Jackson v. Vaughn et al
Filing
12
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS: It is ORDERED that Count I is DISMISSED with prejudice and Counts III and IV are DISMISSED without prejudice. Signed by District Judge Irene M. Keeley on 10/22/15. (cnd)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
BRANDON D. JACKSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
//
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15CV128
(Judge Keeley)
CAROLYN VAUGHN, Individually
and as Director of Gyro
Technologies, Inc., d/b/a
Vaughn Energy Service,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS [DKT. NO. 5]
Pending before the Court is the partial motion to dismiss
(dkt. no. 5) filed by the defendants, Carolyn Vaughn (“Vaughn”) and
Gyro Technologies, Inc. (“Gyro”).
For the following reasons, the
Court GRANTS the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
The
Court’s
recitation
of
the
facts
is
taken
from
complaint of the plaintiff, Brandon D. Jackson (“Jackson”).
the
As it
must at this early stage of the proceedings, the Court construes
those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
See De’Ionta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 524 (4th Cir. 2013).
JACKSON V. VAUGHN
1:15CV128
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS [DKT. NO. 5]
Jackson alleges that he was recruited by Gyro Technologies1
("Gyro") and its director, Carolyn Vaughn ("Vaughn") (from time to
time “the defendants”), from his previous employment with a company
in Midland, Texas. Jackson accepted a job with Gyro and moved from
Midland to Morgantown, West Virginia in May or June, 2014. At the
time Gyro hired him, Jackson informed it that he suffered from
Crohn's disease and may require accommodations related to his
medical conditions, including missing work from time to time.
The
defendants assured Jackson that his medical issues would not
present
a
problem
accommodations.
responsibilities
and
that
According
in
an
to
they
would
make
Jackson,
he
"carried
exemplary
fashion"
during
reasonable
out
his
his
short
employment with Gyro.
Sometime in July, 2014, Jackson sought medical attention due
to his Crohn's disease, and consequently missed one day of work. In
addition, he informed Vaughn and Gyro that, due to the medication
prescribed, he would be unable to drive a motor vehicle for several
days, but otherwise would be able to perform his job duties.
Sometime later that month, while Jackson was off work, Vaughn
or Gyro sent a company representative to Jackson's home to retrieve
1
Gyro Technologies is conducting business as Vaughn Energy
Services in Morgantown, West Virginia.
2
JACKSON V. VAUGHN
1:15CV128
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS [DKT. NO. 5]
company property, including a vehicle, and to inform him that he
had been terminated. When Jackson confronted the defendants about
their allegedly discriminatory treatment, the defendants attempted
to recant their story, stating Jackson had never been terminated.
Jackson, however, asserts that the defendants did in fact terminate
him rather than reasonably accommodate his Crohn’s disease. Jackson
claims
that
the
defendants'
actions
negatively
impacted
his
physical and psychological well-being, exacerbating the symptoms
related to his Crohn’s disease and causing him to incur significant
medical costs.
Jackson originally filed suit against the defendants in state
court in Monongalia County, West Virginia, on July 8, 2015. On
August 3, 2015, the defendants removed the case to this Court.
Jackson’s complaint includes four causes of action: Count I asserts
a Harless-based wrongful discharge claim against Vaughn and Gyro;
Count II asserts discriminatory discharge in violation of the West
Virginia Human Rights Act (“WVHRA”); Count III alleges a claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) against
Vaughn and Gyro; and, finally, Count IV asserts an alternative
theory of liability against Gyro under a theory of respondeat
superior.
3
JACKSON V. VAUGHN
1:15CV128
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS [DKT. NO. 5]
On August 10, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), seeking to
dismiss Counts I, III, and IV. They contend that (1) the WVHRA
cannot serve as the substantial public policy required under
Harless; (2) Jackson has insufficiently plead his claim of IIED;
and
(3)
he
has
insufficiently
plead
his
claim
that
Gyro
is
vicariously liable for the actions of Vaughn. Jackson, notably, has
not responded to the motion. The time limit for doing so has passed
and the motion is ripe for review.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, a district court
“‘must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in
the complaint.’”
Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 188
(4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007)). However, while a complaint does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his
entitlement
to
relief
requires
more
than
mere
labels
and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.
555 (2007).
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
Indeed, courts “are not bound to accept as true a
legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”
4
Papasan v.
JACKSON V. VAUGHN
1:15CV128
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS [DKT. NO. 5]
Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). In considering whether the facts
alleged are sufficient, “a complaint must contain ‘enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Anderson,
508 F.3d at 188 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547).
“A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency
of
a
complaint;
importantly,
it
does
not
resolve
contests
surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability
of defenses.”
Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943,
952 (4th Cir. 1992).
“But in the relatively rare circumstances
where facts sufficient to rule on an affirmative defense are
alleged in the complaint, the defense may be reached by a motion to
dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6),” so long as “all facts necessary
to the affirmative defense ‘clearly appear[] on the face of the
complaint.’” Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir.
2007) (quoting Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. v. Forst, 4
F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 1993)).
III. DISCUSSION
A.
Count I - Harless Wrongful Discharge Claim
The defendants contend that the WVHRA does not provide a basis
for Jackson’s Harless substantial policy claim because the WVHRA
5
JACKSON V. VAUGHN
1:15CV128
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS [DKT. NO. 5]
provides its own statutory cause of action, and an inferred cause
of action under Harless thus is unavailable.
“In West Virginia, an employment relationship of indefinite
duration is ‘presumed to be terminable at any time at the will of
the employer or of the employee, with or without cause.’” Eddy v.
Biddle, 2013 WL 66929, at *4 (N.D.W.Va.,2013) (quoting Suter v..
Harsco Corp., 403 S.E.2d 751, 756 (W.Va.1991)). “This general rule,
however,
is
employer's
‘tempered
motivation
by
for
the
...
the
principle
discharge
that
where
contravenes
the
some
substantial public policy principle, then the employer may be
liable to the employee for damages occasioned by this discharge.’”
Id. (quoting Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d
270, 275 (W.Va. 1978)). Therefore,”a cause of action for wrongful
discharge exists when an aggrieved employee can demonstrate that
his/her employer acted contrary to substantial public policy in
effectuating the termination.” Swears v. R.M. Roach & Sons, Inc.,
696 S.E.2d 1, 6 (W.Va. 2010) (quoting Feliciano v. 7 Eleven, Inc.,
559 S.E.2d 713, 718 (W.Va. 2001)).
The proposition for which Harless stands is clear: When an
employee is discharged in contravention of a substantial public
policy, but no cause of action is provided under that policy,
courts may infer a cause of action. Accordingly, a Harless cause of
6
JACKSON V. VAUGHN
1:15CV128
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS [DKT. NO. 5]
action is superfluous when a public policy is enforceable by a
statutory cause of action. See e.g. Hope v. Bd. of Dirs., 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 92513, *8-9 (S.D. W. Va. July 2, 2013) (“With a clear
mechanism in place to enforce this public policy, a Harless cause
of action is unavailable.”); Hill v. Stowers, 680 S.E. 2d 66, 76
(W. Va. 2009) (“In Harless, this Court found that a private cause
of action was appropriate because there was no other mechanism
available to enforce the public policy at issue.”); Guevara v.
K-Mart Corp., 629 F. Supp. 1189, 1192 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 13, 1986)
(noting another instance of a court implying a cause of action,
stating that “[t]he Court noted in Hurley that without the implied
cause of action there was an ‘absence of any other method of
enforcing the declared right.’”).
When a statutory scheme provides a private cause of action to
ensure compliance with its underlying public policy objectives,
that statutory cause of action cannot be displaced by a Harless
style common law tort action. See e.g. Talley v. Caplan Industries,
Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13191, at *4 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 26,
2007); Broschart v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 2013 WL
2301777, at *1 (W. Va. 2013) (upholding dismissal of
plaintiff’s
Harless action when a remedy was available under West Virginia’s
whistle-blower law); Knox v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 899
7
JACKSON V. VAUGHN
1:15CV128
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS [DKT. NO. 5]
F. Supp. 1529, 1535-36 (N.D. W. Va. May 18, 1995) (“It is a
well-established
principle
that
federal
and
state
anti-discrimination laws, such as Title VII and the West Virginia
Human Rights Act, preempt Harless-type, tort-based actions for
discriminatory treatment in the workplace.”).
Here, it is undisputed that the WVHRA not only establishes a
substantial public policy (see W. Va. Code § 5-11-2), but also
provides a private cause of action under W. Va. Code § 5-11-1, et
seq. Jackson acknowledges the availability of this private cause of
action under the WVHRA because Count II of his complaint is based
on it; moreover, the allegations on which both Counts I and II of
Jackson’s complaint are premised are identical.
In sum, because the WVHRA provides such a statutory cause of
action, the Court DISMISSES Count I of Jackson’s complaint with
prejudice.
B.
Count III - Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Under West Virginia law, employees may sue their employer for
IIED. See Harless, 289 S.E.2d 692, 693-94 (1982). In Travis v.
Alcon Laboratories, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
established the following elements of IIED:
(1) [T]hat the defendant’s conduct was atrocious,
intolerable, and so extreme and outrageous as to exceed
8
JACKSON V. VAUGHN
1:15CV128
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS [DKT. NO. 5]
the bounds of decency; (2) that the defendant acted with
the intent to inflict emotional distress, or acted
recklessly when it was certain or substantially certain
emotional distress would result from his conduct; (3)
that the actions of the defendant caused the plaintiff to
suffer emotional distress; and, (4) that the emotional
distress suffered by the plaintiff was so severe that no
reasonable person could be expected to endure it.
Syl. pt. 3, 504 S.E.2d 419, 421 (W.Va. 1998); see also Warner v.
Boroff, 921 F.Supp.2d 513, 520-21 (N.D.W.Va. Feb. 1, 2013). IIED is
a “difficult fact pattern to prove.” Hines v. Hills Department
Stores, Inc., 454 S.E.2d 385, 390 (W.Va. 1994).
In order to meet the first element, outrageous conduct,
“courts
demand
‘strict
proof
of
unprecedented
and
extreme
misconduct.’” Warner, 921 F.Supp.2d at 521 (quoting Tanner v. Rite
Aid of West Virginia, Inc., 194 W.Va. 643, 461 S.E.2d 149, 157
(1995)). “Only a few courts have held that a plaintiff's claim of
outrage meets the ‘extreme and outrageous’ standard under West
Virginia law.” Id. (quoting Garrett v. Viacom, Inc., 2003 WL
22740917, *5 (N.D.W.Va. Aug. 27, 2003) (citing Miller v. SMS
Schloemann-Siemag,
Inc.,
203
F.Supp.2d
633,
636,
640
(S.D.W.Va.2002) (plaintiff had sufficiently alleged a claim of
outrage where the defendant's offer to transport her severely
injured husband to a medical facility was conditioned on her
promise not to treat the transport as an admission of liability for
9
JACKSON V. VAUGHN
1:15CV128
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS [DKT. NO. 5]
his
injuries).
Finally,
“[w]hether
conduct
may
reasonably
be
considered outrageous is a legal question, and whether conduct is
in fact outrageous is a question for jury determination.” Warner,
921 F.Supp.2d at 521 (quoting Syl. pt. 4, Travis, 504 S.E.2d at
421).
Here, brushing broadly, Jackson alleges that the defendants’
conduct was “extreme and outrageous” and done “recklessly, or with
the
intent
of
causing
Plaintiff
severe
emotional
distress.”
Fatally, however, his complaint is bereft of any facts supporting
those allegations. The bare facts alleged in the complaint are that
he was terminated rather than accommodate his Crohn’s disease, that
Gyro sent an employee to recover company property from him, and
that the defendants tried to recant his termination. As plead, such
actions are not of the type that courts have found rise to the
level
of
outrage
required
under
West
Virginia’s
IIED
law.
Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Count III of the complaint without
prejudice.
C.
Count IV - Vicarious Liability of Gyro Under Respondeat
Superior Theory
As a consequence of the dismissal of Jackson’s IIED claim,
Gyro cannot be held vicariously liable under a theory of respondeat
superior. The Court therefore DISMISSES Count IV without prejudice.
10
JACKSON V. VAUGHN
1:15CV128
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS [DKT. NO. 5]
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, for the reasons discussed, the Court DISMISSES
Count I with prejudice and Count III and IV without prejudice.
It is so ORDERED.
The Court directs the Clerk to transmit copies of this
Memorandum Opinion and Order to counsel of record.
DATED: October 22, 2015.
/s/ Irene M. Keeley
IRENE M. KEELEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
11
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?