Staples v. O'Brien

Filing 31

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (DKT. NO. 24 . The Court adopts the Magistrate Judge's 24 Report and Recommendation in its entirety; overrules Petitioner's 29 Objections; grants the Respondent's 16 Motion to Dismiss o r for Summary Judgment; denies the 1 Petition and dismisses this case with prejudice. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to substitute Warden Joe Coakley, who has replaced Terry OBrien as the warden at U.S.P. Hazelton. Further, the Clerk is directed to enter a separate judgment in this matter. Signed by District Judge Irene M. Keeley on 2/15/17. (To PS Petitioner via cert. mail)(mh) (Additional attachment(s) added on 2/15/2017: # 1 Certified Mail Return Receipt) (mh).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
WILLIAM STAPLES,
Petitioner,
v.

//

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:16CV41
(Judge Keeley)

TERRY O’BRIEN, Warden,
Respondent.
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 24]
On March 15, 2016, the pro se petitioner, William Staples
(“Staples”), filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”) (Dkt. No. 1). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636 and LR PL P 2, the Court referred the Petition to the
Honorable Robert W. Trumble, United States Magistrate Judge, for
initial review. Pending before the Court is Magistrate Judge
Trumble’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (Dkt. No. 24). For the
reasons that follow, the Court ADOPTS the R&R (Dkt. No. 24), GRANTS
the respondent’s motion to dismiss or for summary judgment (Dkt.
No. 16), and DENIES and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE the Petition (Dkt.
No. 1).
I. BACKGROUND
In his Petition, Staples claims that the federal Bureau of
Prisons (“BOP”) unlawfully revoked his good time credit. Id. at 5.
More particularly, he alleges that the BOP violated his due process
rights in connection with its adjudication of four disciplinary

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ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 24]
incident reports. Id. at 5-7. Each of the incident reports resulted
in a finding by the Disciplinary Hearing Officer (“DHO”) that
Staples was guilty of violating prison rules.1 On May 6, 2016, the
respondent filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment (Dkt.
No. 16), arguing that, in each of the disciplinary proceedings at
issue,

it

had

provided

Staples

with

due

process

under

the

Constitution (Dkt. No. 17 at 11).
In

his

disciplinary

R&R,

Magistrate

proceedings

are

Judge

Trumble

not

noted

criminal

that

prison

prosecutions,

and

prisoners are thus entitled only to a limited range of due process
rights

(Dkt.

No.

24

at

9).

In

particular,

he

outlined

the

requirements of due process defined by the Supreme Court in Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), concerning when a disciplinary
proceeding may result in the loss of good time credit (Dkt. No. 24
at 9):
Under Wolff, the inmate is entitled to the following: (1)
written notice of the charges at least twenty-four hours
in advance of the hearing; (2) written findings as to the
evidence relied upon and reasons for the disciplinary
action; and (3) the right to call witnesses and present
evidence in his defense, provided there is no undue
hazard to institutional safety or correctional goals.
Additionally, an inmate should be permitted to seek
counsel substitute (a fellow inmate or a prison employee)

1

Magistrate Judge Trumble’s R&R contains a more detailed
summary of the incident reports as well as the proceedings at issue
(Dkt. No. 24 at 2-5).
2

STAPLES V. O’BRIEN

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ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 24]
if he is illiterate or in complex cases that he cannot
handle alone, and he is entitled to have the charges
adjudicated by a fair and impartial tribunal.
Randall v. Pettiford, 2011 WL 587003, at *2 (D.S.C. Jan. 21, 2011)
(internal citation omitted) (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-71). In
addition,

“some

Superintendent

evidence”

v.

Hill,

carefully

reviewing

Staples’s

disciplinary

must

472

each

support

U.S.

incident

445,

the

454-56

report

proceedings,

BOP’s

and

Magistrate

decision.

(1985).
the

After

record

Judge

of

Trumble

concluded that the BOP had provided Staples with the protections
articulated

in

Wolff,

and

had

based

its

decisions

on

“some

evidence” as required by Hill (Dkt. No. 24 at 10-16). Therefore, he
recommended that the Court grant the respondent’s motion to dismiss
and deny and dismiss the Petition with prejudice. Id. at 16.
The R&R also informed Staples of his right to file “written
objections identifying the portions of the Recommendation to which
objections are made, and the basis for such objections.” Id. It
further warned him that the failure to do so may result in waiver
of his right to appeal. Id. Staples filed timely objections to the
R&R on August 19, 2016 (Dkt. No. 29).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a magistrate judge’s R&R, the Court must review
de novo only the portions to which an objection is timely made. 28

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ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 24]
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). On the other hand, “the Court may adopt,
without explanation, any of the magistrate judge’s recommendations
to which the prisoner does not object.” Dellacirprete v. Gutierrez,
479 F. Supp. 2d 600, 603-04 (N.D.W. Va. 2007) (citing Camby v.
Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983)). Courts will uphold those
portions of a recommendation to which no objection has been made
unless they are “clearly erroneous.” See Diamond v. Colonial Life
& Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005).
Vague objections to an R&R distract a district court from
“focusing on disputed issues” and defeat the purpose of an initial
screening by the magistrate judge. McPherson v. Astrue, 605 F.
Supp. 2d 744, 749 (S.D.W. Va. 2009) (citing Howard’s Yellow Cabs,
Inc. v. United States, 987 F. Supp. 469, 474 (W.D.N.C. 1997)).
Failure to raise specific errors waives the claimant’s right to a
de novo review because “general and conclusory” objections do not
warrant such review. Id. (citing Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44,
47 (4th Cir. 1982); Howard’s Yellow Cabs, 987 F. Supp. at 474); see
also Green v. Rubenstein, 644 F. Supp. 2d 723 (S.D.W. Va. 2009).
Indeed, failure to file specific objections waives appellate review
of both factual and legal questions. See United States v. Schronce,
727 F.2d 91, 94 & n.4 (4th Cir. 1984); see also Moore v. United
States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).

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STAPLES V. O’BRIEN

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ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 24]
III. DISCUSSION
Staples’s

lengthy

objections

to

the

R&R

focus

almost

exclusively on the same background information and legal arguments
he raised before Magistrate Judge Trumble (Dkt. No. 29). For the
most part, these fail to identify specific errors in Magistrate
Judge Trumble’s findings and, in fact, contain few references to
the R&R itself. Several of these references generally allege that
Magistrate Judge Trumble should have made a “fair decision” or that
he “erred in [his] decision.” Id. at 4, 22. These reiterations and
general objections place the Court under no obligation to conduct
a de novo review. Diamond, 414 F.3d at 315.
When liberally construed, however, Staples’s objections to
specific portions of the R&R concern his double jeopardy and due
process rights. See DiPilato v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 2d
333, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that pro se objections should be
“accorded leniency” and “construed to raise the strongest arguments
that they suggest” (internal quotation omitted)). After conducting
a de novo review of those matters, the Court discerns no errors in
Magistrate Judge Trumble’s recommendations.
A.

Double Jeopardy
In both his Petition and response to the motion to dismiss,

Staples argues that he was “tried twice” and subjected to double

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ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 24]
jeopardy regarding Incident Report #26722561 (Dkt. Nos. 1-2 at 19;
23 at 9). As Magistrate Judge Trumble discusses in the R&R, the
record reflects that Staples received the report on January 16,
2015, and the DHO held a hearing on February 4, 2015. Due to
Staples’s procedural objections to the original report, it was
reissued on April 7, 2015, and a second hearing was held on April
22, 2015 (Dkt. No. 17-3). The R&R did not directly address the
double jeopardy issue, and Staples argues that Magistrate Judge
Trumble “erred and dropped the ball” by failing to consider it
(Dkt. No. 29 at 8).
Staples’s double jeopardy argument and related objections are
unavailing. Notably, “prison disciplinary sanctions do not preclude
subsequent criminal prosecution for the same conduct under the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because Congress
intended disciplinary proceedings to be civil in nature.” United
States v. Devaughn, 32 Fed. App’x 60 (4th Cir. 2002) (unpublished
per curiam opinion). Courts that have considered the question have
uniformly rejected the proposition that double jeopardy attaches in
prison disciplinary proceedings. See, e.g., Portee v. Vannatta, 105
Fed. App’x 855, 858 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Meeks v. McBride, 81
F.3d 717, 722 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[A]n acquittal in an earlier prison
disciplinary hearing is no bar to a subsequent hearing to consider

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STAPLES V. O’BRIEN

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ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 24]
the very same charge.”)); Miranda-Gonzalez v. Garcia, 13 Fed. App’x
11 (1st Cir. 2001) (unpublished per curium opinion); Tallini v.
Mitchell, No. 4:10-2242-MBS, 2011 WL 3159101, at *2 (D.S.C. July
26, 2011); Terron v. Kupec, No. AMD-01-2155, 2001 WL 34698403, at
*1 (D. Md. July 30, 2001).
B.

Due Process Objections
Much of Staples’s due process argument is tainted by his

misconception that he has a “created liberty interest” in BOP
Program Statement 5270.09, which includes the Inmate Discipline
Program (Dkt. Nos. 1-2 at 13; 29 at 19-20). Staples objects that
Magistrate Judge Trumble failed to consider that interest and
reasons that each time the BOP allegedly failed to comply with its
own procedures it violated his due process rights (Dkt. No. 29 at
20).

However,

“[p]rocess

is

not

an

end

in

itself.

Its

constitutional purpose is to protect a substantive interest to
which the individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement.” Olim
v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983).
Undoubtedly, Staples has a protected liberty interest in
avoiding the withdrawal of good time credit, Wolff, 418 U.S. at
556-58.

From a review of the record, however, it is clear

Magistrate Judge Trumble properly applied the Supreme Court’s Wolff

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STAPLES V. O’BRIEN

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ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 24]
standard to determine whether Staples had received due process
prior to the deprivation of his liberty (Dkt. No. 24 at 9).
1.

Impartial Decisionmaker

In regard to Incident Report #2672561, where the report was
reissued and reheard, Staples argues that Magistrate Judge Trumble
improperly concluded that he was provided with an impartial fact
finder (Dkt. No. 29 at 9, 20-21). Staples claims that the DHO could
not have been impartial because she presided over both hearings on
the report and, during the first hearing, amended the charge from
a violation of Code 111 (Making of Intoxicants) to a violation of
Code

113

(Possession

of

Intoxicants),

based

on

the

evidence

presented (Dkt. Nos. 17-3 at 27; 29 at 21).
Undoubtedly, Staples is entitled to an impartial adjudicator
that

will

not

subject

him

to

the

“hazard

of

arbitrary

decisionmaking.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 571. In order to ensure this
protection, BOP regulations provide that “[t]he DHO will be an
impartial

decision

maker

who

was

not

a

victim,

witness,

investigator, or otherwise significantly involved in the incident.”
28 C.F.R. § 541.8(b). In this case, there is no evidence that the
DHO ran afoul of either the regulations or the Constitution. She
was not involved in the incident itself, the investigation of
Staples’s infraction, the decision to bring charges against him, or

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STAPLES V. O’BRIEN

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ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 24]
the Unit Discipline Committee’s decision to refer the case to her.
Accord Lucas v. English, No. 16-3174-JWL, 2016 WL 7326288, at *5
(D. Kan. Dec. 16, 2016); Ortiz v. Zuniga, No. 2:14-cv-2598, 2016 WL
6039010, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2016); Lewis v. Warden, U.S.P.
Canaan, No. 3:14-cv-2325, 2016 WL 3156313, at *2 (M.D. Pa. June 2,
2016); Lee v. Lewis, No. 5:13-CT-3218-FL, 2016 WL 866326, at *7
(E.D.N.C. Mar. 3, 2016). The record does not support a finding that
the DHO became biased simply because, during the first hearing, she
concluded that the evidence supported a separate charge upon which
Staples

received

Therefore,

the

an

Court

amended
agrees

report
with

and

additional

Magistrate

Judge

hearing.
Trumble’s

conclusion that the BOP provided an impartial fact finder in
compliance with the due process requirements of Wolff.
2.

Weight of the Evidence

In regard to Incident Reports #2693272 and #2701951, Staples
argues that Magistrate Judge Trumble failed to objectively consider
“the overwhelming greater weight of the evidence” that Staples
presented (Dkt. No. 29 at 10-14). This objection is wholly without
merit in light of the fact that a disciplinary decision need only
be supported by “some evidence.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 454-56. As
Magistrate Judge Trumble noted in the R&R, this is a minimal
standard

and

does

not

require

9

examining

the

entire

record,

STAPLES V. O’BRIEN

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ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 24]
independently assessing the credibility of witnesses, or even
weighing the evidence. Id.

at 455. The relevant question is

“whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the
[DHO’s] conclusion.” Id. at 457. After reviewing the record and the
R&R, the Court agrees that, for each incident report at issue,
“some evidence” supported the DHO’s decision (Dkt. No. 24 at 1015).
IV. CONCLUSION
Following a de novo review of Staples’s specific objections,
and finding no clear error in those portions of the R&R not
specifically objected to, for the reasons more fully stated in the
R&R, the Court:
1.

ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety (Dkt. No. 24);

2.

OVERRULES Staples’s objections (Dkt. No. 29);

3.

GRANTS the respondent’s motion to dismiss or for summary
judgment (Dkt. No. 16); and

3.

DENIES the Petition (Dkt. No. 1) and DISMISSES this case
WITH PREJUDICE.

It is so ORDERED.
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to substitute Warden Joe Coakley,
who has replaced Terry O’Brien as the warden at U.S.P. Hazelton, as
the respondent in this case, and to transmit copies of this Order
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ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 24]
to counsel of record and to the pro se petitioner, certified mail,
return receipt requested. The Clerk is further DIRECTED to enter a
separate judgment order and to remove this case from the Court’s
active docket.
Dated:

February 15, 2017.
/s/ Irene M. Keeley
IRENE M. KEELEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

11