Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company v. Brady et al
Filing
30
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT: It is ORDERED that Plaintiff's 21 Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED and the Court DISMISSES this case WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter a separate judgment order. Signed by District Judge Irene M. Keeley on 8/10/16. (cnd)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
v.
//
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15CV150
(Judge Keeley)
CATHY BRADY, personal
representative of the Estate
of Douglas Brady; CASSANDRA
TAYLOR, personal representative
of the Estate of Jody Taylor,
and RUTH ANN HUNT, personal
representative of the Estate
of Jody Hunt,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 21]
Pending before the Court is the plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (dkt. no. 21). For the reasons that follow, the Court
GRANTS the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
This declaratory action initiated by the plaintiff, Allstate
Property and Casualty Insurance Company (“Allstate”), seeks a
declaration that coverage under an automobile insurance liability
policy was not triggered when one of the defendants, Jody Hunt
(“Hunt”), shot and killed two individuals. This action is related
to two wrongful death suits currently pending in the Circuit Court
of Monongalia County, West Virginia.
ALLSTATE v. BRADY, ET AL.
1:15CV150
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 21]
A.
Factual Background
As it must, the Court construes the facts in the light most
favorable to the defendants as the non-movants. See Ussery v.
Manfield, 786 F.3d 332, 333 (4th Cir. 2015).
On December 1, 2014, Hunt shot and killed Douglas Brady
(“Brady”) and Jody Taylor (“Taylor”), before committing suicide
approximately twelve hours later (dkt. no. 22 at 1-2). Hunt drove
to Brady’s place of business, where the video surveillance system
captured footage of him entering the buidling unobserved, shooting
Brady in the head, and then leaving. Id. at 3. Hunt then drove to
Taylor’s house, where he allegedly shot Taylor from the cab of the
moving truck (dkt. no. 27 at 3). Later, the Westover, West Virginia
Police Department discovered the following Facebook post by Hunt:
I’m deeply hurt by the events that lead up to this day!
I did not chose [sic] to have the love of my life to go
behind my back and sleep with several guys as she came
home to lay her head on my shoulder to say goodnight....
My actions were not right nor were the actions of those
who tried to tear me down and take from me. This was not
a plan but a struggle to see that those who strives [sic]
to hurt me received their fair pay of hurt like I
received.
(dkt. no. 21-1 at 50).
Hunt used his 2011 Ford F-150 truck insured by Allstate
Automobile Liability Policy No. 918 261 049 (“Allstate Policy”) to
drive himself to the locations where he shot Brady and Taylor (dkt.
2
ALLSTATE v. BRADY, ET AL.
1:15CV150
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 21]
no. 27 at 3). Issued to Hunt, the Allstate Policy (dkt. no. 21-1 at
11) “protects an insured person from liability for damages arising
out of the ownership, maintenance or use, loading or unloading of
an insured auto.” Id. at 26 (emphasis omitted). It provides that
“[Allstate] will defend an insured person sued as the result of a
covered auto accident, even if the suit is groundless or false.”
Id. (emphasis omitted).
The Allstate Policy also contains an exclusions clause stating
that Allstate
will not pay for any damages an insured person is legally
obligated to pay because of. . . bodily injury or
property damage which may reasonably be expected to
result from the intentional or criminal acts of an
insured person or which are in fact intended by an
insured person. This exclusion applies only to damages in
excess of the minimum limits required by the financial
responsibility law of West Virginia
(Dkt. No. 21-1 at 28)(emphasis omitted).
B.
Procedural Background
Both Cathy Brady, personal representative of the Estate of
Douglas Brady, and Cassandra Taylor, personal representative of the
Estate of Jody Taylor, have filed complaints in the Circuit Court
of Monongalia County, West Virginia, alleging wrongful death caused
by
Hunt
(dkt.
no.
21-1
at
1-6).
Allstate
instituted
this
declaratory action to determine whether it provides coverage for
the defendants’ claims.
3
ALLSTATE v. BRADY, ET AL.
1:15CV150
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 21]
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary
documents,
judgment
is
appropriate
electronically
declarations,
stored
stipulations
.
.
where
the
information,
.,
admissions,
“depositions,
affidavits
or
interrogatory
answers, or other materials” establish that “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c)(1)(A).
When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court reviews all
the evidence “in the light most favorable” to the nonmoving party.
Providence Square Assocs., L.L.C. v. G.D.F., Inc., 211 F.3d 846,
850 (4th Cir. 2000). The Court must avoid weighing the evidence or
determining
its
truth
and
limit
its
inquiry
solely
to
a
determination of whether genuine issues of triable fact exist.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the
Court
of
the
basis
for
the
motion
nonexistence of genuine issues of fact.
and
of
establishing
the
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party has made the
necessary showing, the non-moving party “must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Anderson,
477 U.S. at 256 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” favoring the non4
ALLSTATE v. BRADY, ET AL.
1:15CV150
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 21]
moving party will not prevent the entry of summary judgment; the
evidence
must
be
such
that
a
rational
reasonably find for the nonmoving party.
trier
of
fact
could
Id. at 248–52.
III. DISCUSSION
The Court, exercising diversity jurisdiction, must apply West
Virginia substantive law in addressing these coverage issues. See
McKinnon v. Lincoln Benefit Life Co., 162 Fed. Appx. 223 (4th Cir.
2006 (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)).
A.
Coverage
Allstate contends that the shooting and killing of Brady and
Taylor by Hunt were actions that did not “aris[e] out of the
ownership, maintenance or use, loading or unloading” of the insured
truck, did not arise out of a covered auto accident, and are thus
not covered by the Allstate Policy (dkt. no. 22 at 2).
The phrase used in the Allstate Policy, “arising out of the
ownership,
maintenance
or
use,”
has
been
given
a
broad
interpretation. Baber v. Fortner ex rel. Poe, 412 S.E.2d 814, 817
(W. Va. 1991). Nonetheless, its bounds are not limitless. In West
Virginia, “[c]ourts have generally refused to interpret the phrase
so as to provide liability insurance coverage for acts which
involve intentional shootings.” Id. (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Brown, 779 F.2d 984, 988 (4th Cir. 1985)). Under West
5
ALLSTATE v. BRADY, ET AL.
1:15CV150
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 21]
Virginia law, it is clear that “an intentional shooting which
occurs from within the cab of a stationary pickup truck is not an
act arising out of the ownership, maintenance, operation, or use of
the vehicle.” Syl. Pt. 1,
Baber, 412 S.E.2d at 815.
For an occurrence to arise out of the use of an insured
vehicle, there must be a causal relationship between the use of the
automobile and the injuries caused. See Cleaver v. Big Arm Bar &
Grill, Inc., 502 S.E.2d 438, 442 (W. Va. 1998). The connection
between the two “must be more than incidental, fortuitous or but
for.” Baber, 412 S.E.2d at 818 (quoting Detroit Automobile InterInsurance Exchange v. Higginbotham, 290 N.W.2d 414, 419 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1980)). In assault cases, courts have tended to find no causal
connection between assault-caused injuries and the use of an
insured motor vehicle. See Baber, 412 S.E.2d at 817-18 (citing
Brown, 779 F.2d at 988).
In
Baber,
an
insured
was
backing
his
truck
out
of
his
estranged wife’s driveway when he became involved in an altercation
involving his wife’s boyfriend. As the boyfriend charged toward
him, the insured fired his pistol from within the truck, injuring
and ultimately killing the boyfriend. On those facts, the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that the insurance policy
did not cover the incident, stating that the shooting
6
ALLSTATE v. BRADY, ET AL.
1:15CV150
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 21]
was not foreseeably identifiable with the normal use of
the vehicle. The shooting did not occur because [the
husband] drove the truck to visit his wife. The vehicle
functioned merely as the situs of a shooting which could
have easily occurred elsewhere, given the circumstances.
Id. at 819 (internal quotations omitted).
Here the defendants assert that merely because Hunt drove to
the locations where he shot Brady and Taylor is sufficient to
conclude that the shootings arose out of his use of the automobile.
They further assert that the Taylor shooting arose out of the use
of the auto because Hunt was driving the truck when he shot Taylor.
Based on the controlling case law in West Virginia, however,
the deaths of Taylor and Brady did not arise out of Hunt’s use of
the insured automobile so as to trigger coverage under the Allstate
Policy. There is not a sufficient causal connection between Hunt’s
driving the truck and his shooting of the victims. In the case of
Brady, for example, Hunt was not in his vehicle when the shooting
occurred. Because Hunt was not in the truck, and the shooting was
not “reasonably related to the use of the vehicle,” there is no
causal connection between his use of the truck and Brady’s fatal
injuries.
Syl. Pt. 2, Cleaver, 502 S.E.2d at 438.1
1
As noted in Baber, a “but for” connection is not strong
enough to establish that the shooting arose out of the use of the
vehicle. Baber, 412 S.E.2d at 818. Thus, any “but for” argument
presented by the defendants must fail.
7
ALLSTATE v. BRADY, ET AL.
1:15CV150
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 21]
As to Taylor, tellingly, even though Hunt was in the truck
when
he
shot
Taylor,
the
shooting
was
“not
foreseeably
identifiable with the normal use of the vehicle.” Baber, 412 S.E.2d
at 819. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit has explained:
The mere fact that an actual nexus links the use of a
vehicle to an accident does not mean that such use was
“normal,” or that the weak causal connection thereby
created makes the injury “foreseeably identifiable” with
the vehicle. So construed, nearly any physical object
that has some remote connection to an ultimate injury
could be “used” to effect the accident that caused the
injury. Such an interpretation ignores the Baber court’s
insistence that the “use” of the car be “foreseeably
identifiable with the normal use of the vehicle.”
Watkins v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 991 F.2d 793 (Table), 1993 WL 127950,
*2 (4th Cir. 1993).
Although the defendants emphasize the fact that the truck was
allegedly in motion when Hunt shot Taylor, that fact bears little
significance in light of the overarching rule enunciated in Baber
that there is no more of a causal connection when a shot is fired
from a moving truck than when a shot is fired from a stationary
truck.2
Hunt’s
shooting
of
Taylor
2
is
no
more
“foreseeably
Indeed, it is not actually clear from the opinion in Baber
whether the truck in question was actually moving. The court simply
notes that the insured was in the process of “backing out of the
driveway, and attempting to turn around and return home” when he
was confronted by the victim. One can fairly question whether the
car was slowly moving, whether it was in “drive” with insured’s
8
ALLSTATE v. BRADY, ET AL.
1:15CV150
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 21]
identifiable with the normal use of a vehicle” merely because of
the vehicle’s movement. Watkins, 991 F.2d at 793. A moving vehicle
does not create a causal connection making a shooting a reasonably
foreseeable outcome of its movement. The reasoning in both Baber
and Watkins leads to the same conclusion here — Hunt’s actions did
not trigger coverage under the Allstate Policy.
B.
Exclusions Clause
Because there is no coverage under the Allstate Policy, the
exclusions clause is not operative.
Even had coverage been
triggered, however, the exclusions clause still would limit any
coverage to the statutory minimums inasmuch as it is undisputed
that the shootings were intentional.
The exclusions clause provides that the Allstate Policy will
not cover “damages in excess of the minimum limits required by the
financial responsibility law of West Virginia” resulting from such
acts (dkt. no. 21-1 at 28). Coverage can only be denied under the
exclusions clause “if the policyholder (1) committed an intentional
foot on the brake, or whether he had placed the vehicle in “park.”
As the circuit court that initially decided Baber noted, and the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia agreed, “[i]n all
probability, the killing of [the victim] would have occurred if
[the shooter] had been on foot, or on a bicycle, moped, or small
car.” Baber, 412 S.E.2d at 816. Similarly, Hunt could have just as
easily shot Taylor while walking down the street, or by utilizing
some other mode of transportation.
9
ALLSTATE v. BRADY, ET AL.
1:15CV150
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 21]
act and (2) expected or intended the specific resulting damage.”
Syl. Pt. 7, Farmers and Mechanics Mut. Ins. Co. Of West Virginia v.
Cook, 557 S.E.2d 801, 802 (W. Va. 2001)(emphasis omitted).
Although the defendants’ underlying state court claims allege
negligence, the intentional nature of the shootings is undisputed;
the defendants reference how Hunt “hunt[ed] down” the victims (dkt.
no. 27 at 3). Additionally, Hunt expressed his intentions and what
motivated the shootings in his Facebook post (dkt. no. 21-1 at 50),
describing his actions that day as “a struggle to see that those
who strives [sic] to hurt me received their fair pay of hurt like
I received.” Id.
This clearly indicates Hunt’s intention to
inflict the harm he caused when he shot Taylor and Brady. Thus,
even
if
Hunt’s
actions
had
triggered
coverage,
because
the
shootings were intentional, the Allstate Policy’s exclusions clause
would not provide any coverage beyond the minimum limits.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, the Court concludes that there are
no disputes of material fact and, under established West Virginia
law,
the
shooting
did
not
arise
out
of
Hunt’s
use
of
the
automobile. Consequently, the Allstate Policy does not provide
coverage and Allstate is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
10
ALLSTATE v. BRADY, ET AL.
1:15CV150
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 21]
The Court therefore GRANTS the plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment (dkt. no. 21) and DISMISSES this case WITH PREJUDICE.
It is so ORDERED.
The Court directs the Clerk to transmit copies of this
Memorandum Opinion and Order to counsel of record and to enter a
separate judgment order.
DATED: August 10, 2016.
/s/ Irene M. Keeley
IRENE M. KEELEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
11
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?