The Monongalia County Coal Company v. United Mine Workers of America, International Union et al

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DKT. NO. 22 . Court DENIES the Unions motion for reconsideration (dkt. no. 22). It is so ORDERED. Signed by District Judge Irene M. Keeley on 5/12/2017. (Copy counsel of record)(jmm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
MONONGALIA COUNTY COAL COMPANY
Plaintiff,
v.

//

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:16CV04
(Judge Keeley)

UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA,
INTERNATIONAL UNION and
UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA,
LOCAL UNION 1702
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [DKT. NO. 22]
The defendants, United Mine Workers of America, International
Union

and

United

(collectively

Mine

Workers

“Union”),

have

of

America,

filed

a

Local

timely

Union

motion

1702

seeking

reconsideration of the Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order Denying
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Granting Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (“Opinion and Order”). That Opinion and
Order

vacated

the

(“Arbitrator”)

in

award
the

issued
parties’

by

Arbitrator

underlying

Betty

labor

Widgeon

grievance

arbitration. For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES the
motion.
I. BACKGROUND1
On February 16, 2017, the Court vacated the Arbitrator’s
Decision and Award (“Award”) after concluding that it failed to
1

This background is limited to those facts relevant to the
instant motion. A full recitation of the factual background leading
to the underlying arbitration can be found in the Court’s Order and
Opinion (dkt. no. 20).

MONONGALIA CTY. COAL CO. V. UMWA

1:16CV4

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [DKT. NO. 22]
draw its essence from the parties’ Collective Bargaining Agreement
(“CBA”).

Id.

at

22.

Specifically,

the

Court

found

that

the

Arbitrator’s conclusion that the disputed work was repair and
maintenance work, rather than construction work, contradicted the
overwhelming arbitral precedent and therefore contravened the
parties agreement.2 Id. at 19-20.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), on March 7, 2017, the Union
moved for reconsideration to “correct a clear error of law and
prevent manifest injustice” (dkt. no. 22 at 1). In particular, the
Union argues that “remand to the Arbitrator rather than vacatur of
her Award is consistent with the governing and well established
principles of labor law and is the proper course for the District
Court to follow when confronted with an ambiguous or incomplete
labor arbitration award.” Id. at 1-2. The motion is fully briefed
and ripe for review.

2

Citing United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav.
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960) (recognizing the “industrial
common law — the practices of the industry and the shop — [which]
is equally a part of the collective bargaining agreement although
not expressed in it”); Clinchfield Coal Co. v. UMWA, Dist. 28, 567
F. Supp. 1431, 1434 (W.D. Va. 1983), aff’d, 736 F.2d 998 (4th Cir.
1984) (applying principle that past decisions by the Arbitration
Review Board under the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreements
constituted part of the common law of the shop). See also Brown &
Pipkins, LLC v. SEIU, Local 39BJ, 846 F. 3d 716, 725 (4th Cir.
2017).
2

MONONGALIA CTY. COAL CO. V. UMWA

1:16CV4

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [DKT. NO. 22]
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), a petitioner must move the
Court to alter or amend a judgment within 28 days from entry of the
judgment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
has recognized three grounds for amending a judgment: (1) to
accommodate an intervening change in controlling law; (2) to
account for new evidence not available at trial; or, (3) to correct
a clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice. See Pacific
Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir.
1998). Rule 59(e) motions are to be used sparingly, and may not be
used to relitigate old matters or “to raise arguments which could
have been raised prior to the issuance of the judgment.” Id.; see
also Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n. 5 (2008).
“It is improper to use such a motion to ask the Court to ‘rethink
what the court has already thought through-rightly or wrongly.’”
Turner v. United States, 2014 WL 4805265 at * 2 (N.D.W. Va. Sept.
26, 2014) (quoting Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannan Roofing,
Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983)).
III. DISCUSSION
The Union does not argue that any intervening change has
occurred in the controlling law, nor does it reference any newly
found evidence not previously available. Rather,
3

MONONGALIA CTY. COAL CO. V. UMWA

1:16CV4

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [DKT. NO. 22]
[t]he main point of this Motion, as more fully addressed
in the UMWA’s accompanying Memorandum, is that remand to
the Arbitrator rather than vacatur of her Award is
consistent with the governing and well established
principles of labor law and is the proper course for the
District Court to follow when confronted with an
ambiguous or incomplete labor arbitration award.
Dkt. No. 22 at 1-2. It also argues, as it did in its motion for
summary judgment, that the Court should not “second-guess” the
Arbitrator or wade into a review of the merits of the grievance.
Dkt. No. 23 at 6-8.
A.

Remand To The Arbitrator Is Not Mandated In This Instance
The Union proclaims that it is a “bedrock of federal labor

law” that, if a court is concerned that an arbitrator’s award is
ambiguous or unclear as to its basis, remand is the proper remedy.
Dkt. No. 23 at 4. The slim reed on which it rests this argument is
a statement in the Court’s Order and Opinion noting that “the
Arbitrator may have found some ambiguity [in the CBA], although she
did not explicitly say so.” Dkt. No. 25 at 9.
Put in its proper context, this statement was limited to
whether the Arbitrator found an ambiguity between the two contract
terms, “construction” and “repair or maintenance,” that

required

her to rely on the “existing common law of the particular plant or
industry, for it is an integral part of the contract.” Clinchfield
Coal Co. v. District 28, United Mine Workers of America & Local
4

MONONGALIA CTY. COAL CO. V. UMWA

1:16CV4

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [DKT. NO. 22]
Union No. 1452, 720 F.2d 1365, 1368 (4th Cir. 1983)(quoting Norfolk
Shipbuilding and Drydock Corp. v. Local No. 684 of the Int’l
Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 671 F.2d 797, 800 (4th Cir. 1982). It
did not bear on whether the Arbitrator’s Award was ambiguous in its
reasoning and conclusion. In point of fact, the Arbitrator was
unambiguous in concluding that the work in question was repair and
maintenance,

not

construction.

It

was

precisely

because

this

conclusion conflicted with the overwhelming arbitral precedent that
the Court determined its essence had not been drawn from the
contract.
The Union next points to the Arbitrator’s conclusion that
hanging

of

the

pumpable

crib

bags

“d[id]

not

fall

into

the

construction exception, and because it is, at the very least,
repair and maintenance work, it is Union work.” Dkt. No. 23 at 2
(emphasis added by Union). The Union argues that the phrase, “at
the very least,” “suggests the possibility of more than just one
contractually founded basis for [the Arbitrator’s] award,” rather
than solely because the work was repair and maintenance. Id. For
example,

the

Union

suggests

that

the

Arbitrator

could

have

concluded that “the work was part of the production process under

5

MONONGALIA CTY. COAL CO. V. UMWA

1:16CV4

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [DKT. NO. 22]
Article IA(a)” of the CBA.3 Id. 3. Or, alternatively, that “since
the

work

had

customarily

been

performed

by

bargaining

unit

employees it properly fell within the Union’s work jurisdiction as
a result of the historical practice and custom at the mine.”4 Id.
Such speculation does not rise to an ambiguity warranting
remand to the arbitrator. Indeed, the cases on which the Union
relies to support its argument highlight the difference between the
Award here and those where an ambiguity warranted remand. For
example, in Cannelton Industries, Inc. v. District 17, United Mine
Workers of America, the Fourth Circuit remanded to the arbitrator
because the award in that case failed to identify which of two
possible violations formed the basis for the award. 951 F.2d 591

3

Article IA(a) of the CBA provides in pertinent part that:
The production of coal, including removal of overburden
and coal waste, preparation, processing and cleaning of
coal and transportation of coal (except by waterway or
rail not owned by Employer), repair and maintenance work
normally performed at the mine site or a central shop for
the employer and maintenance of the gob piles and mine
roads, and work of the type customarily related to all of
the above shall be performed by the classified employees
(emphasis supplied) of the Employer covered by and in
accordance with the terms of this Agreement . . . .
4

To the extent the Union, for the first time, suggests this
argument as an alternative basis for the Award, it is precluded
from raising it in a Rule 59(e) motion. See Exxon Shipping, 554
U.S. at 485 n. 5; Pac. Ins. Co., 148 F.3d at 403 (“Rule 59(e)
motions may not be used, however, to raise arguments which could
have been raised prior to the issuance of the judgment . . . .”).
6

MONONGALIA CTY. COAL CO. V. UMWA

1:16CV4

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [DKT. NO. 22]
(4th Cir. 1991). The first would have allowed for compensatory
damages, while the second would not. Because the court could not
determine which violation formed the basis for the award, it also
could not determine whether the damages were compensatory or
punitive.

Consequently,

it

remanded

to

the

arbitrator

for

clarification. Id. at 594.
Similarly, in a case from this District decided by Judge
Stamp, McElroy Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 2009 WL
367699 (N.D.W.Va. Feb. 10, 2009) (Stamp, J.), the arbitrator
concluded that the employer had violated the CBA and awarded the
union sixteen man-hours. However, because the arbitrator had not
“definitively resolve[] the issue of whether the award granted was
compensatory in nature.” Id. at 5 (citing Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp.
v. Dist. 17 and Local Union 9177, UMWA, 2006 WL 2819537 *9
(S.D.W.Va. Sept. 28, 2006)), Judge Stamp remanded the action to the
arbitrator for "clarification of the basis of the award.” Id.
There is no such ambiguity here. The Union’s contention that
the phrase, “at the very least,” infers an alternative basis upon
which the Arbitrator may have grounded her decision is belied by
the Award itself. Other than simply repeating the Union’s position
in the beginning of the Award, the Arbitrator spares not a single
word

for

the

possibility

of

one,
7

much

less

two,

possible

MONONGALIA CTY. COAL CO. V. UMWA

1:16CV4

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [DKT. NO. 22]
alternative bases for the Award. Unlike Cannelton, McElroy, or the
other cases cited by the Union, there is no ambiguity here between
alternative types of damages for which an arbitrator failed to
clearly

articulate

concluded

that

the

the

basis.

work

The

was

Arbitrator

repair

and

unambiguously

maintenance,

not

construction, a decision that contradicted significant arbitral
precedent. Therefore, remand is not warranted.
B.

The Court Need Not Reconsider Its Prior Decision
The Union next argues that the Court should not have reviewed

the Arbitrator’s Award in the first instance.5 Dkt. No. 23 at 6.
Quoting from several cases, it implies that an arbitrator’s award
is unassailable by a reviewing court so long as “the arbitrator is
even arguably construing or applying the contract.” Dkt. No. 25 at
7 (citing Brown & Pipkin, LLC v. SEIU, 846 F3d 716 at 724 (4th Cir.
2017) and PPG Industries, Inc. v. International Chemical Workers
Union, 587 F3d 648 at 652 (4th Cir. 2009)). The Union even contends
that whenever an arbitrator so much as makes reference to a
contract a court loses any authority to disturb the decision.
Such an absolute prohibition is a bridge too far. In the
circumstance of a dispute involving a labor grievance, as is the
5

This is not a new argument. The Union raised it in its
response to the Company’s motion for summary judgment, as well as
in its own motion for summary judgment.
8

MONONGALIA CTY. COAL CO. V. UMWA

1:16CV4

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [DKT. NO. 22]
case here, one cannot fathom an award that does not, in at least
some way, construe or apply the contract. Moreover, because courts
can and do vacate arbitration awards under certain albeit very
limited circumstances, the Union's broad reading of the case law is
unsupportable. As the Order and Opinion recognized, this case
presented one of those very rare circumstances where a reviewing
court may vacate an arbitration award.
Finally, the Union implies that the Court erred when, in its
analysis, it considered the Arbitration Award of Arbitrator Elliot
Schaller in The Marshall County Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of
America, Local 1638, Case No. 11-31-15-101 (July 27, 2015). Dkt.
No. 25 at 4. In its Opinion and Order, the Court acknowledged, but
questioned, the Arbitrator’s refusal to consider this opinion
solely because the Company presented it late on the day that the
record closed.6
To be clear, the Court cited to the Marshall County decision
for its persuasive reasoning, as well as its exhaustive compilation
of the arbitral precedent, all of which was independently available
to the Arbitrator. See Dkt. No. 20 at 18, n. 9. Thus, the Court’s

6

The parties did not argue, nor did the Court uncover, any
reason why the Arbitrator could not or should not have considered
the Marshall County decision and award as it would any other
arbitral precedent, regardless of whether the record was closed.
9

MONONGALIA CTY. COAL CO. V. UMWA

1:16CV4

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [DKT. NO. 22]
reliance on the Marshall County decision is not only permitted but
prudent; the arbitral precedent collected in that case unassailably
establishes that the common law of the shop dictated that the work
in question was construction — something that should have guided
the Arbitrator’s analysis.
Accordingly, any argument that the Court's reference to the
Arbitrator's decision in Marshall County warrants reconsideration
is unavailing. The Court need not “‘rethink what [it] has already
thought through-rightly or wrongly.’” Turner, 2014 WL 4805265 at *
2 (quoting Above the Belt, 99 F.R.D. at 101)).
IV. CONCLUSION
After careful consideration of the Union’s arguments, for the
reasons

discussed

the

Court

DENIES

the

Union’s

motion

for

reconsideration (dkt. no. 22).
It is so ORDERED.
The Court directs the Clerk to transmit copies of this Order
to counsel of record.
DATED: May 12, 2017
/s/ Irene M. Keeley
IRENE M. KEELEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

10