Stalnaker v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
20
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: It is ORDERED that Plaintiff's 10 Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED; the Defendant's 14 Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED; Magistrate Trumble's 17 Repor t and Recommendation is ADOPTED; Plaintiff's 18 Objections are OVERRULED; and this civil action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and STRICKEN from the docket of this Court. Signed by District Judge Irene M. Keeley on 7/6/16. (cnd) Modified relationship on 7/6/2016 (cnd).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
SHERRY LOUISE STALNAKER,
Plaintiff,
v.
//
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15CV160
(Judge Keeley)
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
ACTING COMMISSIONER
OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 17]
Pending before the Court is the Report and Recommendation
(“R&R”)
of
the
Honorable
Magistrate Judge (Dkt. No.
Robert
W.
Trumble,
United
States
17), regarding the parties’ competing
motions for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the
Court ADOPTS the R&R, GRANTS the Commissioner’s motion for summary
judgment, DENIES Stalnaker’s motion for summary judgment, and
DISMISSES this case WITH PREJUDICE.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 15, 2011, Stalnaker protectively filed a Title II
claim for disability and disability insurance benefits (“DIB”).
(Dkt. No. 7-2 at 16). Subsequently, on August 17, 2011, Stalnaker
1
STALNAKER V. COMM. OF SOCIAL SECURITY
1:15CV160
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 17]
protectively filed a Title XVI claim for supplemental security
income
(“SSI”)
benefits.
Id.
In
both
applications,
Stalnaker
alleges that, on June 1, 2011, she became disabled, rendering her
unable to work due to the following ailments: (1) Graves’ disease;
(2) fibromyalgia; (3) degenerative disc disease; (4) hypertension;
(5)
chronic
fatigue;
(6)
sciatic
nerve;
(7)
depression;
(8)
diabetes mellitus; (9) acid reflux disease; (10) back and hip
impairments; and (11) vision impairments. Id. at 25. Stalnaker’s
claim was initially denied on November 2, 2011, and denied again on
May 15, 2012, after which she filed a written request for a
hearing. (Dkt. No. 11 at 69, 92, 106-07).
On October 25, 2013, a hearing was held before United States
Administrative Law Judge Karl Alexander (“the ALJ”) in Morgantown,
West Virginia. (Dkt. No. 7-2 at 16). Stalnaker, appeared and
testified at the hearing, as did Larry Ostrowski, an impartial
vocational expert. On March 27, 2014, the ALJ issued a decision
unfavorable to Stalnaker, finding that she was not disabled within
the meaning of the Social Security Act. Id. at 13. On August 5,
2015, the Appeals Council denied Stalnaker’s request for review,
rendering
the
ALJ’s
decision
the
final
decision
of
the
Commissioner. Id. at 2.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Stalnaker filed a complaint in
2
STALNAKER V. COMM. OF SOCIAL SECURITY
1:15CV160
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 17]
this Court to obtain judicial review of the Commissioner’s final
decision. (Dkt. No. 1). On November 20, 2015, the Commissioner
filed an answer and a copy of the Administrative Record of the
proceedings. (Dkt. No. 6 & 7). On December 18, 2015, Stalnaker
filed her motion for summary judgment with a supporting memorandum.
(Dkt. No. 10 & 11). Subsequently, the Commissioner filed her own
motion for summary judgment and supporting memorandum on January,
14, 2016. (Dkt. No. 14 & 15). On January 25, 2016, Stalnaker filed
a response to the Commissioner’s motion. (Dkt. No. 16).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)(2012), Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b), and LR Civ. P. 9.02(a) the Court referred this matter to
Magistrate Judge Trumble for a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”).
Magistrate Judge Trumble’s R&R, issued on May 10, 2016, recommends
that
Stalnaker’s
motion
for
summary
judgment
be
denied,
the
Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment be granted, and the
decision of the Commissioner be affirmed. (Dkt. No. 17). Stalnaker
objected to the R&R on May 20, 2016, (Dkt. No. 18), and the
Commissioner responded on May 23, 2016. (Dkt. No. 19).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.
Review of the Report and Recommendation
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C) (2012), this Court must
3
STALNAKER V. COMM. OF SOCIAL SECURITY
1:15CV160
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 17]
conduct a de novo review of any portions of a magistrate judge’s
R&R to which objections have been filed. The Court need not conduct
a de novo review, however, when a party makes only “general and
conclusory objections that do not direct the court to a specific
error in the Magistrate’s proposed findings and recommendations.”
Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). In the absence
of a specific objection, the Court will only review the magistrate
judge’s conclusions for clear error. Diamond v. Colonial Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005).
B.
Review of the Commissioner’s Final Decision
This Court’s review of a final decision regarding disability
benefits is limited to determining whether the ALJ’s findings are
supported by substantial evidence, see Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 390 (1971), and whether the ALJ applied the correct law.
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2012); Stricker v. Colvin, No. 2:15CV15,
2016 WL 543216, at *1 (N.D.W.Va. Feb. 10, 2016). “Substantial
evidence” means “more than a mere scintilla” of evidence and is
that which a “reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.” Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir.
1990) (quoting
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Further, the “possibility of
4
STALNAKER V. COMM. OF SOCIAL SECURITY
1:15CV160
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 17]
drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not
prevent an administrative agency’s findings from being supported by
substantial evidence.” Sec’y of Labor v. Mutual Mining, Inc., 80
F.3d 110, 113 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Conolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n,
383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The issue is not whether a claimant is disabled, but whether
the ALJ’s finding of disabled or not disabled is supported by
substantial
evidence,
and
was
reached
based
upon
a
correct
application of the relevant law. See Mayer v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 700,
704 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th
Cir. 1996)). In reviewing for substantial evidence, the Court does
“not undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility
determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the
[ALJ’s].” Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005).
Rather, it is the province of the ALJ reviewing the case to make
findings of fact and to resolve conflicts in the evidence. See
King v. Califano, 599 F.2d 597, 599 (4th Cir. 1979). If substantial
evidence exists to support the ALJ’s findings, and the correct
legal standard was applied, then the conclusion must be affirmed.
See Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996).
III. Applicable Law
5
STALNAKER V. COMM. OF SOCIAL SECURITY
1:15CV160
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 17]
To be disabled under the Social Security Act, a claimant must meet
the following criteria:
[The] individual . . . [must have a] physical or mental
impairment or impairments . . . of such severity that he
is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot,
considering his age, education, and work experience,
engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work
which exists in the national economy, regardless of
whether such work exists in the immediate area in which
he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for
him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.
. . . '[W]ork which exists in the national economy' means
work which exists in significant numbers either in the
region where such individual lives or in several regions
of the country.
42
U.S.C.
§
423(d)(2)(A)
(2012).
The
Social
Security
Administration uses the following five-step sequential evaluation
process to determine whether a claimant is disabled:
(I) At the first step, we consider your work activity, if
any. If you are doing substantial gainful activity, we
will find that you are not disabled.
(ii) At the second step, we consider the medical severity
of your impairment(s). If you do not have a severe
medically determinable physical or mental impairment that
meets the duration requirement . . . or a combination of
impairments that is severe and meets the duration
requirement, we will find that you are not disabled.
(iii) At the third step, we also consider the medical
severity of your impairment(s). If you have an
impairment(s) that meets or equals one of our listings .
. . and meets the duration requirement, we will find that
you are disabled.
[Before the fourth step, the [residual functional
capacity, or RFC] of the claimant is evaluated “based on
6
STALNAKER V. COMM. OF SOCIAL SECURITY
1:15CV160
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 17]
all the relevant medical and other evidence in your case
record . . . .”]
(iv) At the fourth step, we consider our assessment of
your [RFC] and your past relevant work. If you can still
do your past relevant work, we will find that you are not
disabled.
(v) At the fifth and last step, we consider our
assessment of your [RFC] and your age, education, and
work experience to see if you can make an adjustment to
other work. If you can make an adjustment to other work,
we will find that you are not disabled. If you cannot
make an adjustment to other work, we will find that you
are disabled.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (2016); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (2016).
In steps
one through four, the burden is on the claimant to prove that he or
she is disabled and that, as a result of the disability, he or she
is unable to engage in any gainful employment. See Richardson, 574
F.2d at 804.
Once the claimant meets this burden, the burden of
proof shifts to the Government at step five to demonstrate that
jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant is capable of
performing. See Hicks v. Gardner, 393 F.2d 299, 301 (4th Cir.
1968).
If the ALJ determines that the claimant is either disabled
or not disabled at any of the five steps, the process ceases moving
forward.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (2016); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (2016).
IV. DISCUSSION
After careful consideration of the record, motions, and R&R,
7
STALNAKER V. COMM. OF SOCIAL SECURITY
1:15CV160
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 17]
the Court finds in reviewing the portions of the R&R to which
Stalnaker
filed
no
objections
that
Magistrate
Judge
Trumble
committed no clear error. Regarding Stalnaker’s objections, the
Court finds that while specific conclusions of the magistrate judge
were noted in the text of the document, the objections themselves
are broad and non-specific. In fact, Stalnaker makes only scarce
references to the R&R itself, instead generally objecting to the
ALJ’s
findings.
reconsideration
Although
of
many
issues
of
Stalnaker’s
previously
objections
addressed,
seek
several
specifically challenge the magistrate judge’s conclusion that the
ALJ relied on substantial evidence. For the sake of clarity, the
Court will address each objection, giving de novo review to those
portions which raise a specific objection, and clear error review
to those which reiterate issues previously addressed.
A.
Objection 1: Whether the Magistrate Judge Erred by Allowing
the ALJ to Review Dr. Morrison’s Opinion with More Scrutiny
Than that Given to Dr. Franyutti’s Opinion
Stalnaker alleges that the ALJ did not review the evidence
provided by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) examiners
with the same level of scrutiny as used to examine her treating
physician, Dr. Morrison. Specifically, Stalnaker argues that the
ALJ did not sufficiently explain his reasoning for determining that
8
STALNAKER V. COMM. OF SOCIAL SECURITY
1:15CV160
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 17]
Dr. Franyutti’s opinion deserved “great weight.” (Dkt. No. 7-2 at
39).1 Because of this alleged inequity of scrutiny, Stalnaker
contends that the magistrate judge erred in concluding that the
ALJ’s position was supported by substantial evidence.2
1.
Whether the ALJ Failed to Properly Explain his Determination
that Dr. Franyutti’s Opinion Deserved Great Weight
Stalnaker argues that because the ALJ only “devoted an entire
one-half paragraph” to explain why Dr. Franyutti’s opinion deserved
great weight, he did not apply the same level of scrutiny as
applied to Dr. Morrison. (Dkt. No. 18 at 2). When evaluating
medical opinions that are not entitled to controlling weight, an
ALJ must consider the following factors: (1) whether the physician
has examined the claimant; (2) the treatment relationship between
1
In accordance with the requirements of 20 C.F.R.
404.1520b, the ALJ must review all of the relevant evidence,
including medical opinions, before making a determination about
what the evidence shows. When evidence is inconsistent or
conflicting, the ALJ will “weigh” the evidence, ultimately
concluding which evidence has “greater weight,” or in some cases,
“controlling weight,” thus tipping the scale toward a conclusion of
either disabled or not disabled.
2
In reviewing the ALJ’s determination, it is also
important to note that Stalnaker appears to suggest the ALJ relied
solely on the opinion of Dr. Franyutti in making his determination.
The Court notes, however, that the ALJ stated that his Residual
Functional Capacity determination was based on “the opinions of Dr.
Franyutti and Dr. Bartee and the records of Drs. Morrison, Kafka,
and Powelson.” (Dkt. No. 7-2 at 39 (emphasis added)).
9
STALNAKER V. COMM. OF SOCIAL SECURITY
1:15CV160
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 17]
the physician and the claimant; (3) the supportability of the
physician’s opinion; (4) the consistency of the opinion with the
record; (5) whether the physician is a specialist; and (6) any
other factor that tends to support or contradict the opinion. See
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527 & 416. 927 (2016). An ALJ is not required,
however, to “recount the details of th[e] analysis [of these
factors] in the written opinion.” Fluharty v. Colvin, No. CV 2:1425655, 2015 WL 5476145, at *12 (S.D.W.Va. Sept. 17, 2015). Rather,
an ALJ must “give ‘good reasons’ in the [written] decision for the
weight
ultimately
allocated
to
medical
source
opinions.”
Id.
(quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2) (2016)).
Here, the ALJ determined that Dr. Franyutti’s opinion was
entitled
to
great
weight
because
it
was
reasonable
and
the
objective medical findings in the record supported it . While the
ALJ did not perform a detailed factor-by-factor analysis, it is
clear that consideration of the factors, such as supportability and
consistency
with
the
record,
were
guiding
principles
in
his
evaluation of Dr. Franyutti’s opinion. Furthermore, once the ALJ
has determined “the weight to be assigned to a medical opinion[,
that determination] generally will not be disturbed absent some
indication that the ALJ has dredged up ‘specious inconsistencies’
or has failed to give a sufficient reason for the weight afford a
10
STALNAKER V. COMM. OF SOCIAL SECURITY
1:15CV160
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 17]
particular opinion.” Dunn v. Colvin, 607 F. App’x 264, 267 (4th
Cir. 2015). The Court concludes that the ALJ utilized the requisite
factors in making a determination, and sufficiently explained how
he arrived at his determination. Accordingly, the Court finds no
significant discrepancy in the level of scrutiny given to the
opinion of Dr. Franyutti, and, further, the ALJ’s determination is
supported by substantial evidence.
2.
Whether the ALJ Erred in Determining that Dr. Morrison’s
Opinion Infringed on the Commissioner
Within this objection Stalnaker also attempts to argue that
Dr. Morrison’s opinion did not infringe on issues reserved to the
Commissioner. This argument was presented before the magistrate
judge in plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 10 at
9-10). Magistrate Judge Trumble reviewed this contention in his R&R
and concluded that, even if the ALJ had erred in finding that Dr.
Morrison’s opinion infringed on the Commissioner’s role, such an
error
was
“harmless
in
nature.”
(Dkt.
No.
17
at
34).
While
Stalnaker challenges the magistrate judge’s conclusion that any
error was harmless, her only justification for this challenge is a
reiteration of an argument previously raised and addressed by the
magistrate judge in his R&R. (Dkt. No. 17 at 35) Then, and now,
Stalnaker alleged that finding Dr. Morrison’s opinion to be in
11
STALNAKER V. COMM. OF SOCIAL SECURITY
1:15CV160
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 17]
conflict with the Commissioner’s role instantly removed the opinion
from being given controlling weight. Compare Dkt. No. 11 at 9-10
with Dkt. No. 18 at 2.
As previously stated, a “[g]eneral objection to a magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation, reiterating arguments already
presented, lack the specificity required by Rule 72 and have the
same effect as a failure to object.” See Phillips v. Astrue, No.
6:10-53, 2011 WL 50868551, at *2 (W.D.Va. Oct. 25, 2011) (citing
Veney v. Asture, 539 F.Supp 841, 845 (W.D.Va. 2008)). Because
Stalnaker reiterates an argument previously raised and addressed by
the magistrate judge, the court need only satisfy itself that there
is no clear error present. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. In the R&R, the
magistrate judge determined that, regardless of whether the opinion
infringed
on
the
Commissioner,
it
was
found
undeserving
of
controlling weight because it was not supported by clinical medical
evidence. (Dkt. No. 17 at 35). After reviewing the R&R, as well as
the record, the Court finds no clear error in the magistrate
judge’s conclusion.
3.
Whether the ALJ Erred in Discrediting Dr. Morrison’s Opinion
Regarding Stalnaker’s Fibromyalgia
Stalnaker also appears to have raised an additional objection
within the discussion of Objection 1. Nested in footnote 2,
12
STALNAKER V. COMM. OF SOCIAL SECURITY
1:15CV160
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 17]
Stalnaker objects to the ALJ’s discrediting of Dr. Morrison’s
statement that “[Plaintiff’s] fibromyalgia tender points interfered
with range of motion in her joints.” (Dkt. No. 18, at 3, n.2)
According to plaintiff’s brief in support of her motion for summary
judgment, because the ALJ improperly characterized the evidence
surrounding her fibromyalgia, Dr. Morrison’s opinion should not
have been discredited. (Dkt. No. 11). While this argument was
already addressed in the magistrate judge’s R&R, Stalnaker asserts
that the case law cited by the magistrate judge actually supports
Dr. Morrison’s opinion, rather than discredits it. Stalnaker’s
objection,
however,
magistrate
judge’s
fails
to
findings
consider
and
the
entirety
mischaracterizes
the
of
the
ALJ’s
conclusion. In order to bring clarity to this tangled issue, the
court reviews de novo whether the ALJ’s reasoning for discrediting
Dr. Morrison’s opinion is adequately based on substantial evidence.
Stalnaker asserts that the ALJ mischaracterized the evidence
by trying “to spin the opinion into an issue of ‘range of motion,’”
and
overlooking
that
Dr.
Morrison’s
opinion
was
based
on
Stalnaker’s pain. (Dkt. No. 18, at 3, n.2). In addressing this
contention in his R&R, the magistrate judge cited multiple cases
which found that fibromyalgia patients can retain a full range of
13
STALNAKER V. COMM. OF SOCIAL SECURITY
1:15CV160
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 17]
motion despite still suffering pain.3 According to Stalnaker, these
cases support her argument that Dr. Morrison’s opinion should not
have been discounted over range of motion limitations.
Although Stalnaker is correct in characterizing these cases as
showing that range of motion limitations do not equate to a lack of
pain, Stalnaker fails to understand that range of motion is not the
central issue driving the ALJ’s analysis. The ALJ’s explanation and
the magistrate judge’s citations were not meant to focus on range
of motion or to disregard Stalnaker’s pain, but rather to deal with
inconsistencies between Dr. Morrison’s opinion and the record.
(Dkt. No. 11 at 33). It is these inconsistencies, not the range of
motion limitations, that form the basis of the ALJ’s reasoning for
discrediting Dr. Morrison’s opinion.
As stated in the ALJ’s report, only limited weight was given
to Dr. Morrison’s opinion, “as it is not consistent with the
objective medical signs and findings in the record.” (Dkt. No. 11
at
33).
The
inconsistencies
ALJ
then
related
outlined
to
specific
Stalnaker’s
reasons,
level
of
including
pain,
the
effectiveness of her pain medication, and the extent of her
3
See Generally Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d
234, 244 (6th Cir. 2007); Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99,
108-09 (2d Cir. 2003); Russ v. Colvin, 67 F. Supp. 3d 1274, 1279
(D. Colo. 2014).
14
STALNAKER V. COMM. OF SOCIAL SECURITY
1:15CV160
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 17]
physical limitations. (Dkt. No. 11 at 33-37). Additionally, the ALJ
found
further
inconsistencies
with
Stalnaker’s
subjective
statements and descriptions of her own symptoms, all of which led
the ALJ to declare her testimony not entirely credible. (Dkt. No.
11 at 35).
When reviewing an ALJ’s conclusion, it is not the Court’s
responsibility to re-weigh the evidence or substitute its judgment
for that of the ALJ’s. Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650,653 (4th
Cir. 2005). Rather, the Court determines whether the ALJ’s findings
have provided enough analysis, supported by substantial evidence,
to enable the court to “track the ALJ’s reasoning.” McIntire v.
Colvin, No. 3:13-CV-143, 2015 WL 401007, at *5 (N.D.W.Va. Jan. 28,
2015). On review of his conclusion, the Court finds that the ALJ
sufficiently explained his reasoning, and that such reasoning is
supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the Court affirms the
ALJ’s conclusion.
B.
Objection 2: Whether the Magistrate Judge Erred by Allowing
the ALJ to Cross-exam Dr. Goudy’s Opinion with Less Intensity
Than Dr. Bartee’s Opinion
Stalnaker contends that the magistrate judge is clearly wrong
in
allowing
the
ALJ
to
produce
a
“one-sided,
intense
cross
examination” of the evidence that supports Dr. Goudy’s opinion,
15
STALNAKER V. COMM. OF SOCIAL SECURITY
1:15CV160
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 17]
while “providing no cross-examination” of evidence that supports
Dr. Bartee’s opinion. According to Stalnaker, the ALJ improperly
evaluated Dr. Goudy’s opinion under the five factors listed in 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1527 and 416.927 (2016). Specifically, Stalnaker
argues that the ALJ acted arbitrarily by relying on Dr. Morrison’s
treatment notes and medical opinion, despite the fact that he is
not a mental health specialist and his opinion was previously given
limited weight.
The arguments asserted in this objection merely reiterate
prior arguments in Stalnaker’s summary judgment brief. Compare Dkt.
No. 11 at 13-14 with Dkt. No. 18 at 4-5. Indeed, the objection
contains much of the same language used in plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment, and rehashes issues that the magistrate judge
addressed in the R&R. It appears Stalnaker seeks reconsideration of
her R&R arguments under the guise of objections.
An objection that reiterates arguments that have already been
presented “lack[s] the specificity required by Rule 72 and has the
same effect as a failure to object.” Phillips, 2011 WL 50868551, at
*2. Because Stalnaker reiterates arguments previously addressed by
the magistrate judge, the court need only satisfy itself that there
is no clear error present. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. Upon review of
the R&R, as well as the record, the Court finds no clear error in
16
STALNAKER V. COMM. OF SOCIAL SECURITY
1:15CV160
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 17]
the magistrate judge’s conclusion.
V. Conclusion
After careful consideration, and for the reasons previously
discussed, the Court
1. ADOPTS the R&R (Dkt. No. 17);
2. OVERRULES Stalnaker’s objections (Dkt. No. 18)
3. GRANTS the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt.
No. 14);
4. DENIES Stalnaker’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No.
10);
5. DISMISSES this civil action WITH PREJUDICE and DIRECTS that
it be STRICKEN from the docket of this court.
It is so ORDERED.
The Court directs the Clerk to transmit copies of this Order
to counsel of record.
DATED: July 6, 2016
/s/ Irene M. Keeley
IRENE M. KEELEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
17
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?