Bison Resources Corporation v. Antero Resources Corporation et al

Filing 42

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS ANDSCHEDULING STATUS AND SCHEDULING CONFERENCE: ORDER denying 6 Motion to Dismiss for failure to State a Claim. ORDERED that the parties appear by counsel on April 5, 2017 at 10:00 a.m. in the chambers of Judge Frederick P.Stamp, Jr., Federal Building, 1125 Chapline Street, Wheeling, WestVirginia 26003. Signed by Senior Judge Frederick P. Stamp, Jr on 3/28/17. (jss)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
BISON RESOURCES CORPORATION,
an Oklahoma limited liability company,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No. 1:16CV107
(STAMP)

ANTERO RESOURCES CORPORATION,
a Delaware corporation and
ANTERO RESOURCES APPALACHIAN CORPORATION,
a Delaware corporation and
predecessor-in-interest to defendant
Antero Resources Corporation,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS AND
SCHEDULING STATUS AND SCHEDULING CONFERENCE
This is a dispute over the right to drill for natural gas
relating to a set of oil and gas leases.

The plaintiff, Bison

Resources Corporation (“Bison Resources”), claims it holds rights
of first refusal to drill relating to certain oil and gas leases.
The defendants, Antero Resources Corporation and Antero Resources
Appalachian Corporation (collectively “Antero”), allegedly drilled
wells on the subject properties without first presenting Bison
Resources with the opportunity to do so.

Antero filed a motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) and for nonjoinder of an indispensable party
under

Rule

12(b)(7).

After

limited

discovery

regarding

the

nonjoinder issue, Antero seeks to withdraw its motion as to that
issue and asserts only that Bison Resources fails to state a claim,

arguing

that

the

rights

of

first

refusal

were

either

not

transferrable to Bison Resources or violate the rule against
perpetuities and that Bison Resources should be judicially estopped
from asserting its claims in this civil action.

For the following

reasons, Antero’s motion to dismiss is denied.
I.

Background

In 1979 and 1980, Doran & Associates, Inc. (“Doran”) conveyed
to LaMaur Development Corporation (“LaMaur”) working interests in
previously drilled boreholes on a set of mineral leases, along with
“right[s] of first refusal to drill any additional wells which may
be drilled upon the oil and gas lease[s].”
5-6, 13.
Clark

These conveyances included the Hazel Ash lease, the Okey

lease,

leases”).

ECF Nos. 28-1 at 1-2,

and

the

West

lease

(collectively

“the

subject

In 1993, LaMaur merged into Bison Resources, bringing

its interests in the subject leases with it.
In 2011, Antero purchased from Bison Interests, LLC (“Bison
Interests”), all its interests in the subject leases’ boreholes.
It is unclear at this time exactly what interests Bison Interests
held or how it obtained them. However, it appears that the parties
intended to drill deeper into the boreholes to reach the Marcellus
See ECF No. 27 at 4-5 (providing

shale underlying the properties.

defense counsel’s explanation of the leasing arrangements at oral
argument held on August 30, 2016). Bison Interests has since filed
a separate civil action against Antero in the Circuit Court for

2

Harrison County, West Virginia.

Circuit Court Civil Action No.

15-C-124-1. Bison Interests alleges that it accepted an offer from
Antero to purchase its interests in several oil and gas leases,
including the subject leases, in 2012.

Bison Interests alleges

that it reserved overriding royalty interests in those leases, and
that Antero has failed to pay royalties.

That litigation is

currently pending.
After purchasing Bison Interests’ stake in the subject leases,
Antero entered those properties, drilled new wells deeper into the
boreholes to reach the Marcellus shale, and began producing natural
gas.

Bison Resources then filed this civil action alleging that

Antero did not provide Bison Resources with prior notice before
drilling the new wells or offer Bison Resources an opportunity to
drill in accordance with its rights of first refusal.

Bison

Resources alleges claims for violation of its rights of first
refusal, trespass, conversion, and tortious interference with
business interests.
Antero filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state

a

claim

and

failure

to

join

Bison

Interests

as

an

indispensable party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
and Rule 12(b)(7), arguing that Bison Resources is judicially
estopped from asserting its claims and that Bison Interests is
required to be joined under Rule 19.

On August 30, 2016, the

parties appeared before this Court for oral argument on the motion

3

to dismiss.

At oral argument, this Court indicated that it was

inclined to deny Antero’s judicial estoppel-based argument for
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).

This Court then directed the

parties to file supplemental briefs regarding joinder of Bison
Interests.
Based

upon

the

parties’

supplemental

briefs,

this

Court

directed the parties to engage in limited discovery regarding Bison
Interests’ citizenship and other matters relevant to joinder of
Bison Interests under Rule 19. After completing limited discovery,
the parties filed a second set of supplemental briefs.

They now

agree that joinder of Bison Interests is not feasible because it is
nondiverse.1

Antero seeks to withdraw its motion to dismiss as to

the nonjoinder of Bison Interests, and represents that, if this
Court denies its motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), it will
file a third-party complaint against Bison Interests for express
and implied indemnification and contribution.

Further, Antero now

argues that the complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6)
because Bison Resources’ claimed rights of first refusal were
extinguished or are invalid under West Virginia law.

1

The parties agree that Bison
Colorado and of California.
Bison
California, and Antero is a citizen of
agree that joinder of Bison Interests
is not feasible.
4

Interests is a citizen of
Resources is a citizen of
Colorado. Thus, the parties
as a plaintiff or defendant

II.

Applicable Law

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

This plausibility

standard requires a plaintiff to articulate facts that, when
accepted as true, demonstrate that the plaintiff is plausibly
entitled to relief.

Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th

Cir. 2009) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

“The plausibility standard is

not a probability requirement, but asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

Hall v.

DirectTV, 846 F.3d 757, 765 (4th Cir. 2017). “[C]ourts must accept
as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint
and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Id.
“[A] complaint is to be construed liberally so as to do substantial
justice.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
III.

Discussion

Antero argues that the complaint should be dismissed because
Bison Resources’ claimed rights of first refusal were extinguished
or are invalid and because Bison Resources should be judicially
estopped from asserting its claims in this civil action.

As

discussed fully below, Antero seeks to withdraw its argument that

5

this case should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(7) for failure to
join Bison Interests.
A.

Validity of the Rights of First Refusal
Antero argues in its first and second supplemental briefs that

Bison

Resources’

claimed

rights

of

first

refusal

were

non-

transferrable or are invalid under the rule against perpetuities.
Bison Resources argues that Antero’s arguments should be stricken
because they are outside the scope of this Court’s orders directing
the parties to file their first and second sets of supplemental
briefs.

While Antero’s arguments are beyond the scope of those

orders, Bison Resources has had an opportunity to respond to those
arguments, and this Court believes it is prepared to rule on the
issue.

Thus, this Court considers Antero’s arguments on this

matter.
1.

Transferability

LaMaur merged into Bison Resources in 1993. ECF No. 1-1 at 2.
Under California law, the state in which Bison Resources is
incorporated, “all of the rights and property” of LaMaur were
“succeed[ed], without other transfer,” to Bison Resources.

Cal.

Corp. Code § 1107(a); see also id. § 1109 (providing that upon
merger the dissolving entities’ interests in realty “vest[] in the
surviving or consolidated party to the merger”).2

2

Thus, the rights

Similarly, West Virginia law provides that “[a]ll property
owned by, and every contract right possessed by, each corporation
. . . that merges into the survivor is vested in the survivor
6

of first refusal were assumed by Bison Resources by operation of
law when LaMaur merged into Bison Resources without transfer.
Further, under West Virginia law, contractual rights and property
interests are assignable unless precluded by law or by the parties’
agreement.

See Smith v. Buege, 387 S.E.2d 109, 115-16 (W. Va.

1989) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 317); W. Va. Code
§ 36-1-9 (providing that property interests “may be lawfully
conveyed or devised”); Easley Coal Co. v. Brush Creek Coal Co., 112
S.E. 512, 514-15 (W. Va. 1922). Thus, the rights of first refusal,
whether contractual or property rights, were transferrable unless
the deeds clearly stated otherwise. The deeds were not required to
specifically provide for transferability or that they would be
assumed by any successor entity to LaMaur.
Antero relies on DWG Oil & Gas Acquisitions, LLC v. Southern
Country Farms, Inc., 796 S.E.2d 201 (W. Va. 2017), to argue that
the rights of first refusal conveyed by Doran to LaMaur were
transferrable only if the deeds expressly stated so. However, that
case provides that “to create an exception or reservation in a deed
which would reduce a grant in a conveyance . . . such exception or
reservation must be expressed in certain and definite language.”
Id. at 206 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).

without reversion or impairment,” and that “[a]ll real property
located in the state owned by each corporation . . . that merges
into the survivor passes by operation of law.”
W. Va. Code
§ 31D-11-1107(a).
7

Here, Doran conveyed to LaMaur working interests in boreholes on
the subject leases along with rights of first refusal to drill new
wells.

The rights of first refusal are not reservations in the

grant, they are rights affirmatively granted to LaMaur.

Further,

these grants were expressed clearly, and DWG has no bearing on this
issue.
Relying on DWG and Allegheny Country Farms, Inc. v. Huffman,
787 S.E.2d 626 (W. Va. 2016), Antero argues that the rights of
first refusal were extinguished before Antero drilled on the
subject leases. In DWG, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
concluded that reserved interests in an oil and gas lease are
extinguished when all interests in the oil and gas lease were
merged in one party.

Id. at 206-07.

In Huffman, the court

concluded that a right of first refusal to purchase realty was held
personally by a grantee and was extinguished when the property was
sold at auction and the grantee failed to exercise the right of
first refusal.

Id. at 633.

Antero does not argue that the rights

of first refusal were merged with all other interests in the
subject

leases.

As

discussed

above,

the

rights

were

not

transferred to Bison Resources but were assumed by Bison Resources
upon its merger with LaMaur.

Accordingly, this Court finds that,

based on the allegations in the complaint, the rights of first
refusal were not extinguished by merger of interests in the subject
leases or by transfer.

8

2.

Rule Against Perpetuities

Antero argues that the rights of first refusal are peremptory
rights relating to real property that are subject to the rule
against perpetuities.
refusal

are

perpetuities.

Antero argues that if the rights of first

transferrable,

they

violate

the

rule

against

Thus, Antero argues that this Court must interpret

the assignment to avoid violating the rule against perpetuities,
resulting in non-transferable rights of first refusal.

Given such

an interpretation, Antero argues that the rights of first refusal
were held personally by LaMaur and that they dissolved when LaMaur
merged with Bison Resources.
rights

of

first

refusal

Otherwise, Antero argues that the

are

invalid

under

the

rule

against

perpetuities.
The issue of whether rights of first refusal to drill on oil
and gas leases are subject to the rule against perpetuities appears
to be an issue of first impression under West Virginia law.

Where

applicable state law does not definitively answer a legal issue,
the court must “make as educated a guess as possible” as to what
the applicable state law is.

Comprehensive Techs. Int’l, Inc. v.

Software Artisans, Inc., 3 F.3d 730, 741-42 (4th Cir. 1993),
vacated pursuant to settlement; see also Audler v. CBC Innovis
Inc., 519 F.3d 239, 248-49 (5th Cir. 2008) (“There are . . . no
definitive answers in Louisiana law to the questions presented.
Accordingly, this Court, applying state substantive law, must make

9

an educated ‘Erie guess’ as to how the Louisiana Supreme Court
would resolve the issues before us.”). Based on existing precedent
in West Virginia, this Court believes that if posed with this issue
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals would hold that Bison
Resources’ rights of first refusal are not subject to the rule
against perpetuities.
West Virginia has adopted the Uniform Statutory Rule Against
Perpetuities, W. Va. Code § 36-1A-1 to 36-1A-8, abrogating the
state’s common law rule.

Id. § 36-1A-8.

However, the statutory

rule applies only prospectively to interests created after its
adoption.

Id.

§

36-1A-5.

West

Virginia’s

common

law

rule

“requires that every executory limitation, in order to be valid, []
be so limited that it must necessarily vest, if at all, within a
life or lives in being, ten months and twenty-one years thereafter,
the period of gestation being allowed only in those cases in which
it is a factor.”

Smith v. VanVoorhis, 296 S.E.2d 851, 853 (W. Va.

1982) (internal quotation marks omitted).3

The West Virginia

Supreme Court of Appeals has held that rights of first refusal to
purchase a fee estate in realty are subject to the rule against
perpetuities as executory interests.

3

Smith, 296 S.E.2d at 853.

The statutory rule provides that “[a] nonvested property
interest is invalid unless . . . [w]hen the interest is created, it
is certain to vest or terminate no later than twenty-one years
after the death of an individual then alive[] or . . . [t]he
interest either vests or terminates within ninety years after its
creation.” W. Va. Code § 36-1A-1(a).
10

However, the court has held that “the rule against perpetuities
relates solely to the vesting of estates and is not concerned with
their possession or enjoyment.”

West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co.

v. Strong, 42 S.E.2d 46, 52 (W. Va. 1947).

Further, a deed may

convey “a present fixed right of future enjoyment . . ., although
the right of enjoyment may not be exercised immediately.”

Post v.

Bailey, 159 S.E. 524, 527 (W. Va. 1931).
In Post v. Bailey, 159 S.E. 524 (W. Va. 1931), the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals considered a mineral lease
conveying title to coal under the property along with incidental
surface rights to extract and transport that coal.
Further,

the

lease

provided

that

the

lessee

Id. at 524.

could

construct

structures and improvements on the surface in furtherance of its
incidental surface rights if it paid the surface owner $40 per acre
occupied or improved.

Id. at 526.

The court concluded that this

option to build structures and improvements was not subject to the
rule against perpetuities. Id. at 526-27. The court distinguished
contingent property interests from options for the manner in which
a property interest is enjoyed, noting that the rule against
perpetuities “relates solely to the vesting of estates or interests
and is not concerned with their possession or enjoyment.”
527 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Id. at

Specifically, the court

distinguished the case from one in which a coal lease included an
option for the lessee to purchase the surface property, concluding

11

that

such

an

option

would

be

subject

to

the

perpetuities unlike the option involved in Post.

rule

against

Id.; see also

Strong, 42 S.E.2d at 50-52 (concluding that an option in a coal
lease to purchase the surface was subject to the rule against
perpetuities and distinguishing Post).

The court concluded that

the lessee had a vested interest in the use and enjoyment of the
surface incident to its subsurface rights, and that the option
provision affected only the manner in which those rights may be
enjoyed.

Post, 159 S.E. at 527.

This case is analogous to Post.

The subject leases conveyed

a vested interest in Doran to drill and extract oil and gas from
the subject leases.

Doran conveyed a present vested interest in

the existing boreholes and created an option regarding LaMaur’s
right to exercise Doran’s vested right to drill new wells.

The

rights of first refusal are not property interests themselves, but
are agreements as to the manner in which vested interests may be
exercised.

Thus, this Court believes that, if presented with this

issue, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals would hold that
rights of first refusal to drill contained in the subject leases
are not subject to the rule against perpetuities.

Accordingly,

this Court need not interpret the rights of first refusal to be
non-transferrable.

Taking the complaint’s allegations as true,

Bison Resources holds rights of first refusal to drill new wells on
the subject leases.

12

B.

Judicial Estoppel
Antero argues that the complaint should be dismissed because

Bison

Interests

should

be

judicially

estopped

from

taking

a

position inconsistent with Bison Interests’ stated position in the
pending state action between Bison Interests and Antero.

Antero

argues that Bison Interests’ statements should be attributed to
Bison Resources because the entities are in privity of interest.
At oral argument, this Court indicated to the parties that it was
inclined to deny Antero’s motion on this ground.

As discussed

fully below, this Court’s pronounced order is now confirmed.
Judicial estoppel applies only if: (1) “the party sought to be
estopped

.

.

.

[is]

seeking

to

adopt

a

position

that

is

inconsistent with a stance taken in prior litigation”; (2) “the
prior inconsistent position . . . [was] accepted by the court”; and
(3) “the party against whom judicial estoppel is to be applied
. . . intentionally misled the court to gain unfair advantage.”
Zirkand v. Brown, 478 F.3d 634, 638 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

Furthermore, “[t]he position at issue

must be one of fact as opposed to one of law or legal theory,” and
the “bad faith requirement is the ‘determinative factor.’”

Id.

First, Bison Resources has not taken a position that is
inconsistent with a stance it has taken in prior litigation.

The

pending state litigation between Bison Interests and Antero is not
“prior litigation,” but is currently pending and has not been

13

resolved.

Further, any position Bison Interests has taken in that

litigation cannot be attributed to Bison Resources.

While Antero

argues that judicial estoppel applies to a party in privity with a
party to prior litigation, Antero fails to demonstrate that Bison
Resources’ interests in this civil action are “so closely aligned
with the . . . interests [of Bison Interests] as to be its virtual
Mother’s Rest., Inc. v. Mama’s Pizza, Inc., 723

representative.”

F.2d 1566, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (collecting cases); see also
Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. Marilyn Monroe LLC, 692 F.3d
983,

996

(9th

Cir.

2013)

(recognizing

that

a

party

may

be

judicially estopped from taking a position inconsistent with that
taken by a non-party in privity of interest with the party).
Second, Bison Interests’ position regarding its conveyance to
Antero has not been accepted by the court in the state litigation
or by this Court.

Bison Interests merely alleges in its complaint

that it holds overriding royalty interests in the subject leases
and that it otherwise conveyed its interests in the subject leases,
among others, to Antero.

A court cannot be said to have adopted a

litigant’s factual allegations in the pleadings when the court has
made no factual findings or conclusions of law regarding the merits
of the case.

Finally, there is no indication that Bison Resources

is attempting to mislead this Court to gain an unfair advantage.
Accordingly,

Bison

Resources

is

not

judicially

asserting its claims in this civil action.

14

estopped

from

C.

Nonjoinder
The parties agree that Bison Interests is a citizen of

Colorado and California.

Because Antero is a citizen of Colorado,

and Bison Resources is a citizen of California, joinder of Bison
Interests as a plaintiff or a defendant would defeat diversity.
Thus, the parties agree that joinder of Bison Interests is not
feasible under Rule 19.

Based on this agreement, Antero asks to

withdraw its motion to dismiss as to the nonjoinder of Bison
Interests.
Antero argues that it may implead Bison Interests as a thirdparty defendant within fourteen days of filing its answer.

Antero

intends to assert claims for express and implied indemnification
and contribution against Bison Interests.

It argues that this

Court would have supplemental jurisdiction over the third-party
claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Antero represents that if this

Court denies its motion to dismiss, it will file a third-party
complaint against Bison Interests. Bison Resources did not respond
to this proposal, noting that Antero has not yet filed a thirdparty complaint against Bison Interests.
If Antero impleads Bison Interests, its motion to dismiss for
nonjoinder will be mooted.

As discussed above, this Court is

denying Antero’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
and,

based

upon

Antero’s

stated

15

intention

to

implead

Bison

Interests,

this

Court

denies

Antero’s

motion

to

dismiss

for

nonjoinder.4
IV.

Conclusion

Antero’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 6) is DENIED.

Further,

this Court believes it would be beneficial to hold a status and
scheduling conference to discuss the entry of a scheduling order.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the parties appear by counsel on
April 5, 2017 at 10:00 a.m. in the chambers of Judge Frederick P.
Stamp, Jr., Federal Building, 1125 Chapline Street, Wheeling, West
Virginia 26003.

The parties are DIRECTED to meet and confer prior

to the status and scheduling conference to discuss a trial date,
along with other pretrial filing deadlines.
The Court will permit those out-of-town attorneys having their
offices further than forty (40) miles from the Wheeling point of
holding court to participate in the conference by telephone.
However, any such attorney shall advise the Court as soon as
possible prior to the conference of his or her intention to
participate by telephone and shall (1) inform all counsel of his or
her appearance by telephone; (2) confer with other out-of-town
attorneys to determine if they wish to appear by telephone; (3)
advise the Court of the name of the attorney who will initiate the
conference call and all such attorneys appearing by telephone; and

4

This Court notes that Antero may file a third-party complaint
against Bison Interests without leave of court. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 14(a)(1); 12(a)(4)(A).
16

(4) initiate a timely conference telephone call with such attorneys
to

the

Court

conference.

at

304/233-1120

at

the

time

of

the

scheduled

If the attorneys cannot reach agreement as to the

initiator of the call, the Court will make that determination.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to transmit a copy of this memorandum
opinion and order to counsel of record herein.
DATED:

March 28, 2017

/s/ Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.
FREDERICK P. STAMP, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

17