UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. Walden et al
Filing
80
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING UNITED STATES' MOTION TO HOLD DEFENDANTS IN CIVIL CONTEMPT (DKT. NO. 74 ). Signed by Senior Judge Irene M. Keeley on 3/4/19. (Copy to guardian ad litem D. Scudiere via CM/ECF)(mh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff,
v.
//
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:16CV42
(Judge Keeley)
GARY WALDEN;
BRIAN CARL WALDEN,
as Conservator for Gary Walden,
a protected person;
BRIAN CARL WALDEN,
as Administrator CTA of the Estate
of the deceased Tina Walden;
WALDEN HOMES, LLC;
d/b/a Walden Rentals; and
973 CHESTNUT RIDGE ROAD, INC.
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING THE MOTION OF THE UNITED
STATES TO HOLD DEFENDANTS IN CIVIL CONTEMPT [DKT. NO. 74]
Pending
(“United
is
the
States”),
motion
seeking
of
the
to
hold
United
the
States
of
defendants
America
in
civil
contempt for failing to obey a consent decree entered by the
Court on July 10, 2017. For the reasons that follow, the Court
GRANTS the motion (Dkt. No. 74).
I.
The United States initiated this action to enforce Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (the “Fair Housing Act”), as
amended,
42
U.S.C.
§
3601,
et
seq.
According
to
the
United
States, the defendants, Gary Walden, Tina Walden, Walden Homes,
UNITED STATES V. WALDEN, ET AL.
1:16CV42
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING THE MOTION OF THE UNITED
STATES TO HOLD DEFENDANTS IN CIVIL CONTEMPT [DKT. NO. 74]
LLC d/b/a Walden Rentals, and 973 Chestnut Ridge Road, Inc.,
engaged
in
unlawful
discrimination
on
the
basis
of
sex
by
subjecting female tenants at their rental properties to severe,
pervasive, and unwelcome sexual harassment in violation of the
Fair Housing Act. Specifically, over a period of at least nine
years Gary Walden engaged in egregious acts of sexual harassment
against
female
residential
tenants
rental
and
prospective
properties
he
owned
tenants
and
managed
at
in
the
the
Morgantown, West Virginia area. See Dkt. No. 31.
Gary Walden’s discriminatory conduct included, but was not
limited to, the following: engaging in unwelcome sex acts with
his female tenants; engaging in unwanted sexual touching and
groping; conditioning or offering tangible housing benefits in
exchange for performance of sex acts; touching himself in a
sexual manner and exposing himself in the presence of female
tenants;
advances;
making
unwanted
entering
the
and
unwelcome
apartments
of
sexual
female
comments
tenants
and
without
permission or notice to sexually harass them; and taking or
threatening
to
take
adverse
housing
actions
against
female
tenants who refused or objected to his sexual advances. Id. at
2
UNITED STATES V. WALDEN, ET AL.
1:16CV42
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING THE MOTION OF THE UNITED
STATES TO HOLD DEFENDANTS IN CIVIL CONTEMPT [DKT. NO. 74]
4-5. Tina Walden failed to take appropriate steps to remedy the
discrimination after receiving tenant complaints about sexual
harassment.
threatened
Indeed,
such
she
actions,
took
adverse
in
housing
retaliation
for
actions,
or
discrimination
complaints. Id. at 5-6.
The United States charged that Tina Walden, Walden Homes,
LLC,
and
973
Chestnut
Ridge
Road,
Inc.
were
liable
for
the
discriminatory conduct of Gary Walden, who was acting as their
agent, and that Gary Walden, Walden Homes, LLC, and 973 Chestnut
Ridge Road, Inc. were liable for the discriminatory conduct of
Tina Walden, who was acting as their agent. Id. at 6.
According to the United States, as a consequence of these
acts
and
statements,
the
defendants
(1)
denied
housing
or
otherwise made housing unavailable because of sex in violation
of
42
U.S.C.
§
3604(a);
(2)
discriminated
in
the
terms,
conditions, or privileges of the rental of dwellings, or in the
provision
of
services
or
facilities
in
connection
therewith,
because of sex, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b); (3) made
statements with respect to the rental of dwellings that indicate
a preference, limitation, or discrimination based on sex, in
3
UNITED STATES V. WALDEN, ET AL.
1:16CV42
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING UNITED STATES’S
MOTION TO HOLD DEFENDANTS IN CIVIL CONTEMPT [DKT. NO. 74]
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c); and (4) coerced, intimidated,
threatened,
enjoyment
or
of,
interfered
or
on
with
account
persons
of
their
in
the
having
exercise
or
exercised
or
enjoyed, their rights under Section 804 of the Fair Housing Act,
all in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3617. Id. at 7. The United
States
further
asserted
that
female
tenants
and
prospective
tenants were injured by the defendants’ discriminatory conduct,
and that the defendants’ conduct was intentional, willful, and
taken in reckless disregard for the rights of others. Id. at 8.
Through mediation, the parties settled their dispute prior
to trial. Consequently, on July 10, 2017, the Court entered a
consent decree (“Consent Decree,” or “Decree”) (Dkt. No. 73),
requiring the defendant to deposit $500,000.00 into a Settlement
Fund for the purpose of compensating the victims harmed by Gary
Walden’s sexual harassment. Id. at ¶ 22. They agreed to deposit
a first payment of $100,000.00 into the Settlement Fund within
thirty (30) days of entry of the Decree, and to deposit the
remaining balance of $400,000.00 into the Settlement Fund by
January 15, 2018. Id. Further, the terms of the Consent Decree
also
required
the
defendants
to
4
pay
$100,000.00
in
civil
UNITED STATES V. WALDEN, ET AL.
1:16CV42
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING UNITED STATES’S
MOTION TO HOLD DEFENDANTS IN CIVIL CONTEMPT [DKT. NO. 74]
penalties to the United States by January 15, 2018. Id. at ¶ 33.
Finally,
pursuant
to
the
Consent
Decree,
the
Court
retained
jurisdiction over the case in order to enforce compliance with
its terms. Id. at ¶ 38.
Of critical importance to the pending motion, although the
defendants deposited the initial $100,000.00 payment into the
Settlement Fund on August 10, 2017, they never paid the balance
of
$400,000.00
to
the
Settlement
Fund,
nor
did
they
pay
$100,000.00 in civil penalties to the United States. The United
States communicated with counsel for the defendants on numerous
occasions in an effort to secure compliance with the Consent
Decree (Dkt. Nos. 74 at 3; 75 at 3), but those efforts proved
unavailing.
See
also
Dkt.
No.
75-1,
Exhibit
1,
Letter
from
Jackson to Armistead and Scudiere. There is no dispute that the
defendants
are
“fully
aware”
of
their
obligations
under
the
Decree (Dkt. No. 75 at 4-5). Indeed, they have conceded that
they
both
Settlement
failed
Fund
to
and
deposit
also
to
the
pay
United States. Id.
5
additional
the
civil
funds
into
penalties
to
the
the
UNITED STATES V. WALDEN, ET AL.
1:16CV42
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING UNITED STATES’S
MOTION TO HOLD DEFENDANTS IN CIVIL CONTEMPT [DKT. NO. 74]
II.
“There can be no question that courts have inherent power
to enforce compliance with their lawful orders through civil
contempt.” Render’s Mkts., Inc. v. Joppatowne G.P. Ltd. P’ship,
608 F. App’x 130, 131 (4th Cir. 2015) (unpublished decision)
(quoting Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966));
see also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991). The
Court
may
impose
sanctions
for
civil
contempt
“to
coerce
obedience to a court order or to compensate the complainant for
losses
sustained
Motors
Corp.,
as
61
a
result
of
256,
258
F.3d
the
contumacy.”
(4th
Cir.
In
1995)
re
Gen.
(citation
omitted). “The appropriate remedy for civil contempt is within
the court’s broad discretion.” Id. at 259.
Civil
violated
command”
contempt
“set[s]
that
is
is
appropriate
forth
in
“clear
and
if
specific
the
order
detail
unambiguous.”
Id.
an
said
to
be
unequivocal
Therefore,
in
order to establish that the defendants should be held in civil
contempt, the United States must prove, by clear and convincing
evidence, the following factors:
(1) the
alleged
existence of a valid decree of which the
contemnor
had
actual
or
constructive
6
UNITED STATES V. WALDEN, ET AL.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING UNITED STATES’S
MOTION TO HOLD DEFENDANTS IN CIVIL CONTEMPT [DKT. NO. 74]
knowledge; (2) the decree was in favor of the party
moving for contempt; (3) the alleged contemnor
violated the terms of the decree by its conduct, and
had
actual
or
constructive
knowledge
of
such
violation; and (4) the moving party was harmed by the
violation.
Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 288, 301 (4th Cir. 2000)
(citation omitted). Here, the United States has met this heavy
burden.
III.
A.
The Consent Decree is a valid decree of
defendants had actual or constructive knowledge.
which
the
The United States first must establish the existence of a
valid decree of which the defendants had actual or constructive
knowledge. Ashcraft, 218 F.3d at 301. As already discussed, the
parties
voluntarily
resolved
this
litigation
through
a
negotiated Consent Decree, which the Court entered as an Order
on July 10, 2017 (Dkt. No. 73). The terms of the Decree were
negotiated during mediation sessions attended by the guardian ad
litem
for
Gary
Walden
and
defense
counsel
for
the
other
defendants. See Dkt. No. 75-1 at ¶ 4. All of the defendants
agreed to the terms of the Decree as evidenced by the signatures
of their representatives (Dkt. No. 73 at 15). Further, pursuant
7
UNITED STATES V. WALDEN, ET AL.
1:16CV42
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING UNITED STATES’S
MOTION TO HOLD DEFENDANTS IN CIVIL CONTEMPT [DKT. NO. 74]
to the terms of the Decree, on August 10, 2017, they made the
initial deposit of $100,000.00 into the Settlement Fund. See
Dkt. No. 75-2 at ¶ 4. Finally, they have not disputed that the
Consent
Decree
is
a
valid
decree
of
which
they
had
actual
knowledge. See Dkt. No. 76. The United States, therefore, has
satisfied its burden with regard to the first factor.
B.
The Consent Decree was in the United States’s favor.
Second, the United States must establish that the Consent
Decree
was
in
its
favor.
Ashcraft,
218
F.3d
at
301.
The
defendants do not dispute this factor. See Dkt. No. 76. The
Decree
unambiguously
orders
them
to
deposit
money
into
a
Settlement Fund to compensate persons harmed by their conduct
and to pay civil penalties to the United States to vindicate the
public interest. Further, it enjoins Gary Walden from engaging
in certain activities, including entering the premises of or
performing
management
responsibilities
at
any
of
the
subject
rental properties, and initiating or knowingly participating in
any direct personal contact with any current or past tenant. See
Dkt. No. 73 at 5-11. The United States, therefore, has satisfied
its burden with regard to the second factor.
8
UNITED STATES V. WALDEN, ET AL.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING UNITED STATES’S
MOTION TO HOLD DEFENDANTS IN CIVIL CONTEMPT [DKT. NO. 74]
C.
The defendants knowingly violated the Consent Decree.
Third, the United States must establish that the defendants
knowingly violated the terms of the Consent Decree. Ashcraft,
218 F.3d at 301. The Decree required the defendants to deposit
an additional $400,000.00 into the Settlement Fund and to pay
$100,000.00 in civil penalties to the United States by January
15, 2018 (Dkt. No. 73 at ¶¶ 22, 33). When the defendants failed
to
make
these
outstanding
payments,
obligations
the
United
with
defense
States
discussed
counsel
and
these
Walden’s
guardian ad litem on numerous occasions (Dkt. No. 75-1).
The defendants do not dispute their failure to comply with
the clear and unequivocal terms of the Consent Decree. See Dkt.
No. 76. Nor do they dispute their constructive, if not actual,
knowledge of these violations. Indeed, they concede that they
are “fully aware of the[ir] obligations” under the Decree. Id.
at 1. Rather, they claim that a “range of factors outside of
their control” have prevented them from fulfilling their payment
obligations,
making
timely
performance
“impossible” (Dkt. No. 76 at 1-2).
9
under
the
Decree
UNITED STATES V. WALDEN, ET AL.
1:16CV42
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING UNITED STATES’S
MOTION TO HOLD DEFENDANTS IN CIVIL CONTEMPT [DKT. NO. 74]
A party facing sanctions for civil contempt may assert the
defense of “a present inability to comply with the order in
question.” United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 757 (1983)
(citations omitted) (emphasis in original). It is well settled,
however, that in raising this defense, it is the defendant who
bears the burden of production. Id. Thus, in order to purge
himself
of
civil
contempt,
a
defendant
must
affirmatively
produce evidence showing a present inability to comply with the
order in question. See United States v. Butler, 211 F.3d 826,
831 (4th Cir. 2000).
Courts have held that “[c]onclusory assertions of financial
inability . . . are insufficient to satisfy this burden.” S.E.C.
v. SBM Inv. Certificates, Inc., No. 1:06–CV–0866–DKC, 2012 WL
706999, *11 (D.Md. Mar. 2, 2012) (citations omitted). “Rather,
the [defendants] must show that they acted in good faith and
took all reasonable efforts to comply with the court’s order.”
Id. Moreover, “inability to comply is only a ‘complete defense’
if the party is unable to comply in any manner with a court’s
order.” First Mariner Bank v. Resolution Law Grp., P.C., No.
MJG-12-1133,
2014
WL
1681986,
at
10
*2
(D.
Md.
Apr.
28,
2014)
UNITED STATES V. WALDEN, ET AL.
1:16CV42
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING UNITED STATES’S
MOTION TO HOLD DEFENDANTS IN CIVIL CONTEMPT [DKT. NO. 74]
(emphasis
they
added).
have
“[O]therwise,
undertaken
in
reasonable
order
and
to
good
demonstrate
faith
that
efforts
to
comply, [ ] the party must pay to the extent that [its] finances
would allow.” SBM Inv. Certificates, 2012 WL 706999, at
*11
(citing Loftus v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth, 8 F.Supp.2d 464, 468
(E.D.Pa. 1998), aff’d, 187 F.3d 626 (3rd Cir. 1999)).
Here,
the
Beyond
merely
failed
to
defendants
asserting
have
their
affirmatively
failed
to
financial
produce
meet
their
inability,
evidence
of
burden.
they
their
have
“present
inability to comply with the order in question.” See generally
Dkt.
No.
defendant
76
at
1-3;
asserting
“impossible”
has
“the
see
that
also
Butler,
compliance
burden
of
211
with
producing
F.3d
at
court
831
order
evidence
that
(a
is
he
presently lack[s] the funds to comply”). They have submitted no
bank statements, account records, or other financial documents
tending to corroborate their purported inability to pay. Other
than pointing to an alleged inability “to obtain a loan secured
by
the
real
estate”
or
to
borrow
money
“from
any
private
sources,” Dkt. No. 76 at 2, they have produced no evidence that
they in good faith have made “all reasonable efforts to comply”
11
UNITED STATES V. WALDEN, ET AL.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING UNITED STATES’S
MOTION TO HOLD DEFENDANTS IN CIVIL CONTEMPT [DKT. NO. 74]
with the Court’s Order. SBM Inv. Certificates, 2012 WL 706999,
at *11.
Significantly, the defendants concede that they own “more
than
$700,000.00
worth
of
property,”
which
could
be
sold
to
satisfy their payment obligations under the Consent Decree (Dkt.
No. 76 at 2). But they have not sold these properties because
Gary
Walden
properties
“intends
to
his
to
transfer
children.”
his
Id.
In
interest
the
face
in
of
[these]
their
obligations under the Consent Decree, they credulously submit
that a “forced sale” of the properties at below fair market
value
“would
only
punish
innocent
persons
not
party
to
the
Consent [Decree].” Id.
This
argument
is
unconvincing.
As
an
initial
matter,
obtaining fair market value for the sale of the defendants’ real
estate is not a condition of the Consent Decree. Fulfilling
payment obligations to the Settlement Fund and to the United
States, on the other hand, is “an unequivocal command.” See Dkt.
No. 73 at ¶¶ 22, 33. That the defendants might have to sell
properties at below fair market value does not vitiate their
12
UNITED STATES V. WALDEN, ET AL.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING UNITED STATES’S
MOTION TO HOLD DEFENDANTS IN CIVIL CONTEMPT [DKT. NO. 74]
obligation to comply with the clear and unambiguous terms of the
Consent Decree.
Further,
as
the
United
States
emphasizes,
the
“innocent
persons” at issue in this case are the defendants’ former female
tenants and prospective tenants who have yet to be compensated
for
the
harms
they
suffered
as
a
result
of
Gary
Walden’s
conduct. Thus, the defendants have wholly failed to demonstrate
that they have undertaken reasonable and good faith efforts to
comply with the Consent Decree by “paying to the extent that
their
finances
would
allow.”
SBM
Inv.
Certificates,
2012
WL
706999, at *11.
Finally, the defendants’ contention that they did not have
“full
knowledge
or
appreciation
of”
the
supposed
financial
impediments to their compliance is specious. See Dkt. No. 76 at
1. All the parties to the Consent Decree negotiated and agreed
to
terms
that
clearly
contemplated
the
defendants
would
pay
monies into the Settlement Fund and to the United States by a
date certain. Having been intimately involved in the lengthy
negotiations
question
that
that
the
resulted
in
defendants
the
were
13
settlement,
it
is
well
of
their
aware
beyond
own
UNITED STATES V. WALDEN, ET AL.
1:16CV42
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING UNITED STATES’S
MOTION TO HOLD DEFENDANTS IN CIVIL CONTEMPT [DKT. NO. 74]
financial circumstances at the time they obligated themselves to
the terms of the Consent Decree. For the same reasons, they also
have been fully aware of those obligations since that time.
The evidence is clear and convincing that the defendants
have
knowingly
failing
to
violated
deposit
the
terms
$400,000.00
of
into
the
the
Consent
Decree
Settlement
Fund
by
to
compensate aggrieved persons, and failing to pay $100.000.00 in
civil penalties to the United States, both by January 18, 2018
(Dkt. No. 73 at ¶¶ 22, 33). Further, they have wholly failed to
satisfy
their
burden
of
proving
the
defense
of
a
“present
inability to pay.” The United States, therefore, has satisfied
its burden with regard to the third Ashcraft factor.
D.
The United States has suffered harm due to violations of
the Consent Decree.
Finally, the United States must establish that it suffered
harm as the result of the defendants’ violations of the Consent
Decree.
Ashcraft,
218
F.3d
at
301.
According
to
the
United
States, without the additional $400,000.00 the defendants are
required
adequately
to
deposit
compensate
into
the
all
of
Settlement
the
victims
Fund,
it
harmed
cannot
by
the
defendants’ violations of the Fair Housing Act (Dkt. No. 75 at
14
UNITED STATES V. WALDEN, ET AL.
1:16CV42
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING UNITED STATES’S
MOTION TO HOLD DEFENDANTS IN CIVIL CONTEMPT [DKT. NO. 74]
5). In addition to the fifteen (15) persons identified in the
Consent Decree, Dkt. No. 73 at App’x B, the United States is
investigating
whether
additional
aggrieved
persons
should
be
compensated from the Fund. See id. at 73; see also Dkt. No. 75-2
at ¶¶ 8-9. It asserts that, given the nature and extent of the
harm
inflicted
by
the
defendants,
the
$100.000.00
previously
deposited is insufficient to adequately compensate all aggrieved
persons
who
may
have
been
harmed
by
Gary
Walden’s
sexual
harassment, which occurred over a period of at least nine years
(Dkt. No. 75 at 5-6).
In addition, the United States contends that it has clearly
suffered harm because of the loss of resources it has had to
expend to enforce the Decree and prosecute this motion. See
Summerville v. Local 77, No. 1:06CV00719, 2008 WL 3983118, at *5
(M.D.N.C. Aug. 26, 2008). The defendants have neither disputed
nor otherwise responded to this contention. The United States,
therefore, has satisfied its burden as to the fourth factor.
IV.
In conclusion, for the reasons discussed, the Court GRANTS
the motion of the United States (Dkt. No. 74) and HOLDS the
15
UNITED STATES V. WALDEN, ET AL.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING UNITED STATES’S
MOTION TO HOLD DEFENDANTS IN CIVIL CONTEMPT [DKT. NO. 74]
defendants in civil contempt. Furthermore, the Court ORDERS the
parties to submit briefs on the appropriate remedy in this case.
The United States shall file an opening brief no later than
March 15, 2019. The defendants shall respond by March 29, 2019.
The United States may file a reply no later than April 5, 2019.
The Court
Memorandum
DIRECTS
Opinion
and
the Clerk to transmit copies of this
Order
to
counsel
of
record
and
the
guardian ad litem.
DATED: March 4, 2019
/s/ Irene M. Keeley
IRENE M. KEELEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
16
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