Yoakum v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
18
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (DKT. NO. 16 ). The Court adopts the Magistrate Judge's 16 Report and Recommendation in its entirety; Overrules the Plaintiff's 17 Objections; Grants the Defendant's 12 Motion for Summary Judgment; Denies the Plaintiff's 8 Motion for Summary Judgment and Dismisses this civil action with prejudice and directs that it be stricken from the Court's active docket. The Clerk is further directed to enter a separate judgment order in this matter. Signed by District Judge Irene M. Keeley on 3/8/17. (mh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
GENELLIA P. YOAKUM,
Plaintiff,
v.
//
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:16cv34
(Judge Keeley)
CAROLYN COLVIN,
ACTING COMMISSIONER
OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 16]
Pending before the Court is the Report and Recommendation
(“R&R”) of the Honorable James E. Seibert, United States Magistrate
Judge (Dkt. No. 16), regarding the parties’ competing motions for
summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the Court ADOPTS the
R&R in its entirety, OVERRULES the plaintiff’s objections, GRANTS
the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and DENIES plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
On July 11, 2011, the plaintiff, Genellia Yoakum (“Yoakum”),
filed a claim for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”), alleging
that she had become disabled on February 1, 2011. (Dkt. No. 16 at
1). The Social Security Administration denied Yoakum’s claim on
August 29, 2011, and again upon reconsideration on October 25,
2011. Id. As a result, Yoakum filed a written request for a hearing
on November 1, 2011. (Dkt. No. 16 at 1). The Administrative Law
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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 16]
Judge (“ALJ”), Karen B. Kostol, conducted a hearing on November 27,
2012, at which Yoakum, represented by counsel, appeared and offered
testimony.
Id.
Additionally,
an
impartial
vocational
expert
testified at the hearing. Id. On November 30, 2012, the ALJ issued
a decision unfavorable to Yoakum, finding that she was not disabled
within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Id. at 2.
On April 25, 2014, pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Yoakum filed a complaint in this
Court against Carolyn Colvin, acting Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration (“Commissioner”), seeking judicial review
of the Commissioner’s final decision. (See Civil Action No. 1:14cv-74, Dkt. No. 1). The Court referred that matter to United States
Magistrate Judge Robert W. Trumble, who entered an R&R on March 16,
2015. That R&R recommended that the matter be remanded to the
Commissioner to determine, inter alia, whether Yoakum’s former
position was a composite job and, if so, whether she had the
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) “to perform the exertional
demands of both components” of the composite job. See Yoakum v.
Commissioner of Social Security, 2015 WL 1585745 at *25 (N.D.W.Va.
April 9, 2015). Additionally, the R&R directed the Commissioner to
assign weight to the state agency physician’s opinion that the ALJ
had relied on in making her decision to deny benefits, and also to
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provide an explanation for why she assigned such weight. Id.
On remand, the ALJ held a second hearing on August 31, 2015,
at which Yoakum and a vocational expert again testified, following
which she again issued an unfavorable decision to Yoakum. On March
3, 2016, Yoakum filed suit in this Court seeking judicial review of
the Commissioner’s second denial of disability benefits. On May 10,
2016, the Commissioner filed its answer, together with the Social
Security Administration record. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 5, and 6). Yoakum and
the Commissioner each moved for summary judgment on June 7, 2016,
and August 16, 2016, respectively.
For this second civil action, the Court referred the matter to
United States Magistrate Judge James E. Seibert, who issued his R&R
on October 19, 2016, recommending that the Court deny Yoakum’s
motion for summary judgment and grant the Commissioner’s motion for
summary judgment. Id. Yoakum timely filed her objections to the R&R
on October 31, 2016. (Dkt. No. 17).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Review of the Report and Recommendation
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c) (2012), this Court must
review de novo any portions of a magistrate judge’s R&R to which
objections have been filed. However, when a party makes only
“general and conclusory objections that do not direct the court to
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a
specific
error
in
the
Magistrate’s
proposed
findings
and
recommendations,” the Court need not conduct a de novo review.
Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). In the absence
of a specific objection, the Court will only review the magistrate
judge’s conclusions for clear error. Diamond v. Colonial Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005).
B. Review of the Commissioner’s Final Decision
This Court’s review of a final decision regarding a DIB claim
is limited to (1) whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by
substantial evidence, see Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390
(1971), and (2) whether the ALJ applied the correct law. See 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) (2012); Stricker v. Colvin, 2016 WL 543216, at *1
(N.D.W. Va. Feb. 10, 2016). “Substantial evidence” means “more than
a mere scintilla” of evidence and is that which a “reasonable mind
might
accept
as
adequate
to
support
a
conclusion.”
Hays
v.
Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Richardson
v.
Perales,
402
U.S.
389,
401
(1971)).
Additionally,
the
“possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the
evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s findings from
being supported by substantial evidence.” Sec’y of Labor v. Mutual
Mining, Inc, 80 F.3d 110, 113 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Conolo v.
Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)).
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Importantly,
the
issue
is
not
whether
the
claimant
is
disabled, but whether the ALJ’s finding of disabled or not is
supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a
correct application of the relevant law. See Mayer v. Astrue, 662
F.3d 700, 704 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585,
589 (4th Cir. 1996)). Thus, the Court does “not undertake to reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or
substitute [its own] judgment for that of the [ALJ’s].” Johnson v.
Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005). Instead, making
findings of fact and resolving conflicts in the evidence is the
province of the ALJ reviewing the case. See King v. Califano,
599 F.2d 597, 599 (4th Cir. 1979). Therefore, if substantial
evidence exists to support the ALJ’s finding, and the correct legal
standard was applied, the ALJ’s conclusion must be affirmed. See
Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996).
III. APPLICABLE LAW
Disability is the “inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical
or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). To reach a
finding of disability, the ALJ must apply a five-step, burden5
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shifting process set out in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The initial
burden of proof is on the claimant to show that she is unable to
perform her previous work because of impairment. See McLain v.
Schweiker, 715 F.2d 866, 868-69 (4th Cir. 1983).
At step one, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is
currently
engaged
in
substantial
gainful
activity.
20
C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(b). If not, the ALJ moves to the second step to analyze
whether the claimant has a medically determinable impairment or
combination of impairments that are severe. Id. § 404.1520(c). If
so, the analysis moves to the third step, which requires the ALJ to
determine whether the claimant’s impairments or combination of
impairments meets or equals any of those listed in 20 C.F.R. Part
404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Id. § 404.1520(d). If they do, the
claimant is disabled. Id. § 404.1520(d). If the impairment does
not, however, meet or equal a listed impairment, the ALJ must then
assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), which
represents the claimant’s ability to do physical and mental work
activities
on
a
sustained
basis
despite
her
impairment’s
limitations. Id. § 404.1520(e).
Once the ALJ establishes the claimant’s RFC, the analysis
moves to step four, under which ALJ must determine whether the
claimant, based on her RFC, can perform past relevant work. Id. §
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404.1520(f). If the claimant cannot, then she has presented a prima
facie case of disability, and the ALJ moves to the final step of
the process. At this fifth and final step, however, the burden
shifts to the Commissioner to overcome the prima facie case by
establishing that the claimant has a sufficient RFC to engage in
“other work.” Id.; see McLain v. Schweiker, 715 F.2d 866, 868-69
(4th Cir. 1983). The ALJ must determine whether “other work” exists
in significant numbers in the national economy (either in the
region where the claimant lives or in several regions in the
country) that the claimant is capable of performing based on her
age, education, work experience, and RFC. Id. § 404.1520(g).
Finally, if the claimant can adjust to such “other work,” then the
ALJ will conclude that the claimant is not disabled. Id.
IV. DISCUSSION
Yoakum’s objections to the R&R are lengthy, repetitive, and
often overlapping. The Court will review de novo
only those
objections that discuss a specific error in the R&R. The gravamen
of Yoakum’s objections can be separated into four questions: (1)
did
the
ALJ
address
evidence
suggesting
that
Yoakum
lacked
transferrable skills; (2) did the ALJ mistakenly assign an RFC of
“light,”; (3) did the ALJ improperly discount Yoakum’s credibility
regarding the level of her pain; and (4) did the ALJ fail to
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adequately discuss evidence contrary to her decision. For the
reasons that follow, the Court overrules Yoakum’s objections.
A.
The ALJ Properly Addressed Whether Yoakum had Transferrable
Skills
Yoakum argues that, in ruling that she had transferable
skills, the ALJ did not address relevant evidence conflicting with
her conclusion. She contends that the ALJ failed to consider all of
the vocational expert’s relevant testimony suggesting that Yoakum
did not have transferable skills, but instead only performed simple
tasks that did not equate to transferrable work skills. (Dkt. 17 at
4). Specifically, Yoakum argues that the R&R utilized a “post-hoc
rationalization” to justify an issue that the ALJ did not address
in her decision.
She claims the R&R draws attention to particular
language from the administrative hearing in an attempt to support
a conclusion that the vocational expert gave conflicting testimony:
Q: So, in reality, these are just everyday tasks that
people do that aren’t real work skill, but [she’s] just
changing from a medium job to a light job?
A: Yes.
(Dkt. No. 16 at 6). However, the R&R rightfully notes that Yoakum’s
quote is incomplete, leaving out material language:
Q: So in reality, these are just everyday tasks that
people do that aren’t real work skills, but [she’s] just
changing jobs from a medium job to a light job? Or - yeah, a light job. Is that correct?
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Id. at 7 (emphasis added). Yoakum argues that, despite the compound
nature of the question, neither the vocational expert nor the ALJ
indicated that the question was confusing at the time it was asked
and that the only time it was considered “confusing” or “compound”
was in the R&R. (Dkt. No. 17 at 2).
Yoakum’s argument misses the point. The R&R did not rely on a
post-hoc rationalization to uphold the ALJ’s decision. Rather, the
ALJ justified her decision on the remainder of the vocational
expert’s testimony, and the R&R merely illustrated that Yoakum’s
reliance on the “confusing question” was misplaced. For example,
even if it is unclear whether the vocational expert was answering
“yes” to both parts of the question or only to one part, the expert
explicitly testified that Yoakum has transferable skills at the
medium level:
Q:
And would you please tell me what skills that she
developed as a home . . . as a home attendant, at
the medium level?
A:
You know, she - - typically, a home attendant will
help a person cook a meal, prepare meals, do light
cleaning, do care such as assisting in bathing and
taking care of the activities of daily living, you
know such as, you know cleaning oneself, bathing,
and what have you. Those same skills would apply to
working as a companion, but with the elimination of
the bathing and assisting in the mobility for - the individual.
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(Dkt. No. 16 at 7) (emphasis added).
Furthermore, the vocational expert was asked on two additional
occasions whether Yoakum had developed transferable skills. First,
the ALJ inquired:
Q:
Did the claimant have skills from her past work
that would transfer into the light [RFC] given?
A:
Yes, Your Honor. There would be the work of a
companion. This is a light and semi-skilled job . .
. .
(Dkt. No. 6-10 at 79). Later, Yoakum’s attorney queried:
Q:
Now it’s my understanding . . . that you first
testified that the home attendant was a medium
job . . . .
A:
Correct.
Q:
And it’s my understanding that’s either unskilled
or semi-skilled.
A:
That’s semi-skilled.
Q:
And then you named a companion job, at the light
level, that these skills of the semi-skilled job
transferred into.
A:
Yes.
Id. at 83. As such, no post-hoc rationalization was used to justify
the
ALJ’s
position
on
the
evidence,
or
even
to
justify
“contradictory testimony.” Rather, when the R&R stated that the
question
was
“confusing
at
best,”
it
merely
underscored
the
weakness in Yoakum’s argument and illustrated that, in isolation,
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the question was a mischaracterization of the testimony.
Ultimately, the Court is tasked with determining whether the
ALJ’s
findings
rest
on
sufficient
analysis,
supported
by
substantial evidence, to enable it to “track the ALJ’s reasoning.”
McIntire v. Colvin, 2015 WL 401007, at *5 (N.D.W.Va. Jan. 28,
2015). The Court concludes that sufficient evidence exists to
persuade a reasonable person that Yoakum had transferable skills,
and therefore OVERRULES her objection on this issue.
B.
The ALJ Properly Assigned an RFC of “Light”
Yoakum next takes issue with the ALJ’s finding that she had an
RFC of “light,” even though Dr. Kirk had concluded that her RFC was
“less than sedentary” and Dr. Gajendragadkar had concluded that her
RFC was “medium.” Although the R&R states that she received “the
benefit of the doubt,” Yoakum questions this when neither doctor
specifically found an RFC of light. (Dkt. No. 17 at 10). Yoakum
argues that the ALJ utilized conflicting evidence as a basis to
apply her own medical opinion in concluding that she was capable of
light work. Id. Further, Yoakum argues that Dr. Gajendragadkar’s
opinion does not satisfy many of the factors for evaluating opinion
evidence and that the ALJ improperly discounted Dr. Kirk’s opinion.
Id. at 12.
Medical opinions are considered together with the rest of the
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evidence that the ALJ receives. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. A treating
source’s opinion receives controlling weight only when it is “wellsupported
by
medically
acceptable
clinical
and
laboratory
diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other
substantial
evidence
in
[the]
case
record.”
20
C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(c)(2). “[I]f a physician’s opinion is not supported by
clinical evidence or if it is inconsistent with other substantial
evidence, is should be accorded significantly less weight.” Craig
v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 590 (4th Cir. 1996). In such cases, the ALJ
retains “discretion to give less weight to the testimony of a
treating physician in the face of persuasive contrary evidence.”
Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 178 (4th Cir. 2001).
When deciding not to give a treating physician’s medical
opinion controlling weight, an ALJ must consider and apply the
following factors in assigning weight to other medical opinions:
(1) the length of the treatment relationship and frequency of
examination;
(2)
the
nature
and
extent
of
the
treatment
relationship; (3) the amount of relevant evidence to support an
opinion; (4) consistency of the medical opinion with the record;
(5) the doctor’s specialization when the opinion is related to that
specialty; and (6) and other relevant factors brought to the ALJ’s
attention. 20 C.F.R. 404.1527(c).
12
The ALJ need not list each of
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these factors, so long as her reasoning considers all those that
are pertinent. Hamm v. Colvin, 2015 WL 165302, at *9 (E.D.W. Va.
Jan 12, 2015) (citing Burch v. Apfel, 9 Fed. App’x 225, 259-60 (4th
Cir. 2001)). Although the ALJ must not “play doctor” or come to her
own medical opinion,1 the final responsibility for deciding the
claimant’s RFC is reserved to the ALJ. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.
When the ALJ gave Yoakum the “benefit of the doubt” by
assigning her a light RFC, she plainly rejected Dr. Kirk’s RFC of
“less than sedentary,”2 as well as an RFC of “sedentary.” (Dkt. No.
6-10 at 13-14). The ALJ explained that Dr. Kirk’s opinion lacked
the support of objective medical studies. See Dkt. No. 6-10 at 1213.
Indeed, she found his opinion to be inconsistent with the
conclusions reached in those studies. Moreover, in rejecting Dr.
Kirk’s opinion, the ALJ relied on “the sparse treatment records,
the objective studies from those treatment records, the claimant’s
activities of daily living, and the reasoned opinion of the State
agency consultant,” all persuasive contrary evidence. (Dkt. No. 6-
1
See, e.g., Forquer v. Colvin, 2016 WL 4250364 at *19 (N.D.W.
Va. 2016) (citing Schmidt v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 117, 118 (7th Cir.
1990) and Wilson v. Califano, 617 F.2d 1050, 1053-54 (4th Cir.
1980)).
2
The ALJ cited to Social Security Ruling 96-9p, 1996 WL
374185, which holds that an RFC of less than sedentary “is expected
to be relatively rare.”
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10 at 14).
Conversely,
the
ALJ
noted
no
such
shortcomings
in
Dr.
Gajendragadkar’s reasoning. She assigned his opinion substantial
weight because objective studies supported his conclusion, and his
“superior
expertise”
and
“understanding
of
Social
Security
Administration regulations and rules for determining disability”
rendered his opinion more persuasive. (Dkt. No. 6-10 at 12-13).
Based on her evaluation, the ALJ clearly could have assigned
Yoakum an RFC of medium and denied her DIB benefits. Rather, she
gave Yoakum the benefit of the doubt and applied the slightly more
favorable RFC:
Even assuming, arguendo, that the claimant was incapable
of medium exertional work . . . there is still
insufficient evidence to conclude that the claimant was
subsequently limited to sedentary exertional work. . . .
This
does
not
reflect
any
fallacy
with
Dr.
Gajendragadkar’s reasoning, but rather is a function of
according the claimant the utmost benefit of the doubt.
.
.
.
During the period at issue, . . . the findings were
insufficient to limit the claimant to sedentary work
activities. She was capable of light work activities
prior to her date last insured.
(Dkt. No. 6-10 at 13-14).
Yoakum provides no support for her argument that the ALJ’s RFC
rating
had
to
match
exactly
14
either
Dr.
Kirk’s
or
Dr.
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Gajendragadkar’s rating. See, e.g., Gordils v. Sec’y of Health and
Human Svcs., 921 F.2d 327, 329 (1st Cir. 1990)(noting that an ALJ
is free to make common-sense judgments about functional capacity
based on medical findings). Further, the evidence is clear that,
had she been required to choose one or the other, the ALJ would
have
agreed
Accordingly,
with
Dr.
the
Court
Gajendragadkar’s
concludes
RFC
that
the
rating
ALJ
of
medium.
appropriately
evaluated the competing medical opinions and properly assigned
Yoakum an RFC of light.
C.
The ALJ did not Improperly Discount Yoakum’s Credibility as to
the Level of her Pain
Yoakum
argues
that,
because
pain
can
wax
and
wane,
intermittence is not a reason to discount a claimant’s credibility
or a medical opinion. She argues that the ALJ discounted her
credibility as a means to then discount the credibility of Dr. Kirk
and his RFC. Additionally, Yoakum argues that evidence of her daily
living should not have been used to lessen her credibility.
An ALJ will not find an individual to be disabled based on
alleged symptoms alone. See Social Security Ruling 96-7p, 1996 WL
374186, at *2.3 Nor may an ALJ reject a claimant’s statements about
3
The Court recognizes that SSR 16-3p has superseded SSR 96-7p,
but because this case was adjudicated prior to the effective date
of March 28, 2016, SSR 96-7p still applies.
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her
symptoms
objective
solely
medical
because
evidence.”
“they
Id.
are
In
not
substantiated
evaluating
a
by
claimant’s
symptoms, including pain, the ALJ must use a two step process.
First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a medically
determinable
impairment
that
could
reasonably
be
expected
to
produce the alleged symptoms. Id. Next, if an underlying physical
impairment
that
could
reasonably
be
expected
to
produce
the
symptoms is established, the ALJ must evaluate the intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms to determine the
extent to which they limit the claimant’s ability to do basic work
activities.
Id.
If
the
statements
are
not
substantiated
by
objective medical evidence, the ALJ must make a finding on the
claimant’s credibility based on consideration of the entire case
record, including medical history, objective medical evidence, and
her own statements about her symptoms. Id.
Here, the ALJ did not reject Yoakum’s description of her pain
out of hand, but instead acknowledged that her impairments could
reasonably be expected to cause her alleged symptoms. (Dkt. No. 610 at 9). However, she did find that Yoakum’s descriptions of her
intermittent
pain
were
inconsistent
with
an
intractable
and
debilitating condition, or her admittedly significant activities of
daily living, including childcare. (Dkt. No. 6-10 at 12). Further,
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although Yoakum had testified to “severe back pain” at her initial
hearing, her doctors noted unremarkable symptoms. Finally, recent
objective
medical
abnormalities
evaluations
without
impingement.” Id.
instability,
“showed
relatively
stenosis,
or
nerve
minor
root
From this, the ALJ ultimately concluded that
Yoakum’s allegations of the severity of her symptoms. As discussed
above, there was substantial evidence to discount Dr. Kirk’s
opinion. (Dkt. No. 6-10 at 10).
For these reasons, the Court concludes that the ALJ properly
evaluated Yoakum’s credibility and gave her testimony appropriate
weight.
D.
It therefore overrules this objection.
The ALJ Adequately Addressed Evidence Contrary to her Decision
In Yoakum’s final objection, she argues that by ignoring
relevant evidence and limiting her discussion only to evidence that
supports her ruling, the ALJ violated Fourth Circuit case law and
the Commissioner’s own regulations. (Dkt. No. 17 at 7). Yoakum
maintains that the ALJ is required to discuss any evidence that
supports a medical opinion and that, “by not discussing the same
physical therapy records that this Court found to be inconsistent
with the ALJ’s previous finding” of “light work,” the ALJ committed
legal error and the magistrate judge is allowing it to persist. Id.
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These arguments were preemptively addressed in Magistrate
Judge Seibert’s R&R. To be clear, the Court’s previous holding was
not that the physical therapy records were inconsistent with the
ALJ’s previous finding of “light work,” but rather that, alone,
they were insufficient to discredit Dr. Kirk’s opinion and provide
substantial evidence for the ALJ’s position. After remand, the ALJ
was much more articulate and offered many reasons as to why she
gave Dr. Kirk’s opinion little weight.
Finally, Yoakum contends that, because the ALJ must assess RFC
based on all of the relevant evidence in her case record, the ALJ
erred by limiting the scope of the evidence when evaluating Dr.
Kirk’s opinion. (Dkt. No. 17 at 8). According to Yoakum, the ALJ
must consider the entire record and not limit her analysis to a
particular time period on or before Dr. Kirk issued his opinion.
Id. By allowing the ALJ to limit her findings to whether evidence
existed at the time of Dr. Kirk’s opinion, Yoakum asserts the
magistrate judge erred. Id.
Yoakum is correct that an ALJ is obligated to consider all
relevant medical and other evidence when assessing an RFC. 20
C.F.R.
§
404.1545.
But
Yoakum’s
argument
confuses
the
ALJ’s
obligation when assessing an RFC to consider all evidence with the
ALJ’s determination of how much weight to assign to Dr. Kirk’s
18
YOAKUM V. COMM. OF SOCIAL SECURITY
1:16CV34
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 16]
opinion. That is to say, the ALJ weighed Dr. Kirk’s opinion based
on what evidence Dr. Kirk had available to him at the time he
authored his opinion. See Dkt. No. 6-10 at 12. This does not mean
that the ALJ limited her review of the entire record, both before
and after Dr. Kirk’s opinion, when she assessed Yoakum’s RFC. The
ALJ reasoned in part that, because there were no objective studies
available, Dr. Kirk’s opinion lacked support for his findings, and
thus his report deserved less weight than it would had it been
based on additional objective evidence. Id.
It is clear from the record that the ALJ weighed and addressed
all the evidence, including Dr. Kirk’s opinion. Although the ALJ
afforded less weight to that opinion that Yoakum might have liked,
she did not ignore it. Therefore, the Court concludes that the ALJ
appropriately weighed the evidence, including evidence contrary to
her conclusion, and therefore overrules this objection.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court’s task on review is to determine whether the ALJ
based her findings on substantial evidence, that is, evidence that
a
“reasonable
mind
might
accept
as
adequate
to
support
a
conclusion.” Hays, 907 F.2d at 1456 (quoting Perales, 402 U.S. at
401). Here, such substantial evidence exists, and, for the reasons
discussed, the Court:
19
YOAKUM V. COMM. OF SOCIAL SECURITY
1:16CV34
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 16]
1.
ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety (Dkt. No. 16);
2.
OVERRULES Yoakum’s objections (Dkt. No. 17);
3.
GRANTS the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment
(Dkt. No. 12);
4.
DENIES Yoakum’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 8);
and
5.
DISMISSES this civil action WITH PREJUDICE and DIRECTS
that it be STRICKEN from the Court’s active docket.
It is so ORDERED.
The Court directs the Clerk to transmit copies of this
Memorandum Opinion and Order to counsel of record and to enter a
separate judgment order.
DATED: March 8, 2017
/S/ Irene M. Keeley
IRENE M. KEELEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
20
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