Walker v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REJECTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION DKT. NO. 20 . Court REJECTS the R&R Dkt. No. 20 ; GRANTS Walkers motion for summary judgment Dkt. No. 10 ; DENIES the Commissioners motion for summary judgment Dkt. No. 14 ; REVER SES the Commissioners decision under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and § 1383(c)(3); and REMANDS this case to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion. Court DIRECTS the Clerk to enter a separate judgment order, and to strike this case from the Courts active docket. Signed by Senior Judge Irene M. Keeley on 8/20/2018. (copy counsel of record)(jmm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
LISHA M. WALKER,
Plaintiff,
v.

//

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:17CV63
(Judge Keeley)

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REJECTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 20]
On April 21, 2017, the plaintiff, Lisha M. Walker (“Walker”),
filed a complaint seeking review of an adverse decision of the
defendant,

Nancy

A.

Berryhill,

Acting

Commissioner

of

Social

Security (“the Commissioner”) (Dkt. No. 1). Pending are Walker’s
objections to the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) filed by the
Honorable

Robert

W.

Trumble,

United

States

Magistrate

Judge,

recommending that the Court affirm the Commissioner (Dkt. Nos. 20;
21). For the following reasons, the Court REJECTS the R&R and
REVERSES and REMANDS the Commissioner’s decision.
I. BACKGROUND
The Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) and 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). Walker filed claims for
disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security

WALKER V. BERRYHILL

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REJECTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 20]
income (“SSI”) in July 2013 (R. 243-50).1 At the time, she alleged
a disability onset date of February 8, 2008 (R. 243), but later
amended that date to February 1, 2012 (R. 43-44). Walker’s most
recent relevant work was as a hotel front desk clerk from 2000 to
2008 (R. 63, 266). Walker alleged that a number of limitations
prevented her from working, including major depressive disorder,
anxiety, panic disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, personality
disorders, attention deficit disorder, narcolepsy, fibromyalgia,
chronic fatigue, and migraine headaches (R. 264).2
The Commissioner denied Walker’s claim at both the initial and
reconsideration

levels

(R.

180,

192).

At

Walker’s

request,

Administrative Law Judge Nikki Hall (“the ALJ”) held a hearing on
January 5, 2016 (R. 37). The ALJ denied Walker’s claim in a written
decision on March 14, 2016 (R. 20-31). Walker appealed the ALJ’s
decision to the Appeals Council, but it declined review on February

1

Throughout this Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court
cites the administrative record (Dkt. No. 7) by reference to the
pagination as assigned by the Social Security Administration.
2

This is Walker’s second application for DIB and SSI. She
first applied for benefits in January 2009, alleging an onset date
of February 8, 2008. By decision dated November 8, 2010, an
administrative law judge found that, although Walker had severe
physical and mental impairments, she was not disabled (R. 89-100).
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REJECTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 20]
21, 2017, thus rendering the ALJ’s decision the final decision of
the Commissioner for purposes of appeal (R. 1).
Thereafter, on April 21, 2017, Walker filed suit in this
Court, seeking reversal of the Commissioner’s final decision (Dkt.
No. 1). In her complaint, Walker argued that the ALJ’s decision “is
neither supported by substantial evidence nor based upon a correct
application of the law.” Id. at 2. More particularly, in her motion
for

summary

judgment,

Walker

argued

that

the

ALJ

improperly

concluded that she “was exaggerating her symptoms and voluntarily
portraying

herself

in

a

negative

manner,”

and

that

the

ALJ

improperly “rejected every medical opinion favorable to her without
providing sufficient explanation or support” (Dkt. 11 at 1).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the local rules, the Court
referred the case to Magistrate Judge Trumble for initial review.
In his R&R, the magistrate judge rejected Walker’s contentions
(Dkt. No. 20). First, he found substantial evidence to support the
ALJ’s determination that Walker was not entirely credible. Id. at
20. Second, he reasoned that, in her decision, the ALJ satisfied
her duty to sufficiently explain the weight given to each medical
opinion. Id. at 14. Walker filed timely objections to the R&R,
again arguing that the ALJ impermissibly had substituted her own
opinion for that of the medical providers (Dkt. No. 21).
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REJECTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 20]
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A.

The Magistrate Judge’s R&R
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c), this Court must review

de novo any portion of the magistrate judge’s recommendation to
which objection is timely made. The Court, however, will uphold
those portions of the R&R to which no objection is made unless they
are “clearly erroneous.” See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident
Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005). Because Walker filed
objections to the R&R (Dkt. No. 21), this Court will review de novo
all those portions of the R&R to which she has objected.
B.

The ALJ’s Decision
The question presented is not whether Walker is disabled. See

Mayer v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 700, 704 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing Craig v.
Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996)). Judicial review of the
Commissioner’s final decision is limited to determining whether the
ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether
she correctly applied the law. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Milburn
Colliery Co. v. Hicks, 138 F.3d 524, 528 (4th Cir. 1998). It is the
duty of the ALJ to make findings of fact and resolve disputed
evidence. King v. Califano, 599 F.2d 597, 599 (4th Cir. 1979).

4

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REJECTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 20]
Substantial evidence is that which a “reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Hays v. Sullivan,
907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation omitted)). “[I]t
consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be
somewhat less than a preponderance.” Mastro v. Apfel, 20 F.3d 171,
176 (4th Cir. 2001) (alteration in original) (quoting Laws v.
Celbrezze, 368 F.3d 585, 589 (1966)). “In reviewing for substantial
evidence, [the court should not] undertake to re-weigh conflicting
evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its]
judgment for that of the Secretary.” Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting

Craig,

76

F.3d

at

589).

That

“two

inconsistent

conclusions” may be drawn “from the evidence does not prevent an
administrative

agency’s

findings

from

being

supported

by

substantial evidence.” Sec’y of Labor v. Mut. Mining, Inc., 80 F.3d
110, 113 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Conolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n,
383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966) (internal quotation omitted)).
Nonetheless, “[a]n ALJ may not select and discuss only that
evidence that favors his ultimate conclusion, but must articulate,
at some minimum level, his analysis of the evidence to allow the
appellate court to trace the path of his reasoning. An ALJ's
failure to consider an entire line of evidence falls below the
5

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REJECTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 20]
minimal level . . . .” Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 307 (7th Cir.
1995) (internal citation omitted). The Court must be able to “track
the ALJ’s reasoning and be assured that the ALJ considered the
important evidence.” Id. at 308 (quoting Green v. Shalala, 51 F.3d
96, 101 (7th Cir. 1995)).
III. DISCUSSION
As part of its review of the R&R, the Court incorporates by
reference the parties’ stipulations of fact (Dkt. Nos. 18; 19) and
Magistrate Judge Trumble’s articulation of the Commissioner’s fivestep evaluation process (Dkt. No. 20 at 3-5).
A.

Credibility Determination
Walker first contends that the ALJ improperly decided that

“[h]er allegations are not entirely credible given the apparently
voluntary and self-motivated nature of her clinical presentations”
(Dkt. No. 11 at 8-11). For the following reasons, the Court
concludes

that

the

ALJ

did

not

support

her

credibility

determination with substantial evidence.
1.

Applicable Law

An ALJ uses a two-step process when determining whether a
person is disabled by pain or other symptoms. Craig, 76 F.3d at
594. In the first step, objective medical evidence must exist

6

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REJECTING
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demonstrating a medical impairment resulting from anatomical,
physiological,

or

psychological

abnormalities

that

“could

reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms
alleged.” Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(b), 416.929(b)(2011));
see also Social Security Ruling 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *2 (July
2, 1996) [hereinafter SSR 96-7p].
After the claimant makes this “threshold showing,” the ALJ
must evaluate the claimant’s credibility regarding her subjective
symptoms. SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *2. In this second step,
the ALJ assesses the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects
of the symptoms “to determine the extent to which [they] limit the
individual’s ability to do basic work activities.” Id. If the
claimant’s

statements

about

the

intensity,

persistence,

or

functionally limiting effects of symptoms are unsubstantiated by
objective medical evidence, the ALJ must “make a finding on the
credibility of those statements based on the consideration of the
entire case record,” including the medical signs and laboratory
findings,

the

claimant’s

statements,

statements

by

medical

professionals, and any other relevant evidence. Id.
In addition to objective medical evidence, the ALJ must
consider the following factors regarding credibility:
1.

The individual’s daily activities;
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REJECTING
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2.

The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of
the individual’s pain or other symptoms;

3.

Factors
that
symptoms;

4.

The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects
of any medication the individual takes or has taken
to alleviate pain or other symptoms;

5.

Treatment, other than medication, the individual
receives or has received for relief of pain or
other symptoms;

6.

Any measures other than treatment the individual
uses or has used to relieve pain or other symptoms
(e.g., lying flat on his or her back, standing for
15 to 20 minutes every hour, or sleeping on a
board); and

7.

Any other factors concerning the individual’s
functional limitations and restrictions due to pain
or other symptoms.

precipitate

and

aggravate

the

Id. at *3.
Although the ALJ need not document specific findings as to
each factor, Wolfe v. Colvin, No. 3:14CV4, 2015 WL 401013, at *4
(N.D.W.Va. Jan. 28, 2015) (Groh, J.), her decision “must contain
specific reasons for the finding on credibility, supported by
evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to
make clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the
weight the adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements and the
reasons for that weight.” SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *2.

8

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REJECTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 20]
An

ALJ’s

credibility

determinations

are

“virtually

unreviewable.” Ryan v. Astrue, No. 5:09CV55, 2011 WL 541125, at *3
(N.D.W.Va. Feb. 8, 2011) (Stamp, J.) (quoting Darvishian v. Geren,
No. 08-1672, 2010 WL 5129870, at *9 (4th Cir. 2010)). Because it is
the

ALJ

who

observed

the

claimant’s

demeanor

during

the

administrative hearing, her determination regarding credibility is
to be given great weight. Shively v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 987, 989
(7th Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted).
2.

Analysis

Although

credibility

determinations

are

due

substantial

deference by this Court, the ALJ in this case did not support her
determination with substantial evidence. Her reasoning does not
permit a reasonable mind to accept the conclusion that Walker is
not credible. Hays, 907 F.2d at 1456. The ALJ reasoned that,
although

Walker’s

“medically

determinable

impairments

could

reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms,” she was not
entirely credible due to her “inconsistent course of mental health
treatment,” the “apparently voluntary” nature of her clinical
presentations,

and

treatment

notes

regarding

certain

of

her

activities (R. 26-28). The record reflects deficiencies in the
ALJ’s reasoning with regard to each of these categories.

9

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REJECTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 20]
First, the ALJ noted that Walker “has had an inconsistent
course of mental health treatment” (R. 28). She further reasoned
that, “[d]espite the claimant’s various explanations, her pattern
of noncompliance both suggests that her conditions are not as
severe as alleged, and also that they are less limiting when she
actually attends her therapy as prescribed” (R. 29). But, as other
courts have noted, “faulting a person with diagnosed mental illness
.

.

.

for

failing

to

pursue

mental

health

treatment

is

a

questionable practice.” Simpson v. Colvin, No. 6:15-CV-06244 EAW,
2016 WL 4491628, at *15 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2016) (quoting McGregor
v. Astrue, 993 F. Supp. 2d 130, 143 (N.D.N.Y. 2012)). The ALJ thus
erred

when

she

used

Walker’s

inconsistent

and

noncompliant

treatment history to support the conclusion that her limitations
are not as severe as alleged.
Second, the ALJ reasoned that Walker displayed a “pattern of
exaggeration, both in her claims” and “to treatment providers” (R.
27). According to the ALJ, Walker’s “allegations are not entirely
credible given the apparently voluntary and self-motivated nature
of her clinical presentations” (R. 27). The ALJ’s conclusion,
however, results from a misapprehension of the evidence.

10

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REJECTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 20]
For instance, the following is the ALJ’s discussion of a
neuropsychological assessment that corresponds with the alleged
onset of Walker’s disability:
In May and June 2012, she was admitted for day treatment
and attended early group sessions; she then stopped
attending and did not respond to attempts to reschedule
or continue her treatment. At the same time, the
neuropsychological assessment discussed above revealed
the presence of notable anxiety and likely personality
disorders, but also a lack of effort or motivation in the
clinical setting. The evidence strongly indicated that
“[s]econdary gain issues, such as avoidance of
responsibility in her daily life, as well as social
security disability, may play a role in her presentation
and maintenance of her symptoms.”
(R. 27).
The assessment conducted by Dr. Ekaterina Keifer, however,
paints a different picture:
Reasons for poor effort in this patient likely include a
desire to demonstrate the degree of her emotional
distress, which she did in an exaggerated and dramatic
fashion that is consistent with the presence of an
underlying personality disorder. Secondary gain issues,
such as avoidance of responsibilities in daily life, as
well as social security disability, may play a role in
her presentation and maintenance of her symptoms. From a
diagnostic perspective, the patient has significant
symptoms of generalized anxiety and appears to use
compulsive behavior as a coping strategy. . . . The longstanding immutable nature of her difficulties, along with
her dramatic presentation provide support for the
presence of a personality disorder.
(R. 331) (emphasis added). Dr. Keifer did not separately discuss
“likely personality disorders” and “a lack of effort or motivation”
11

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REJECTING
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(R. 27). Context makes clear that Dr. Keifer associated “poor
effort . . . with the presence of an underlying personality
disorder” (R. 331). In other words, she concluded that Walker
exhibited poor effort in a manner consistent with personality
disorders, not apart from them.
Moreover, nowhere in her assessment does Dr. Keifer reason
that the evidence strongly indicates the presence of secondary gain
issues. The evidence actually suggests only that secondary gain
issues “may” be a factor that contributes to Walker’s presentation
(R. 331). And, to make matters worse, the ALJ relied on her
misunderstanding of Dr. Keifer’s assessment to completely dismiss
a consultative evaluation that concluded Walker was “severely
deficient based on her presentation” (R. 28).
Contrary to the ALJ’s conclusion that Walker’s presentation is
exaggerated and voluntary (R. 27), no treatment provider or medical
professional of record has suggested that Walker is malingering. In
fact, an evaluation by Dr. Tony Goudy indicated that the results
were “fundamentally inconsistent with an individual trying to
malinger”

(R.

492).

“[T]he

ALJ

simply

does

not

possess

the

competency to substitute [her] views on the severity of plaintiff’s
psychiatric problems for that of a trained professional.” Grimmett
v.

Heckler,

607

F.

Supp.

502,
12

503

(S.D.W.Va.

1985)

(citing

WALKER V. BERRYHILL

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REJECTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 20]
Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d 396, 397 (4th Cir. 1974); McLain v.
Schweiker, 715 F.2d 866, 869 (4th Cir. 1983)).3
Third,

the

ALJ

pointed

to

“physical

treatment

notes,”

reasoning that they did “not suggest the level of symptoms or
deficits she allege[d]” (R. 28). For instance, the ALJ reasoned
that, in one note, Walker was merely noted to be “anxious” on June
18, 2014, but was “well-groomed [with] good eye contact.” In
addition, she has cared for her grandmother and disabled son, for
whom she acts as representative payee (R. 28).
The ALJ erred in this regard by selectively relying on
treatment notes favorable to her conclusion. Diaz, 55 F.3d at 307.
For example, the same provider who noted Walker was “anxious,” had
previously noted that Walker was “anxious, confused” and exhibited
“flight of ideas” thought patterns (R. 413-14). The provider also
indicated that Walker should continue mental health treatment
because she was “[v]ery emotional and cryi[n]g alot with son
Diagnosed with Aspergers Syndrome She is very nervous and not
leaving the house much” (R. 413). “Mental illness waxes and wanes
3

The subjective nature of the ALJ’s approach to mental health
evidence is illustrated by her actions at the hearing. When Walker
exhibited documented symptoms of her mental illness, the ALJ told
Walker “to get a hold of [herself]” and that she was “wasting [her]
time by losing control” (R. 53-54). The ALJ also indicated on
several occasions that she was “not buying it” (R. 54-55).
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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 20]
over time . . . .” Coldren v. Astrue, No. 10-CV-04080, 2011 WL
4352500,

at

*16

(N.D.

Iowa

Sept.

15,

2011).

A

few

isolated

treatment notes inconsistent with debilitating mental illness do
not

provide

substantial

evidence

in

support

of

an

adverse

credibility finding.
In addition, the ALJ relied on Walker’s care for her disabled
son without addressing conflicting, non-medical evidence that her
participation in Individual Educational Plan meetings “was often
not productive” because “she would become very upset for no
reason,” and “would cry and appear to become overwhelmed” (R. 29,
317). It was inappropriate for the ALJ to bolster her conclusion by
presenting an incomplete narrative of the documentary evidence.
In sum, the ALJ’s credibility determination is not supported
by substantial evidence because she improperly relied on treatment
noncompliance, misinterpreted the relevant medical evidence, and
selectively discussed components of the record that supported her
conclusion. On remand, it will be incumbent upon the ALJ to assess
Walker’s subjective complaints through a more fulsome and inclusive
analysis of the record evidence.

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B.

Medical Opinions
Second,

Walker

contends

that

the

ALJ

rejected

favorable

medical opinions without a sufficient explanation (Dkt. No. 11 at
12-15). Here too the record supports the conclusion that the ALJ
did not support her reasoning and conclusions with substantial
evidence.
1.

Applicable Law

If a claimant’s severe impairments neither meet nor equal the
severity of a listed impairment, as was the undisputed step-three
determination in this case, the ALJ must then assess the claimant’s
residual functional capacity (“RFC”).4 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). An
ALJ is to determine the claimant’s RFC “based on all the relevant
medical and other evidence,” id., including medical opinions. Id.
§ 404.1527(b). “Medical opinions are statements from acceptable
medical

sources

that

reflect

judgments

about

the

nature

and

severity” of a claimant’s “impairment(s), including [her] symptoms,

4

A claimant’s RFC “is the most [she] can still do despite
[her] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545. It is also described as
“an assessment of an individual’s ability to do sustained workrelated physical and mental activities in a work setting on a
regular and continuing basis. A ‘regular and continuing basis’
means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work
schedule.” Social Security Ruling 96-8p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,474,
34,478 (July 2, 1996) [hereinafter SSR 96-8p].
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diagnosis,

or

prognosis,

what

[she]

can

still

do

despite

impairment(s), and [her] physical or mental restrictions. Id.
§ 404.1527(a)(1).
A treating physician’s opinion is entitled to controlling
weight so long as it is “well-supported by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques,” and is consistent
with the other evidence of record. Id. § 404.1527(c)(2); Mastro v.
Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 178 (4th Cir. 2001). When a medical opinion is
not entitled to controlling weight, the ALJ should consider the
following factors in deciding what weight to assign: (1) the
examining relationship; (2) the length, frequency, nature, and
extent of the treatment relationship; (3) supportability; (4)
consistency; (5) specialization; and (6) other factors. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(c). Ultimate conclusions as to whether a claimant is
“disabled” or “unable to work” are categorically reserved to the
Commissioner. Id. § 404.1527(d)(1).
The Commissioner abides by the following guidance:
The RFC assessment must include a narrative discussion
describing how the evidence supports each conclusion,
citing specific medical facts (e.g., laboratory findings)
and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily activities,
observations).
SSR 96-8p, 61 Fed. Reg. at 34,478. This guidance obligates the ALJ
to provide more than mere “conclusory analysis” when assigning
16

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weight to medical opinions. Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 191
(4th Cir. 2016); see also SSR 96-8p, 61 Fed. Reg. at 34,478 (“If
the RFC assessment conflicts with an opinion from a medical source,
the adjudicator must explain why the opinion was not adopted.”).
Although the ALJ may decline to give an opinion weight, it is
for the Court to determine whether substantial evidence supports
her decision. See Russell v. Barnhart, 58 F. App’x 25, 29–30 (4th
Cir. 2003). The ALJ’s determination as to the weight to be assigned
to a medical opinion “generally will not be disturbed absent some
indication that the ALJ has dredged up ‘specious inconsistencies,’
or has failed to give a sufficient reason for the weight afforded
a particular opinion.” Dunn v. Colvin, 607 F. App’x 264, 267 (4th
Cir. 2015) (internal citations omitted). The ALJ must reach a
conclusion that appears rational. Id. at 266; see also Schmidt v.
Sullivan, 914 F.2d 117, 118 (7th Cir. 1990) (reasoning that an ALJ
may not “succumb to the temptation to play doctor”).
2.

Analysis

The ALJ erred by “fail[ing] to give a sufficient reason for
the weight afforded” many of the medical opinions of record. Dunn,
607

F.

App’x

at

267.

Most

notably,

the

record

contains

an

evaluation and psychiatric follow up notes by treating physician

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Dr. James Abel from November 2012 through September 2015 (R. 36576, 468-78). Throughout the records, Dr. Abel prescribed and
adjusted medication, consistently noting his impressions that
Walker was labile, tearful, distressed, and tangential, including
his initial impression that Walker had “a near-psychotic like
presentation” (R. 478).
In addition, prior to the hearing before the ALJ, Dr. Abel
provided a medical source statement as follows:
I have been involved with Lisha Walkers [sic] psychiatric
care for roughly 8 years now. To be quite frank, Lisha is
one of the more neurotic and dramatic patients I have
ever cared for. My initial impressions of Lisha were that
she was embellishing and even fabricating some of her
symptoms for unclear objective. She appeared to covet the
“sick role” while searching for personal validation
through the theatrical expression of emotional distress
and mental illness.
However, as I got to know Lisha over time, I began to
realize that she is in-fact severely mentally ill and
completely dysfunctional socially and occupationally. Her
presentation of hysteria, irrationality, paranoia, and
helplessness has been consistent in every interaction I
have had with her over the last 8 years. Without her
mother’s support, she would either be in a long term
state facility or homeless. In the time I have known her
she has received a tremendous amount [of] psychiatric
care from multiple providers and has shown negligent
improvement.
Despite
full
treatment
compliance,
medication management along with intensive individual and
group therapy continue to be ineffective.
In my professional opinion, Lisha has a profound and
disabling mental illness with genuine and consistent
presentation. Her level of functioning is severely
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impaired in personal, social, and occupational realms. I
hope this is helpful in rendering a decision.
(R. 483). The ALJ gave this opinion “little weight,” explaining:
While he stated he had been involved in her care for
eight years, the records as discussed above show a
sporadic and inconsistent treatment relationship. His
statements that the claimant is “completely dysfunctional
socially and occupationally” are thus undermined
considering he claims this is despite “full treatment
compliance” in direct contradiction of his own records.
Though Dr. Abel is a treating source, his statements were
not persuasive.
(R. 28-29).
The ALJ relied on only one “specious inconsistency” in Dr.
Abel’s statement, while simultaneously failing to discuss important
factors. Dunn, 607 F. App’x at 267. Although compliance definitely
is problematic for Walker, the ALJ erred when she rejected Dr.
Abel’s opinion based only on his comment that Walker showed no
improvement
precedent

“[d]espite

instructs

full

that

Dr.

treatment
Abel’s

compliance.”5
opinion

is

Relevant

entitled

to

controlling weight unless it is not “well-supported by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques” or is
inconsistent

with

the

other

evidence

of

record.

Id.

§ 404.1527(c)(2); Mastro, 270 F.3d at 178. Because the ALJ did not
5

Indeed, on at least one occasion during Walker’s inpatient
treatment, Dr. Abel noted that she was attending therapy and taking
her medications, but remained “very intense” (R. 369).
19

WALKER V. BERRYHILL

1:17CV63

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REJECTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 20]
discuss these matters, she did not “build an accurate and logical
bridge from the evidence to [her] conclusion” regarding Dr. Abel’s
opinion. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000).
In addition, the ALJ provided insufficient explanations for
the weight that she gave to other medical opinions of record. For
instance, the only opinion to which she gave “great weight” was
that of state agency mental health consultant Dr. Karl Hursey. She
reasoned that his “opinion was most consistent with the treatment
records and the overall clinical picture obtained by his objective
review of the evidence” (R. 25). But such reasoning is far too
conclusory. “Without more specific explanation of the ALJ’s reasons
for the” weight assigned to Dr. Hursey’s opinion, the Court simply
cannot conduct a “meaningful substantial-evidence review.” Monroe,
826 F.3d at 189 (citing Radford, 734 F.3d at 295).
The

record

also

contains

a

September

2013

consultative

evaluation by Morgan Morgan, M.A. He noted, in part, that “[m]any
aspects

of

[Walker’s]

presentation

and

statements

indicate

significant maladaptive personality features,” and that Walker’s
“overall social functioning was deemed to be severely deficient,
based upon her presentation” (R. 429-30). The ALJ gave “little
weight” to this evaluation due mostly to her misinterpretation of
the

“secondary

gain

issues”

acknowledged
20

in

Dr.

Keifer’s

WALKER V. BERRYHILL

1:17CV63

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REJECTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 20]
assessment, as well as Walker’s “generally inconsistent allegations
and

behavior.”

As

discussed

with

regard

to

her

credibility

determination, the ALJ failed to support these conclusions with
substantial evidence. They thus provide an insufficient basis upon
which to disregard Mr. Morgan’s evaluation.6
In sum, the ALJ did not support her discussion of the medical
opinions with substantial evidence. Without having more “specific
reasons” for the weight given by the ALJ, the Court’s only option
is to review the record in search of supportive evidence. This
task, however, exceeds the scope of the Court’s appellate review
and is committed to the Commissioner. Jackson v. Colvin, No.
3:14cv24834, 2015 WL 5786802, at *2 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 30, 2015)
(“It is not the role of the courts to search for reasons . . . that
were not furnished by the ALJ.”). On remand, the ALJ must provide
a “narrative discussion” regarding the weight given to each medical

6

The Court further notes that the ALJ erroneously discredited
the subjective testimony of Walker’s mother and a “non-lawyer
advocate who ha[d] assisted [Walker] in her interactions with her
son’s school” (R. 29-30). The ALJ may not disregard such assertions
on the sole basis that the testimony is non-medical, but must
explain why the testimony does not comport with the medical
evidence. See Coldren v. Astrue, 2011 WL 4352500, at *15 (N.D. Iowa
Sept. 15, 2011) (citing Smith v. Heckler, 735 F.2d 313, 317 (8th
Cir. 1984)).
21

WALKER V. BERRYHILL

1:17CV63

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REJECTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 20]
opinion, including a full analysis of the weight given to treating
physician Dr. Abel’s opinion.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, the Court:
1)

REJECTS the R&R (Dkt. No. 20);

2)

GRANTS Walker’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No.
10);

3)

DENIES the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment
(Dkt. No. 14);

4)

REVERSES the Commissioner’s decision under sentence four
of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and § 1383(c)(3); and

5)

REMANDS

this

case

to

the

Commissioner

for further

proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.7
It is so ORDERED.

7

Although Walker requests that the Court remand for
calculation of benefits, reversal without remand for rehearing is
appropriate only if “the record does not contain substantial
evidence to support a decision denying coverage under the correct
legal standard.” Rebrook v. Astrue, No. 1:09-CV-50, 2010 WL
2233672, at *33 (N.D.W.Va. May 14, 2010). Otherwise, district
courts should “remand to give the Secretary an opportunity to apply
the correct legal standard.” Id. (quoting Breeden v. Weinberger,
493 F.2d 1002, 1011-12 (4th Cir. 1974)). Here, because the ALJ’s
decision is most notable for its failure to analyze the record, the
Court concludes that the Commissioner should be given an
opportunity to support her decision with substantial evidence.
22

WALKER V. BERRYHILL

1:17CV63

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REJECTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 20]
The Court

DIRECTS

the Clerk to transmit copies of this

Memorandum Opinion and Order to counsel of record, to enter a
separate judgment order, and to strike this case from the Court’s
active docket.
DATED: August 20, 2018.
/s/ Irene M. Keeley
IRENE M. KEELEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

23