Consolidation Coal Company et al v. United Mine Workers of America, International Union et al

Filing 31

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS 7 AND DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE: The Court GRANTS the UMWAs motionto dismiss 7 and DISMISSES the case WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Court directs the Clerk to enter a separate judgment order. Signed by District Judge Irene M. Keeley on 6/10/16. (jss)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CONSOLIDATION COAL COMPANY, a Delaware
Corporation; McELROY COAL COMPANY, a
Delaware Corporation; THE OHIO COAL
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation;
THE HARRISON COUNTY COAL COMPANY,
a Delaware Corporation; THE MONONGALIA
COUNTY COAL COMPANY, a Delaware
Corporation; THE MARION COUNTY COAL
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation; and
THE MARSHALL COUNTY COMPANY, a
Delaware Corporation,
Plaintiffs,
v.

//

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15CV167
(Judge Keeley)

UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA,
International Union;
UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA,
District 31; and
RONALD BOWERSOX,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS [DKT. NO. 7] AND DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Pending before the Court is the motion to dismiss filed by the
defendants, the United Mine Workers of America, International
Union; the United Mine Workers of America, District 31; and Ronald
Bowersox (collectively, “the UMWA”) (Dkt. No. 7).

The questions

presented are (1) whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction
under Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 207 (1994);
and (2) whether the Court should dismiss the case because the
collective

bargaining

arbitration.

agreement

between

the

parties

requires

The Court finds that it does have jurisdiction, but

CONSOLIDATION COAL CO. V. UMWA

1:15CV167

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS [DKT. NO. 7] AND DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE
nonetheless GRANTS the UMWA’s motion to dismiss because MAEI was
obligated to arbitrate the dispute.

It therefore DISMISSES the

case WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
BACKGROUND
A.

Factual Background
As it must, the Court construes the facts in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party, here, the plaintiffs.
De’Lonta

v.

Johnson,

708

F.3d

520,

524

(4th

Cir.

See

2013).

Consolidation Coal Company, McElroy Coal Company, The Ohio County
Coal Company, The Harrison County Coal Company, The Monongalia
County Coal Company, The Marion County Coal Company, and The
Marshall

County

Coal

Company

(collectively,

“MAEI”),

own

and

operate five underground bituminous coal mines within the Northern
District of West Virginia (Dkt. No. 1 at 1-2). MAEI employs hourly
wage UMWA workers pursuant to the National Bituminous Coal Wage
Agreement of 2011 (“the CBA”).
provides

that

miners

must

Id. at 2.
report

Article III of the CBA

unsafe

safety

and

health

conditions to employers immediately; miners also must make an
effort to resolve such issues first with employers.

2

Id.

CONSOLIDATION COAL CO. V. UMWA

1:15CV167

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS [DKT. NO. 7] AND DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE
On December 5, 2013, Consol Energy, Inc. (“Consol”) sold the
five mines to Murray Energy Corporation (“MEC”).1

Id. at 2, 8.

Shortly after the sale, between December 5-13, 2013, MEC’s Chairman
of the Board of Directors, President, and Chief Operating Officer,
Robert E. Murray (“Murray”), traveled to each mine and spoke to
employees at awareness meetings.
awareness

meetings,

Murray

Id. at 8-9.

educated

miners

During these
“regarding

the

operations of the mines and their employees to ensure that MEC’s
core values and policies, including commitment to safety, are being
implemented in the field.”

Id. at 9.

Local UMWA member Ann Martin (“Martin”), who was Chairperson
of the Safety Committee for the Harrison County Mine at the time,
attended the initial awareness meeting at the Harrison County Mine
on December 11, 2013.

Id.

She later testified that Murray

intimidated and offended miners during the awareness meeting.

Id.

After the meeting, Martin contacted defendant Ronald Bowersox
(“Bowersox”),

who

is

an

International

Safety

Representative

employed by the UMWA and assigned to District 31.
Martin

and

Bowersox

spoke

after

1

every

The companies that comprise
subsidiaries of MEC (Dkt. No. 1 at 8).
3

Id. at 5, 9.

awareness

MAEI

are

meeting

now

to

indirect

CONSOLIDATION COAL CO. V. UMWA

1:15CV167

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS [DKT. NO. 7] AND DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE
coordinate the local UMWA response to assertions made by Murray
during the meetings.

Id. at 10.

Before the 2013 sale, the UMWA had a custom and practice of
first raising safety and health concerns with mine management
before filing complaints under § 103(g)2 of the Federal Mine Safety
and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 801 (2012) (“the Mine Act”).
Id. at 2, 7-8.

In the year before MEC’s acquisition, when Consol

controlled the 5 mines, UMWA members generated a total of 54 §
103(g) complaints.

Id. at 8.

Following the sale of the mines to MEC, however, UMWA members
employed at the mines, who were displeased with new management,
allegedly “embarked on an anti-management campaign” against MAEI.
Id. at 2.
significantly

As part of that campaign, miners began filing a
larger

number

of

§

103(g)

complaints,

a

high

percentage of which were subsequently deemed meritless by the Mine
Safety and Health Administration (“MSHA”).

Id. at 2-3.

After the

awareness meetings, for example, the UMWA filed a total of 100 §

2

Pursuant to § 103(g), a miner (or a representative of a
miner) can obtain an immediate inspection of a mine when the miner
has “reasonable grounds” to believe that imminent danger (or a
violation of a mandatory health or safety standard) exists. 30
U.S.C. § 813(g) (2012). These so-called § 103(g) complaints are
anonymous. Id. Employers may not discriminate against any miner
who files a § 103(g) complaint. 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(1) (2012).
4

CONSOLIDATION COAL CO. V. UMWA

1:15CV167

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS [DKT. NO. 7] AND DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE
103(g) complaints — an 85% increase over the prior year.

Id. at

10. The number of meritless complaints increased from 27 (prior to
MEC’s acquisition) to 45, a 66% increase.3
trend continued.

Id.

In 2015, this

Complaints at the Marshall County Mine increased

by 416%; complaints at the Ohio County Mine increased by 1000%;
complaints at the Monongalia County Mine increased by 87%; and
complaints at the Harrison County Mine increased by 64%.

Id.

MAEI contends that it spent time, money, and human resources
investigating each § 103(g) complaint. Id. To combat the increase
in meritless § 103(g) complaints, on April 10, 2014, Murray sent a
letter to the UMWA International President, Cecil E. Roberts, Jr.,
noting the high number of meritless § 103(g) complaints.
10-11; Dkt. No. 1-6 at 2-3.

Id. at

In a similar letter sent to mine

superintendents, Murray requested that the UMWA, “in place of, or
in conjunction with a 103(g) complaint,” inform mine management of
any safety issues, in compliance with Article III of the CBA (Dkt.
No. 1 at 11; Dkt. No. 1-7 at 2).

3

In contrast, MEC’s 7 existing mines only generated an
aggregate of 11 § 103(g) complaints in 2014, which was a decrease
from 26 complaints received in 2013 (Dkt. No. 1 at 10). The trend
at the five mines previously owned by Consol therefore contradicted
the trend at the remainder of MEC’s mines. See id.
5

CONSOLIDATION COAL CO. V. UMWA

1:15CV167

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS [DKT. NO. 7] AND DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE
The UMWA responded to the April 10, 2014, letter by filing a
§ 105(c)4 interference complaint with MSHA (Dkt. No. 1 at 11).
Bowersox testified that the purpose of the § 105(c) complaint was
to stop Murray from “getting in front of a group and possibly
interfering with the miners’ rights under the Act.”

Id.

MAEI

contends that by its anti-management campaign, especially its
failure to comply with Article III of the CBA, the UMWA has
breached the CBA and interfered with MAEI’s contractual right to
manage its operations and employees.
B.

Id. at 3.

Procedural Background
On September 18, 2015, MAEI filed suit in this Court, alleging

that the UMWA breached the CBA by engaging in an “orchestrated,
purposeful pattern of conduct to dilute MAEI’s management rights by
attempting to curtail or eliminate Mr. Murray’s participation in
the [a]wareness [m]eetings.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 12).

According to

MAEI, its claim of breach of the CBA is actionable under § 185 of
the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (2012)
(“LMRA”).

Id. at 13.

4

A miner who believes he has been discharged, interfered
with, or discriminated against may file a § 105(c) interference
complaint with the Secretary alleging discrimination. 30 U.S.C. §
815(c)(2).
6

CONSOLIDATION COAL CO. V. UMWA

1:15CV167

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS [DKT. NO. 7] AND DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Four

days

after

MAEI

filed

suit

in

this

Court,

an

administrative law judge (“ALJ”) heard testimony in the UMWA’s §
105(c) interference case (Dkt. No. 7-1 at 12).5
filed

in

this

Court

contained

deposition

The complaint

testimony

from

the

interference proceeding, including testimony from three of the six
individuals who had filed § 105(c) complaints (Dkt. Nos. 1-3, 1-4,
1-5).

Those complainants declined to testify at the ALJ hearing

out of fear that any further statements by them would become fodder
for this suit (Dkt. No. 7-2 at 33).

The ALJ heard the case and, on

November 18, 2015, issued a decision in the UMWA’s favor, finding
that MAEI had violated § 105(c) by interfering with miners’ rights
to make anonymous § 103(g) complaints.

Id. at 37-39.

MAEI has

appealed that decision to the Commission, and it is currently under
review (Dkt. No. 10 at 6).

5

The UMWA has attached exhibits, including the ALJ’s opinion
from the interference proceeding, to its motion to dismiss (Dkt.
No. 7-2). In addition, MAEI relied on deposition excerpts from the
interference proceeding in its complaint (Dkt. No. 1 at 9-11). The
Court finds that the UMWA’s exhibits are "integral to and
explicitly relied on in the complaint . . . ,” and that MAEI does
not challenge their authenticity. See Am. Chiropractic Ass'n v.
Trigon Healthcare, Inc., 367 F.3d 212, 234-35 (4th Cir. 2004). It
therefore may consider the exhibits without converting the motion
to dismiss into one for summary judgment. Id.
7

CONSOLIDATION COAL CO. V. UMWA

1:15CV167

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS [DKT. NO. 7] AND DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE
On January 13, 2016, the UMWA moved to dismiss this case
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (Dkt. No. 7), raising the
following arguments:
C

MAEI has failed to arbitrate the dispute as required by the
CBA;

C

MAEI’s claims are precluded by the ALJ’s decision in the §
105(c) proceeding;

C

MAEI’s claims violate the CBA;

C

Bowersox’s role in the events was as a union official, and he
is therefore an improper defendant; and

C

MAEI’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations.6

MAEI opposed the motion on February 26, 2016, contending that the
crux of the case arises under the LMRA, and not the Mine Act (Dkt.
No. 10).

Further, it argues (1) that the CBA does not require it

to resort to arbitration; (2) that a 10-year statute of limitations
for breach of contract is applicable; and (3) that the case is
neither precluded by the Mine Act nor the ALJ’s non-final decision.
Id.

6

Because the Court finds that the CBA requires the parties to
arbitrate the dispute, it need not address the remaining claims in
the UMWA’s motion to dismiss.
8

CONSOLIDATION COAL CO. V. UMWA

1:15CV167

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS [DKT. NO. 7] AND DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE
On March 21, 2016, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 517,7 the United
States filed a statement of interest urging the Court to dismiss
the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it
improperly circumvents the administrative review procedures in the
Mine Act (Dkt. No. 18).

The United States also contends that the

complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
because it presumes that the civil rights afforded by the Mine Act
can be waived by a CBA.

Id.

The United States takes no position

on the remainder of the arguments raised by the UMWA in its motion
to dismiss.
In its response to the United States’ statement of interest,
MAEI argues that jurisdiction exists under the LMRA, and that its
complaint states a claim under that statute (Dkt. No. 24).

On May

6, 2016, the Court heard oral argument on the jurisdictional and
arbitration issues.

These matters now are ripe for review.

7

Section 517 permits the DOJ to “attend to the interests of
the United States in a suit pending in a court of the United States
. . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 517 (2012). Pursuant to that authority, the
United States may enter a statement of interest counseling
dismissal. See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 714
(2004).
9

CONSOLIDATION COAL CO. V. UMWA

1:15CV167

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS [DKT. NO. 7] AND DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE
LEGAL STANDARD
A.

Rule 12(b)(1)
The Court construes the United States’ request to dismiss the

case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). At oral argument, the United
States clarified its intent to bring a facial challenge — not a
factual challenge — to the allegations in the complaint.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) provides that the Court must dismiss
a complaint if it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. If the movant
alleges that the complaint simply fails to state facts upon which
subject matter jurisdiction can be based, the Court must assume
that the facts in the complaint are true, and determine whether the
complaint

alleges

jurisdiction.

sufficient

facts

to

invoke

subject

matter

Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192-93 (4th

Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted).
B.

Rule 12(b)(6)
In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, a district court

“‘must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in
the complaint.’”

Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 188

(4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007)).

While

a

complaint

does

not

need

detailed

factual

allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his
10

CONSOLIDATION COAL CO. V. UMWA

1:15CV167

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS [DKT. NO. 7] AND DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE
entitlement

to

relief

requires

more

than

mere

labels

and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.
555 (2007).

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

Indeed, courts “are not bound to accept as true a

legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”

Papasan v.

Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
In considering whether the facts alleged are sufficient, “a
complaint must contain ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’”
(quoting

Twombly,

550

U.S.

at

Anderson, 508 F.3d at 188

547).

“A

claim

has

facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009). This requires “more than a sheer possibility that
a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

Id.

ANALYSIS
A.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The United States challenges this Court’s subject matter

jurisdiction, citing Thunder Basin for the proposition that the
Mine Act precludes initial judicial review because Congress has
established a comprehensive review process that applies to all

11

CONSOLIDATION COAL CO. V. UMWA

1:15CV167

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS [DKT. NO. 7] AND DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE
violations of the Act (Dkt. No. 18 at 13).8

See Thunder Basin, 510

U.S. at 208-09.
Thunder Basin operated a surface coal mine in Wyoming, where
it employed approximately 500 non-union employees. Id. at 204. In
1990, pursuant to § 813(f) of the Mine Act, Thunder Basin employees
selected two UMWA members, who were not fellow employees, to serve
as their representatives to management.
to

post

information

regarding

required by 30 C.F.R. § 40.4.

the
Id.

Id.

Thunder Basin failed

miners’

representatives

as

Instead, it filed suit in

federal district court, seeking pre-enforcement injunctive relief.
Id. at 204-05.

In its suit, Thunder Basin argued that the

designation of non-employee UMWA representatives violated its
rights under the National Labor Relations Act.

Id. at 205.

The district court enjoined the Secretary from enforcing 30
C.F.R. § 40.4, finding that Thunder Basin might suffer irreparable
harm and had raised serious questions on the merits.
06.

Id. at 205-

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

reversed, holding that the Mine Act’s review scheme precluded
jurisdiction over the claims.

Id. at 206.

8

In its reply to MAEI’s motion to dismiss, filed on the same
day as the United States’ statement of interest, the UMWA argues
for the first time that Thunder Basin applies (Dkt. No. 19 at 710).
12

CONSOLIDATION COAL CO. V. UMWA

1:15CV167

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS [DKT. NO. 7] AND DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE
On review of the case, the Supreme Court held that parties
cannot obtain initial judicial review under the Mine Act in
district court unless the claims are (1) wholly collateral to the
administrative review scheme, and (2) outside of the agency’s
expertise,

particularly

where

a

finding

foreclose all meaningful judicial review.

of

preclusion

could

Elk Run Coal Co., Inc.

v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 804 F. Supp. 2d 8, 17 (D.D.C.
2011) (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight
Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 489-90 (2010) (internal citations omitted)).
In the Mine Act, Congress established “a detailed structure
for

reviewing

violations

of

‘any

mandatory

health

or

safety

standard, rule, order, or regulation promulgated’ under the Act.”
Id. at 208.

The Act vests “exclusive jurisdiction over challenges

to agency enforcement proceedings” in the Commission and the
appropriate appeals court. Id. Although Thunder Basin had brought
a pre-enforcement challenge, the Supreme Court held that “Congress
intended to preclude challenges such as the present one[,]” because
“[t]he Act’s comprehensive review process does not distinguish
between preenforcement and postenforcement challenges, but applies
to all violations of the Act and its regulations.”

Id. at 208-09.

According to the United States, this case implicates Thunder
Basin

because

it

improperly
13

circumvents

the

Mine

Act’s

CONSOLIDATION COAL CO. V. UMWA

1:15CV167

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS [DKT. NO. 7] AND DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE
administrative review process by attempting to frame a Mine Act
claim as one arising under the LMRA (Dkt. No. 18 at 13-14).
Although MAEI pleaded a claim under the LMRA, the United States
argues that claim requires interpretation of the parties’ rights
and

duties

under

the

Commission’s expertise.

Mine

Act,

which

places

it

within

the

Id. at 14.

MAEI contends that this Court’s jurisdiction is proper under
the LMRA, which establishes a substantive federal right to have a
federal court review disputes under a CBA (Dkt. No. 24 at 9-10).
See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S.
448, 455 (1957).

Even if Thunder Basin does apply, MAEI argues it

would not preclude claims based on the CBA because the dispute does
not implicate the Mine Act’s remedial provisions, but, rather, only
requires the Court to interpret and determine whether the UMWA
breached the CBA (Dkt. No. 24 at 14, 17).
After carefully considering the parties’ arguments, the Court
concludes that the LMRA clearly provides it with federal question
jurisdiction in cases regarding disputes over collective bargaining
agreements.
crucial

See, e.g., Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456-57.

question

jurisdiction.

is

whether

Thunder

Basin

destroys

The Court concludes that it does not.

14

The
that

CONSOLIDATION COAL CO. V. UMWA

1:15CV167

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS [DKT. NO. 7] AND DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE
First, MAEI’s lawsuit about breach of the CBA is “wholly
collateral” to the Mine Act’s administrative review scheme inasmuch
as

it

is

not

challenging

enforcement of the Act.

the

Secretary’s

interpretation

Elk Run, 804 F. Supp. 2d at 17.

or

Although

MAEI’s claim would likely require the Court to consider some
provisions of the Mine Act, its essential focus is on the CBA.

See

Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 490 (finding the petitioners’ general
challenge to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to be
“wholly collateral” to any Securities and Exchange Commission
orders or rules from which review may be sought).
Second, this dispute lies outside of MSHA’s expertise because
it is focused primarily on a collective bargaining dispute.
Run, 804 F. Supp. 2d at 17.

Elk

Historically, MSHA has acknowledged

that other forums are more appropriate “for resolving issues so
closely related to collective bargaining and union management
relations [as work stoppage].”

Local Union 5869, Dist. 17, United

Mine Workers of Am. v. Youngstown Mine Corp., 1 FMSHRC 990, 995
(1970).

For

example,

although

MSHA

can

and

does

interpret

collective bargaining agreements “for the purpose of resolving
issues arising under the Mine Act,” it “does not sit as a super
grievance or arbitration board.”
Corp., 9 FMSHRC 891, 899 (1987).
15

Mullins v. Beth-Elkhorn Coal

CONSOLIDATION COAL CO. V. UMWA

1:15CV167

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS [DKT. NO. 7] AND DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Finally, MAEI does not have access to the Commission for
meaningful judicial review of the CBA,9 and a final finding of
preclusion here may foreclose all meaningful judicial review.
Run, 804 F. Supp. 2d at 17.

Elk

The Mine Act does not give MSHA

jurisdiction over MAEI’s breach of CBA claims. See Am. Coal Co. v.
Mine Safety and Health Admin., No. 08-CV-814, 2010 WL 653113, at *5
(S.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 2010) (explaining the jurisdictional grant of
the Mine Act).
Unlike Thunder Basin, where the mine operator brought a preenforcement challenge to provisions of the Mine Act, MAEI seeks to
See 510 U.S. at 507-08.

enforce provisions of the CBA.

Although

MAEI’s claims may tangentially “require interpretation of the
parties’ rights and duties” under the Mine Act, they do not arise
under the Mine Act.

See 510 U.S. at 214.

Cases subsequent to

Thunder Basin have described its holding as “a challenge to the
agency’s

interpretation

of

a

statute

it

was

charged

with

enforcing.” Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, __

9

The United States contends that MAEI could have raised its
breach of CBA claim as a defense during the interference
proceeding.
MAEI did not, likely because this case, filed two
months before the ALJ’s hearing, was already pending. Under these
circumstances, the Court declines to impose a rule that MAEI must
bring its breach of CBA claim as a defense in the interference
proceeding or risk losing any opportunity to obtain relief.
16

CONSOLIDATION COAL CO. V. UMWA

1:15CV167

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS [DKT. NO. 7] AND DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE
F. Supp. 3d __, No. 1:15CV2512, 2015 WL 7273262, at *5 (N.D. Ga.
Nov. 17, 2015).
Assuming all facts in the complaint are true, as the Court
must, MAEI is not challenging the interpretation of the Mine Act,
but rather the UMWA’s failure to abide by the CBA.
F.3d at 193.
declines

to

See Kerns, 585

For all of these reasons, therefore, the Court
dismiss

the

case

for

lack

of

subject

matter

jurisdiction.
B.

Arbitration
The UMWA argues that the Court should dismiss MAEI’s complaint

for failure to exhaust mandatory arbitral remedies before filing
suit in district court (Dkt. No. 7-1 at 9).

It points to Articles

XXVII and XXVIII of the CBA, which outline a detailed grievance
process, including arbitration, and an agreement to settle all
disputes and claims “unless national in character” by the grievance
process “without recourse to the courts.”
XXVIII(c).

CBA, Art. XXVII, Art.

The UMWA urges the Court to follow Domino Sugar Corp.

v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392 of the United Food & Com. Workers
Int’l Union, 10 F.3d 1065, 1066 (4th Cir. 1993), which provides a
presumption in favor of arbitrability unless the arbitration clause
is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted
dispute (Dkt. No. 7-1 at 8).
17

CONSOLIDATION COAL CO. V. UMWA

1:15CV167

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS [DKT. NO. 7] AND DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE
MAEI contends that the CBA does not require it to grieve the
claim in this case because an employer is not required to grieve
disputes over the CBA (Dkt. No. 10 at 8).

It argues that the

decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit in Jim Walter Res., Inc. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 633
F.3d 1322, 1324 (11th Cir. 2011), which analyzed the same CBA at
issue here and concluded the employer was not compelled to grieve
a dispute over the CBA, is persuasive and on point.

Id. at 8, 11-

13. According to MAEI, Domino Sugar’s presumption of arbitrability
does not apply, and, even if it did, the Supreme Court limited its
scope in Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287,
296 (2010).

Id. at 8, 12.

The question of arbitrability is to be determined by the Court
unless the parties “clearly and unmistakably” provide otherwise.
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S.
574, 582-83 (1960).

A court may submit to arbitration only those

disputes the parties have agreed to submit. Granite Rock, 561 U.S.
at 302.
When a labor agreement contains an arbitration provision,
courts must find in favor of arbitrability “unless it may be said
with

positive

assurance

that

the

arbitration

clause

is

not

susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.
18

CONSOLIDATION COAL CO. V. UMWA

1:15CV167

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS [DKT. NO. 7] AND DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.”
F.3d at 1069 (quoting AT&T Tech., Inc.

v.

Domino Sugar, 10

Commc’n Workers of Am.,

475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986) (internal quotation marks, citations, and
emphasis omitted)). The policy favoring arbitration, however, only
applies where it reflects “a judicial conclusion that arbitration
of a particular dispute is what the parties intended because their
express agreement to arbitrate was validly formed . . . ,” is
legally enforceable and is best construed to encompass the dispute.
Granite Rock, 561 U.S. at 303.
The Court must first examine the CBA to determine whether it
requires arbitration. Article XXVII, titled “Maintain Integrity of
Contract and Resorts to Courts,” reflects the intention of the
parties to submit “all disputes and claims which are not settled by
agreement” to the process in Article XXVIII.

CBA, Article XXVII.

Under Article XXVII, all disputes, except for cases involving
successorship or disputes that are “national in character,” must be
settled using the dispute resolution process.10

Id.

Article XXVIII confirms the broad nature of the parties’
agreement to arbitrate.

It specifies that the parties should use

10

MAEI’s focus on Article III of the CBA, see Dkt. No. 10 at
4-5, 9, would yield the same result because Article III refers the
grievant to the dispute resolution framework in Article XXVIII(c).
See Article III(i)(4), III(p)(3).
19

CONSOLIDATION COAL CO. V. UMWA

1:15CV167

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS [DKT. NO. 7] AND DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE
the dispute resolution procedure to resolve “differences . . .
between the Mine Workers and an Employer as to the meaning and
application

of

the

provisions

of

this

Agreement

.

.

.,”

“differences . . . about matters not specifically mentioned in this
Agreement . . . ,” or “any local trouble of any kind . . . at the
mine.”

CBA, Article XXVIII(c).

The dispute resolution process involves multiple steps.

The

employee must first complain to his immediate foreman, who has the
authority to settle the matter. If the foreman and employee do not
agree, the complaint is submitted to the Mine Committee and mine
management. Next, the grievance is referred to a representative of
the

UMWA

and

a

representative

of

the

employer.

If

the

representatives fail to agree, the dispute is referred “to the
appropriate district arbitrator, who shall decide the case without
delay.”

CBA, Article XXVIII(c)(1)-(4).

is final.

The arbitrator’s decision

CBA, Article XXVIII(c)(4).

Here, the parties agreed in the CBA to arbitrate this dispute.
Articles XXVII and XXVIII reflect the broad scope of arbitrable
matters, which include “all disputes and claims,” differences about
the meaning of the CBA, and differences not specifically mentioned
in the CBA.

CBA, Articles XXVII, XXVIII.

This dispute centers on

provisions in the CBA that allegedly require UMWA members first to
20

CONSOLIDATION COAL CO. V. UMWA

1:15CV167

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS [DKT. NO. 7] AND DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE
report safety concerns to management. That the grievance procedure
mentions an “employee,” as opposed to the employer, filing a
complaint is not dispositive for two reasons.
First, the CBA itself says that employers must use the
procedure

set

specifically
“[s]hould

forth

states

in
that

differences

Article
the

arise

XXVIII.

parties

between

Article

must

the

use

Mine

the

XXVIII(c)
procedure

Workers

and

an

Employer as to the meaning and application of the provisions of
this Agreement.”

CBA, Article XXVIII(c) (emphasis added).

Second, binding Fourth Circuit precedent directs the Court to
submit the case to arbitration.

Akin to this case, Domino Sugar

dealt with an arbitration clause that lacked a provision requiring
the employer to arbitrate a dispute.

10 F.3d at 1069.

The Fourth

Circuit rejected the same argument advanced by MAEI, noting in
doing so that it “must interpret a collective bargaining agreement
as imposing arbitration requirements on an employer unless ‘there
is an express, flat limitation that arbitration boards should
consider only employee grievances.’” Id. (quoting Atkinson v.
Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 243 (1962)).

Thus, even if the

CBA were silent, the Court would interpret it as requiring MAEI to
arbitrate.

21

CONSOLIDATION COAL CO. V. UMWA

1:15CV167

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS [DKT. NO. 7] AND DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Jim Walter, on which MAEI
so heavily relies, does not compel a different conclusion.

In

point of fact, Jim Walter recognized that the Fourth Circuit had
reached a different result in Domino Sugar.

Jim Walter, 663 F.3d

at 1327 (noting that, in addition to the Fourth Circuit, the Second
and Third Circuits also have applied a presumption of arbitrability
to compel employers to arbitrate where the contract expressed a
general commitment to arbitrate disputes, because “if the parties
had intended to exclude employer initiated claims from arbitration,
they could and should have said so.”).
MAEI’s other argument, that Granite Rock drastically changed
the

landscape

similarly

of

arbitration

unavailing.11

In

law

in

Granite

the
Rock,

Fourth
the

Circuit,

Supreme

is

Court

reaffirmed that courts must interpret the parties’ agreement and
determine whether they agreed to arbitrate disputes involving a
particular matter.

561 U.S. at 301.

To that end, courts apply the

presumption of arbitrability “only where a validly formed and

11

To the contrary, in post-Granite Rock cases, the Fourth
Circuit rejected the suggestion that Granite Rock compelled courts
to narrowly construe all arbitration clauses. See, e.g., Cent. W.
Va. Energy, Inc. v. Bayer Crop-Science LP, 645 F.3d 267, 277 n.11
(4th Cir. 2011)(explaining that Granite Rock narrowly held that the
phrase “arising under” in an arbitration clause did not extend to
cover disputes about the agreement’s formation).
22

CONSOLIDATION COAL CO. V. UMWA

1:15CV167

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS [DKT. NO. 7] AND DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE
enforceable arbitration agreement is ambiguous about whether it
covers the dispute at hand,” and adhere to the presumption unless
it is rebutted.

Id. (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted).
The Supreme Court cautioned courts to respect the framework
for

deciding

arbitrability,

and

not

let

the

presumption

of

arbitrability override the principle that “a court may submit to
arbitration only those disputes . . . that the parties have agreed
to submit.”
omitted).

Id.

at 302 (internal citations and quotation marks

Here, the Court has followed the Supreme Court’s

directive by determining that the parties intended to arbitrate the
instant dispute.
C.

Motion to Dismiss
Although the Federal Arbitration Act directs courts to stay

cases subject to arbitration, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2012), the Fourth
Circuit, in Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc.

v.

BSR Tropicana Resort,

Inc., 252 F.3d 707, 709-10 (4th Cir. 2001), held that dismissal is
proper when all issues in a lawsuit are arbitrable.

Because all

issues in this case are arbitrable, the Court exercises its
discretion to grant the UMWA’s motion and dismiss the case in favor
of arbitration.

See Cox v.

Assisted Living Concepts, Inc., No.

6:13-00747, 2014 WL 1094394, at *7-8 (D.S.C. Mar. 18, 2014)
23

CONSOLIDATION COAL CO. V. UMWA

1:15CV167

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS [DKT. NO. 7] AND DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE
(dismissing the case without prejudice for failure to arbitrate
when all claims are subject to arbitration).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, the Court GRANTS the UMWA’s motion
to dismiss (Dkt. No. 7) and DISMISSES the case WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
It is so ORDERED.
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to transmit copies of this Order
to counsel of record, to enter a separate judgment order, and to
remove this case from the Court’s active docket.
DATED:

June 10, 2016.
/s/ Irene M. Keeley
IRENE M. KEELEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

24