Metz v. Eastern Associated Coal, LLC
Filing
25
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO AMEND 2 AND MOTION TO REMAND 7 ; DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 5 AND MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT 18 : The Court GRANTS Metzs motion to amend his complaint 2 ; GRANTS Metzs motion to remand and REMANDS this case to the Circuit Court of Monongalia County 7 ; DENIES as MOOT Easterns motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 5 ; DENIES as MOOT Easterns motion to dismiss plaintiffs amended complaint 18 ; and CANCELS the Scheduling Conference on Friday, February 26, 2016. (copy to Circuit Clerk with copy of docket sheet) Signed by District Judge Irene M. Keeley on 2/25/16. (jss)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
HENRY METZ
Plaintiff,
v.
//
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15CV236
(Judge Keeley)
EASTERN ASSOCIATED COAL, LLC.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO AMEND [DKT. NO. 2] AND MOTION TO REMAND
[DKT. NO. 7]; DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM [DKT. NO. 5]
AND MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT [DKT. NO. 18]
Pending before the Court are multiple motions filed by both
parties. The plaintiff, Henry Metz (“Metz”), has filed two motions.
In the first, he moves to amend his original complaint (dkt. no.
2). In the second, he moves for remand based on his amended
complaint (dkt. no. 7). The defendant, Eastern Associated Coal, LLC
(“Eastern”), also has filed two motions to dismiss Metz’s original
and amended complaints (dkts. no. 5 and 18). These motions are
fully briefed and ripe for review.
I. BACKGROUND
Metz worked at the Martinka #1 coal mine from 1977 until its
closure in 1993. Following that, he worked at the Martinka / Tygart
River Mine until its closure on or about December 5, 1995. After
being laid off, Metz became certified as an underground surface
electrician, one of the requirements to hold the classification of
METZ v. EASTERN ASSOCIATED COAL, LLC.,
1:15CV236
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO AMEND [DKT. NO. 2] AND MOTION TO REMAND
[DKT. NO. 7]; DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM [DKT. NO. 5]
AND MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT [DKT. NO. 18]
mechanic. Also, in 1988, he had returned to school, where he earned
a degree in Industrial Relations.
At all relevant times, Metz was a member of the United Mine
Workers Association (“UMWA”). The UMWA has a collective bargaining
agreement (“CBA”) with Eastern, which provides the procedure for
applying for jobs at Eastern that are subject to the CBA. One of
those procedures required Metz to select the jobs for which he
would like to be considered should a vacancy arise. Around May 21,
2012, Metz updated his list of jobs to include the positions of
“mechanic” or “mechanic trainee.”
Around July, 2012, Eastern posted positions for mechanic
trainees at its Federal #2 mine. Metz was not selected; instead,
Eastern filled the positions with existing employees of the Federal
#2 mine. According to the complaint, under the CBA, if the “skills
are presently available within the classified workforce” (i.e.
qualified mechanics), Eastern was required to post vacancies for
mechanics — not mechanic trainees. Finally, under the CBA, a member
shall be considered for every job which he has listed on his panel
form based on seniority, and the sole basis for determining
2
METZ v. EASTERN ASSOCIATED COAL, LLC.,
1:15CV236
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO AMEND [DKT. NO. 2] AND MOTION TO REMAND
[DKT. NO. 7]; DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM [DKT. NO. 5]
AND MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT [DKT. NO. 18]
seniority is based on length of service and ability to perform the
work posted.
At the time he was passed over, Metz believed that he was not
selected
“simply
because
Defendant
failed
to
adhere
to
the
requirements of the CBA.”1 (Dkt. No. 15 at 2). Around January 15,
2014, however, he learned Don Mallard, Eastern’s Manager of Human
Resources, had stated at a grievance hearing that he did not hire
Metz “because he was too old and wanted younger employees.” Id. at
3.
Metz filed suit against Eastern in the Circuit Court of
Monongalia County, West Virginia, on November 23, 2015 (dkt. no. 11). Eastern removed the case to this Court on December 21, 2015
(dkt. no. 1). Metz’s original complaint asserted two counts:
1
Metz does not elaborate on how Eastern specifically failed to
adhere to the CBA. Presumably, Metz believes Eastern violated the
CBA because they posted a job for a mechanic trainee when there
were mechanics, such as he, available to fill that position; he
should have been considered for the job because it was listed on
his panel form; and he had seniority and the ability to perform the
work. Furthermore, Metz makes no mention of any complaint or
grievance he might have filed with Eastern or the UMWA in regards
to the alleged violation of the CBA.
3
METZ v. EASTERN ASSOCIATED COAL, LLC.,
1:15CV236
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO AMEND [DKT. NO. 2] AND MOTION TO REMAND
[DKT. NO. 7]; DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM [DKT. NO. 5]
AND MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT [DKT. NO. 18]
•
•
Count I:
Violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (“ADEA”) (29 U.S.C. § 623, et
seq.)
Count II: Violation of the West Virginia Human Rights
Act (“WVHRA”) (W.Va. Code § 5-11-1, et seq.)
The complaint sought compensatory damages, compensation for
mental and emotional distress, lost wages, the value of lost
retirement benefits, costs and attorney fees, punitive damages, and
any other appropriate relief. Notably, Metz sought monetary relief
only “under and up to the limits of [Eastern’s] insurance coverage”
(dkt. no. 1-1 at 4; dkt. no. 15 at 3). This is because Eastern is
bankrupt (dkt. no. 5 at 11; dkt. no. 16 at 3-4).
Following removal, Metz moved to amend his complaint as a
matter of course on December 22, 2015 (dkt. no. 2). His amended
complaint contains allegations identical to those in his original
complaint,
but
omits
his
federal
ADEA
claim
in
Count
I.
Contemporaneously with his motion to amend, Metz moved to remand
based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction as a consequence of
his amendment removing the federal law claim (dkt. no. 7). Eastern
opposes the motion, claiming the sole reason Metz seeks to amend is
to move to remand (dkt. no. 13).
4
METZ v. EASTERN ASSOCIATED COAL, LLC.,
1:15CV236
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO AMEND [DKT. NO. 2] AND MOTION TO REMAND
[DKT. NO. 7]; DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM [DKT. NO. 5]
AND MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT [DKT. NO. 18]
II. DISCUSSION
A.
Metz’s Motion to Amend / Correct Complaint (Dkt. No. 2)
When Metz filed his motion to amend on December 22, 2015, one
day after removal, he attached his amended complaint to the motion.
As amended, the complaint asserts one count for violation of the
WVHRA.
Subsequently, Metz filed the amended complaint without a
motion on January 7, 2016 (dkt. no. 15). It is unclear why
initially he had moved to amend when Rule 15(a)(1) clearly allowed
him to amend as a matter of course.
Rule 15 provides in pertinent part:
(a)
Amendments Before Trial.
(1)
(2)
Amending as a Matter of Course. A party may
amend its pleading once as a matter of course
within:
(A) 21 days after serving it, or
(B) if the pleading is one to which a
responsive pleading is required, 21 days
after service of a responsive pleading or
21 days after service of a motion under
Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is
earlier.
Other Amendments. In all other cases, a party
may amend its pleading only with the opposing
party's written consent or the court's leave.
The court should freely give leave when
justice so requires.
5
METZ v. EASTERN ASSOCIATED COAL, LLC.,
1:15CV236
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO AMEND [DKT. NO. 2] AND MOTION TO REMAND
[DKT. NO. 7]; DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM [DKT. NO. 5]
AND MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT [DKT. NO. 18]
. . .
Fed. R. Civ. p. 15(a).
In its motions to dismiss, Eastern cites several cases for the
proposition that courts should not allow post-removal amendment
when the sole purpose is to defeat jurisdiction. None of these
cases, however, involves amendment as a matter of course under Rule
15(a)(1); instead, they involve cases where defendants have moved
for leave to amend under Rule 15 (a)(2). Eastern acknowledges that
Metz may amend “as a matter of course, but [it] opposes this
amendment to the extent it serves only as a precursor to elude this
Court’s jurisdiction.”
Courts agree that “Rule 15 confers ‘an absolute right to
amend’
when
a
plaintiff
submits
a
timely
amendment
and
no
responsive pleading has been served.” Canales v. Sheahan, 2016 WL
489896, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Peckham v. Scanlon, 241 F.2d
761, 764 (7th Cir. 1957)); see also Anderson v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co.,
218 F.R.D. 307, 309 (D.D.C. 2003) (“According to our court of
appeals, Rule 15(a) ‘guarantee[s] a plaintiff an absolute right’ to
amend the complaint once at any time so long as the defendant has
not served a responsive pleading and the court has not decided a
6
METZ v. EASTERN ASSOCIATED COAL, LLC.,
1:15CV236
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO AMEND [DKT. NO. 2] AND MOTION TO REMAND
[DKT. NO. 7]; DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM [DKT. NO. 5]
AND MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT [DKT. NO. 18]
motion to dismiss.” (quoting James V. Hurson Assocs., Inc. v.
Glickman, 229 F.3d 277, 282-83 (D.C.Cir. 2000))).
Moreover, courts have found that, when a party has a right to
amend as a matter of course but seeks leave to amend, denial of
that leave is error. See, e.g., Peterson Steels v. Seidman, 188 F.
2d 193, 194 (7th Cir. 1951). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Metz’s
motion to amend his complaint.
B.
Metz’s Motion to Remand (Dkt. No. 7)
While amendment may be of right, remand is not. The Court
determines removal jurisdiction based on a snapshot of the state
court complaint at the time of removal. See Dotson v. Elite
Oilfield Services, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 3d 865, 870 (N.D.W.Va. March
4, 2015) (citing Cavallini v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 44
F.3d 256, 265 (5th Cir. 1995)). Nonetheless,“[i]f at any time
before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c).
It is undisputed that Metz’s complaint stated a federal law
cause of action at the time of removal; thus, the Court could
exercise original jurisdiction over that claim pursuant to 28
7
METZ v. EASTERN ASSOCIATED COAL, LLC.,
1:15CV236
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO AMEND [DKT. NO. 2] AND MOTION TO REMAND
[DKT. NO. 7]; DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM [DKT. NO. 5]
AND MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT [DKT. NO. 18]
U.S.C.
§
1331.
The
Court
can
also
exercise
supplemental
jurisdiction over Metz’s state law claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1367 because it is related to the federal law claim.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) outlines the grounds upon which courts may
forego exercising supplemental jurisdiction:
The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a [state law] claim . . . if(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of
State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the
claim or claims over which the district court
has original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims
over which it has original jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other
compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.
Pursuant to § 1367(c)(3), courts have consistently ruled that
“‘a federal district court has discretion under the doctrine of
pendent[2] jurisdiction to remand a properly removed case to state
court
when
all
federal-law
claims
in
the
action
have
been
eliminated and only pendent state-law claims remain.’” Wood v.
Crane Co., 764 F.3d 316, 321 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Carnegie-
2
Pendent jurisdiction was the predecessor to supplemental
jurisdiction codified under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The terms are used
interchangeably.
8
METZ v. EASTERN ASSOCIATED COAL, LLC.,
1:15CV236
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO AMEND [DKT. NO. 2] AND MOTION TO REMAND
[DKT. NO. 7]; DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM [DKT. NO. 5]
AND MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT [DKT. NO. 18]
Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 345 (1988)); see also
Henry
v. UBC Product Support Center, Inc., 2008 WL 5378321, at *5
(N.D.W.Va.
Dec.
24,
2008)
(“[F]ederal
courts
have
discretion
whether to keep claims arising under state law after the federal
claims have been dismissed . . . .” (citing United Mine Workers of
America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966))).
In addition to the grounds provided in § 1367(c), the Supreme
Court of the United States has instructed that courts should
consider “the principles of economy, convenience, fairness and
comity.”
Cohill,
484
U.S.
at
350
(hereinafter
the
“Cohill
principles”). Of particular relevance to this case, the Cohill
court opined:
When the balance of these factors indicates that a case
properly belongs in state court, as when the federal-law
claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early
stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal
court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction by
dismissing the case without prejudice.
In a case with facts very analogous to those presented here,
this Court found that remand was proper. See Henry, 2008 WL
5378321. There, after Henry’s state court complaint was removed,
the Court conducted a hearing, during which it gave Henry a
9
METZ v. EASTERN ASSOCIATED COAL, LLC.,
1:15CV236
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO AMEND [DKT. NO. 2] AND MOTION TO REMAND
[DKT. NO. 7]; DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM [DKT. NO. 5]
AND MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT [DKT. NO. 18]
deadline to file any motions to amend the pleadings or to remand.
Henry amended her complaint, removing any reference to claims that
could provide the basis for a federal claim or defense, and also
moved to remand.
As a consequence of the complaint’s amendment, the Court found
that remand was proper, explaining:
Here, because the claim over which the Court had original
jurisdiction has been eliminated, the Court may properly
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c). Additionally, this action is still in
its earliest stage; no trial or pretrial dates have been
scheduled, nor has discovery commenced. Moreover, because
the claims remaining in this case arise solely under West
Virginia law, the principles of economy, convenience,
fairness and comity favor remand. Indeed, should novel
questions of state law under the WVHRA arise in this
case, West Virginia courts certainly will be better
positioned to answer them.
Thus, as the United States Supreme Court recognized in
Cohill, “[w]hen the single federal-law claim in the
action was eliminated at an early state of the
litigation, the District Court had a powerful reason to
choose not to continue to exercise jurisdiction.” 484
U.S. at 351.
Henry, 2008 WL 5378321 at *8 (emphasis added); see also Savilla v.
Speedway Superamerica, LLC, 2004 WL 2359410, at *4 (S.D.W.Va. Aug.
25, 2004) (applying same analysis to similar case where federal
claim was removed and court found that remand was appropriate).
10
METZ v. EASTERN ASSOCIATED COAL, LLC.,
1:15CV236
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO AMEND [DKT. NO. 2] AND MOTION TO REMAND
[DKT. NO. 7]; DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM [DKT. NO. 5]
AND MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT [DKT. NO. 18]
Eastern, on the other hand, posits that the Court should
follow its previous ruling in Dotson, 91 F. Supp. 3d 865. Dotson,
however, is distinguishable from the facts here, and far less
instructive on the point in issue than is Henry. In Dotson, the
Court addressed whether remand was warranted in the face of a
fraudulently
joined
defendant.
Even
though
the
non-diverse
defendant was in the case at the moment of removal, he had been
fraudulently joined, and the Court concluded that it need not
consider his citizenship for purposes of diversity. Id. at 874.
Finally, Eastern claims that Metz is simply engaging in forum
shopping and removed his federal claim in bad faith. The Supreme
Court addressed this very concern in Cohill:
Petitioners also argue that giving district courts
discretion to remand cases involving pendent state-law
claims will allow plaintiffs to secure a state forum
through the use of manipulative tactics. Petitioners’
concern appears to be that a plaintiff whose suit has
been removed to federal court will be able to regain a
state forum simply by deleting all federal-law claims
from the complaint and requesting that the district court
remand the case. This concern, however, hardly justifies
a categorical prohibition on the remand of cases
involving state-law claims regardless of whether the
plaintiff has attempted to manipulate the forum and
regardless of the other circumstances in the case. A
district court can consider whether the plaintiff has
engaged in any manipulative tactics when it decides
11
METZ v. EASTERN ASSOCIATED COAL, LLC.,
1:15CV236
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO AMEND [DKT. NO. 2] AND MOTION TO REMAND
[DKT. NO. 7]; DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM [DKT. NO. 5]
AND MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT [DKT. NO. 18]
whether to remand a case. If the plaintiff has attempted
to manipulate the forum, the court should take this
behavior into account in determining whether the balance
of factors to be considered under the pendent
jurisdiction doctrine support a remand in the case. The
district courts thus can guard against forum manipulation
without a blanket rule that would prohibit the remand of
all cases involving pendent state-law claims.
484 U.S. at 357 (citations omitted); see also
Wood v. Crane Co.,
764 F.3d 316, 321 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Cohill).
To be sure, re-pleading a complaint does not divest this Court
of
its
jurisdiction.
See
Dotson,
91
F.
Supp.
3d
at
873-74
(collecting cases). Nevertheless, the fact that its jurisdiction
has not been divested in no way lessens the Court’s discretionary
power to decide whether to remand. When weighing that choice, due
consideration of the factors in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) and the Cohill
principles is appropriate.
This case is much more analogous to Henry. It involves removal
of
a
federal
claim,
leaving
only
discretionary
supplemental
jurisdiction over a state law claim. Thus, it falls squarely under
§ 1367(c)(3), which supports remand. Further, like Henry, this case
is in its infancy; no trial or pretrial dates have been scheduled,
and no discovery appears to have commenced beyond the initial
12
METZ v. EASTERN ASSOCIATED COAL, LLC.,
1:15CV236
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO AMEND [DKT. NO. 2] AND MOTION TO REMAND
[DKT. NO. 7]; DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM [DKT. NO. 5]
AND MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT [DKT. NO. 18]
disclosures.3 In addition, “because the claims remaining in this
case arise solely under West Virginia law, the principles of
economy, convenience, fairness and comity favor remand.” Henry,
2008 WL 5378321 at *8.
Accordingly, because the Cohill principles weigh in favor of
remand, the Court GRANTS Metz’s motion (dkt. no. 7) and REMANDS
this case to the Circuit Court of Monongalia County.
C.
Eastern’s Motions to Dismiss (Dkt. Nos. 5 and 18)
Having granted Metz’s motion to amend his complaint, the Court
finds that Eastern’s motion to dismiss the original complaint has
been rendered moot and, therefore, DENIES as MOOT that motion (dkt.
no. 5). Furthermore, because the Court has granted Metz’s motion to
remand, it no longer retains jurisdiction to rule on Eastern’s
motion to dismiss Metz’s amended complaint, and, accordingly,
DENIES as MOOT that motion (dkt. no. 18).
3
Moreover, no unfair delay or prejudice is present here
because the motions to amend and remand were filed the day after
the case was removed and a mere twenty-nine (29) days after the
filing of the suit in state court. By contrast, in Henry the
complaint was filed January 25, 2008, the case was removed over
five months later, on June 9, 2008, and it was an additional three
months after that before the plaintiff filed her motion to remand.
13
METZ v. EASTERN ASSOCIATED COAL, LLC.,
1:15CV236
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO AMEND [DKT. NO. 2] AND MOTION TO REMAND
[DKT. NO. 7]; DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM [DKT. NO. 5]
AND MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT [DKT. NO. 18]
III. CONCLUSION
The Court:
1.
GRANTS Metz’s motion to amend his complaint (dkt. no. 2);
2.
GRANTS Metz’s motion to remand and REMANDS this case to
the Circuit Court of Monongalia County (dkt. no. 7);
3.
DENIES as MOOT Eastern’s motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim (dkt. no. 5);
4.
DENIES as MOOT Eastern’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s
amended complaint (dkt. no. 18); and
5.
CANCELS the Scheduling Conference on Friday, February 26,
2016.
It is so ORDERED.
The Court directs the Clerk to transmit copies of this Order
to counsel of record and to the Clerk of the Circuit Court of
Monongalia County.
DATED: February 25, 2016
/s/ Irene M. Keeley
IRENE M. KEELEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
14
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