Release,”
confirming
that
her
name,
personal
information, and signature were present on the electronic form
(dkt. no. 33-1 at 29-30).
The Particiant Waiver and Release included the following
language:
You acknowledge and agree that the Funhouse contains
design features and activities, which may not be suitable
for certain individuals and/or which could cause personal
injury or damage to personal property. . . .
PARTICIPATION IN THE Funhouse ACTIVITY, INCLUDING, BUT
NOT LIMITED TO, THE FEATURES/ACTIVITIES MENTIONED ABOVE,
CONTAIN CERTAIN INHERENT RISKS AND HAZARDS AND CAN RESULT
IN DAMAGE TO YOUR PERSONAL PROPERTY AND/OR SERIOUS
INJURY/DEATH TO YOU. YOU VOLUNTARILY ASSUME ALL RISK OF
LOSS, DAMAGE AND/OR PERSONAL INJURY "INCLUDING DEATH"
THAT YOU MAY SUSTAIN RESULTING FROM PARTICIPATING IN THE
Funhouse ACTIVITY. . . . YOU AGREE AND COVENANT WITH
ADULT SWIM THAT YOU SHALL NEVER SUE IT (OR ANY OF ITS
OFFICERS, DIRECTORS, SHAREHOLDERS, EMPLOYEES, AGENTS,
CONTRACTORS, VOLUNTEERS, REPRESENTATIVES, ATTORNEYS,
SUCCESSORS, AFFILIATES, AND/OR ASSIGNS) (COLLECTIVELY,
INDEMNIFIED PARTIES) IN EITHER A REPRESENTATIVE OR
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, IN LAW OR EQUITY, AND YOU SHALL
NEVER CAUSE A LAWSUIT TO BE BROUGHT AGAINST ANY OF THE
INDEMNIFIED PARTIES FOR ANY CLAIMS, DEMANDS, RIGHTS, OR
CAUSES OF ACTION WHATSOEVER ARISING FROM OR RELATING TO
ANY KNOWN OR UNKNOWN, FORESEEN OR UNFORESEEN, BODILY AND
PERSONAL INJURIES, DEATHS, DAMAGE TO PROPERTY, OR
CONSEQUENCES THEREOF WHICH RESULT FROM YOUR PARTICIPATION
IN THE FUNHOUSE ACTIVITY REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE
INJURIES, DEATH, DAMAGE, OR CONSEQUENCES WERE CAUSED BY
ANY ACTS OR OMISSIONS (WHETHER NEGLIGENT OR OTHERWISE)
COMMITTED OR PERMITTED BY ANY OF THE INDEMNIFIED PARTIES
OR BY YOU. YOU EXPRESSLY WAIVE AND RELINQUISH ANY CLAIM
FOR NEGLIGENCE OR ANY OTHER CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST ANY
OF THE INDEMNIFIED PARTIES BY YOU OR YOUR LEGAL
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LUTZ V. TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, ET AL.
1:15CV28
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 33]
REPRESENTATIVES, HEIRS, ASSIGNS, CHILDREN OR ANYONE
CLAIMING BY OR THROUGH YOU, WHICH MIGHT ALLEGEDLY ARISE
FROM YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THE FUNHOUSE ACTIVITY.
(Dkt. No. 33-1 at 4, 18). In addition, Hadley’s project manager and
event producer, Seth Bardake, provided an affidavit stating that
there were notices posted throughout the Funhouse containing the
following language:
NOTICE. PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE ENTERING THE FUNHOUSE
AREA. IF YOU DON’T AGREE TO THESE TERMS, PLEASE DON’T
ENTER! BY PARTICIPATING IN THIS ACTIVITY YOU ASSUME ALL
RELATED RISKS AND YOU RELEASE TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM,
INC. AND ITS CONTRACTORS/SUBCONTRACTORS FROM ALL
LIABILITY, DAMAGE AND/OR INJURY/DEATH RELATED TO YOUR
PARTICIPATION.
(Dkt. No. 33-1 at 18-19). Lutz, however, contends that she never
saw any of the posted signs while she was in the Funhouse. Id. at
31.
After obtaining her wrist band, Lutz entered the Funhouse,
where she encountered multiple rooms and a maze (dkt. no. 33-1 at
30-31). At one point, she asked a woman working inside the Funhouse
which way the exit was located. The woman pointed her down a
hallway, which led to a two-story inflatable slide by which to exit
the Funhouse (dkt. no. 33-1 at 31). As she approached the slide,
Lutz claims she intended to descend it in a seated position, but
was instead instructed by Hadley’s employee that she could not
descend
the
slide
in
that
manner
4
(dkt.
no.
33-1
at
32).
LUTZ V. TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, ET AL.
1:15CV28
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 33]
Specifically, Lutz recounted that a male worker at the top of the
slide told her that she could not simply sit and slide down,
rather, she had to “do something crazy,” like roll or flip down the
slide (dkt. no. 33-1 at 32). Lutz conceded that, although the
workers insisted she either roll or flip, no one physically touched
her, and it was possible for her to have just slid down once she
was seated atop the exit slide (dkt. no. 33-1 at 32-33).
Lutz began to roll down the slide and, during her first turn,
felt her ankle snap while it was underneath her (dkt. no. 33-1 at
32). She stated that she felt three “pops” and then continued to
roll to the bottom of the slide, where she yelled for help (dkt.
no. 33-1 at 32). Lutz refused workers’ requests to leave the area
at the base of the slide because it was apparent to her that she
had suffered significant injuries to her ankle (dkt. no. 33-1 at
32). Ultimately, Funhouse employees called emergency responders to
the scene, where they treated Lutz, eventually transporting her to
Ruby Memorial Hospital (dkt. no. 33-1 at 33-34). The following
morning, Lutz underwent corrective surgery for her injuries; a
dislocated ankle, a broken tibia, and a broken fibula (dkt. no. 331 at 34-35).
In her complaint, Lutz alleges that her injuries were caused
by one of Hadley’s employees insisting that she “descend the slide
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LUTZ V. TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, ET AL.
1:15CV28
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 33]
in a dangerous and unsafe manner not appropriate for someone to
exit
this
slide
nor
in
a
manner
in
which
[she]
anticipated
descending the slide” (dkt. no. 1-1 at 6). Furthermore, Lutz
asserts that, although she originally intended to simply sit and
slide down the exit, “[i]t was not until she was instructed by the
Hadley Media employee to exit the slide in a dangerous manner that
she actually did so” (dkt. no. 1-1 at 6). Lutz contends that the
defendants’ negligent operation and maintenance of the Funhouse was
the direct and proximate cause of her injuries (dkt. no. 1-1 at 6).
On January 15, 2015, Lutz filed her complaint against the
defendants
in
the
Circuit
Court
of
Monongalia
County,
West
Virginia, asserting one count of negligence (dkt. no. 1-1). On
February 18, 2015, the defendants removed the case to this Court
based on diversity jurisdiction (dkt. no. 1).
On
December
11,
2015,
the
defendants
moved
for
summary
judgment on Lutz’s negligence claim, citing two bases (dkt. no.
33).
They first argue that they are entitled to summary judgment
because
Lutz
executed
a
valid
waiver
prior
to
entering
the
Funhouse, agreeing to release them from liability for any injuries
that might result from her participation in the Funhouse. They next
argue that, during her deposition, Lutz admitted she was the
proximate cause of her own injuries when she explained that she
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LUTZ V. TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, ET AL.
1:15CV28
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 33]
decided to exit the Funhouse in a manner in which she did not feel
comfortable. Id.
Lutz counters that there was no meeting of the minds between
the parties prior to the execution of the waiver because she did
not have enough time to read the electronic waiver, and it was not
presented in a clear and concise manner (dkt. no. 34). Moreover,
Lutz argues that she did not contemplate that a Funhouse employee
would insist that she either flip or roll down the slide, nor did
she anticipate exiting the slide in the manner in which she did.
Id.
Therefore, Lutz contends that, even had there been a meeting
of the minds between the parties, the defendants’ acts were outside
the scope of the waiver. Id. Finally, Lutz disagrees that she was
the
proximate
cause
of
her
own
injuries
because
she
merely
acquiesced to the employees’ insistence that she flip or roll down
the slide after believing she had no choice, and because no
alternative exits were available to her. Id. at 7-8.
II.
Summary
documents,
judgment
STANDARD OF REVIEW
is
electronically
declarations,
stipulations
appropriate
stored
.
.
where
the
information,
.,
admissions,
“depositions,
affidavits
or
interrogatory
answers, or other materials” establish that “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
7
LUTZ V. TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, ET AL.
1:15CV28
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 33]
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c)(1)(A).
When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court reviews all
the evidence “in the light most favorable” to the nonmoving party.
Providence Square Assocs., L.L.C. v. G.D.F., Inc., 211 F.3d 846,
850 (4th Cir. 2000). The Court must avoid weighing the evidence or
determining
its
truth
and
limit
its
inquiry
solely
to
a
determination of whether genuine issues of triable fact exist.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct.
2505, 2510 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the
Court
of
the
basis
for
the
motion
nonexistence of genuine issues of fact.
and
of
establishing
the
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2556 (1986). Once the moving
party has made the necessary showing, the non-moving party “must
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S. Ct. at 2510 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The “mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence” favoring the non-moving party will not
prevent the entry of summary judgment; the evidence must be such
that a rational trier of fact could reasonably find for the
nonmoving party.
Id. at 248–52.
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LUTZ V. TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, ET AL.
1:15CV28
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 33]
III. DISCUSSION
The defendants assert that they are entitled to summary
judgment because Lutz executed a valid and enforceable waiver and
release, which relieves them from any and all liability resulting
from her participation in the Funhouse, even if her injuries
resulted
from
negligence
on
their
part.
Alternatively,
the
defendants contend that, even absent the waiver, Lutz’s decision to
roll down the inflatable slide was the sole proximate cause of her
injuries, and they therefore cannot be held liable.
A.
The Waiver
The defendants argue that Lutz voluntarily executed a valid
waiver releasing them from any and all physical injuries suffered
by
her
while
participating
in
the
Funhouse,
including
those
injuries that might have resulted from their own negligence. In
response, Lutz maintains that the waiver is unenforceable because
the parties did not reach a meeting of the minds, in that the
waiver “did not contemplate the inherent dangers neither foreseen
nor contemplated by [her] prior to entering the Funhouse” (dkt. no.
34 at 1). Further, Lutz avers that the waiver is unenforceable
because she had insufficient time to read it and no one working at
the Funhouse read or explained it to her.
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LUTZ V. TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, ET AL.
1:15CV28
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 33]
1.
Applicable Law
Courts generally disfavor waivers that release a party from
injuries caused by their own negligence. Krazek v. Mountain River
Tours, Inc., 884 F.2d 163, 165 (4th Cir. 1989). Such waivers are
“strictly construed against the releasee,” and their language must
be “clear and definite” before it will shield a releasee from
liability for its own negligence; any ambiguities in the waiver’s
language are strictly construed against the preparer. Id.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
has long held that waivers, also known as exculpatory agreements,
are normally upheld when they are freely entered into by parties of
equal bargaining power, so long as they do not violate a public
interest or conflict with an applicable safety statute.1 See Murphy
v. North American River Runners, Inc., 412 S.E.2d 504, 509 (W. Va.
1991). A plaintiff who “expressly and, under the circumstances,
clearly
agrees
to
accept
a
risk
of
harm
arising
from
the
defendant’s negligent or reckless conduct may not recover for such
harm.” Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Restatement (Second) of
1
Safety statutes include, for example, the West Virginia
Whitewater Responsibility Act and the West Virginia Skiing
Responsibility Act. Such acts establish codes of conduct and
applicable standards of care for particular industries and
activities. The parties do not contend, nor does the Court find,
that there is any safety statute applicable to this matter.
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LUTZ V. TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, ET AL.
1:15CV28
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 33]
Torts § 496B (1963, 1964)(express assumption of risk)). Krazek, 884
F.2d at 165.
Under West Virginia law, a waiver and release “ordinarily
covers only such matters as may fairly be said to have been within
the contemplation of the parties at the time of its execution.”
Murphy, 412 S.E.2d at 511 (internal quotations omitted). Parties
are at liberty to mutually agree to waive liability for the
negligent acts of the releasee. Id. at 510-11. This is true even
when the waiver fails to explicitly use the word “negligence” or
“negligent acts or omissions,” but instead makes general statements
that the releasee is “relieved in effect from all liability for any
future
loss
or
damage.”
Id.
at
511
(noting
that
the
words
“negligence” or “negligent acts or omissions” are not “magic words”
required
to
clearly
waive
the
right
to
bring
a
common-law
negligence claim). Indeed, waivers that go so far as to relieve the
releasee from claims resulting from its “intentional or reckless
misconduct or gross negligence” are valid, so long as it is clear
from the facts and circumstances that the releasor intended to do
so.2 Id. at 510.
2
Although Lutz correctly notes that “a general clause in an
exculpatory agreement or anticipatory release exempting the
defendant from all liability for any future negligence will not be
construed to include intentional or reckless misconduct or gross
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LUTZ V. TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, ET AL.
1:15CV28
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 33]
2.
Discussion
Here, the language of the waiver is clear and unambiguous, a
fact that Lutz does not contest. Instead, Lutz contends the waiver
is
invalid
particular,
because
not
of
the
way
it
was
permitting
her
time
to
presented
to
adequately
her,
read
in
and
understand it. This argument lacks merit.
As a preliminary matter, West Virginia law upholds the use of
“clickwrap” or “click-through” agreements, which require users to
consent to any terms and conditions through the use of internet
web-pages. State ex rel. U-Haul Co. v. Zakaib, 752 S.E.2d 589, 594
(W. Va. 2013). In Zakaib, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia found no difference between electronic contracts and
tangible paper agreements, concluding that electronic contracts
cannot be denied enforcement solely based on their electronic
format. Id. Instead, courts are required to interpret and apply the
same common law rules to electronic agreements as those that have
been applied to oral and written agreement for hundreds of years.
Id. at 595.
negligence . . . ,” her complaint asserts no allegations that the
defendants’ acts were anything more than common law negligence.
Dkt. No. 34 at 6 (quoting Murphy, 412 S.E.2d at 510).
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LUTZ V. TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, ET AL.
1:15CV28
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 33]
Lutz, however, claims that the waiver was not presented to her
in a “clear and concise manner” because it “was only accessible by
scrolling through [a computer maintained by the defendants], at a
makeshift table, after only accessing this waiver through [her]
Facebook
account.”3
According
to
Lutz,
these
circumstances
prevented her from having any appreciation for what she was
purportedly reading and signing. Finally, she claims that she was
only at the waiver table for a very brief time, clearly not long
enough to read the waiver, and that no employee of the Funhouse
read or explained the agreement to her.
Even taking these claims as true, Lutz’s reasoning lacks any
legal basis for finding the waiver invalid. She is college educated
and makes no claim that she could not comprehend the language
contained in the waiver (dkt. no. 33-1 at 25). Further, she fails
entirely to provide any factual support that the circumstances
somehow prevented her from reading the waiver before she signed it.
Clearly, had she chosen to do so, Lutz could have taken adequate
time to scroll through the one-and-a-half page waiver.4
3
Lutz states that she does not specifically remember the
waiver, but does not dispute that her personal information and
electronic signature appear in the form (dkt. no. 33-1 at 29-30).
4
Lutz notes that the entire document is four pages in length
(dkt. no. 34 at 5). While true, this does not change the Court’s
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LUTZ V. TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, ET AL.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 33]
The fact that Lutz accessed the waiver through her Facebook
account, on the defendants’ computer, and at a makeshift table is
wholly irrelevant. Moreover, the fact that she was at the waiver
table for only a brief time is a result of her decision not to read
the waiver, not the other way around. Indeed, Lutz makes no
assertion that she was rushed in any way and admits there was no
line when she arrived at the Funhouse (dkt. no. 33-1 at 29).
Finally, Lutz’s contention that the employees failed to read the
waiver to her lacks merit, as there is no legal requirement that an
employee do so.5 Ultimately, Lutz is not entitled to relief simply
because
she
signed
the
waiver
without
reading,
knowing,
or
understanding it. See Appalachian Leasing, Inc. v. Mack Trucks,
Inc., 765 S.E.2d 223, 231 (W. Va. 2014) (quoting Reddy v. Community
Health Foundation of Man, 298 S.E.2d 906, 910 (W. Va. 1982) (“A
person who fails to read a document to which he places his
signature does so at his peril.”).
Lutz next claims that the waiver is invalid because it “did
not
contemplate
the
inherent
dangers
neither
foreseen
nor
opinion that she could have easily read such a document in a short
amount of time.
5
Furthermore, at no point does Lutz contend that she asked any
questions of the Funhouse employees regarding the waiver.
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LUTZ V. TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, ET AL.
1:15CV28
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 33]
contemplated by [her] prior to entering the Funhouse” (dkt. no. 34
at 1). This argument also fails, as the language of the waiver,
along with her own observations, belie Lutz’s contention. The
agreement and waiver clearly note that the Funhouse, including the
slide, “contain certain inherent risks and hazards and can result
in . . . serious injury/death . . . .” See Dkt. No. 33-1 at 4. The
very concept of an inflatable funhouse is obviously to provide an
apparatus
for
persons
to
engage
in
a
variety
of
physical
activities, including running, jumping, bouncing, climbing, and
sliding. Taking Lutz at her word, she would have seen patrons
participating in the Funhouse, including flipping and rolling6 down
the exit slide as she drove up and while she was preparing to enter
(dkt.
no.
33-1
at
31).
The
Court
concludes
that
the
waiver
contemplated the inherent risk of the type of injury suffered by
Lutz and it therefore remains valid and enforceable.
B.
Proximate Causation
Having concluded that Lutz waived her right to sue, even if
her
injuries
resulted
from
allegedly
negligent
acts
by
the
defendants, the Court need not reach the issue of proximate
causation.
6
This must be true if, as Lutz asserts, the Funhouse employees
forced the patrons to either flip or roll, rather than slide in a
seated position.
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1:15CV28
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 33]
IV. CONCLUSION
For
the
reasons
discussed,
the
Court
FINDS
that
Lutz
voluntarily and knowingly signed the waiver, its language was clear
and unambiguous, and that it contemplated the inherent risks that
led
to
her
injuries.
Consequently,
the
waiver
is
valid
and
enforceable, and bars Lutz’s right to sue for any damages that
resulted from her participation in the Funhouse, even if they were
a result of negligent acts by the defendants. Accordingly, the
Court GRANTS the defendants’ motion for summary judgment (dkt. no.
33) and DISMISSES Lutz’s complaint WITH PREJUDICE.
It is so ORDERED.
The Court directs the Clerk to transmit copies of this
Memorandum Opinion and Order to counsel of record and to enter a
separate judgment order.
DATED: May 9, 2016.
/s/ Irene M. Keeley
IRENE M. KEELEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
16
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