Southern v. The Marion County Coal Company et al
Filing
16
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 11 MOTION TO REMAND. The Marion County Coal Company has sufficiently proven subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332(a). Accordingly, Charles Adam Southern' s motion to remand is DENIED. Signed by Senior Judge Frederick P. Stamp, Jr. on 11/10/2015. (kd)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLES ADAM SOUTHERN,
individually and as the parent and
next-friend of A.K.S., an infant
under the age of 18 years,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Civil Action No. 1:15CV171
(STAMP)
THE MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY,
a West Virginia corporation,
MURRAY AMERICAN ENERGY, INC.,
a Delaware corporation,
CONSOL ENERGY, INC.,
a Delaware corporation,
CONSOLIDATION COAL COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation, and
JOHN DOE CORPORATION,
a not yet known corporate entity,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND
Charles Adam Southern (“Southern”) filed this workplace injury
case in the Circuit Court for Marion County, West Virginia.
defendants
removed
the
case
to
this
Court,
citing
The
diversity
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Southern is a citizen of West
Virginia, and the defendants are all incorporated in Delaware and
have their principal places of business in Ohio or Pennsylvania.
Southern filed a motion to remand, arguing that defendant, The
Marion County Coal Company (“Marion”), is also a citizen of West
Virginia and thus breaks complete diversity.
The dispute revolves
around whether Marion’s principal place of business is located in
Mannington, West Virginia or St. Clairsville, Ohio.1
I.
Background
Southern worked as a foreman for Marion at its Loveridge #22
Mine.
He entered the mine to replace the battery for a “650
scoop,” a large mining vehicle that has a bulldozer-like scoop on
its front.
The battery was placed on top of the 650 scoop.
Suddenly, the other end of the 650 scoop fell into a pit.
Southern
stumbled and grabbed the battery for stability. Unfortunately, the
end of the scoop on which the battery was sitting was forced
upwards against the mine roof, crushing Southern’s hands. He filed
this action in the Circuit Court of Marion County, West Virginia,
alleging claims for deliberate intent under West Virginia Code
§
23-4-2(d)(2)(ii),
negligence,
strict
liability,
and
strict
products liability. The defendants removed the case to this Court,
and Southern filed this motion to remand.
In support of removal, the defendants allege that Southern is
a citizen of West Virginia; that all defendants are incorporated in
Delaware;
that
Marion,
Murray
American
Energy,
Inc.,
and
Consolidation Coal Company have their principal places of business
in St. Clairsville, Ohio; and that Consol Energy, Inc. has its
1
This Court notes that in their briefs, the parties spelled
out “Saint.” However, the City of St. Clairsville’s official name
abbreviates “Saint,” and this Court will refer to it as “St.
Clairsville.”
See
City
of
St.
Clairsville,
Ohio,
http://www.stclairsville.com/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2015).
2
principal place of business in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania.
Further,
the defendants allege that, based on Southern’s serious injuries,
emotional trauma, lost wages, and lost earning capacity, the amount
in controversy likely exceeds $75,000.00.
In his motion to remand, Southern argues that there is not
complete diversity because Marion’s principal place of business is
in Mannington, West Virginia rather than St. Clairsville, Ohio as
it alleges.
He relies on an unrelated complaint Marion filed in
2014, wherein Marion alleged that its principal place of business
was in Mannington.
Southern argues that Marion’s principal place
of business is still in Mannington and that Marion should be
judicially estopped from claiming otherwise.
In response, Marion
argues that the prior filing was erroneous and inconsequential to
the litigation.
It further offers an affidavit from a corporate
executive stating that Marion’s principal place of business is in
St. Clairsville.
II.
Applicable Law
A defendant may remove a case from state court to a federal
court with original jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1441.
Under 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a), district courts have original jurisdiction where
the dispute is between citizens of different states and the amount
in controversy exceeds $75,000.00.
The parties must be completely
diverse, meaning that “the citizenship of each plaintiff must be
different from the citizenship of each defendant.”
3
Hoschar v.
Appalachian
Power
Co.,
739
F.3d
163,
170
(4th
Cir.
2014).
Diversity is “assessed at the time the action is filed.” FreeportMcMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428 (1991).
The party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing
federal jurisdiction.
LLC,
460
F.3d
challenged,
576,
the
See In re Blackwater Security Consulting,
583
(4th
defendant
Cir.
must
2006).
establish
When
removal
jurisdiction
by
is
a
Strawn v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 530
preponderance of the evidence.
F.3d 293, 297-98 (4th Cir. 2008).
Further, this Court must
strictly construe its removal jurisdiction and remand if federal
jurisdiction is doubtful.
Hartley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 187 F.3d
422, 425 (4th Cir. 1999).
III.
Discussion
Southern argues that Marion is a citizen of West Virginia and,
thus, breaks complete diversity.
Southern does not challenge the
alleged citizenship of any other defendant, and only challenges the
location of Marion’s principal place of business.
A corporation is “deemed to be a citizen of every State . . .
[in] which it has been incorporated and of the State . . . where it
has its principal place of business.”
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c).
A
corporation’s principal place of business is its “nerve center.”
Hoschar, 739 F.3d at 170 (citing Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S.
77, 80-81(2010)).
The nerve center is “the place where the
corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and coordinate
4
the corporation’s activities.”
Hertz, 559 U.S. at 80-81.
While
the nerve center will typically be “where the corporation maintains
its headquarters,” it must be the place where corporate officers
make significant corporate decisions and set corporate policy. Id.
at 93; see also Hoschar, 739 F.3d at 172 (“We conclude that if a
corporation’s day-to-day operations are managed in one state, while
its officers make significant corporate decisions and set corporate
policy
in
another,
the
principal
place
of
business
is
the
latter.”).
In support of removal, Marion supplied an affidavit from Paul
B. Piccolini (“Piccolini”), Marion’s Vice President, stated that
Marion “has always had its corporate headquarters . . . in St.
Clairsville.”
ECF No. 14 Ex. 2 at 1.
Marion’s Chief Executive
Officer, Vice Presidents, and Secretary maintain their primary
offices in the St. Clairsville headquarters. All corporate records
are kept at the headquarters, and all accounts payable are managed
there.
Further,
Piccolini
stated
that
Marion’s
“high
level
officers have always directed, controlled, and coordinated [its]
business operations from [its] corporate headquarters.” ECF No. 14
Ex. 2 at 2. Thus, Piccolini’s affidavit demonstrates that Marion’s
headquarters is located in St. Clairsville and that its corporate
officers make significant corporate decisions and set corporate
policy there.
5
Southern argues that Marion’s assertion that its principal
place of business is in St. Clairsville is inconsistent with prior
assertions it made to this Court in a separate case.
Marion filed
an unrelated complaint with this Court in March 2014, in which it
alleged that its principal place of business was in Mannington,
West Virginia.
Southern argues that Marion is attempting to
manipulate this Court into exercising jurisdiction and that Marion
should be estopped from claiming that its principal place of
business is in St. Clairsville.
“Judicial estoppel precludes a party from adopting a position
that is inconsistent with a stance taken in prior litigation.
The
purpose of the doctrine is to prevent a party from playing fast and
loose with the courts, and to protect the essential integrity of
the judicial process.”
Lowery v. Stovall, 92 F.3d 219, 223 (4th
Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The doctrine
applies only if: (1) the party sought to be estopped [is] . . .
seeking to adopt a position that is inconsistent with a stance
taken in prior litigation”; (2) “the prior inconsistent position
[was] . . . accepted by the court”; and (3) “the party against whom
judicial estoppel is to be applied . . . intentionally misled the
Zinkand v. Brown, 478 F.3d 634,
court to gain unfair advantage.”
683 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Further,
the inconsistent position must be factual rather than legal and the
6
“bad faith requirement is the determinative factor.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Here, Marion presented an affidavit from Jacob A. Manning, who
helped prepare the 2014 complaint for Marion.
Manning stated that
a month after filing the complaint, he realized that Marion’s
principal place of business was actually in St. Clairsville.
he
amended
principal
the
place
complaint
of
to
omit
business.
any
reference
Accordingly,
to
Marion
So,
Marion’s
did
not
intentionally mislead this Court into believing that its principal
place of business was in Mannington. Nor did Marion actually adopt
that
position,
as
it
amended
its
complaint
to
withdraw
the
principal place of business assertion. Further, that assertion was
not adopted by this Court because jurisdiction in that case was
based on a federal question, and the parties’ citizenship was
inconsequential.
See ECF No. 14 Ex. 3 at 2-3; 5:14cv39, ECF No. 1
at 2-3. Therefore, Marion is not judicially estopped from claiming
that its principal place of business is in St. Clairsville.
Accordingly, this Court finds that Marion has proven that its
principal place of business is located in St. Clairsville, Ohio.
As such, complete diversity exists and this Court has original
jurisdiction over this case.
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IV.
Conclusion
The Marion County Coal Company has sufficiently proven subject
matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
Accordingly,
Charles Adam Southern’s motion to remand (ECF No. 11) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to transmit a copy of this memorandum
opinion and order to counsel of record herein.
DATED:
November 10, 2015
/s/ Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.
FREDERICK P. STAMP, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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