The Huntington National Bank v. Hard Rock Exploration, Inc. et al
Filing
33
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' INITIAL MOTION TO DISMISS/STAY AS MOOT AND DENYING DEFENDANTS' REMAINING MOTIONS TO DISMISS/STAY: It is ORDERED that Defendants' 15 Motion to Dismiss is DENIED AS MOOT, and Defendanta' 21 Motion to Dismiss, 22 Motion to Dismiss are DENIED. Signed by Senior Judge Frederick P. Stamp, Jr on 7/27/16. (cnd)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
THE HUNTINGTON NATIONAL BANK,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 1:16CV48
(STAMP)
HARD ROCK EXPLORATION, INC.,
CARALINE ENERGY COMPANY,
BLUE JACKET GATHERING, LLC,
BLUE JACKET PARTNERSHIP,
BROTHERS REALTY, LLC,
DUANE YOST,
JAMES L. STEPHENS, JR.,
GREGORY LAUGHLIN and
MONICA R. FRANCISCO,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING DEFENDANTS’ INITIAL MOTION
TO DISMISS/STAY AS MOOT AND
DENYING DEFENDANTS’ REMAINING
MOTIONS TO DISMISS/STAY
I.
Background
This Court previously decided Hard Rock Exploration, et al. v.
Huntington Bancshares Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 1:16CV46 (“the
first action”), in which this Court remanded the first action to
state court.
While the first action remained pending before this
Court, however, the defendant in the first action, The Huntington
National Bank (“Huntington”), filed an action in this Court for
breach of contract (“current action”).
Defendants Hard Rock
Exploration, Inc., Caraline Energy Company, Blue Jacket Gathering,
LLC, Blue Jacket Partnership, and Brothers Realty (collectively,
“Hard
Rock
Entities”)
are
business
entities
affiliated
with
defendant Hard Rock Exploration, Inc., which engages in oil and gas
development.1
Francisco,
Defendants
Duane
Yost,
James
and
L.
Stephens,
Gregory
Jr.,
Laughlin
Monica
R.
(collectively,
“principals”) are shareholders of defendant Hard Rock Exploration,
Inc.
The Hard Rock Entities borrowed money from the plaintiff in
the current action, Huntington, so as to pursue oil and gas
operations.
Several years into the lending relationship, however,
Huntington claims that the defendants have failed to satisfy their
obligations. In particular, the following amounts allegedly remain
outstanding: (1) a $ 500,000.00 loan (referred to as “Obligation
174”);
(2)
a
$17,887,867.00
loan
(“Obligation
158”);
(3)
a
$6,250,000.00 loan (“Obligation 42”); (4) a $5,000,000.00 loan
(“Obligation 59”); and (5) an unspecified credit card obligation
(“credit card obligation”), which is allegedly worth $19,148.10.
In addition, the parties engaged in a series of swap transactions
and
a
forbearance
obligations:
(1)
agreement,
termination
which
charges
contain
for
the
$839,606.02 and (2) a $30,000.00 forbearance fee.
the
following
swaps
totaling
The plaintiff
seeks a judgment for the balance due under the obligations listed
above, including legal fees.
1
The Hard Rock Entities are all citizens of West Virginia.
Defendants Stephens, Francisco, and Laughlin are citizens of West
Virginia, and defendant Yost is a citizen of Pennsylvania.
Huntington is a citizen of Ohio.
2
At issue now are the following motions: (1) the initial motion
to dismiss/stay (ECF No. 15) of the defendants; (2) motion to
dismiss/stay (ECF No. 21) by defendants Duane Yost (“Yost”) and
Gregory Laughlin (“Laughlin”); and (3) the supplemental motion to
dismiss/stay (ECF No. 22) by defendants, with the exception of Yost
and Laughlin.
A.
Defendants’ Initial Motion to Dismiss/Stay
At the time the defendants filed their initial motion to
dismiss/stay, the first action remained pending before this Court.
More specifically, Huntington filed the current action shortly
after the first action was removed.
The defendants in the current
action then filed their initial motion to dismiss/stay.
ECF No.
15.
In their initial motion to dismiss/stay, the defendants rely
on the “first-to-file” rule.
following:
In particular, they argue the
(1) the defendants filed the first action before the
current action; (2) the first action and current action involve the
same parties; and (3) the actions both relate to the enforceability
of the same loans.
Before Huntington filed a response in opposition, this Court
granted the motion to remand in the first action.
Following that
ruling, Huntington filed a response to the initial motion to
dismiss.
ECF No. 20.
Huntington argues that because this Court
remanded the first action, the first and current action are no
3
longer concurrently pending in federal court.
Therefore, the
first-to-file rule no longer applies, and thus, Huntington believes
that the initial motion to dismiss/stay should be denied as moot.
Before the defendants filed a reply, they first filed a
supplemental motion to dismiss/stay, which is discussed in the next
section of this opinion.
ECF No. 22.
In their reply, the
defendants point to the arguments found in the supplemental motion
to dismiss/stay, particularly the abstention doctrine discussed
therein.
Therefore, the defendants point to the briefing of the
supplemental motion to dismiss/stay as completing their argument in
favor of the initial motion to dismiss/stay.
B.
Motion to Dismiss/Stay of Defendants Yost and Laughlin
After Huntington filed a response in opposition to the initial
motion to dismiss/stay, defendants Yost and Laughlin filed a
separate motion to dismiss/stay.
ECF No. 21.
Defendants Yost and
Laughlin argue that the abstention doctrine applies in this case,
pursuant to Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
In particular, defendants Yost and
Laughlin point out that parallel litigation in state and federal
court exists, which involves the same parties and dispute.
To
avoid inconsistent rulings, they believe this Court should abstain
from exercising jurisdiction.
Rather than file a specific response to defendants Yost and
Laughlin’s motion to dismiss, Huntington filed a general response
4
to defendants Yost and Laughlin’s motion to dismiss, as well as the
remaining defendants’ supplemental motion to dismiss, which is
discussed below.
C.
Supplemental Motion to Dismiss/Stay of Defendants, Excluding
Yost and Laughlin
The defendants, with the exception of Yost and Laughlin, filed
a supplemental motion to dismiss/stay.
ECF No. 22.
Similar to
motion of Yost and Laughlin, the remaining defendants contend that
the abstention doctrine applies. Therefore, they request that this
Court either dismiss or stay the current action.
Huntington filed a response, which addresses both Yost and
Laughlin’s
dismiss.
Colorado
motion
to
ECF No. 24.
River,
and
dismiss
and
the
supplemental
motion
to
Huntington addresses the factors under
contends
that
none
apply,
or
at
least
insufficiently apply so as to disfavor abstention. The defendants,
with the exception of Yost and Laughlin, filed a reply.
25.
In
that
reply,
they
reassert
their
arguments
ECF No.
that
the
abstention doctrine applies.
For the reasons set forth below, the initial motion to
dismiss/stay (ECF No. 15) of the defendants is DENIED AS MOOT, and
the motion to dismiss/stay (ECF No. 21) of the defendants Yost and
Laughlin and the supplemental motion to dismiss/stay (ECF No. 22)
of the defendants, with the exception of Yost and Laughlin, are
both DENIED.
5
II.
Applicable Law
In assessing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
court must accept all well-pled facts contained in the complaint as
true.
Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc, 591 F.3d
250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009). However, “legal conclusions, elements of
a cause of action, and bare assertions devoid of further factual
enhancement fail to constitute well-pled facts for Rule 12(b)(6)
purposes.” Id.
(citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009)).
Court
This
inferences,
also
unreasonable
declines
conclusions,
to
or
consider
“unwarranted
arguments.”
Wahi
v.
Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 615 n.26 (4th Cir.
2009).
It has often been said that the purpose of a motion under Rule
12(b)(6) is to test the formal sufficiency of the statement of the
claim for relief; it is not a procedure for resolving a contest
about the facts or the merits of the case.
5B Charles Alan Wright
& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (3d ed.
1998).
The Rule 12(b)(6) motion also must be distinguished from a
motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56, which goes to the merits of the claim and is designed to test
whether there is a genuine issue of material fact.
Id.
For
purposes of the motion to dismiss, the complaint is construed in
the
light
most
favorable
to
the
6
party
making
the
claim
and
essentially
the
court’s
inquiry
is
directed
to
whether
the
allegations constitute a statement of a claim under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8(a).
Id. § 1357.
A complaint should be dismissed “if it does not allege ‘enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on is face.’”
Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“Facial
plausibility is established once the factual content of a complaint
‘allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Nemet Chevrolet,
591 F.3d at 256 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Detailed factual
allegations are not required, but the facts alleged must be
sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
III.
A.
Discussion
First-to-File Rule No Longer Applies
In their initial motion to stay, the defendants argue that the
“first-to-file” rule requires that this civil action be dismissed.
The defendants, however, filed their initial motion to dismiss when
the first action remained pending before this Court.
Since then,
this Court remanded the first action, and thus, only the current
action remains before this Court.
Therefore, the plaintiffs
contend that the first-to-file rule no longer applies.
7
The first-to-file rule applies when “the same party or parties
have filed similar litigation in separate federal fora.” Butler v.
DirectSat USA, LLC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 662, 665 (D. Md. 2011).
The
first-to-file rule may also apply where the parties file two
actions in the same district court.
See, e.g., Abrahams v. Hard
Drive Productions, Inc., 2012 WL 1945493 (N.D. Cal. May 30, 2012);
Intervet, Inc. v. Merial Ltd., 535 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D.D.C. 2008);
SAS Inst., Inc. v. PracticingSmarter, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 2d 614
(M.D.N.C. 2005).
Under the first-to-file rule, “the matter should
proceed in the court where the action was first filed, and that the
later-filed action should be stayed, transferred, or enjoined.”
Nutrition & Fitness, Inc. v. Blue Stuff, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 357,
360
(W.D.N.C.
2003).
District
courts
determining whether the rule should apply.
have
discretion
in
Alltrade, Inc. v.
Uniweld Products, Inc., 946 F.2d 622, 628 (9th Cir. 1991).
When
making such a determination, a district court should consider the
following three factors: (1) “the chronology of the filings”; (2)
“the similarity of the parties involved”; and (3) “the similarity
of the issues at stake.”
Blue Stuff, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d at 360.
In this case, the first-to-file rule no longer applies. After
the defendants filed their initial motion to dismiss/stay, in which
they seek dismissal based on the first-to-file rule, this Court
remanded the first action to state court.
That means that the
first action and the current action are no longer pending in the
8
same or different “federal fora,” and therefore, the first-to-file
rule is inapplicable.
Thus, the initial motion to dismiss/stay
(ECF No. 15) of the defendants is DENIED AS MOOT.
B.
Abstention Doctrine Does Not Apply
This Court will now turn to the remaining motions, which are
the following: (1) the motion to dismiss/stay (ECF No. 21) of
defendants Yost and Laughlin and (2) the supplemental motion to
dismiss/stay (ECF No. 22) of the defendants, with the exception of
defendants Yost and Laughlin. In both motions to dismiss/stay, the
defendants argue that the abstention doctrine, pursuant to the
holding in Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), applies to the current action.
For
the reasons set forth below, this Court finds that the Colorado
River doctrine does not apply in the current action.
The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that “[t]he
doctrine of abstention, under which a District Court may decline to
exercise
or
postpone
exercise
of
its
jurisdiction,
is
an
extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court
to adjudicate a controversy properly before it.”
424 U.S. at 813.
Colorado River,
Phrased another way, the Colorado River doctrine
is not a doctrine of abstention, which is based upon the principles
of federalism and comity for state relations; rather, it is a
doctrine resting upon considerations of judicial economy and “wise
judicial administration.”
Id. at 813.
9
For this reason, courts
should apply the Colorado River doctrine only in exceptional
circumstances.
Id. at 818.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has
summarized the approach for applying the Colorado River doctrine:
The threshold question in deciding whether Colorado River
abstention is appropriate is whether there are parallel
federal and state suits. If parallel suits exist, then
a district court must carefully balance several factors,
with the balance heavily weighted in favor of the
exercise of jurisdiction.
Although the prescribed
analysis is not a hard-and-fast one in which application
of a checklist dictates the outcome, six factors have
been identified to guide the analysis: (1) whether the
subject matter of the litigation involves property where
the first court may assume in rem jurisdiction to the
exclusion of others; (2) whether the federal forum is an
inconvenient one; (3) the desirability of avoiding
piecemeal litigation; (4) the relevant order in which the
courts obtained jurisdiction and the progress achieved in
each action; (5) whether state law or federal law
provides the rule of decision on the merits; and (6) the
adequacy of the state proceeding to protect the parties’
rights. In the end, however, abstention should be the
exception, not the rule, and it may be considered only
when the parallel state-court litigation will be an
adequate vehicle for the complete and prompt resolution
of the issues between the parties.
Chase Brexton Health Services, Inc. v. Maryland, 411 F.3d 457, 46364 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
1.
Parallel Proceedings
Pursuant to the Fourth Circuit’s analysis in Chase Brexton,
this Court must first determine whether the state and federal
actions
are
sufficiently
similar
to
constitute
parallel
proceedings. “Suits are parallel if substantially the same parties
litigate substantially the same issues in different forums.”
10
New
Beckley Mining Corp. v. International Union, United Mine Workers of
America, 946 F.2d 1072, 1073 (4th Cir. 1991). However, “suits need
not be identical to be parallel, . . . and the mere presence of
additional
parties
or
issues
in
one
of
the
cases
will
not
necessarily preclude a finding that they are parallel.” AAR Int’l,
Inc. v. Nimelias Enter. S.A., 250 F.3d 510, 518 (7th Cir. 2001)
(internal citations omitted).
“The question is not whether the
suits are formally symmetrical, but whether there is a substantial
likelihood that the [state litigation] will dispose of all claims
presented in the federal case.”
Id.
This Court finds that the first action and the current action
are not parallel proceedings.
It is true that the current action,
which is proceeding before this Court, and the first action, which
is proceeding before the state court, involve somewhat similar
issues and almost identical parties. A substantial likelihood does
not exist, however, that the resolution of the claims in the first
action will dispose of the claims in the current action before this
Court.
In particular, the current action asserts a claim for
breach of contract regarding several loans, and for relief, seeks
the amounts due under those loans.
The first action, however, is
essentially a lender liability action and asserts the following
claims: (1) fraud and deceit; (2) interference with prospective
business advantage; (3) breach of implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing; (4) breach of contract; (5) economic duress; (6)
11
breach of fiduciary duty; (7) demand for injunctive relief; and (8)
accounting.
Civil Action No. 1:16CV46, ECF No. 29.
Although both
actions generally share common parties and, to some extent, similar
matters, the first action and current action are not substantially
similar.
Resolving the claims in the first action would not
dispose of the claims in the current action before this Court.
Thus, this Court finds that the first action and current action do
not constitute parallel proceedings.
Failing to satisfy this
preliminary requisite means that application of the Colorado River
doctrine would be improper.
2.
Application of Colorado River Factors
Even assuming that the first action and current action are
parallel
proceedings,
this
Court
nevertheless
balance of factors disfavors abstention.
holds
that
the
A decision declining to
exercise jurisdiction over a federal action because of parallel
litigation in state court “does not rest on a mechanical checklist,
but on a careful balancing of the important factors as they apply
in a given case, with the balance heavily weighted in favor of the
exercise of jurisdiction.”
Gannett Co., Inc. v. Clark Constr.
Group, Inc., 286 F.3d 737, 744 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Moses H.
Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 16 (1983))
(emphasis added).
This Court will now turn to the factors set
forth in Chase Brexton, 411 F.3d at 463-64.
12
a.
Assumption of Jurisdiction Over the Property
The plaintiff contends, and the defendants do not appear to
dispute, that no property rights are at issue in this case.
Because no property rights are at issue, that means that “this
factor weighs against abstention.”
Gannett Co., Inc., 286 F.3d at
747.
b.
Convenience of the Federal Forum
In their motions, the defendants point out that they do not
live near Wheeling, West Virginia, which is where the current
action is proceeding before the undersigned judge.
Because of
that, the defendants assert that they will expend significantly
more
time
and
money
to
litigate
the
current
action.
That
assertion, however, is slightly misguided for four reasons. First,
while there has been a transfer of this case to the undersigned
judge, who is based in Wheeling, the civil action remains a case
pending at the Clarksburg point of holding court.
Second, this
Court is well aware of the distance that counsel for all parties
may travel.
In recognition of that fact, this Court has permitted
counsel to appear by telephone at all the hearings in the first
action, and there is no reason why that cannot be done in the
current action. Third, as noted, the current action was originally
filed in Clarksburg, West Virginia, before being transferred to the
undersigned judge in Wheeling, West Virginia.
The difference
between the two locations as to travel time and geographic distance
13
is barely worth noting, let alone using such differences as a
justification
inconvenient.
that
the
undersigned
judge’s
location
is
Finally, aside from the pretrial conference, which
will probably be scheduled in Wheeling to allow for other hearings
before the undersigned judge in Wheeling on that date, the trial in
the current action will be scheduled to occur in Clarksburg, West
Virginia. For those reasons, this Court finds that the convenience
factor
weighs
against
the
application
of
the
Colorado
River
doctrine in this case.
c.
Avoidance of Piecemeal Litigation
The third factor to consider is whether federal jurisdiction
creates the danger of piecemeal litigation.
“Piecemeal litigation
occurs when different tribunals consider the same issue, thereby
duplicating efforts and possibly reaching different results.”
Gannett Co., Inc., 286 F.3d at 744.
However, the potential for
conflicting outcomes, without more, is insufficient to warrant
staying the exercise of federal jurisdiction.
Chase Brexton, 411
F.3d at 457 (quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 816). Rather, the
exercise
of
jurisdiction
“must
create
the
possibility
of
inefficiencies and inconsistent results beyond those inherent in
parallel litigation, or the litigation must be particularly illsuited for resolution in duplicate forums.”
744.
Gannett, 286 F.3d at
The critical inquiry in avoiding piecemeal litigation is not
whether there is formal symmetry between the two actions, but
14
whether
there
is
“a
substantial
likelihood
that
the
state
litigation will dispose of all claims presented in the federal
case.”
American Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 212 F. Supp. 2d
621, 630 (N.D. W. Va. 2002)
In this case, the first action in state court is unlikely to
dispose of the claims in the current action before this Court.
As
identified earlier, the current action asserts only a breach of
contract claim.
that
essentially
The first action, however, asserts eight claims
pertain
to
lender
liability.
Therefore,
resolution of the first action is unlikely to resolve the claims in
the current action. Thus, there is little to be gained in judicial
economy by abstaining from exercising jurisdiction.
d.
Relevant Order of the Exercise of Jurisdiction
The fourth factor to be considered under Colorado River is the
order in which courts obtained jurisdiction and the progress
achieved in each action.
Relevant to this inquiry is not only the
order in which the complaints were filed, but also how much
progress has been made in the two actions.
Mem’l. Hosp., 460 U.S. at 22.
See Moses H. Cone
Further, as the United States
District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia has
observed, at least two policy considerations appear to underlie
this fourth factor in the Colorado River analysis:
First, the more that a state court lawsuit has
progressed, the greater the state’s own investment and
involvement in the proceeding. As a matter of comity,
the more the state has invested its time and resources
15
into the proceedings, the less appropriate it is for a
federal court to intervene and disrupt those proceedings.
See Gannett, 286 F.3d at 748 (noting that abstention is
based in part on principles of comity).
Second, the
longer that the party who now seeks federal court
intervention has actively participated in the state court
proceedings, the more that party has forfeited any right
to a federal forum. See Vulcan [Chemical Technologies,
Inc. v. Barker, 297 F.3d 332, 343 (4th Cir. 2002)]
(finding abstention appropriate in part because the case
“was gladly litigated by both parties in California,” and
that only after Vulcan had received a negative outcome
did it seek to “bypass the procedure that [it] had
elected to follow” by filing suit in federal court).
Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Skaggs, 272 F. Supp. 2d 595, 601
(S.D. W. Va. 2003).
Here, discovery in the current action does not appear to have
started, as neither a first order and notice nor a scheduling order
have been entered.
Regarding the first action, a review of the
state court docket shows that no scheduling order has been entered.
The state court docket also shows that a motion to dismiss and a
motion for a preliminary injunction remain pending. Moreover, both
the first action and the current action were filed within two days
of each other.
The first action was filed on March 21, 2016, and
the current action was filed on March 23, 2016.
The point is that
these cases are not proceeding on markedly different tracks, nor
has one case advanced more significantly than the other.
In light
of this time line, this Court finds that the fourth factor weighs
against abstention.
16
e.
Source of Applicable Law and Adequacy of State Court
Proceedings
These fifth and sixth factors require this Court to consider
whether state law provides the rule of decision on the merits and
the adequacy of state court proceedings.
“[T]he Supreme Court has
made clear that the presence of state law and the adequacy of state
proceedings can be used only in ‘rare circumstances’ to justify
Colorado River abstention.”
Gannett Co., Inc., 286 F.3d at 746
(quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 26).
Indeed,
“[t]hat state law is implicated . . . does not weigh in favor of
abstention, particularly since both parties may find an adequate
remedy in either state or federal court.”
quotations omitted).
Id. at 747 (internal
The Fourth Circuit has recognized that in
diversity cases, “federal courts regularly grapple with questions
of state law, and abstention on the basis of the presence of state
law, without more, would undermine diversity jurisdiction.”
Id.
Here, nothing in the record suggests that the federal forum is
inadequate to protect the rights of the parties, or that the state
forum is more adequate to protect such rights.
The current action
involves a breach of contract claim, which usually is a state law
claim.
a
This Court, however, is an adequate forum to resolve such
claim,
as
the
claim
presents
no
novel
or
complex
issue.
Accordingly, the mere presence of state law does not weigh in favor
of declining to exercise jurisdiction.
17
Considered
together,
the
Colorado
River
factors
do
not
indicate the presence of exceptional circumstances which warrant
abstention.
Therefore, this Court believes that even if parallel
proceedings did exist, a dismissal or a stay of this action is not
the appropriate course.
Thus, the motion to dismiss/stay (ECF No.
21) of defendants Yost and Laughlin and the supplemental motion to
dismiss/stay (ECF No. 22) the other defendants, with the exception
of Yost and Laughlin, are both DENIED.
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the initial motion to
dismiss/stay (ECF No. 15) of the defendants is DENIED AS MOOT, and
the motion to dismiss/stay (ECF No. 21) of defendants Duane Yost
and Gregory Laughlin and the supplemental motion to dismiss/stay
(ECF No. 22) of the defendants (with the exception of Yost and
Laughlin) are both DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to transmit a copy of this memorandum
opinion and order to counsel of record herein.
DATED:
July 27, 2016
/s/ Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.
FREDERICK P. STAMP, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
18
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