Fielder v. R.V. Coleman Trucking, Inc. et al
Filing
207
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING 112 DEFENDANTS EQT CORPORATION, EQT PRODUCTION COMPANY AND EQUITRANS LPS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING 113 DEFENDANT R.V. COLEMAN TRUCKING, INC.S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING 114 DEFENDANT A RKOS FIELD SERVICES, LPS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING 115 DEFENDANT R.V. COLEMAN TRUCKING INC.S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING 116 PLAINTIFF JASON FIELDERS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING 117 DEFENDANT MEC CONSTRUCTIO N LLCS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO DELIBERATE INTENTION AND DENYING RULING AS TO INDEMNITY OR CONTRIBUTION AS PREMATURE. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58, the Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment on this matter as to defendants EQT Corporation, EQT Production Company, and Equitrans, LP. Signed by Senior Judge Frederick P. Stamp, Jr on 1/11/2018. (copy counsel of record)(jmm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
JASON FIELDER,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 1:16CV23
(STAMP)
R.V. COLEMAN TRUCKING, INC.,
ARKOS FIELD SERVICES, LP,
EQT CORPORATION,
EQUITRANS, LP d/b/a EQT MIDSTREAM,
and EQT PRODUCTION COMPANY,
Defendants,
and
R.V. COLEMAN TRUCKING, INC.,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
v.
MEC CONSTRUCTION, LLC,
Third-Party Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING DEFENDANTS EQT CORPORATION, EQT PRODUCTION COMPANY
AND EQUITRANS LP’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
DENYING DEFENDANT R.V. COLEMAN TRUCKING, INC.’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
DENYING DEFENDANT ARKOS FIELD SERVICES, LP’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
DENYING DEFENDANT R.V. COLEMAN TRUCKING INC.’S
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
DENYING PLAINTIFF JASON FIELDER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
DENYING DEFENDANT MEC CONSTRUCTION LLC’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO DELIBERATE INTENTION AND
DENYING RULING AS TO INDEMNITY OR CONTRIBUTION AS PREMATURE1
1
This Court issued a letter (ECF No. 178) to counsel of record
prior to the pretrial conference in this civil action to set forth
tentative rulings on the pending motions discussed in this opinion.
While the Court’s letter indicates that this Court would defer its
ruling on defendant R.V. Coleman’s motion for partial summary
judgement (ECF No. 115) and also defer a ruling as to indemnity or
I.
Background
This civil action is a personal injury case that arises out of
a
workplace
accident.
Plaintiff
Jason
Fielder
(“Fielder”)
originally filed suit in the Circuit Court of Monongalia County,
West Virginia and this civil action was then removed to the United
States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia.
ECF No. 1.
This civil action was then transferred pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 455(b)(4), from United States District Judge Irene M.
Keeley, to the undersigned judge.
ECF No. 34.
Plaintiff, Jason Fielder, was employed as a laborer for MEC
Construction,
construction
LLC
of
(“MEC”).
a
compressor
He
was
station
working
near
for
MEC
on
Blacksville,
the
West
Virginia, which has been referred to as the Blacksville Compressor
Station Phase 2 site.
Defendants EQT Production Company, EQT
Corporation, and Equitrans, LP, are hereinafter, referred to as the
“EQT defendants.”
MEC was hired by Equitrans as the prime/general
contractor to construct the compressor station at the Blacksville
Phase 2 site.
EQT ordered a number of large steel pipes for the Blacksville
Phase 2 compressor station from Arkos Field Services, LP (“Arkos”).
On October 7, 2015, a number of pipes that were ordered by EQT were
loaded onto a trailer at the Smithfield, Pennsylvania facility by
an Arkos employee, Doug Lough.
On October 16, 2014, the load of
contribution as premature (ECF No. 117), this Court now finds that
denying these motions is more appropriate.
2
pipes was picked up by Cale Sukala, a driver for R.V. Coleman
Trucking, Inc. (“R.V. Coleman”), at the Arkos facility.
R.V.
Coleman transported the load from the Arkos - Smithfield, PA
facility to the Blacksville site.
Upon arriving at the Blacksville Phase 2 site, the pipes were
to be unloaded from the trailer.
During the removal of the pipes,
two large pipes rolled from the trailer and struck the plaintiff
Jason Fielder. He was trapped beneath one of the pipes, and
eventually taken to the hospital because of his injuries. The
parties dispute whether the pipes were chocked and/or properly
secured at the Arkos facility, during transport by R.V. Coleman,
and when they arrived at the Blacksville Phase 2 site. The parties
further dispute the manner in which the pipes were unloaded.
The motions have been fully briefed and the parties’ pending
motions for summary judgment are ripe for decision.
II.
Applicable Law
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, this Court must
grant a party’s motion for summary judgment if “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
A fact is
“material” if it might affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
A dispute of material
fact is “genuine” if the evidence “is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Id. If the
nonmoving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
3
the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial,” summary
judgment must be granted against the plaintiff.
Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In reviewing the supported
underlying facts, all inferences must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of
showing the absence of any genuine issues of material fact.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
See
“The burden then shifts to the
nonmoving party to come forward with facts sufficient to create a
triable issue of fact.”
Temkin v. Frederick County Comm’rs, 945
F.2d 716, 718 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1095 (1992).
However, “a party opposing a properly supported motion for summary
judgment may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986).
III.
Discussion
Now before the Court are six pending motions for summary
judgment which have been fully briefed: (1) motion for summary
judgment by EQT Corporation, EQT Production Company, Equitrans, LP
(ECF No. 112); (2) motion for summary judgment by R.V. Coleman
Trucking, Inc. (ECF No. 113); (3) motion for summary judgment by
Arkos Field Services, LP (ECF No. 114); (4) motion for partial
4
summary judgment with respect to the third-party complaint against
MEC Construction, LLC by R.V. Coleman Trucking, Inc. (ECF No. 115);
(5) motion for summary judgment against defendant R.V. Coleman
Trucking, Inc. by plaintiff Jason Fielder (ECF No. 116); (6) motion
for summary judgment by MEC Construction, LLC (ECF No. 117).
Following its review of the fully briefed motions, and the
memoranda and exhibits submitted by the parties, this Court finds
that, for the reasons set forth below, summary judgment in favor of
the EQT defendants is appropriate, there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact, and these defendants are entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. The other pending motions for summary judgment
are denied.
Accordingly,
the
motion
for
summary
judgment
by
EQT
Corporation, EQT Production Company, and Equitrans, LP (ECF No.
112) is granted; the motion for summary judgment by R.V. Coleman
Trucking, Inc. (ECF No. 113) is denied; the motion for summary
judgment by Arkos Field Services, LP (ECF No. 114) is denied; the
motion for partial summary judgment with respect to the third-party
complaint against MEC Construction, LLC by R.V. Coleman Trucking,
Inc. (ECF No. 115) is denied; the motion for summary judgment
against defendant R.V. Coleman Trucking, Inc. by Jason Fielder (ECF
No.
116)
is
denied;
the
motion
for
summary
judgment
by
MEC
Construction, LLC (ECF No. 117) is denied as to “deliberate
intention.”
A ruling as to indemnity or contribution is denied as
premature.
5
The motions for summary judgment are discussed, in turn,
below.
1.
Motion for Summary Judgment by EQT Corporation, EQT Production
Company, Equitrans, LP
Defendant EQT Corporation, Equitrans, LP, d/b/a EQT Midstream,
and EQT Production Company (“EQT”), filed a motion for summary
judgment (ECF No. 112) pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and moves this Court for judgment as a matter of
law as to (1) all claims asserted against EQT and (2) the duty of
Arkos Field Services, LP, R.V. Coleman Trucking, Inc., and MEC
Construction, LLC to defend and indemnify EQT with respect to
plaintiff’s claims.
ECF No. 112 at 2.
EQT asserts in its
memorandum in support, “[i]mportantly, EQT entered into Master
Service Agreements (“MSA”) with [R.V. Coleman], MEC, and Arkos.
The MSA’s provide that R.V. Coleman, MEC, and Arkos will defend and
indemnify EQT from Plaintiff’s claims in this case.” ECF No. 112-1
at 5.
EQT also states that additionally, the MSAs provide that
Arkos, MEC, and R.V. Coleman are “responsible for the prevention of
accidents and injury in the vicinity of or connected with [their]
work.”
ECF No. 112-1 at 8.
Lastly, EQT asserts that the MSA
provides a choice of law provision “wherein the parties agree that
the
MSA’s
shall
be
construed,
interpreted,
and
enforced
in
accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.” ECF
No. 112-1 at 9.
EQT argues that:
Numerous depositions have been taken in this case,
including deposition of Mr. Fielder, and employees of
Arkos, MEC, and [R.V. Coleman]. No witness testified
6
that EQT supervised or directed the work of Arkos, [R.V.
Coleman], or MEC employees with respect to loading,
transporting, or unloading the shipment of pipes at
issue. Additionally, each party submitted expert reports
with respect to liability. No expert opines that EQT was
negligent, or that any act or omission of EQT caused or
contributed to Plaintiff’s injuries.
ECF No. 112-1 at 11.
Ultimately, EQT argues that summary judgment is proper because
(1) it did not have a duty to ensure that the pipes were properly
loaded, unloaded, and/or secured by Arkos, R.V. Coleman, or MEC,
(2) it provided a reasonably safe workplace and exercised no
control over the equipment provided by MEC for use by its employees
to unload the R.V. Coleman trailer and, therefore, did not owe any
further duty to Mr. Fielder and (3) R.V. Coleman, MEC, and Arkos
owe EQT a duty to defend and indemnify it from plaintiff’s claims.
Defendant R.V. Coleman Trucking, Inc. (“R.V. Coleman”), in its
capacity as a defendant filed a response to EQT’s motion for
summary judgment and asserts that “R.V. Coleman has accepted EQT’s
tender of defense and has been paying for EQT’s defense costs.”
ECF No. 127 at 2.
However, R.V. Coleman adds that any finding by
the Court as to the parties’ duties and obligations to defend and
indemnify EQT is premature, asserting that as no findings of fault
have yet been made by either the Court or the jury, which would
effect such obligations.
ECF No. 127 at 2-3.
R.V. Coleman also
adds that “[u]pon information and belief, MEC has also accepted
EQT’s tender and is paying for EQT’s defense.
EQT’s tender.”
ECF No. 127 at 2 n.1.
7
Arkos has rejected
Defendant Arkos filed a response in opposition (ECF No. 128)
stating that EQT’s motion, as it pertains to Arkos, is a motion for
indemnification. Arkos asserts that EQT’s argument is based on its
own interpretation of the Master Service Agreement (“MSA”).
Arkos
asserts, however, that the indemnification clause within the MSA
requires Arkos to indemnify EQT for negligence on the part of
Arkos, not EQT’s own negligence.
Arkos maintains that because
there can be no finding that Arkos was negligent in any way, Arkos
is not contractually obligated to indemnify EQT for its negligence
or the negligence of any other party.
Third-party
and
cross-defendant,
MEC
Construction,
LLC
(“MEC”), also filed a response in opposition to EQT’s motion for
summary judgment (ECF No. 133).
MEC’s response asserts that until
such time as there is a determination of liability on the part of
the EQT defendants and MEC, the existence of MEC’s indemnity
obligation cannot be determined. Further, MEC asserts that an
examination of applicable Pennsylvania law demonstrates that the
EQT defendants are not entitled to indemnity from MEC under the
circumstances present in this case, and that the Project/Site
Specific Safety Plan is not a contract document and does not define
the contractual obligations of MEC.
carrier,
Zurich
American
MEC states that its insurance
Insurance
Company,
accepted
the
EQT
defendants’ request for coverage as an additional insured, and has
provided a defense to them in this case.
MEC
asserts
that
because
MEC’s
8
ECF No. 133 at 7.
general
liability
Thus,
carrier
is
providing a defense to the EQT defendants, they have not incurred
any liability and therefore have no damages for which to seek
indemnity.
ECF No. 133 at 7.
Plaintiff Jason Fielder filed a response in opposition to
EQT’s motion (ECF No. 134), arguing that the general contractor,
the entity that hired all of the independent contractors on the
construction site, was defendant EQT.
ECF No. 134 at 2.
Fielder
asserts that EQT retained sufficient control over the premises so
that the subcontractors that were hired by EQT could gain access to
the workplace and conduct work thereupon and deliver the materials
that
were
necessary
for
the
completion
Compressor Station Phase 2 construction.
of
EQT’s
Blacksville
Therefore, plaintiff
contends, genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether
defendant EQT (1) provided a reasonably safe workplace and (2) can
establish
that
it
exercised
no
control
over
the
workplace
thereafter.
In its reply to plaintiff’s memorandum in opposition to its
motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 138), EQT asserts that the
plaintiff has not offered any evidence that EQT breached any duty
owed to the plaintiff, or that any act or omission of EQT was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. EQT also asserts that
the plaintiff has not offered any evidence that EQT exercised
control over the premises.
Thus, EQT contends that summary
judgment is proper.
9
In its reply to defendants’ responses to its motion for
summary judgment (ECF No. 139), EQT asserts that R.V. Coleman, MEC,
and Arkos owe EQT a duty to defend and indemnify it from the
plaintiff’s claims.
Agreements
require
EQT again asserts that the Master Service
the
contractor
defendants
to
defend
and
indemnify EQT and that the contractor defendants named EQT as an
additional insured on their commercial general liability policies.
For these reasons, EQT contends summary judgment is proper.
This Court finds no genuine issue of material fact concerning
the EQT defendants’ motion for summary judgment and the EQT
defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Under West
Virginia law, a property owner only has a duty to turn over a
reasonably safe workplace to an independent contractor and the
property owner generally cannot be held liable for any hazards
thereafter created by the independent contractor.
France v. S.
Equip. Co., 225 W. Va. 1, 10, 689 S.E.2d 1, 10 (2010).
independent
contractor
assumes
control
of
the
Once an
premises,
the
property owner is relieved of liability for conditions created by
the independent contractor. France v. S. Equip. Co., 225 W. Va. 1,
11, 689 S.E.2d 1, 11 (2010).
When the owner of a place of
employment provides a reasonably safe workplace and exercises no
control thereafter, the owner has complied with responsibilities of
the statute imposing an obligation to provide a safe workplace.
Henderson v. Meredith Lumber Co., 190 W. Va. 292, 438 S.E.2d 324
(1993).
The employer’s duty is directly related to employment
10
activity — activity controlled by the employer — and the owner’s
duty is limited to providing a reasonably safe workplace, unless
the owner continues to exercise control of the place of employment.
Id. at 294.
Here, the evidence fails to show that EQT exercised
control over the workplace premises beyond being the owner of the
land, and ordering the pipes for the Blacksville Phase 2 compressor
station.
In the instant case, the evidence shows that EQT turned
over a reasonably safe workplace to MEC and its employees, and
thereafter exercised no control of the manner in which the trailer
was unloaded.
This Court notes EQT’s assertion that the MSA is to
be “construed, interpreted, and enforced in accordance with the
laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.”
However, even if
Pennsylvania law applied, the result would not change.
Similar to
West Virginia law, “[t]he primary question in many premises cases
. . . is whether the property owner hirer of the independent
contractor retained sufficient control of the work to be legally
responsible for the harm to the plaintiff.”
Beil v. Telesis
Const., Inc., 608 Pa. 273, 290, 11 A.3d 456, 466 (2011).
Under
Pennsylvania law, for an employer/landowner to retain sufficient
control, “the right of control must go beyond a general right to
order, inspect, make suggestions, or prescribe alterations or
deviations”, and there must be “such a retention of the right of
supervision that it renders the contractor not entirely free to do
the work in his own way.”
Id.
The premises owner must have
control over the manner, method, and operative details of the work.
11
Id. at 291.
Here, the evidence supports a finding of summary
judgment in favor of the EQT defendants as they did not have a duty
to ensure that the pipes were properly loaded, unloaded, and/or
secured and exercised no control over the equipment provided by MEC
for use by its employees to unload the R.V. Coleman trailer.
Accordingly, this court grants summary judgment in favor of the EQT
defendants.
2.
Motion for Summary Judgment by R.V. Coleman Trucking, Inc.
R.V. Coleman, in its capacity as a defendant and third-party
plaintiff, filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure against plaintiff Jason
Fielder.
R.V. Coleman argues that plaintiff’s negligence claim
against R.V. Coleman fails as a matter of law as the undisputed
material facts demonstrate that R.V. Coleman owed no duty to the
plaintiff with respect to the accident at issue.
R.V. Coleman
asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment as (1) the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (“FMCSRs”) do not apply to the
unloading of cargo which is not in the course of transportation
and, therefore, do not impose a duty on R.V. Coleman in this case
and (2) no common law duty exists.
ECF No. 113 at 2.
Plaintiff Jason Fielder filed a response in opposition to R.V.
Coleman’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 130), and argues
that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Statute imposed a duty upon
R.V. Coleman and its driver, Cale Sukala (“Sukala”), to properly
secure cargo that is likely to roll, such as the round pipes, with
12
chocks, wedges, or a cradle to prevent them from rolling off the
trailer. Plaintiff notes that Sukala testified that, had he loaded
the trailer, he would have put the pipes on cribbing and nailed
chocks or wedges to the cribbing to prevent the pipes from rolling
once the straps were removed.
However, plaintiff asserts, because
the relevant pipes were preloaded onto an aluminum trailer, Sukala
chose not to load the pipes properly, and when he arrived at the
Compressor Station in Blacksville, there was nothing to prevent the
large, round pipes from rolling off the trailer once the straps
were removed.
Plaintiff asserts, nonetheless, Sukala proceeded to
remove the last strap holding the pipes onto the trailer, causing
them to instantly roll off and crush Mr. Fielder. Plaintiff argues
that because of these actions, R.V. Coleman violated the cargo
securement requirements of the FMCSRs, which are applicable to the
round pipes at issue in this case, and that the statute imposed a
duty upon R.V. Coleman and its driver to properly secure the pipes
which were likely to roll to prevent them from rolling off of the
trailer.
Plaintiff requests that this Court deny defendant R.V.
Coleman’s motion for summary judgment and find as a matter of law
that defendant R.V. Coleman owed the plaintiff a duty of care and
that R.V. Coleman’s violation of the relevant provisions of the
FMCSRs constitutes prima facie negligence.
ECF No. 130 at 22.
R.V. Coleman filed a reply (ECF No. 137) in its capacity as a
defendant asserting that plaintiff’s argument to the contrary
notwithstanding, R.V. Coleman did not owe a common law duty to
13
plaintiff as the accident at issue occurred during the unloading
process and the cargo was not in transit at the time of the
accident, and that the FMCSRs are not applicable to an accident
which occurs during the unloading of cargo which is not in the
course
of
transportation.
R.V.
Coleman
asserts,
in
the
alternative, that even if the regulations are applicable, it did
not violate the regulations.
This Court finds a genuine issue of material fact exists, and
that the evidence presented is sufficient to create a triable issue
of fact at trial concerning plaintiff’s negligence claim against
R.V. Coleman.
Accordingly, R.V. Coleman’s motion for summary
judgment is denied.
3.
Motion for Summary Judgment by Arkos Field Services, LP
Defendant Arkos filed its motion for summary judgment (ECF No.
114) asserting that Arkos did not owe a duty to the plaintiff under
the circumstances of this case.
Arkos argues in support of this
proposition that it is not responsible for load securement per the
explicit requirements of the FMCSRs, stating that cargo securement
falls solely upon the commercial motor carrier and its driver. ECF
No. 114-1 at 6.
Arkos asserts that it was simply the shipper and
not the motor carrier.
Arkos states that although it was Douglas
Lough, an employee of Arkos, who preloaded the cargo onto the
trailer, it was the ultimate responsibility of R.V. Coleman and
Sukala as the driver to ensure the cargo was properly secured and
in compliance with the FMCSRs. ECF No. 114-1 at 8. Alternatively,
14
Arkos argues that plaintiff cannot pursue its claim against Arkos
as there were intervening causes that resulted in the plaintiff’s
injuries.
ECF No. 114-1 at 10.
Arkos cites R.V. Coleman’s
decision to breach the FMCSRs by failing to adequately secure the
load prior to transit and multiple decisions that went into
unloading the pipes as intervening causes.
ECF No. 114-1 at 11.
Arkos requests, for these reasons, that the Court enter an order
dismissing all claims asserted against it.
R.V. Coleman, in its capacity as a defendant, filed a response
in opposition to Arkos’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 123).
R.V. Coleman argues that the Court should deny Arkos’s motion as
Arkos
owed
a
common
law
duty
of
reasonable
care
under
the
circumstances and asserts that Arkos’s own expert has testified
that a reasonable shipper in the same or similar circumstance as
Arkos would have taken steps to attempt to rectify the lack of
cribbage, dunnage, etc., after the issue was brought to Arkos’s
attention prior to the accident at issue.
ECF No. 123 at 8.
R.V.
Coleman additionally cites to the expert testimony of other parties
which supports the same position.
ECF No. 123 at 8.
Further, R.V.
Coleman argues that Arkos loaded the pipes at issue pursuant to the
Master Services Agreement between Arkos and EQT, and the Master
Services Agreement imposed a duty upon Arkos to act with reasonable
care under the circumstances.
ECF No. 123 at 9.
15
R.V. Coleman also
argues that the Savage2 rule, which places the primary duty as to
the safe loading of property upon the carrier, is inapplicable in
this case because the rule arises from the FMCSRs, and the FMCSRs
are not applicable to the accident because it did not occur during
the course of transportation. ECF No. 123 at 11-12. R.V. Coleman,
to the contrary, likens this case to Spence,3 asserting that Arkos
significantly involved itself in the securing of the load. ECF No.
123 at 15.
Lastly, R.V. Coleman asserts, in the alternative, that
if the Court finds that the FMCSRs are applicable to the accident
at issue, the Court should deny Arkos’s motion as the FMCSRs
imposed a duty of care on Arkos and that intervening causation is
a question of fact to be resolved by the jury.
ECF No. 123 at 17.
Plaintiff Jason Fielder also filed a response in opposition to
Arkos’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 131).
Plaintiff
asserts that while the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations
(“FMCSRs”) impose a clear duty on the carrier to secure the load
safely they do not relieve others, such as a shipper who breaches
a common law duty of care, from liability for their negligence and
their comparative share of the resulting damages. Plaintiff argues
that
to
the
extent
that
Arkos
suggests
that
Savage
states
otherwise, it is mistaken in that the Savage rule simply extends
the industry’s reasonable understanding to suits between shippers
2
United States v. Savage Truck Line, Inc., 209 F.2d 442 (4th
Cir. 1953)
3
Spence v. ESAB Grp., Inc., 623 F.3d 212 (3d Cir. 2010)
16
and carriers; it does not prevent an injured third-party from
pursuing a negligence claim against the shipper. Plaintiff asserts
that although Arkos may be able to rely upon Savage to assert a
claim for contribution or indemnity against defendant R.V. Coleman,
it may not do so to avoid liability to the plaintiff for Arkos’s
negligence
and
comparative
share
in
the
plaintiff’s
damages.
Plaintiff maintains that Arkos negligently loaded the pipes and
that R.V. Coleman failed to properly secure the pipes.
Plaintiff
seeks to refute Arkos’s arguments by stating that the Savage rule
does not apply to the plaintiff’s claim for damages against Arkos,
and that while the federal safety regulations imposed a clear duty
on R.V. Coleman to properly secure the pipes and restrain them from
rolling once unstrapped, that does not relieve Arkos, as the
shipper, from its common law liability for contributing to the
unsafe load.
Plaintiff asserts the negligence of defendant R.V.
Coleman and actions of defendant MEC were foreseeable and do not
constitute intervening, superseding causes.
ECF No. 131 at 11.
Plaintiff requests this Court deny Arkos’s motion and find that
defendant Arkos owed the plaintiff a common law duty of reasonable
care.
Arkos filed a reply in support of its motion (ECF No. 135),
stating that Arkos cannot be found negligent as it breached no duty
owed to the plaintiff in the manner in which it loaded the cargo
onto the flatbed trailer, and that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations do not apply to Arkos in the circumstances in the
17
matter at hand.
Further, Arkos asserts it cannot be found liable
under the Savage rule as there were no hidden defects in the manner
in which it secured the cargo.
Arkos argues that it was the
responsibility of R.V. Coleman, through its driver Cale Sukala, to
ensure the security of the load.
Defendant, Arkos Field Services,
LP, requests that this Court grant its motion for summary judgment
as to all of the plaintiff’s claims, and for such further relief as
this Court deems just and proper.
This Court finds a genuine issue of material fact exists, and
that the evidence presented is sufficient to create a triable issue
of fact at trial concerning plaintiff’s negligence claim against
Arkos. Accordingly, Arkos’s motion for summary judgment is denied.
4.
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with Respect to
Third-Party Complaint Against MEC Construction, LLC by R.V.
Coleman Trucking, Inc.
R.V. Coleman, in its capacity as a third-party plaintiff,
filed a motion for partial summary judgment with respect to thirdparty complaint against MEC Construction, LLC.
ECF No. 115. R.V.
Coleman asserts that it is entitled to partial summary judgment as
a matter of law with respect to its third-party complaint against
MEC as the undisputed material facts demonstrate that a specific
unsafe working condition existed in the workplace which presented
a high degree of risk and a strong probability of serious injury or
death and that MEC had actual knowledge of the existence of said
specific
unsafe
working
condition
§ 23-4-2(d)(2)(ii)(A) and (B).
under
West
ECF No. 115 at 2.
18
Virginia
Code
R.V. Coleman
requests the Court enter partial summary judgment in its favor with
respect to its third-party complaint against MEC for “deliberate
intent.”4
Third-party and cross-defendant MEC Construction, LLC filed a
response in opposition to R.V. Coleman’s motion for partial summary
judgment (ECF No. 129).
MEC asserts that R.V. Coleman has failed
to satisfy the requisite standards under deliberate intention,
requiring a denial of its motion for partial summary judgment, and
R.V. Coleman’s failure to present sufficient evidence of all the
requirements of a deliberate intention claim entitles MEC to
judgment as a matter of law in its favor.
asserts
that
R.V.
Coleman
only
argues
ECF No. 129 at 2.
in
its
motion
MEC
that
subsections A and B are satisfied, and responds by asserting that
it is clear from the plain language of that statute that all five
criteria must be satisfied in order to maintain a claim for
deliberate intention.
ECF No. 129 at 3.
MEC then addresses the
two factors which R.V. Coleman asserts are satisfied, and argues
that to the extent there was an unsafe condition, it was created by
the unforeseeable actions of the R.V. Coleman truck driver, and
that there is no evidence that MEC had actual knowledge of the
alleged unsafe working condition.
4
Because R.V. Coleman did not
See Sydenstricker v. Unipunch Prod., Inc., 169 W. Va. 440,
452, 288 S.E.2d 511, 518–19 (1982) (holding that the deliberate
intention exception contained in W. Va. Code § 23-4-2 permits a
defendant to bring a third-party action in contribution against the
employer of the injured plaintiff.)
19
even allege the remaining three requirements, MEC asserts that R.V.
Coleman’s motion must be denied.
R.V. Coleman filed a reply (ECF No. 136) in its capacity as a
third-party plaintiff, and asserts that the Court can grant its
motion, despite MEC’s argument, because it is a motion for partial
summary judgment.
R.V. Coleman submits that if the Court grants
summary judgment on these two factors, the other factors will be
submitted to the jury to find deliberate intention.
Following its review of the fully briefed motion, this Court
denies R.V. Coleman’s motion for partial summary judgment with
respect to the third-party complaint against MEC.
5.
Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendant R.V. Coleman
Trucking, Inc. by Jason Fielder
Plaintiff, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, filed a motion for partial judgment as a matter of law
against defendant R.V. Coleman Trucking, Inc. (ECF No. 116),
asserting there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether
defendant R.V. Coleman Trucking, Inc. was negligent and that such
negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.
No. 116 at 1.
ECF
Plaintiff argues that defendant R.V. Coleman
Trucking, Inc. was negligent and violated load securement rules of
the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, and asserts defendant
R.V. Coleman and its retained expert both admit that R.V. Coleman
is required to comply with the FMCSRs, and specifically Parts 392.9
and 393.106(c)(1).
R.V. Coleman Trucking, Inc.’s retained expert
Stanley Pulz outright admitted that R.V. Coleman violated Parts
20
393.106 and 392.9 by using wooden blocks that were not secured to
the trailer.
ECF No. 116-1 at 7.
Plaintiff states, that there is
additional evidence and testimony in support of each and every fact
set forth herein.
However, based exclusively on testimony and
evidence put forth by defendant R.V. Coleman, there is no genuine
issue of material fact as to whether defendant R.V. Coleman and its
employee-driver violated the FMCSRs and that such violation was a
proximate cause of Fielder’s severe injuries.
Therefore, the
plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and a pretrial
adjudication that defendant R.V. Coleman violated Parts 392.9 and
393.106(c)(1) of the FMCSRs, that defendant R.V. Coleman was
negligent, and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the
plaintiff’s injuries.
ECF No. 116-1 at 8.
R.V. Coleman, in its capacity as a defendant, filed a response
in opposition (ECF No. 125), and asserts five reasons the Court
should not grant the plaintiff’s motion: (1) the FMCSRs are not
applicable to the accident at issue; (2) even if the FMCSRs were
applicable, R.V. Coleman did not violate the FMCSRs; (3) plaintiff
has failed to establish that the proximate cause of the accident
was the actions of R.V. Coleman as opposed to Arkos’s failure to
initially properly load the pipes on to the trailer and MEC’s
failure to safely unload the pipe at issue; (4) R.V. Coleman
breached no duty of care owed to the plaintiff; and (5) genuine
issues of material fact preclude the entry of summary judgment in
plaintiff’s favor.
21
Plaintiff filed a reply to R.V. Coleman’s response (ECF No.
140) and reiterates many of the arguments asserted in the motion
for partial summary judgment. Plaintiff states that defendant R.V.
Coleman
Trucking,
Inc.’s
retained
expert,
Stanley
Pulz,
has
admitted that R.V. Coleman violated the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Regulations (“FMCSRs”).
deny
its
expert’s
Defendant R.V. Coleman does not
admissions;
however,
it
argues
that
its
violations of the FMCSRs should be either excused or ignored.
While R.V. Coleman admits that the cargo securement provisions of
the FMCSRs apply to the securement of the round pipes at issue, it
argues they do not apply when the cargo rolled off of the trailer
– the exact harm the regulations seek to prevent.
Finally, R.V.
Coleman ignores its expert’s admissions to the contrary and argues
that it did not violate the cargo securement provisions of the
FMCSRs.
Plaintiff asserts, based upon R.V. Coleman’s own expert’s
admissions, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to
whether defendant R.V. Coleman violated these cargo securement
provisions of the FMCSRs.
ECF No. 140 at 2.
This Court finds a genuine issue of material fact exists, and
that the evidence presented is sufficient to create a triable issue
of fact at trial concerning plaintiff’s negligence claim against
R.V. Coleman. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment
is denied.
22
6.
Motion for Summary Judgment by MEC Construction, LLC.
Third-party and cross-defendant MEC filed a motion for summary
judgment in its favor on all claims against it (ECF No. 117).
MEC
states that its insurer has previously accepted the tender from the
EQT defendants and is providing indemnity to the EQT defendants.
Further, MEC argues that neither the plaintiff nor the defendants
asserting contribution claims against MEC can satisfy all of the
requirements to establish a claim for deliberate intention, and
therefore MEC is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. MEC
asserts the applicable workers’ compensation statute specifically
authorizes an award of summary judgment under the circumstances.
ECF No. 117.
In its memorandum in support (ECF No. 119), MEC
asserts: MEC did not have actual knowledge of the existence of the
specific unsafe working condition and of the high degree of risk
and the strong probability of serious injury or death presented by
the specific unsafe working condition; the alleged specific unsafe
working condition was not a violation of a state or federal safety
statute,
rule
or
regulation,
or
of
a
commonly
accepted
and
well-known safety standard within the industry or business of MEC;
MEC did not intentionally expose the plaintiff to the alleged
specific unsafe working condition; and MEC does not have any
obligation to provide implied indemnity to R.V. Coleman as R.V.
Coleman cannot prove that any special relationship existed between
it and MEC.
23
Defendant and third-party plaintiff R.V. Coleman filed a
response in opposition to MEC’s motion for summary judgment (ECF
No. 126) and argues that the Court should deny MEC’s motion as
sufficient evidence has been developed to permit the jury to
determine whether MEC violated the five-factor “deliberate intent”
test under the West Virginia Code.
R.V. Coleman also asserts that
any determination regarding MEC’s obligation to provide implied
indemnity to R.V. Coleman is premature as there has been no finding
regarding the relative liabilities of the defendants herein.
ECF
No. 126 at 23.
Plaintiff Jason Fielder also filed a response in opposition
(ECF No. 132) to MEC’s motion, and argues that MEC’s motion for
summary judgment must be denied as there are genuine issues of
material fact as to whether defendant MEC acted with “deliberate
intent”
as
that
term
is
defined
in
West
Virginia
Code
§ 23-4-2(d)(2)(ii)(A)-(E).
MEC filed its reply (ECF No. 141) and asserts that the
arguments of R.V. Coleman and the plaintiff do not satisfy the five
step test for “deliberate intent,” arguing that the specific unsafe
condition did not exist until the R.V. Coleman truck driver
released the straps securing the straight pipes to the trailer, MEC
did not have actual knowledge of an unsafe condition in relation to
the subject load of pipes, MEC did not violate a state or federal
safety statute, rule or regulation, or of a commonly accepted and
well-known safety standard within the industry or business of MEC,
24
and that the plaintiff and R.V. Coleman fail to present any
evidence that MEC intentionally exposed the plaintiff to the
alleged
specific
unsafe
working
condition.
Third-party
and
cross-defendant MEC requests that this Court grant its motion for
summary judgment on the plaintiff’s cross-claim; the third-party
claims of R.V. Coleman; and the cross-claims for contribution filed
by the EQT defendants and enter judgment as a matter of law in its
favor, and award to it such other relief as the Court may find
appropriate under the circumstances.
ECF No. 141 at 13.
This Court finds that there is a genuine issue of material
fact
as
to
deliberate
intention.
The
evidence
presented
is
sufficient to create a triable issue of fact at trial concerning
whether the deliberate intention standard can be met. Accordingly,
MEC’s motion for summary judgment is denied.
Further, a ruling as
to indemnity or contribution is denied as premature.
V.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, this Court finds that summary
judgment in favor of the EQT defendants is appropriate. This Court
finds that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
that the EQT defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.
This Court also finds that defendant R.V. Coleman’s motion
for summary judgment and defendant Arkos’s motion for summary
judgment shall be denied.
R.V. Coleman’s motion for partial
summary judgment is denied.
Additionally, plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment shall be denied.
25
MEC’s motion for summary
judgment as to “deliberate intention” is denied and a ruling as to
indemnity or contribution is denied as premature.
Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment by EQT
Corporation, EQT Production Company, Equitrans, LP (ECF No. 112) is
GRANTED. The motion for summary judgment by R.V. Coleman Trucking,
Inc. (ECF No. 113) is DENIED.
The motion for summary judgment by
Arkos Field Services, LP (ECF No. 114) is DENIED.
The motion for
partial summary judgment with respect to third-party complaint
against MEC Construction, LLC by R.V. Coleman Trucking, Inc. (ECF
No. 115) is DENIED. The motion for summary judgment against
defendant R.V. Coleman Trucking, Inc. by Jason Fielder (ECF No.
116)
is
DENIED.
The
motion
for
summary
judgment
by
MEC
Construction, LLC (ECF No. 117) is DENIED as to “deliberate
intention.”
A ruling as to indemnity or contribution is DENIED AS
PREMATURE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to transmit a copy of this memorandum
opinion and order to counsel of record herein. Pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 58, the Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment
on this matter as to defendants EQT Corporation, EQT Production
Company, and Equitrans, LP.
DATED:
January 11, 2018
/s/ Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.
FREDERICK P. STAMP, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
26
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?