The Ohio Valley Coal Company v. United Mine Workers of America International Union et al
Filing
23
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ECF NO. 17 , DENYING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ECF NO. 18 AND VACATING ARBITRATION AWARD. Signed by District Judge Thomas S. Kleeh on 9/27/2019 (copy counsel of record). (jmm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CLARKSBURG
THE OHIO VALLEY COAL COMPANY,
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant,
v.
Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-213
(Judge Kleeh)
UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA,
INTERNATIONAL UNION, and
UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA,
Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 17],
DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[ECF NO. 18] AND VACATING ARBITRATION AWARD
Pending before the Court are the cross motions for summary
judgment filed by Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant The Ohio Valley
Coal Company [ECF No. 17] and Defendants and Counter-Claimants the
United Mine Workers of America, International Union, and United
Mine Workers of America, District 31 [ECF No. 18].
The parties
have fully briefed the issues presented and the matter is ripe for
decision.
For the reasons articulated herein, the Court GRANTS
Plaintiff’s motion, DENIES Defendants’ motion and VACATES the
arbitration award.
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 13, 2017, Plaintiff The Ohio Valley Coal Company
(“Ohio Valley”) instituted this action initially challenging an
Ohio Valley Coal v. UMWA et al.
Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-213
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 17],
DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[ECF NO. 18] AND VACATING ARBITRATION AWARD
arbitration
award
finding
the
underlying
grievance
to
be
arbitrable [ECF No. 1]. Defendants United Mine Workers of America,
International Union and United Mine Workers of America, District
31
(collectively
hereinafter
“UMWA”),
filed
their
Answer
and
Counterclaim on February 5, 2018 [ECF No. 7]. Judge Keeley entered
a scheduling order governing designation of a joint stipulated
record and briefing on February 13, 2018 [ECF No. 9].
Ohio Valley
answered the Counterclaim on February 23, 2018 [ECF No. 11].
Following the Arbitrator’s decision on the merits, Ohio Valley
filed its Amended Complaint to Vacate Arbitration Award on February
26, 2018 [ECF No. 12].
Defendants filed their Answer and Amended
Counterclaim on March 7, 2018 [ECF No. 13].
Ohio Valley answered
the Amended Counterclaim on March 28, 2018 [ECF No. 14].
The parties submitted their Joint Stipulation of Record on
June 15, 2018 [ECF No. 15].
Thereafter, the parties timely filed
cross
judgment
motions
opposition
for
[ECF
summary
Nos.
17,
18,
20
with
and
timely
21].
responses
This
matter
in
was
transferred to United States District Judge Thomas S. Kleeh on
December 1, 2018 [ECF No. 22].
II.
While
the
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
procedural
history
and
underlying
proceedings
appeared to take a twisted path, the factual background of this
2
Ohio Valley Coal v. UMWA et al.
Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-213
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 17],
DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[ECF NO. 18] AND VACATING ARBITRATION AWARD
matter is straightforward. 1
Ohio Valley formerly operated the
Powhatan No. 6 Mine (“Mine”) in Belmont County, Ohio. 2
United
Mine
Workers
of
America,
District
31
Defendant
represented
all
bargaining unit employees of the Mine since it was constructed and
commenced operation in 1972.
The 2016 National Bituminous Coal
Wage Agreement (“NBCWA”) governs the terms and conditions of
employment for all bargaining unit employees at the Mine.
The
NBCWA
provides
the
following
regarding
“Work
Jurisdiction”:
The production of coal, including removal of
over-burden and coal waste, preparation,
processing
and
cleaning
of
coal
and
transportation of coal (except by waterway or
rail not owned by Employer), repair and
maintenance work normally performed at the
mine site or at a central shop of the Employer
and maintenance of gob piles and mine roads,
and work of the type customarily related to
all of the above shall be performed by
classified Employees of the Employer covered
by and in accordance with the terms of this
Agreement.
Contracting,
subcontracting,
1
The parties do not raise the specter of a genuine issue of
material fact which could prevent this Court from disposing of
this matter on the cross motions for summary judgment. Defendants
affirmatively disclaim any issues of fact – “The pleadings filed
herein reveal that no dispute exists between the parties as to any
material fact.” [ECF No. 19 at 1].
2 Plaintiff’s
Summary Judgment Motion details the chain of ownership
for this mine culminating in Ohio Valley’s operation.
Those
transactions are not relevant to the questions presented in the
cross motions and, therefore, will not be repeated here.
3
Ohio Valley Coal v. UMWA et al.
Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-213
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 17],
DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[ECF NO. 18] AND VACATING ARBITRATION AWARD
leasing and subleasing, and construction work,
as defined herein, will be conducted in
accordance with the provisions of this
Article.
Nothing in this section will be construed to
diminish the jurisdiction, express or implied,
of the United Mine Workers.
[ECF No. 15-1 at Art. IA §(a)].
The NBCWA also provides:
All decisions of the Arbitration Review Board
rendered prior to the expiration of the
National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of
1978 shall continue to have precedential
effect under this Agreement to the extent that
the basis for such decisions have not been
modified by subsequent changes in this
agreement.
[ECF No. 15-1 at Art. XXIII §(k)].
Ohio Valley and UMWA entered into a separate Memorandum of
Understanding (“MOU”) when the NBCWA was signed.
That
MOU
modified
the
terms
and
conditions
[ECF No. 15-3].
of
the
parties’
relationship and Ohio Valley’s obligations under the NBCWA.
That
MOU establishes what constitutes the Mine as well as “coal lands”
for
purposes
of
properties,
lands,
reserves,
operations
and
facilities to which the NBCWA applies.
The Mine was in operation through exhaustion of its coal
reserves with production permanently ceasing on October 16, 2016.
Ohio
Valley
finished
processing
mined
coal
from
the
Mine
on
December 15, 2016, and it was permanently sealed on December 31,
4
Ohio Valley Coal v. UMWA et al.
Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-213
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 17],
DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[ECF NO. 18] AND VACATING ARBITRATION AWARD
2016.
The Mine, which once employed nearly 500, was staffed by
only 16 classified employees when the underlying grievance was
filed.
In
[ECF No. 12-1 at 5].
2001,
an
unrelated
subsidiary
of
Murray
Energy
Corporation, American Energy Corporation, opened the Century Mine
to mine a coal reserve contiguous with the Mine.
Ohio Valley has
no ownership interest in the Century Mine and the UMWA does not
represent any employees at the Century Mine.
On July 15, 2002, Ohio Valley and American Energy Corporation
entered into a Slurry Disposal Agreement.
Ohio Valley licensed
rights to dispose of coal slurry materials to American Energy
Corporation in the impoundment on property formerly associated
with the Mine. [ECF No. 15-4 at Art. III, V].
Pursuant to the
terms of the agreement, American Energy Corporation retains sole
responsibility for the transportation of its slurry materials to
the impoundment.
[Id. at Art. IV].
Ohio Valley did grant an
easement and right-of-way entry onto its property for installation
and maintenance of the necessary pipeline. [Id.]. American Energy
continued to dispose of its slurry materials in the impoundment as
of briefing in this matter.
5
Ohio Valley Coal v. UMWA et al.
Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-213
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 17],
DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[ECF NO. 18] AND VACATING ARBITRATION AWARD
A. The Dispute
The UMWA disputes the use of non-bargaining unit labor for
repair
and
maintenance
of
the
heavy
equipment
being
used
to
maintain and increase the size of the water impoundment located on
Ohio
Valley’s
property
formerly
associated
with
the
Mine.
Grievance No. 17-31-04 challenged Ohio Valley contracting out
mechanical
work
required
on
a
D6
Caterpillar
Bulldozer.
Specifically, the grievance stated
On 03-09-17 Company violated ART. 1a sec g-2
XXVI sec. b and other pertinent provisions of
the contract. Company has dozer taken out for
repair 6 m[.] This is our work we have always
done [.]
Asking to be made whole in all
matters an cease in Dist from this action or
practice. [sic]
[ECF No. 15-2].
A. Arbitration Proceedings and Awards
Arbitrator Mollie H. Bowers convened a hearing on Grievance
No. 17-31-04 on September 20, 2017.
Ohio Valley initially raised
an issue with respect to arbitrability given the NBCWA’s Work
Jurisdiction provisions.
determine
evidence
if
on
the
the
The arbitrator bifurcated the hearing to
grievance
merits;
was
however,
6
arbitrable
she
only
before
heard
receiving
argument
on
Ohio Valley Coal v. UMWA et al.
Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-213
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 17],
DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[ECF NO. 18] AND VACATING ARBITRATION AWARD
arbitrability and received no evidence. 3
Arbitrator Bowers issued
her first Award in the underlying proceedings on October 21, 2017.
She dismissed Plaintiff’s concerns and found the matter to be
arbitrable.
Thereafter,
Arbitrator
Bowers
convened
a
hearing
on
the
merits of Grievance No. 17-31-04 on January 24, 2018. 4 The parties
presented evidence on both the issue of arbitrability and the
merits of the UMWA’s grievance.
Arbitrator Bowers again sustained
the grievance as arbitrable 5 and found for the UMWA on the merits
as well.
She awarded the grievants 48 hours of work at time and
one half for overtime finding Ohio Valley’s contracting out the
work to be “arbitrary and capricious.”
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
3
Plaintiff contends it submitted a number of court decisions and
panel arbitration decisions to Arbitrator Bowers along with a
“binder” of hearing exhibits for her review. [ECF No. 17-1 at 6].
4 Plaintiff avers it advised the arbitrator that this civil action
had already been initiated when this second arbitration hearing
was convened. [ECF No. 17-1 at 7].
5
Proving herself clairvoyant, Arbitrator Bowers opined in her
second Arbitration Award that Ohio Valley’s “appeal to vacate of
the [sic] Arbitrator’s award of October 21, 2017, was likely to
be granted by the court.” [ECF No. 12-2 at 4].
7
Ohio Valley Coal v. UMWA et al.
Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-213
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 17],
DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[ECF NO. 18] AND VACATING ARBITRATION AWARD
judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The movant
“bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court
of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of
‘the
pleadings,
depositions,
answers
to
interrogatories,
and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which
it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
The
nonmoving party must “make a sufficient showing on an essential
element of its case with respect to which it has the burden of
proof.”
Id. at 317–18.
Summary judgment is proper “[w]here the
record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to
find for the non-moving party, there [being] no ‘genuine issue for
trial.’”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
IV. GOVERNING LAW
This Court may review labor arbitrators’ decisions under
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29
U.S.C. § 185, but this power of review is “extremely limited.”
Cannelton Indus., Inc. v. Dist. 17, UMWA, 951 F.2d 591, 593 (4th
Cir. 1991).
bargaining
This is because “[t]he parties to a collective
agreement
bargained
for
the
arbitrator’s
interpretation, and ‘so far as the arbitrator’s decision concerns
8
Ohio Valley Coal v. UMWA et al.
Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-213
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 17],
DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[ECF NO. 18] AND VACATING ARBITRATION AWARD
construction
of
the
contract,
the
courts
have
no
business
overruling him because their interpretation . . . is different
from his.’”
Island Creek Coal Co. v. Dist. 28, UMWA, 29 F.3d 126,
129 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing United Steelworkers of America v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960)).
The
Supreme Court of the United States, in the “Steelworkers Trilogy,” 6
has “emphasized that federal courts should refuse to review the
merits of an arbitration award under a collective bargaining
agreement.”
Mutual Mining, Inc. v. Dist. 17, UMWA, 47 F.3d 1165,
at *2 (4th Cir. 1995) (unpublished). Both an arbitrator’s findings
of fact and interpretation of the law are accorded great deference.
Upshur Coals Corp. v. UMWA, Dist. 31, 933 F.2d 225, 229 (4th Cir.
1991).
In
addition,
“[t]he
selection
of
exclusively within the arbitrator’s domain.”
remedies
is
almost
Cannelton, 951 F.2d
at 593–54 (citing United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, 484
U.S. 29 (1987)).
Still, there are some limitations on arbitration awards.
The
award “must draw its essence from the contract and cannot simply
6
The Steelworkers Trilogy includes the following cases: United
Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); and United Steelworkers of
America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
9
Ohio Valley Coal v. UMWA et al.
Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-213
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 17],
DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[ECF NO. 18] AND VACATING ARBITRATION AWARD
reflect
the
arbitrator’s
Misco, 484 U.S. at 38.
own
notions
of
industrial
justice.”
In addition, an arbitrator may not “impose
a punitive award or punitive damages” unless a provision in the
collective bargaining agreement provides for them.
Island Creek,
29 F.3d at 129 (citing Cannelton, 951 F.2d at 594).
Notably, under
Fourth Circuit precedent, compensation for a loss of union work
can be permissible.
See Cannelton, 951 F.2d at 594 (writing that
if
“ordered
the
arbitrator
monetary
damages
to
compensate
employees for work they were entitled to perform under the NBCWA,
the award might reasonably be construed as compensatory damages
for a cognizable loss of union work”).
award
is
punitive
or
whether
it
In deciding whether an
draws
its
essence
from
the
agreement, courts should be mindful that arbitrators “need not
give
their
reasons
for
an
award,”
but
courts
may
rely
on
arbitrators’ reasoning to determine whether the arbitrator has
applied “his own brand of industrial justice . . . .”
Cannelton,
951 F.2d at 594.
In reviewing arbitration awards, courts “must be concerned
not
to
broaden
the
scope
of
judicial
review
of
arbitration
decisions nor to lengthen a process that is intended to resolve
labor disputes quickly.”
Id. at 595; see also Upshur Coals Corp.,
933 F.2d at 231 (writing that “[l]abor arbitration serves the
10
Ohio Valley Coal v. UMWA et al.
Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-213
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 17],
DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[ECF NO. 18] AND VACATING ARBITRATION AWARD
important
goal
of
providing
swift
resolution
to
contractual
disputes”). “As long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing
or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his
authority, the court cannot overturn his decision simply because
it disagrees with his factual findings, contract interpretations,
or choice of remedies.”
Misco, 484 U.S. at 30.
As the Fourth Circuit has written, “[a]bove all, we must
determine only whether the arbitrator did his job — not whether he
did it well, correctly, or reasonably, but simply whether he did
it.”
Mountaineer Gas Co. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l
Union, 76 F.3d 606, 608 (4th Cir. 1996).
In this determination,
the Court considers “(1) the arbitrator’s role as defined by the
CBA; (2) whether the award ignored the plain language of the CBA;
and (3) whether the arbitrator’s discretion in formulating the
award comported with the essence of the CBA’s proscribed limits.”
Id.
Furthermore, “the arbitrator must take into account any
existing common law of the particular plant or industry, for it is
an integral part of the contract.”
Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock
Corp. v. Local No. 684, 671 F.2d 797, 799–800 (4th Cir. 1982); see
also Mountaineer Gas Co. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l
Union, 76 F.3d 606, 610 (4th Cir. 1996) (vacating arbitration award
when arbitrator “blatantly ignored the unambiguous language” of an
11
Ohio Valley Coal v. UMWA et al.
Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-213
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 17],
DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[ECF NO. 18] AND VACATING ARBITRATION AWARD
applicable policy).
The common law, as described above, does not
allow the arbitrator to impose punitive damages unless they are
provided for in the agreement.
V.
See Cannelton, 951 F.2d at 594.
DISCUSSION
The true issue raised in the pending cross motions is one of
arbitrability.
Ohio Valley conceded before Arbitrator Bowers that
it violated the terms of the NBCWA if – but only if – the grievance
was arbitrable.
The undisputed facts, the unambiguous language of
the NBCWA as well as the weight of relevant arbitral and judicial
decisions
compel
the
conclusion
that
the
grievance
is
not
arbitrable as the UMWA did not have work jurisdiction making both
arbitration awards an expression of the arbitrator’s own sense of
industrial justice as opposed to drawing their essence from the
contract. This Court is mindful of its limited role in proceedings
such as this and the great deference to which arbitrators are
entitled;
however,
arbitration
awards
cannot
stand
when
the
arbitrator substitutes her own judgment over the plain language
and essence of the contract.
See Misco, 484 U.S. at 38.
Again, Article IA of the NBCWA limits the work jurisdiction
of the covered bargaining unit to activities related to “[t]he
production of coal ...” [ECF No. 15-1 at §(a)].
There is no
dispute that the Mine had long ceased operations and producing
12
Ohio Valley Coal v. UMWA et al.
Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-213
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 17],
DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[ECF NO. 18] AND VACATING ARBITRATION AWARD
coal at the time of the work made subject of the grievance below.
In fact, the UMWA offered to stipulate to this undisputed fact –
“You know, [the Union will] stipulate that the Mine no longer
produced coal.”
[ECF No. 15-12 at 10:7-10:8].
The arbitrator
herself made repeated reference to the fact the mine had not been
in operation producing coal in both her Arbitration Awards:
•
“Effective on October 16, 2016, all coal production at the
mine ceased permanently and the mine was sealed.
no disagreement that assets of the mine were sold.”
There was
[ECF No.
12-1 at 5];
•
“That is because, on October 16, 2016, all coal production at
the Powhatan No. 6 mine ceased permanently, the mine was
sealed, and the asserts [sic] were sold.
None of these facts
are disputed.” [ECF No. 12-1 at 6];
•
“The mine is permanently closed and the assets have been
sold;” [ECF No. 12-1 at 10];
•
“There
is
no
dispute
that
the
Powhatan
No.
6
mine
was
permanently closed, in October of 2016, and that reclamation
work had not begun at the time the grievance was filed, nor
had it begun at the time of this hearing.” [ECF No. 12-2 at
10];
13
Ohio Valley Coal v. UMWA et al.
Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-213
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 17],
DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[ECF NO. 18] AND VACATING ARBITRATION AWARD
•
“The Powhatan No. 6 mine was permanently closed and all coal
production ceased there on October 16, 2016.” [ECF No. 12-2
at 11].
Yet, evading this settled fact and avoiding the clear language of
the
contract
and
the
guiding
precedential
decisions
to
the
contrary, the Arbitrator twice found the grievance arbitrable.
In so doing, she initially wrote “nothing in the language
contained in Article IA(a) restricts or eliminates coverage of
classified employees who are performing work associated with the
‘production of coal’ by another Company owned mine (union or
otherwise) when it is done on the property of a closed mine.”
No. 12-1 at 11] (emphasis added).
[ECF
After Plaintiff endeavored to
submit additional evidence at the January 24, 2018, hearing, the
arbitrator then turned to NCBWA’s Article IA(f) 7 for support.
However, the Arbitration Awards’ findings and conclusion find no
basis in the factual record before the arbitrator, the plain
language
of
the
NBCWA
or
the
precedent
provided
during
the
proceedings below.
7
That provision provides that the NBCWA “covers the operation of
all the coal lands, coal producing and coal preparation facilities
owned or held under lease by them ... or acquired during its term
which may hereafter (during the term of this Agreement) be put
into production or use.” [ECF No. 12-1 at IA(f)].
14
Ohio Valley Coal v. UMWA et al.
Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-213
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 17],
DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[ECF NO. 18] AND VACATING ARBITRATION AWARD
Again, there is no dispute that the Mine was permanently
closed and sealed as of October 2016.
Likewise, there appears to
be no dispute in the record that the production of coal generating
the slurry being deposited in Ohio Valley’s impoundment occurred
at the Century Mine.
This Court does not find a dispute in the
record about the ownership of the Century Mine compared to Powhatan
No. 6 but senses a great deal of potential confusion. 8
Despite failing to point to any evidence in the record to
support the conclusion, the arbitrator repeatedly makes sweeping
statements treating the separately owned mines (Powhatan No. 6 and
Century) as being owned and operated by the same entity.
For
example, she states, without evidentiary support or reference to
any aspect of the record, “[t]he Company owns a nearby sister,
non-union mine.” [ECF No. 12-1 at 5]. 9 Similar sweeping statements
are found throughout the arbitration awards:
“a Company-owned,
8
The Court notes and finds quite revealing the silence from the
UMWA on this matter in its briefing. At no point did the UMWA
advance the theory (or defend the arbitrator’s findings) that
Powhatan No. 6 and the Century Mine are owned or operated by the
same company or share any similarities other than being
geographically contiguous making deposit of coal slurry from the
Century Mine to the Powhatan No. 6 impoundment feasible by
pipeline.
9
The October 21, 2017, Arbitration Award makes clear “the Company”
is Ohio Valley Coal Company and specifically its Powhatan No. 6
mining operation.
[ECF No. 12-1 at 1].
15
Ohio Valley Coal v. UMWA et al.
Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-213
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 17],
DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[ECF NO. 18] AND VACATING ARBITRATION AWARD
non-union sister mine [ECF No. 12-1 at 7]; ”[t]he case involves
one company that is signatory to the NBCWA for the purposes of the
Powhatan No. 6 mine and is also the owner of an adjacent, nonunion mine” [ECF No. 12-1 at 10]; “...coal waste from production
at the adjacent mine that it owns” [ECF No. 12-1 at 10]; “[f]acts
are that the Company has not divested itself of the coal lands
associated with the Powhatan No. 6 mine and that it is conducting
‘operations’ on that land associated with coal production at a
property owned by it,” [ECF No. 12-1 at 11]; and, “...operating on
that land to support coal production at an adjacent mine which the
Company owns.”
[ECF no. 12-1 at 13].
The arbitrator continued down this unsupported path in an
effort to distinguish the present matter from decisions provided
to her during the first arbitration hearing.
In an effort to
distance the arbitration award from the helpful and persuasive
analysis in BethEnergy Mines, Inc. v. Dist. 30, UMWA, Local Union
5741, 714 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. Ky. 1988), she stated “[t]he Company
here owns both properties in question and is ‘operating’ the coal
lands and is utilizing classified employees at Powhatan No. 6 to
support
‘the
production
adjacent mine.”
of
coal’
and
[ECF No. 12-1 at 14].
its
‘operations’
at
an
Frankly, that statement is
clearly erroneous based on the record before both the arbitrator
16
Ohio Valley Coal v. UMWA et al.
Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-213
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 17],
DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[ECF NO. 18] AND VACATING ARBITRATION AWARD
and this Court (which also fails to distinguish the BethEnergy
Mines decision). 10
Moreover, the arbitrator repeated the same false premise to
support her finding.
The Company here has continued to actively use
(operate) coal land and classified employees
associated with Powhatan No. 6 mine to support
coal
production
at
its
adjacent
mine.
Granted, this work does not support coal
production at the subject mine, but it does
support and is essential to coal production at
and the operation of the adjacent mine which
is also owned by the Company.
[ECF No. 12-1 at 15] (emphasis added).
The arbitrator’s own words
run afoul of the clear, unambiguous language of the NBCWA and the
efforts to support her own sense of industrial justice based on
clearly erroneous statements of fact are unavailing.
Considering
one of the factors this Court must consider when assessing if the
arbitrator “did her job” is whether she ignored the plain language
of
the
applicable
contract,
this
10
Court
cannot
conclude
the
In their briefing, Defendants likewise attempt to distinguish
the numerous arbitration decisions and cases cited and produced by
Plaintiffs in support of their position.
Defendants are quite
correct to note that most, if not all, of those decisions and cases
address the meaning and impact of the key NBCWA provisions in this
case in the context of successorship litigation. UMWA likewise
correctly notes that no successorship issues exist in this matter.
However, this Court still finds that arbitration and judicial
authority quite persuasive particularly considering the lack of
authority to the contrary provided by any of the parties or cited
by the arbitrator.
17
Ohio Valley Coal v. UMWA et al.
Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-213
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 17],
DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[ECF NO. 18] AND VACATING ARBITRATION AWARD
arbitrator “did her job.”
See Mountaineer Gas Co., 76 F.3d at
608.
Ohio Valley provided the arbitrator and this Court with
numerous decisions and cases addressing the impact a mine being
closed or sealed has on whether that mine is an “operation” or,
arguably, engaged in the “production of coal” as set forth in the
NBCWA.
Although the arbitration awards indicate those decisions
and cases were considered, those precedential offerings were
apparently cast aside or, as noted infra at p.17, “distinguished”
based on false assumptions about the ownership of the mines
subject to the Slurry Disposal Agreement.
[ECF No. 15-4].
This
Court may not substitute its legal analysis for that of the
arbitrator;
however,
this
Court
must
insist
that
the
plain
language of the contract and the existing common law of the
industry be adhered to and followed.
See Norfolk Shipbuilding &
Drydock Corp., 671 F.2d at 799-800 (requiring the arbitrator to
“take into account any existing common law of the particular plant
or industry, for it is an integral part of the contract.”).
Those decisions and cases, which were provided to both the
arbitrator during the underlying proceedings and this Court as
18
Ohio Valley Coal v. UMWA et al.
Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-213
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 17],
DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[ECF NO. 18] AND VACATING ARBITRATION AWARD
Exhibit 1 of Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion [ECF No. 17-2], 11
all maintain a consistent point – that, absent a specific exception
to the contrary, a coal mine must be actively operating to trigger
the work jurisdiction of the NBCWA.
See, e.g., Eastern Ass’n Coal
Co. v. UMWA Local Union 9177, Dist. 17, Case No 84-17-86-299 (Arb.
Vierthaler, 1986)(“The term ‘coal mining operations’ carries with
it the plain meaning that coal is being mined or processed.”);
UMWA, Int’l Union v. U.S. Steel Mining Co., 636 F. Supp. 151, 15354 (D. Utah 1986)(“[A]s a matter of law, a mining ‘operation,’ for
purposes of Article I of the 1984 NBCWA, refers to a mine site or
facility where active coal mining operations are being conducted.
That is, an ‘operation’ connotes a mine that is actively producing
coal and operating as a coal mine.”); UMWA, Dist. 31 v. Thomas
Dev., Ltd., 821 F. Supp. 426, 428 (S.D.W. Va. 1993)(“The term
‘operation’ connotes a mine that is actively producing coal and
operating as a coal mine ...”).
In short, the plain language of the NBCWA as well as the
arbitration and judicial precedent require the production of coal,
as defined in the contract, for the bargaining unit to have
11
This Court has reviewed and considered this voluminous
collection of authority and could find no other relevant guidance
elsewhere.
As noted infra, Defendants cited nothing to the
contrary or any authority suggesting a different reasoning.
19
Ohio Valley Coal v. UMWA et al.
Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-213
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 17],
DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[ECF NO. 18] AND VACATING ARBITRATION AWARD
jurisdiction
over
the
work
being
performed.
Despite
wholly
inaccurate assumptions to the contrary, Ohio Valley was not engaged
at any relevant time in the production of coal at the Mine as it
was
closed
production
and
of
sealed
coal
at
Energy’s Century Mine.
nor
was
another
Ohio
Valley
company’s
involved
operation,
in
the
American
Instead, under the terms of the Slurry
Disposal Agreement, Ohio Valley licensed use of its impoundment to
a separate legal entity where the UMWA has no work jurisdiction.
The Court does not merely “disagree” with the arbitrator’s
“factual findings or contractual interpretations.”
U.S. at 30.
Misco, 484
In both arbitration awards, the arbitrator relied on
inaccurate factual premises to reach a conclusion and failed to
adhere to the unambiguous and plain language of the agreement;
therefore, she failed to do her job. 12
12
Mountaineer Gas Co., 76
It is axiomatic that arbitrators may not venture outside the
four-corners of the contract and substitute their own personal
sense of fairness or justice. Although the Court makes no findings
or conclusions with respect to any motivations, the arbitration
awards do contain references indicating the arbitrator based her
decisions on her own personal notions of fairness and equity as
opposed
to
the
applicable
contract
language,
instructive
arbitration and judicial authority and the record before her. For
example, the arbitrator makes reference to “crumbs of overtime,”
“menial tasks” and “arbitrary and capricious” decisions which are
clearly vested to management discretion under the contract. [ECF
No. 12-2 at 17].
The arbitrator also takes a mostly-unnamed
supervisor, “Supervisor V,” to task because he was not presented
20
Ohio Valley Coal v. UMWA et al.
Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-213
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 17],
DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[ECF NO. 18] AND VACATING ARBITRATION AWARD
F.3d at 608; see also United States Postal Service v. American
Postal Workers Union, 204 F.3d 523, 527 (4th Cir. 2000)(citation
omitted) (“When the arbitrator ignores the unambiguous language
chosen by the parties, the arbitrator simply fails to do [her]
job.”).
As the Supreme Court of the United States noted long ago,
an arbitration award “is legitimate only so long as it draws its
essence
from
the
collective
bargaining
agreement.
When
the
arbitrator’s words manifest an infidelity to this obligation,
courts have not choice but to refuse enforcement of the award.”
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597.
Here, the Court
has no choice but to vacate the arbitration awards.
VI.
For
the
reasons
CONCLUSION
discussed
above,
Plaintiff’s
Motion
for
Summary Judgment is GRANTED [ECF No. 17], and Defendants’ Motion
as a witness. [ECF No. 12-2 at 13]. The arbitrator’s failure to
follow the plain language of the NBCWA and the factually inaccurate
efforts to justify that departure coupled with these remarks
confirm for this Court the arbitrator substituted her own sense of
industrial justice in place of that for which the parties
bargained.
Plaintiff suggests in its briefing that the alleged punitive nature
of the remedy awarded the grievants is also indicia of the
arbitrator “failing to do her job.” The Court has not undertaken
an analysis of the remedy given the conclusion the matter was not
arbitrable in the first instance and, therefore, makes no findings
with respect to the propriety of the stated remedy.
21
Ohio Valley Coal v. UMWA et al.
Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-213
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 17],
DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[ECF NO. 18] AND VACATING ARBITRATION AWARD
for Summary Judgment is DENIED [ECF No. 18].
awards are hereby VACATED.
The arbitration
It is further ORDERED that this action
be and hereby is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and STRICKEN from the
active docket of the Court.
It is so ORDERED.
The Clerk is directed to transmit copies of this memorandum
opinion and order to counsel of record.
DATED: September 27, 2019
____________________________
Thomas S. Kleeh
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
22
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