International Union, United Mine Workers of America et al v. Monongalia County Coal Company

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 15 , AND DENYING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 17 : The Court GRANTS the Unions motion for summary judgment 15 , DENIES the Companys motion for summary judgment 17 , and ORDERS that the Arbitration Award be ENFORCED, including its CEASE AND DESIST order. The Court directs the Clerk to transmit copies of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to counsel of record and to enter a separate judgment order. Signed by District Judge Irene M. Keeley on 3/6/17. (jss)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED
MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, and
LOCAL UNION 1702, UNITED
MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA,
Plaintiffs,
v.

//

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:16CV56
(Judge Keeley)

MONONGALIA COUNTY COAL COMPANY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 15], AND DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 17]
Pending

for

consideration

are

cross

motions

for

summary

judgment filed by the plaintiff, International Union, United Mine
Workers of America, and Local Union 1702, United Mine Workers of
America (collectively “Union”), and the defendant, Monongalia
County Coal Company (“Company”). For the reasons that follow, the
Court GRANTS the Union’s motion for summary judgment (dkt. no. 15)
and DENIES the Company’s motion for summary judgment (dkt. no. 17).
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Company operates the Monongalia County Mine (the “Mine”),
an

underground

Virginia.

The

coal
Union

(union)

employees

Company

and

the

mine

located

represents

for
Union

purposes
are

in

the
of

bound

Monongalia

Company’s
collective

by

a

County,

West

bargaining

unit

bargaining.

collective

The

bargaining

agreement, titled the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of
2011 (“CBA”), that governs the wages, hours, and working conditions
of union employees at the Mine. (Dkt. No. 16 at 2).

UMWA v. MONONGALIA CTY. COAL CO.

1:16CV56

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 15], AND DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 17]
Sometime in 2014, the Company began operating a continuous
mining schedule, meaning that employees mined coal twenty-four
hours a day, seven days per week. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 5). The Company
established three crews to work a traditional Monday to Saturday
schedule, with the crews rotating off every third Saturday. A
fourth crew schedule was established so that production could
continue on Sundays. Id. That fourth schedule had employees working
from Wednesday to Sunday, with Monday and Tuesday off from work.
Id.
The continuous schedule presented certain difficulties, among
which was the replacement of the heavy duty steel cables used to
hoist mined coal to the surface, also known as “skip ropes.” Id. at
6. Because they are required to lift large, extremely heavy buckets
of coal to the surface, skip ropes require regular inspection and
replacement. Id. As part of the inspection process, skip ropes are
x-rayed periodically to determine when they are nearing the end of
their life cycle. Id.

According to the parties, skip ropes are

changed on roughly an annual basis, or more frequently depending on
their condition. Id. Because changing the skip ropes can only be
accomplished when there is no production in progress, the Company
scheduled the replacement for times when production was going to be

2

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1:16CV56

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 15], AND DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 17]
halted for other reasons and the skip hoist would therefore not be
required to raise coal to the surface. Id.
Two skip rope changes are at the center of this matter. The
first occurred during the twelve-hour time period beginning with
the second shift on October 21, 2014, and running into the midnight
shift on October 22, 2014. The second occurred during the twelvehour time period beginning with the second shift on November 8,
2014, and running into the midnight shift on November 9, 2014. For
each skip rope replacement, Preparation Plant Supervisor, Roland
Smith (“Smith”), scheduled them only a few days in advance after
being told by the Mine Superintendent that production would be
halted

during

those

time

periods.

Id.

Although

a

few

union

employees performed portions of the work, it is undisputed that the
Company also utilized an outside contractor, NexGen Industrial
Services Inc. (“NexGen”), to perform approximately 85.5 hours of
labor related to the skip rope changes. Id.
The Union filed two grievances, arguing that the skip rope
changes are jurisdictional work that can only be performed by union
employees under Article IA(a) of the CBA, which provides:
Work Jurisdiction The production of coal, including removal of overburden
and coal waste, preparation, processing and cleaning of
coal and transportation of coal (except by “waterway or
3

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1:16CV56

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 15], AND DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 17]
rail not owned by Employer), repair and maintenance work
normally performed at the mine site or at a central shop
of the Employer and maintenance of gob piles and mine
roads, and work of the type customarily refuted to all of
the above shall be performed by classified Employees of
the Employer covered by and in accordance with the terms
of this Agreement. Contracting, subcontracting, leasing
and subleasing, and construction work, as defined herein,
will be conducted in accordance with the provisions of
this Article.
Alternatively, the Union contended that, even if the work did not
fall under Article IA(a), it would still be “repair and maintenance
work” under Article IA(g)(2), which provides in pertinent part:
Repair and Maintenance Work Repair and maintenance work of the type customarily
performed by classified Employees at the mine or central
shop Shall not be contracted out except . . . where the
Employer does not have available equipment or regu1ar
Employees (including laid-off Employees at the mine or
central shop) with necessary skills available to perform
the work at the mine or central shop.
According to the Union, even if it was repair and maintenance work,
the slip rope replacement was work that union employees always
performed, and were readily available to perform in this instance;
thus, the CBA barred the Company from contracting it out to NexGen.
Conversely, the Company argued that the work was clearly
repair and maintenance work, not jurisdictional work under Article
IA(a), and, as such, it could contract the work to NexGen because
union employees were not reasonably available during the relevant

4

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 15], AND DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 17]
times. Id. It maintained that all union employees were offered the
opportunity to work on the dates in question. Although a few
accepted and worked on the skip rope replacement, others were
already working on other assigned duties in the mine and therefore
were unavailable; the remainder simply declined to accept the
invitation to work. Id. at 16.
On June 12, 2015, Arbitrator Michael L. Allen (“Arbitrator”),
consolidated the two grievances and conducted a hearing with the
parties, during which they presented exhibits and witnesses for
examination and cross examination. (Dkt. No. 1-1). On July 10,
2015, the Arbitrator entered his Arbitration Award (“Award”),
ultimately finding that the Company violated the CBA when it
contracted out the subject work to NexGen. Id. at 21-22. The Award
concluded that the Company had failed to make a good faith effort
to notify the union employees of the availability of the skip rope
replacement work, and that the “evidence [was] inadequate that all
the Company’s entire force of ‘regular Employees’ on those dates
was not ‘reasonably available’ for the work.” Id. at 23-24. The
Arbitrator sustained the grievances and awarded the Union “85.5
hours’ pay at straight-time Grade 1 Plant wage rate.” Id. at 24.
Further the Award ordered that the Company “shall cease and desist
the use of outside contractors to change skip ropes in the future,
5

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1:16CV56

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 15], AND DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 17]
unless such Article IA(g)(2) work is first fairly offered to all
‘regular Employees,’ and unless it then appears that sufficient
employees for its performance are ‘reasonably unavailable.’” Id.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 31, 2016, the Union filed suit in this Court,
claiming that the Company has failed to comply with the cease-anddesist

order

in

the

Award.

(Dkt.

No.

1).

Specifically,

the

complaint alleges that the Company has continued, as recently as
February

26,

2016,

to

use

contractors

to

perform

skip

rope

replacement work without first providing adequate notice to the
union employees of the work availability, despite there being
seventy miners idled during that time period and an additional 200
laid-off miners. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5).
The Union asks the Court: 1) to declare that the Award is
final, binding, and enforceable; 2) to specifically enforce the
Award, including the make whole portion of the Award and the ceaseand-desist order; 3) to permanently enjoin the Company from using
contractors in contravention of the CBA; 4) to award it damages for
continued lost work opportunities of its members, including lost
benefits, lost dues, and pre- and post-judgment interest of the
monetary award; and 5) to award attorney’s fees and costs and any
other just and proper relief. (Dkt. No. 1 at 7).
6

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 15], AND DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 17]
In

their

Rule

26(f)

report

(dkt.

no.

9),

the

parties

stipulated that there were no material facts in dispute and that
this matter should be resolved on cross motions for summary
judgment. Those motions are fully briefed and the matter is ripe
for review.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A.

Summary Judgment
Summary

documents,

judgment

is

appropriate

electronically

declarations,

stipulations

where

the

stored

information,

.

,

.

.

“depositions,
affidavits

admissions,

or

interrogatory

answers, or other materials” establish that “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c)(1)(A).
When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court reviews all
the evidence “in the light most favorable” to the nonmoving party.
Providence Square Assocs., L.L.C. v. G.D.F., Inc., 211 F.3d 846,
850 (4th Cir. 2000). The Court must avoid weighing the evidence or
determining

its

truth

and

limit

its

inquiry

solely

to

a

determination of whether genuine issues of triable fact exist
sufficient to prevent judgment as a matter of law.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).

7

Anderson v.

UMWA v. MONONGALIA CTY. COAL CO.

1:16CV56

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 15], AND DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 17]
The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the
Court

of

the

basis

for

the

motion

and

nonexistence of genuine issues of fact.

of

establishing

the

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party has made the
necessary showing, the non-moving party “must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”

Anderson,

477 U.S. at 256 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” favoring the nonmoving party will not prevent the entry of summary judgment; the
evidence

must

be

such

that

a

rational

reasonably find for the nonmoving party.
B.

trier

of

fact

could

Id. at 248–52.

Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards
Judicial review of arbitration awards is “among the narrowest

known to the law.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Int’l Chemical Workers Union
Council of United Food and Comm’l Workers, 587 F.3d 648, 652 (4th
Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted). Arbitration awards are
presumptively valid. Mountaineer Gas Co. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic
Workers Int’l Union, 76 F.3d 606, 608 (4th Cir. 1996). This is
because the parties to a CBA “bargained for the arbitrator’s
interpretation and resolution of their dispute.” Id. Consequently,
courts generally defer to the arbitrator’s reasoning and should not
overturn their factual findings unless there has been fraud by the
8

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1:16CV56

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 15], AND DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 17]
parties or dishonesty by the arbitrator. Id. Indeed, “as long as
the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract
and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is
convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn
his

decision.”

PPG

Indus.,

587

F.3d

at

652

(quoting

United

Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987)).
Nevertheless, courts should overturn arbitration awards when
the “award violates well-settled and prevailing public policy,
fails to draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement
or reflects the arbitrator’s own notions of right and wrong.”
Mountaineer, 76 F.3d at 608 (citing Misco, 484 U.S. at 38). Thus,
an “arbitrator cannot ‘ignore the plain language of the contract’
to impose his ‘own notions of industrial justice.’” PPG Indus., 587
F.3d at 652 (quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at 38).
Moreover, when construing the contract, “the arbitrator must
take into account any existing common law of the particular plant
or

industry,

for

it

is

an

integral

part

of

the

contract.”

Clinchfield Coal Co. v. District 28, United Mine Workers of America
& Local Union No. 1452, 720 F.2d 1365, 1368 (4th Cir. 1983)
(quoting Norfolk Shipbuilding and Drydock Corp. v. Local No. 684 of
the Int’l Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 671 F.2d 797, 800 (4th Cir.
1982)). Finally, “[t]he ‘basic objective’ of a reviewing court in
9

UMWA v. MONONGALIA CTY. COAL CO.

1:16CV56

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 15], AND DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 17]
the arbitration context is ‘to ensure that commercial arbitration
agreements, like other contracts, are enforced according to their
terms, and according to the intentions of the parties.’” PPG
Indus., 587 F.3d at 654 (quoting First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947 (1995)).
IV. DISCUSSION
The

Union

contends

that

the

Court

should

enforce

the

Arbitrator’s Award because it draws its essence from the contract
and comports with the common law of the shop. (Dkt. No. 16 at 5).
Further, it argues that this is exactly the type of arbitral
decision the parties bargained for in the CBA and agreed would be
final and binding. Id. The Union also argues that any belatedly
asserted defenses to the Award are time-barred as a matter of law.
Id. Finally, the Union maintains that enforcement of the Award,
particularly

the

cease-and-desist

order,

is

vital

to

avoid

rendering the arbitration process futile. Id.
For its part, the Company argues that the Award should be
vacated because it ignores arbitral precedent and the common law of
the shop, and presumably applies the Arbitrator’s own notions of
equity and fairness. (Dkt. No. 17-1 at 2). The Company thus
maintains that the Award does not draw its essence from the
contract. Id. Finally, the Company insists that the Arbitrator
10

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 15], AND DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 17]
failed to take into account applicable industry safety standards
and regulations, specifically the training regulations of the Mine
Safety and Health Administration codified in 30 C.F.R. § 48.25-27.
This failure, according to the Company, presents a safety concern
and violates public policy. Id.
There are three issues presented here for the Court’s review.
The first is whether the defenses raised in the Company’s answer to
the complaint are time barred under the United States Arbitration
Act (“Arbitration Act”), 9 U.S.C. § 12.

The next issue is whether

the Award drew its essence from the contract and comported with the
common law of the shop. The third and final question is whether the
Award should be vacated because it violates public policy. For the
reasons that follow, the Court concludes that the Company’s defense
is not time-barred, the Award draws its essence from the contract
and comports with the common law of the shop, and, finally, the
Award does not violate public policy.
A.

The Company’s Defense is not Time Barred
The Union argues that the Company’s defenses to the Award are

time barred under 9 U.S.C. § 12, which provides that “[n]otice of
a motion to vacate, modify, or correct an award must be served upon
the adverse party or his attorney within three months after the
award

is

filed

or

delivered.”
11

This

argument,

however,

is

UMWA v. MONONGALIA CTY. COAL CO.

1:16CV56

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 15], AND DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 17]
inapplicable here because the Company does not challenge the
validity of the Award, but rather its enforceability.

Indeed,

contrary to the Union’s position, the two cases on which it relies
recognize this distinction, separately analyzing validity and
enforceability. See Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Assoc. v. Power City
Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 934 F. 2d 557 (4th Cir. 1991); Int’l
Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen, Local Union No. 15 v.
Rich Farms, Inc., 2005 WL 2175132 (N.D.W.Va. Sept. 7, 2005)
(“Having determined that the Court is precluded from reviewing the
validity of the Committee’s decision, this Court must now determine
the enforceability of the Committee’s decision.”).
Attacks on the validity of an Award stem from impropriety in
the

arbitral

process.

The

Arbitration

Act

itself

explicitly

provides the bases for vacating an award, which include, among
other things, fraud, corruption, misconduct, material mistake, or
an arbitrator exceeding his authority. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11; see
also Smiga v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 766 F.2d 698, 707-08 (2nd
Cir. 1985) (holding that “only clear evidence of impropriety in the
arbitration proceedings would justify denial of the award” (citing
Sommer v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc., 597 F.2d 819, 825 (2d Cir.
1979))).

12

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 15], AND DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 17]
The Company does not attack the validity of the Award, but
instead contends that it is unenforceable because it fails to draw
its essence from the contract, runs counter to the common law of
the shop, and conflicts with public policy. There is no allegation
that the arbitration was infected with fraud, corruption, or any
other form of procedural defect, nor does the Company argue that
the Arbitrator exceeded his authority by arbitrating the issues
grieved. See e.g., Power City Plumbing, 934 F.2d at 561 (analyzing
attack under 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-12 and holding that award was valid
despite
received

defendant’s
proper

absence

notice).

from

Because

arbitration
the

because

Company’s

it

defense

had
of

unenforceability is not an attack on the validity of the Award, the
Court concludes that it is not time barred under the three month
limitation of 9 U.S.C. § 12.
B.

The Award Draws its Essence from the CBA and Comports with the
Common Law of the Shop
The Company argues that the Arbitrator ignored the plain

meaning of Article IA(g)(2) of the CBA, which states that repair or
maintenance work “Shall not be contracted out except . . . where
the Employer does not have . . . regu1ar Employees (including
laid-off Employees at the mine or central shop) with necessary
skills available to perform the work . . . .” (emphasis added). In

13

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 15], AND DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 17]
support, the Company presented the Arbitrator with what it deems is
a “long history” of arbitral precedent establishing that it “had
properly inquired as to the availability of the bargaining unit
employees and determined that they were unavailable.” (Dkt. No. 171 at 13); (Arb. Award, Dkt. No. 1-1 at 15-16 (discussing Company’s
cited arbitral precedent)).
The Union maintains that the Arbitrator acted within his
authority to interpret the meaning of Article IA(g)(2), and the
Award therefore draws its essence from the contract. (Dkt. No. 18
at 3). Moreover, according to the Union, the law of the shop
establishes that the Company’s efforts to notify union employees of
the availability of the work were wholly insufficient, and it
therefore cannot be said that there were not enough employees
available to perform the work. Id.; see also Arb. Award, Dkt. No.
1-1 at 14 (discussing Union’s arbitral precedent).
Here, based on a plethora of arbitral decisions addressing the
matter, it is evident that the phrase, “available to perform the
work,” is vague. Consequently, the Arbitrator not only is allowed
to interpret its meaning, he is obligated to do so. Mountaineer
Gas, 76 F.3d at 608 (noting that the parties to a CBA “bargained
for

the

arbitrator’s

interpretation

and

resolution

of

their

dispute”); see also PPG Indus., 587 F.3d at 654 (noting that courts
14

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 15], AND DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 17]
should not second-guess an arbitrator’s finding of ambiguity).
Indeed, “construing or applying the contract” is generally within
the exclusive purview of the Arbitrator. PPG Indus., 587 F.3d at
652.
After determining that the contract provision was ambiguous,
the Arbitrator did not ignore the “existing common law of the
particular plant or industry.” Clinchfield Coal, 720 F.2d at 1368.
Rather, he thoroughly reviewed the prevailing common law of the
shop to arrive at his decision. He first concluded that the
arbitral

precedent

cited

by

the

Company

“hold[s]

that

the

classified employees may be considered to be unavailable, and
contracting may justifiably occur, if, at the time when the needed
repair and maintenance work is to be done, they have declined all
known overtime opportunities.” (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 19).
The Arbitrator then reviewed the arbitral precedent submitted
by the Union, which concluded that “the employer cannot properly
determine

whether

its

employees

are

or

are

not

‘reasonably

available’ for the overtime or premium work opportunity, ‘[u]ntil
that offer was made and the employees declined it.’” Id. (quoting
Arbitration

Review

Board

Decision

No.

78-45).

Further,

the

Arbitrator recognized several decisions holding that the employer
must make a “good faith” and “serious” effort to notify union
employees of the work opportunity. Id. Finally, other precedent
15

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 15], AND DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 17]
established that “the lack of volunteer sign-ups does not provide
sufficient justification . . . where the employer failed to use
‘reasonable alternative ways to contact bargaining unit members and
offer them the repair and maintenance work,’ such that [they] were
unaware of the extant opportunity.” Id. (citations omitted).
Guided
painstakingly

by

these

overarching

reviewed

the

facts

principles,
of

the

the

case,

Arbitrator

the

evidence

presented by the parties, and the testimony of the witnesses. He
considered the limited scope of the notice provided by the company,
together with testimony that underground workers “commonly seek and
will very readily accept surface assignments when the same are made
known and offered to them.” Id. at 21. Notably, he found that the
Company

had

failed

to

bear

the

burden

of

establishing

the

applicability of Article IA(g)(2). More specifically, it had failed
to establish “that its underground personnel from the Mine were
informed by it of the repair and maintenance opportunities relative
to the skip rope changing work . . . , much less that said
opportunities were knowingly spurned by said personnel, nor that
the personnel from the Mine were not ‘reasonably available’ to be
called out to the surface.” Id.
In

reaching

his

conclusion,

the

Arbitrator

analyzed

the

competing precedent defining the relevant common law of the shop,
made factual findings regarding the grieved actions, and concluded
16

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 15], AND DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 17]
that the Company had violated the CBA because there was inadequate
evidence that the entire force of “regular Employees” was not
“reasonably available” to perform the work. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2122).
Ultimately, the Company asks the Court to review and reject
the Arbitrator’s factual findings. This the Court will not do. The
Supreme Court of the United States has specifically admonished any
court from such judicial interference in arbitrators’ factual
findings, and the facts of this case hardly give rise to an
occasion to circumvent that edict. See Mountaineer Gas, 76 F.3d at
608 (“[A]bsent any fraud by the parties or dishonesty by the
arbitrator, an arbitrator's findings should never be overturned.”
(citing Misco, 484 U.S. at 38)). Accordingly, the Court concludes
that the well reasoned and factually supported Award not only drew
its

essence

from

the

contract,

but

also

conformed

with

the

prevailing common law of the shop.
C.

The Award does not Violate Public Policy
The Company finally contends that the Award fails to consider

the “legal requirements which must be met for employees to perform
work at a coal mine.” (Dkt. No. 17-1 at 17). In support of its
contention,

the

Company

cites

30

17

C.F.R.

§§

48.25-27,

which

UMWA v. MONONGALIA CTY. COAL CO.

1:16CV56

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 15], AND DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 17]
generally outline certain training requirements for miners. This
argument lacks merit.1
To begin, there is no indication that the regulations cited by
the Company had any bearing on whether there would have been union
workers available to perform the skip rope changes had they been
adequately notified. The first regulation, 30 C.F.R. § 48.25,
covers training that all miners receive prior to starting work at
a mine. Presumably, the Company does not argue that it failed to
fulfill this regulation with every miner it employed — before they
began working at the mine.
The

next

regulation,

30

C.F.R.

§

48.26,

applies

to

“experienced miners” who are: “(1) Newly employed by the operator;
(2)

Transferred

to

the

mine;

(3)

Experienced

surface

miners

transferred from underground to surface; or (4) Returning to the
mine after an absence of more than 12 months.” Again, the Company
is presumably not arguing that any such experienced miners working
at the mine during the relevant time periods were not then trained
because “[e]xperienced miners must complete the training prescribed

1

Tellingly, although it complains that the Award did not
discuss this issue, the Company never bothered to raise it with the
Arbitrator in its opening statement (dkt. no. 17-1 at 26-32),
during the proceedings, or during its closing statement (dkt. no.
17-1 at 127-44).
18

UMWA v. MONONGALIA CTY. COAL CO.

1:16CV56

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 15], AND DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 17]
in this section before beginning work duties.” 30 C.F.R. § 48.26
(emphasis added).
Finally, 30 C.F.R. § 48.27 appears to apply only to “[m]iners
assigned to new work tasks as mobile equipment operators, drilling
machine operators, haulage and conveyor systems operators, ground
control machine operators, AMS operators, and those in blasting
operations,” none of which was the type of work at issue here.
Further undermining the Company’s argument was the testimony
by multiple mine personnel that the skip ropes changes were often
performed by workers without any specialized training. See, e.g.,
Dkt. No. 1-1 at 7 (testimony of

Herb Frye that “comparatively

inexperienced personnel from the underground portion of the mine
helped” perform skip rope changes); Dkt. No. 1-1 at 8 (testimony of
Jim

Ponceroff

that

“[e]mployees

inexperienced

in

said

work,

including some from the underground areas, . . . have previously
been assigned to help in the project”).
Although it is true that courts should refuse to enforce
arbitration awards that interpret contract language in such a way
that “would violate ‘some explicit public policy,’” this is not
such a case. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. at 43. As noted, there is no
evidence that the regulations cited by the Company apply to the
work at issue here. Further, the testimony established that there
19

UMWA v. MONONGALIA CTY. COAL CO.

1:16CV56

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 15], AND DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 17]
were no special skills required to perform the skip rope changes,
and the Company often utilized inexperienced and unskilled workers
to perform such work. Accordingly, the Award of the Arbitrator did
not violate any public policy.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, the Court GRANTS the Union’s motion
for summary judgment (dkt. no. 15), DENIES the Company’s motion for
summary judgment (dkt. no. 17), and ORDERS that the Arbitration
Award be ENFORCED, including its CEASE AND DESIST order.
It is so ORDERED.
The Court directs the Clerk to transmit copies of this
Memorandum Opinion and Order to counsel of record and to enter a
separate judgment order.
DATED: March 6, 2017

/s/ Irene M. Keeley
IRENE M. KEELEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

20