Parrish v. United States of America

Filing 69

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION, OVERRULING PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS, AND DENYING MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION: It is ORDERED that Magistrate Aloi's 21 Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED; Plaintiff's 28 Objections are OVERRULED; and Plaintiff's 17 Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction is DENIED. Signed by Senior Judge Irene M. Keeley on 6/18/18. (Attachments: # 1 Certified Mail Return Receipt)(copy Plaintiff)(cnd)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
DONTE PARRISH,
Plaintiff,
v.

//

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:17CV70
(Judge Keeley)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 21],
OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS [DKT. NO. 28], AND
DENYING MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION [DKT. NO. 17]
I. BACKGROUND
On

May

3,

2017,

the

pro

se

plaintiff,

Donte

Parrish

(“Parrish”), filed a complaint pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 et seq. (“FTCA”), alleging claims of false
imprisonment, abuse of process, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, negligence, and malicious prosecution related to the
BOP’s investigation of a 2009 incident at USP Hazelton, and his
placement in various Special Management Units (“SMUs”) during the
pendency

of

that

investigation

(Dkt.

No.

1).

Parrish

seeks

$5,000,000.00 in damages. Id. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the
local rules, the Court referred this matter to United States
Magistrate Judge Michael J. Aloi for initial screening and a report
and recommendation (“R&R”).
By Order entered on June 19, 2017, Magistrate Judge Aloi
directed Parrish to pay an initial partial filing fee (“IPFF”)
within 28 days (Dkt. No. 11). On July 18, 2017, Parrish moved for

PARRISH V. USA

1:17CV70

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 21],
OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS [DKT. NO. 28], AND
DENYING MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION [DKT. NO. 17]
an extension of time in which to pay the IPFF (Dkt. No. 13), which
Magistrate Judge Aloi granted (Dkt. No. 14). On September 8, 2017,
Parrish filed a second motion for an extension of time in which to
pay the IPFF, along with a motion to proceed without paying the fee
(Dkt. No. 16). He also filed a motion for a temporary restraining
order (“TRO”) or preliminary injunction (Dkt. No. 17). The motion
for a TRO or preliminary injunction requested (1) that he be
permitted more law library time, (2) that he have access to his
legal work and Disciplinary Hearing Officer reports, (3) that the
prison Trust Account Officer pay his IPFF to the Court,1 and (4)
that he not be placed in the Special Management Unit (“SMU”) (Dkt.
No. 17).
Magistrate Judge Aloi’s R&R recommended that the Court deny
the motion because Parrish had not established his entitlement to
a

preliminary

injunction

pursuant

to

the

four-factor

test

articulated in Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7,
20 (2008) (Dkt. No. 21). Specifically, the R&R concluded that
Parrish had not established a likelihood of success on the merits,

1

Magistrate Judge Aloi has previously entered an order directing the
Warden at USP Big Sandy to respond to Parrish’s allegations regarding the
Trust Account Officer’s failure to timely deduct Parrish’s IPFF from his
account (Dkt. No. 18). Accordingly, Parrish’s motions for a second
extension of time in which to pay the IPFF (Dkt. No. 16) and his motion
to proceed without payment of the IPFF (Dkt. No. 17) have been denied as
moot (Dkt. No. 20).

2

PARRISH V. USA

1:17CV70

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 21],
OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS [DKT. NO. 28], AND
DENYING MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION [DKT. NO. 17]
as required by the first factor in Winter (Dkt. No. 21 at 4).
Parrish filed timely objections to the R&R (Dkt. No. 28).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A preliminary injunction is proper when the plaintiff can “[1]
establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he
is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4]
that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter, 555 U.S. at
20. “[A]ll four requirements must be satisfied,” Real Truth About
Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2009), and “[a]
preliminary injunction shall be granted only if the moving party
clearly establishes entitlement.” Di Biase v. SPX Corp., 872 F.3d
224, 230 (4th Cir. 2017).
The Court is mindful of the fact that "[a] preliminary
injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right."
Winter, 555 U.S. at 24 (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689-90
(2008)). A preliminary injunction is a remedy that is “granted only
sparingly and in limited circumstances.” Micro Strategy, Inc. v.
Motorola, Inc., 245 F.3d 335, 339 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal
quotation marks omitted). In the prison context, courts should
grant preliminary injunctive relief involving the management of
correctional institutions “only under exceptional and compelling
circumstances.” Asemani v. Warden, No. CV RDB-16-1170, 2017 WL
3

PARRISH V. USA

1:17CV70

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 21],
OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS [DKT. NO. 28], AND
DENYING MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION [DKT. NO. 17]
1194173, at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 30, 2017) (citing Taylor v. Freeman, 34
F.3d 266, 269 (4th Cir. 1994)).
III. DISCUSSION
When reviewing a magistrate judge's R&R, the Court must review
de novo the portions to which an objection is timely made. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Moreover, the pleadings and objections of a
pro se plaintiff are entitled to liberal construction. See DiPilato
v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 2d 333, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting
that pro se objections should be “accorded leniency” and “construed
to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest” (internal
quotation omitted)). Having conducted a de novo review of Parrish’s
request in light of the factors outlined in Winter and his pro se
objections to the R&R, the Court concludes that he is not entitled
to the equitable relief he seeks.
First, as the magistrate judge correctly concluded, Parrish
has not shown that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his
FTCA claims. Although the defendant has not yet responded to
Parrish’s claims, “[i]t is well-accepted that courts afford federal
prison administrators wide berth in deciding issues of prison
management and security.” Holloway v. Coakley, No. 2:17CV74, 2018
WL 1287417, at *4 (N.D. W. Va. March 3, 2018) (citing Hewitt v.
Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983)). Unless “a clear violation of
constitutional rights is occurring,” courts will not intervene. Id.
4

PARRISH V. USA

1:17CV70

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 21],
OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS [DKT. NO. 28], AND
DENYING MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION [DKT. NO. 17]
Indeed, “[e]ven where there has been a finding on the merits that
unconstitutional conditions exist, federal courts should proceed
cautiously and incrementally in ordering remediation so as not to
assume the role of prison administrators.” Taylor v. Freeman, 24
F.3d 266, 269 (4th Cir. 1994).
Additionally, Parrish “has no constitutional right to remain
in the general population or not to be transferred to the SMU.”
Holloway, 2018 WL 1287417, at *4 (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S.
215, 223-24 (1976)). Placement in a SMU also does “not constitute
a dramatic departure from the accepted standards for conditions of
confinement such that due process [is] implicated.” Id. (quoting
Robinson v. Norwood, 535 Fed. Appx. 81, 83-84 (3d. Cir. 2013)).
Therefore, Parrish has failed to establish that he is likely to
succeed on the merits of his claims.
Next, even had Parrish shown a likelihood of success on the
merits, he has failed to establish irreparable harm in the absence
of preliminary relief. In his objections, Parrish argues that, if
he is “sent [back] to the SMU, [he] will be basically forfeiting
[his] claim,” because “researching and responding to motions [will
be] utterly impossible” (Dkt. No. 28 at 3). On the contrary, since
filing his motion for a TRO or preliminary injunction, Parrish has
also filed a motion to seal (Dkt. No. 25), objections to Magistrate
Judge Aloi’s R&R (Dkt. No. 28), a motion for leave to file an
5

PARRISH V. USA

1:17CV70

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 21],
OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS [DKT. NO. 28], AND
DENYING MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION [DKT. NO. 17]
amended complaint (Dkt. No. 34), an amended complaint (Dkt. No.
39), a memorandum of evidence (Dkt. No. 51), and a motion for
summary judgment (Dkt. No. 63).
Finally, Parrish has failed to establish that the balance of
equities tips in his favor, or that an injunction would be in the
public interest. While Parrish argues that “[t]he public has an
interest in knowing the law will protect him from overzealous and
retaliatory

defendants”

(Dkt.

No.

28

at

5),

the

Court

also

recognizes that “the public most certainly has an interest in the
effective management of the prison system, both for the safety of
the general public and those in the prison system.” Holloway, 2018
WL 1287417, at *7. Indeed, “[t]here is a strong public interest in
allowing

the

BOP

to

perform

its

function,

and

the

inherent

discretion that accompanies this function, without interference
from courts.” Id. This interest is particularly compelling in cases
where, as here, a prisoner has been able to pursue his claims
diligently, without the need for an injunction.
Because Parrish cannot satisfy each of the factors set forth
in Winter, the Court OVERRULES his objections (Dkt. No. 28), ADOPTS
the R&R (Dkt. No. 21), and DENIES the motion for a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction (Dkt. No. 17).
It is so ORDERED.

6

PARRISH V. USA

1:17CV70

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 21],
OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS [DKT. NO. 28], AND
DENYING MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION [DKT. NO. 17]
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to transmit this Order to counsel
of record and to the pro se plaintiff by certified mail, return
receipt requested.
Dated: June 18, 2018.
/s/ Irene M. Keeley
IRENE M. KEELEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

7