Prince v. Sears Holdings Corporation et al
Filing
24
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS (DKT. NO. 8 ) AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Senior Judge Irene M. Keeley on 12/21/17. (mh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
BILLY E. PRINCE,
Plaintiff,
v.
//
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:17CV142
(Judge Keeley)
SEARS HOLDINGS CORPORATION;
SEARS HOLDINGS CORPORATION
ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE; and
PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF
AMERICA,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS [DKT. NO. 8] AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE
The plaintiff, Billy E. Prince (“Prince”), filed a complaint
on August 16, 2017, in which he alleged that the defendants had
breached certain fiduciary duties owed to him under ERISA (Dkt. No.
1). Now pending is the motion to dismiss filed by the defendants,
Sears Holdings Corporation (“Sears”), Sears Holdings Corporation
Administrative
Committee
(the
“Committee”),
and
Prudential
Insurance Company of America (“Prudential”)(Dkt. No. 8). For the
reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS the motion and DISMISSES
Prince’s complaint WITH PREJUDICE.
I. BACKGROUND
A.
Factual Background
The Court’s recitation of the facts is taken from Prince’s
complaint (Dkt. No. 1), which the Court construes in the light most
PRINCE v. SEARS HOLDINGS, ET AL.
1:17CV142
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS [DKT. NO. 8] AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE
favorable to Prince. See De’Lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 524
(4th Cir. 2013).
Sears is the sponsor of an employee welfare benefit plan (the
“Plan”) governed by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. The Plan provides
certain employee benefits, including dependent life insurance
benefits (the “benefit”) to eligible participants. Prince, a Sears
employee, was a participant in the Plan, and was eligible to enroll
in the benefit.1 Sears and the Committee administer the life
insurance plan through Prudential.
On or about November 1, 2010, Prince submitted an application
to Sears, for $150,000 in optional life insurance coverage for his
wife, Judith Prince (“Mrs. Prince”). On May 23, 2011, Sears sent a
“Health and Group Benefits Confirmation of Coverage” to Prince,
and,
in
June
2011,
it
began
withholding
premiums
from
his
paychecks.
In late 2011, Mrs. Prince learned that she had Stage IV liver
cancer. In October 2012, almost a year after Mrs. Prince’s initial
1
Dependent life insurance insures the life of a participant’s
dependent, with the participant (or other designee) as the beneficiary.
Here, Prince was a participant in the Plan, as well as the named
beneficiary for the benefit.
2
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
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diagnosis, Prince accessed his online Sears benefits summary, which
confirmed his election to purchase life insurance coverage for his
wife in the amount of $150,000.
Another year passed, and in September 2013, Sears sent Prince
an “Account Update Notice” advising him that Mrs. Prince’s coverage
had never become effective because no “Evidence of Insurability”
questionnaire had been submitted. Sears explained that Prudential
had sent a letter to Prince in January 2011 advising that it would
terminate his application for life insurance coverage unless a
completed insurability questionnaire was submitted. Prince claims
that
he
has
no
record
of
receiving
that
letter,
nor
any
correspondence advising that his application for life insurance was
incomplete or had been denied, until receipt of the September 2013
notice.
On May 26, 2014, Mrs. Prince died, and on November 3, 2014,
Prudential denied Prince’s claim for life insurance benefits.
B.
Procedural Background
Prince filed a complaint against Sears in the Circuit Court of
Marion County, West Virginia, on December 8, 2014. The complaint
asserted one count of “constructive fraud/negligent representation”
and one count of “intentional/reckless infliction of emotional
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distress” based on Sears’s alleged misrepresentations regarding the
optional life insurance policy. Prince sought payment of $150,000
and other damages.
On January 16, 2015, Sears removed the case to the Northern
District of West Virginia and subsequently moved to dismiss the
complaint, arguing that ERISA completely preempted Prince’s state
law claims. Prince opposed the motion and moved to remand the case.
On December 21, 2015, the Northern District granted the motion,
holding
that
Accordingly,
ERISA
the
completely
Court
denied
preempted
Prince’s
Prince’s
motion
to
claim.
remand
and
dismissed the complaint without prejudice to refile an ERISA claim
after exhausting administrative remedies available to him (Dkt. No.
8-4). Specifically, the Court concluded that Prince’s claims were
“enforceable under section 502(a) of ERISA.” Id. at 12.
Prince timely appealed, and on January 27, 2017, the Court of
Appeals
for
the
Fourth
Circuit
affirmed,
finding
that
ERISA
completely preempted Prince’s state law claims and that Prince’s
claims were “enforceable under section 502(a).” (Dkt. No. 8-5).
Prince then filed this lawsuit against the defendants on
August
16,
2017,
seeking
relief
pursuant
to
ERISA
section
502(a)(3), based on the defendants’ alleged breaches of fiduciary
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS [DKT. NO. 8] AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE
duty (Dkt. No. 1). Prince alleges that, by letter dated February
22, 2017 and received on March 6, 2017, Prudential denied his
second appeal and request for reconsideration of its decision to
deny
his
claim,
and
that
he
therefore
has
exhausted
his
administrative remedies under ERISA.
Prince’s complaint alleges a cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty under ERISA against all defendants. He alleges that
the defendants, as ERISA fiduciaries, pursuant to section 1104, had
the duty to provide him with accurate information regarding his
wife’s life insurance policy, to administer the policy in the best
interests of Mr. and Mrs. Prince, and to discharge their fiduciary
responsibilities regarding the policy with the requisite care,
skill, prudence, and diligence.
Prince further alleges that the defendants breached the duties
owed to him by misrepresenting the status of Mrs. Prince’s life
insurance coverage for over two years, by withholding from Prince’s
paycheck premiums for life insurance coverage which did not exist,
by failing to promptly advise Prince that his wife’s application
for life insurance was deficient, and by failing to administer the
life insurance plan in the best interest of Mr. and Mrs. Prince.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS [DKT. NO. 8] AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE
Prince contends that he does not have an adequate remedy
pursuant to the terms of the life insurance plan as he did not
receive notice of any deficiency with his wife’s application and
therefore did not submit the evidence of insurability questionnaire
in 2011. He thus seeks equitable relief sufficient to make him
whole, pursuant to ERISA section 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
On November 8, 2017, the defendants moved to dismiss Prince’s
complaint with prejudice, arguing that his claim is time barred by
the applicable statute of limitations (Dkt. No. 8). The motion is
fully briefed, and argument was heard on December 15, 2017.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to move for
dismissal on the grounds that a complaint does not “state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.” When reviewing the sufficiency
of a complaint, a district court “must accept as true all of the
factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Anderson v. Sara
Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 188 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). “While a complaint . . . does not
need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to
provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
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elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citation omitted). A
court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as
a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
In order to be sufficient, “a complaint must contain ‘enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Anderson, 508 F.3d at 188 n.7 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Generally, a motion to dismiss “does not resolve contests
surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability
of defenses.” Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952
(4th Cir. 1992). If it appears from the face of the complaint,
however, that a cause of action has not been brought within the
applicable
statute
of
limitations
period,
the
defense
of
limitations may be raised in a pre-answer motion pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Brockington v.
Boykins, 637 F.3d 503, 506 (4th Cir. 2011)(noting that dismissal is
“appropriate when the face of the complaint clearly reveals the
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existence of a meritorious affirmative defense”); see also Hughes
on behalf of Hughes v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Ass'n, 697 F. App'x 191,
192 (4th Cir. 2017)(affirming dismissal of complaint on statute of
limitations grounds).
III. DISCUSSION
In support of their motion, the defendants argue that Prince’s
complaint is time barred by ERISA’s statute of limitations for
breach of fiduciary duty claims, and that the Court should not toll
the statute. Prince argues, however, that to the extent that the
statute of limitations applies to his claim, the statute was tolled
and does not bar this action.
A.
Statute of Limitations
The defendants first argue that ERISA section 1113, Limitation
of Actions, applies to Prince’s breach of fiduciary duty claim.
Prince, however, argues that the defendants’ motion to dismiss is
premature, and that section 1113 does not apply because he might
bring a breach of fiduciary duty claim based upon fiduciary
obligations arising from something other than the “part” of ERISA
(Part 4) referenced in section 1113.
ERISA has an express statute of limitations for breach of
fiduciary duty claims. Specifically, ERISA section 1113 provides:
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DISMISS [DKT. NO. 8] AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE
No action may be commenced under this subchapter with
respect to a fiduciary’s breach of any responsibility,
duty, or obligation under this part, or with respect to
a violation of this part, after the earlier of–(1) six years after (A) the date of the last action
which constituted a part of the breach or
violation, or (B) in the case of an omission the
latest date on which the fiduciary could have cured
the breach or violation, or
(2) three years after the earliest date on which
the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or
violation;
except that in the case of fraud or concealment, such
action may be commenced not later than six years after
the date of discovery of such breach or violation.
29 U.S.C. § 1113 (emphasis added).
Prince’s complaint unambiguously seeks relief pursuant to
ERISA section 502(a)(3) (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 9)(“This action seeks
relief pursuant to § 502(a)(3) (29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)) of ERISA”).
His claim is premised solely on the defendants’ alleged breach of
fiduciary duties, based on their alleged failures 1) to provide
Prince
with
accurate
information
regarding
his
wife’s
life
insurance policy, 2) to administer the policy in the best interests
of Mr. and Mrs. Prince, and 3) to discharge their fiduciary
responsibilities regarding the policy with the requisite care,
skill, prudence, and diligence. Id. at ¶¶ 35-36. In other words,
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DISMISS [DKT. NO. 8] AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE
Prince’s complaint sets forth a sole claim under section 502(a)(3)
based upon the defendants’ fiduciary duties. It contains no other
claims. Id., passim.
Prince’s contention that his claim for breach of fiduciary
duties might arise under some part of ERISA other than the “part”
referenced in section 1113 (i.e., 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1112) is
unpersuasive.
He
fails
to
identify
any
ERISA
fiduciary
duty
prescribed by another part of the statute; further, section 1104 of
ERISA is plainly the part of the statute that prescribes the duties
Prince alleges the defendants violated. See 29 U.S.C. §
1104
(“Fiduciary Duties”). In fact, Prince’s complaint specifically
cites to section 1104 in describing the fiduciary duties allegedly
owed by the defendants to Prince under ERISA (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 35).
Prince’s related argument, that the defendants’ motion is
premature because discovery could reveal additional duties owed by
the defendants, is similarly unpersuasive. The complaint sets forth
only a claim under section 502(a)(3) based upon the defendants’
section 1104 fiduciary duties, and Prince has identified no duties
at issue beyond those imposed by section 1104 (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 9,
35-36).
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Significantly, the cases relied on by Prince do not support
his contention that section 1113 does not apply to his claim. See,
e.g., Wright v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 925 F.2d 1288, 1290-91 (10th
Cir. 1991)(holding that section 1113 did not apply to a claim for
benefits); Kilpatrick v. Intertrade Holdings, Inc., No. 1:02-173,
2003 WL 21938912, at *3 n.2 (E.D. Tenn. July 7, 2003)(noting that
section 1113 is limited to ERISA sections addressing breaches of
fiduciary duties). Rather, the Fourth Circuit has stated that
“[f]or any claim that alleges a breach of fiduciary duty, ERISA
provides
a
three-year
statute
of
limitations.
29
U.S.C.
§
1113(a)(2).” Shofer v. Hack Co., 970 F.2d 1316, 1318 (4th Cir.
1992). See also Browning v. Tiger’s Eye Benefits Consulting, 313 F.
App’x 656, 660 (4th Cir. 2009)(“breach of fiduciary duty ... claims
are subject to the statute of limitations framework provided in
ERISA 413, 29 U.S.C. § 1113").
Finally, Prince makes no argument that section 1113's six-year
limitations period applies because he lacked knowledge of either
the breach or any alleged fraud or concealment.
At bottom, Prince’s complaint asserts one claim: breach of
fiduciary
duties
under
ERISA
section
11
502(a)(3)
against
the
PRINCE v. SEARS HOLDINGS, ET AL.
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DISMISS [DKT. NO. 8] AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE
defendants. Accordingly, the limitation provision in section 1113
applies to Prince’s claim.
Further, Prince’s breach of fiduciary duty claim is premised
on his allegation that the defendants did not provide him with
accurate information concerning his wife’s life insurance coverage
(Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 35-40). He specifically alleges in his complaint
that he learned of the cancellation of the benefit due to lack of
evidence of insurability on September 26, 2013, when Sears sent him
a notice informing him that his wife’s coverage had been reduced.
Id. at ¶ 16-17). From this, it is clear that Prince had actual
knowledge of the alleged breach of fiduciary duty on September 26,
2013. Pursuant to section 1113, therefore, the three-year statute
of limitations on any breach of fiduciary duty claim
ran on
September 26, 2016. Prince did not file his complaint until August
16, 2017, however, almost one year after the statute ran (Dkt. No.
1). Accordingly, his complaint is time barred by ERISA’s statute of
limitations for breach of fiduciary duty claims.
B.
Tolling
Prince
argues
that,
to
the
extent
that
the
statute
of
limitations applies to his claim, the statute was tolled and does
not bar this action. Specifically, Prince argues that the statute
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was tolled by language in the life insurance plan (the “Plan”), and
by the totality of the circumstances, including the pursuit of his
administrative remedies and the district court’s order dismissing
his prior lawsuit. The defendants argue that neither of these
arguments has merit.
1.
The Plan
Prince argues that the Plan tolls the statute of limitations.
He cites in support of this argument a provision in its benefit
claim and appeal procedures that states, “[i]f you elect to submit
the dispute to the second level of appeal, the [P]lan agrees that
any statute of limitations or other defense based on timeliness is
tolled during the time that the appeal is pending” (Dkt. No. 12 at
8; Dkt. No. 12-14 at 22)(emphasis added). Prince argues that during
the time at which the defendants claim the statute of limitations
expired, September 26, 2016, he was exhausting his administrative
remedies, including his second level appeal of Prudential’s claim
denial decision, and that, pursuant to the language of the Plan,
any applicable limitations period should therefore be tolled.
As the defendants point out, however, the Plan agreed to toll
any statute of limitations pending the outcome of a second appeal.
Prince, however, has not sued the Plan, but rather its purported
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fiduciaries, for alleged breaches of fiduciary duties (Dkt. No. 1,
¶¶ 9, 30-43). Moreover, the language Prince cites in the Plan
appears
in
the
“Claims
Information”
section,
which
provides
information about how to file claims for benefits and how to appeal
adverse decisions with respect to those claims (Dkt. No. 12-14 at
18). The agreement to toll the statute of limitations is therefore
limited to claims for Plan benefits. The instant action does not
allege a claim for benefits under the Plan; rather, it asserts a
statutory breach of fiduciary duty claim, which is not subject to
the Plan’s claim and appeal procedures. Accordingly, the language
of the Plan does not require tolling of section 1113's limitations
period.
2.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies and the Prior
Lawsuit
Prince next argues that the statute of limitations should be
tolled pending the exhaustion of his administrative remedies and
because the district court, in dismissing his original complaint,
stated it was dismissing without prejudice pending exhaustion of
administrative remedies (Dkt. No. 12 at 9-11).
The Fourth Circuit has made clear that exhaustion is a
prerequisite
for
filing
a
claim
14
for
benefits
under
section
PRINCE v. SEARS HOLDINGS, ET AL.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS [DKT. NO. 8] AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE
502(a)(1)(B), but it is not a prerequisite for filing a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty
with respect to a claim for breach of fiduciary duty
brought pursuant to subsection 502(a), a plaintiff must
only exhaust his administrative remedies ‘where the basis
of the claim is a plan administrator’s denial of benefits
or an action by the defendant closely related to the
plaintiff’s claim for benefits.’ ... However, where the
basis of the claim is not based on a denial of benefits
or
closely
related
to
a
claim
for
benefits,
administrative exhaustion is not required.
Hall v. Tyco Int’l, Ltd., 223 F.R.D. 219, 237 (M.D.N.C. 2004),
quoting Smith v. Snydor, 184 F.3d 356, 362 (4th Cir. 1999)(internal
citations omitted)(emphasis added). In other words, to the extent
that a plaintiff’s claim is a true breach of fiduciary duty claim
pursuant to section 502(a)(3), administrative exhaustion is not
required. Id. at 238.
Here, Prince clearly has brought his breach of fiduciary duty
claim
pursuant
to
section
502(a)(3);
thus
exhaustion
of
his
administrative remedies does not toll the statute. Exhaustion only
enabled
him
to
file
a
claim
for
benefits
under
section
502(a)(1)(B), which he clearly has elected not to pursue. See Dkt.
No. 1 at ¶ 40 (“Mr. Prince does not have an adequate remedy
pursuant to the terms of the subject life insurance plan.”); see
also Dkt. No. 12 at 15 (“In Mr. Prince’s situation, the subject
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ERISA life insurance policy does not provide him with an adequate
remedy. The equitable relief described . . . is Mr. Prince’s best
shot at being made whole pursuant to ERISA.”).
Prince nonetheless argues that, despite the rule in Smith, no
determination is necessary as to whether his current claim required
administrative exhaustion because the Northern District’s December
21, 2015, Memorandum Opinion and Order “explicitly required [him]
to exhaust his administrative remedies ‘before filing any related
action.’” (Dkt. No. 12 at 10, citing Dkt. No. 8-4, “This Court
finds that because Prince’s stated causes of action ‘duplicate,
supplement, or supplant the ERISA civil enforcement remedy,’ those
claims are completed preempted by ERISA. As such, Prince must first
exhaust the administrative remedies available to him under the
ERISA statutory scheme before re-filing any related action.”). The
defendants argue, however, that neither the initial lawsuit’s
removal to the Northern District, nor the Court’s prior order in
that case have any bearing on whether section 1113 should be tolled
here.
The Fourth Circuit has held that the commencement of an action
in the improper forum does not toll the statute of limitations.
Shofer
v.
Hack
Co.,
970
F.2d
16
1316,
1318-20
(4th
Cir.
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1992)(affirming district court’s finding that plaintiff’s ERISA
claims were barred by the section 1113, and that equitable tolling
was not applicable).
In Shofer, the plaintiff timely filed an ERISA claim in
Maryland
state
court,
which
dismissed
the
claim
because
jurisdiction for the claim lay exclusively in federal court. The
plaintiff then filed his claim in federal court, but after the
limitations period had run. In response to the defendant's motion
for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations, the
plaintiff asserted that his timely filed state action “should
equitably toll the running of the statute of limitations under
federal tolling principles.” Id. at 1318. The Court rejected that
argument, holding that “[t]he commencement of an action in a
clearly
inappropriate
forum,
a
court
that
clearly
lacks
jurisdiction, will not toll the statute of limitations.” Id. at
1319.
The Fourth Circuit recently reaffirmed this principle in
Woodson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 855 F.3d 628, 634 (4th Cir. 2017),
where it rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that their filing in
North Carolina state court, which clearly lacked jurisdiction
because federal law exclusively governs claims made on insurance
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policies issued under the National Flood Insurance Program, should
equitably toll the federal one-year statute of limitations:
The Woodsons' filing in state court was no more
meaningful than the similar state court filing in
Shofer. And because the state court lacked jurisdiction,
the fact that the action was subsequently removed to
federal court, rather than dismissed has no impact on
the running of the statute of limitations.
Id. The Court concluded that because the complaint was not filed in
federal court within the one-year limitations period, as required
by the National Flood Insurance Act, the claim was time barred.
Here, as in Shofer and Woodson, Prince initially filed his
lawsuit in state court, and the complaint asserted claims governed
exclusively by federal law. More precisely, Prince did not assert
claims over which the state court could assert jurisdiction (as all
were preempted by ERISA), nor did he assert a breach of fiduciary
duty
claim
(nor
any
claims
at
all
against
the
Committee
or
Prudential). The first time Prince filed a breach of fiduciary duty
claim under ERISA section 503(a) was when he filed the instant
lawsuit on August 16, 2017, almost one year after the three-year
statute of limitations had run. Therefore, pursuant to Shofer and
Woodson, Prince’s initial lawsuit, which was clearly commenced in
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an
improper
forum,
does
not
apply
to
toll
the
three-year
limitations period under ERISA.
In addition, language in the Northern District’s December 2015
order noting that Prince “must exhaust the administrative remedies
available to him under the ERISA statutory scheme before re-filing
any related action” was not a directive or explicit order that
Prince must exhaust administrative remedies before filing a claim
for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA section 502(a)(3). Rather,
as discussed above, administrative exhaustion would have enabled
Prince to file a claim for benefits under section 502(a)(1)(B), a
path he elected not to pursue in the instant suit, instead taking
a “best shot” at relief pursuant to section 502(a)(3) (Dkt. No. 12
at 15).
Finally, Prince argues that the totality of the circumstances,
including his prior lawsuit, should equitably toll the statute of
limitations. The Fourth Circuit has instructed that
[g]enerally, parties are entitled to equitable tolling
only if they show that they have pursued their rights
diligently and extraordinary circumstances prevented them
from filing on time . . . Equitable tolling is reserved
for those rare instances where–-due to circumstances
external to the party’s own conduct–-it would be
unconscionable to enforce the limitation period against
the party and gross injustice would result . . . The use
of equitable tolling must be guard and infrequent, lest
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circumstances of individualized hardship supplant the
rules of clearly drafted statutes.
Hughes on behalf of Hughes v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Ass'n, 697 F. App'x
191, 192 (4th Cir. 2017)(internal citations omitted).
Here, Prince has failed to establish grounds for equitable
tolling. There is no dispute that Prince first learned of the facts
that form the basis of his breach of fiduciary duty claim on
September 26, 2013. Accordingly, he could have filed the instant
action
at
that
time,
without
exhausting
his
administrative
remedies, but chose not to do so. And, even after filing his
initial lawsuit, Prince failed to file an ERISA claim, despite
being on notice that he needed to file such a claim well before the
statute of limitations ran on September 26, 2016.
Most notably, on December 21, 2015, Prince was informed by the
district court that his claims were actionable under ERISA section
502(a) when it dismissed his initial complaint without prejudice to
refile an ERISA action. In short, any delay in filing the instant
ERISA claim was caused by Prince’s refusal to assert his claim
until after his appeal was rejected by the Fourth Circuit, even
though he could have done so at any time.
Accordingly, the Court declines to find that the applicable
statute of limitations was tolled pending Prince’s exhaustion of
20
PRINCE v. SEARS HOLDINGS, ET AL.
1:17CV142
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS [DKT. NO. 8] AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE
administrative remedies, nor by the removal of his initial lawsuit
to the Northern District or the Court’s prior order in that case.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, the Court concludes that Prince’s
claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations and that
Prince
failed
to
establish
that
the
statute
was
tolled.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the defendants’ motion (Dkt. No. 8)
and DISMISSES Prince’s complaint WITH PREJUDICE.
It is so ORDERED.
The Court directs the Clerk to transmit copies of this Order
to counsel of record.
DATED: December 21, 2017.
/s/ Irene M. Keeley
IRENE M. KEELEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
21
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