United Mine Workers of America International Union et al v. The Monongalia County Coal Company

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 12 ] AND GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 11 ]. The arbitration award is CONFIRMED. It is further ORDERED that this action be and hereby is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and STRICKEN from the active docket of the Court. Signed by District Judge Thomas S. Kleeh on 8/8/2019. (wrr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA
INTERNATIONAL UNION and
UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA,
LOCAL UNION 1702,
Plaintiffs/CounterDefendants,
v.

Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-126
(Judge Kleeh)

THE MONONGALIA COUNTY COAL COMPANY,
Defendant/CounterClaimant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 12] AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 11]
Pending

before

the

Court

are

cross

motions

for

summary

judgment filed by the United Mine Workers of America, International
Union, and the United Mine Workers of America, Local Union 1702
(together, the “Union” or “Plaintiffs”), and the Monongalia County
Coal Company (“Defendant”). For the reasons discussed below, the
Court denies Plaintiffs’ motion and grants Defendant’s motion.
I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 4, 2018, Plaintiffs brought this action against
Defendant, seeking to vacate an arbitration award. The Honorable
Irene M. Keeley, United States District Judge, ordered the parties
to submit a joint stipulated record, cross motions for summary
judgment, and response briefs. Defendant filed an Answer and

UMWA V. MCCC

1:18-CV-126

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 12] AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 11]
counterclaim against Plaintiffs. The case was transferred to the
Honorable

Thomas

S.

Kleeh,

United

States

District

Judge,

on

December 1, 2018. The parties have filed their cross motions for
summary judgment, which are now ripe for consideration.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Defendant operates the Monongalia County Mine, an underground
coal mine in West Virginia and Pennsylvania. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 4.
Plaintiffs represent Defendant’s bargaining unit employees for
purposes

of

collective

bargaining.

Id.

¶

3.

The

collective

bargaining agreement that governs this relationship is the 2016
National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement (“NBCWA”). Id. ¶ 5. The
NBCWA establishes work jurisdiction of union-represented employees
and provides restrictions on Defendant’s ability to contract out
this work. Id. ¶ 6.
The dispute at issue involves work performed at the Monongalia
County Mine on November 12, 2017. Id. ¶ 9. On that day, Defendant
used

non-bargaining

unit

personnel

to

perform

repair

and

maintenance work at the mine. Id. On December 6, 2017, the Union
filed a grievance, alleging that Defendant violated Article IA of
the NBCWA because the work performed by contractors was reserved
for bargaining unit employees. Id. ¶ 10. The Union sought “lost

2

UMWA V. MCCC

1:18-CV-126

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 12] AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 11]
wages for 11/11/17 and [for] this practice to cease and [to] be
made whole in all ways.” Id.
On

February

8,

2018,

the

parties

had

a

hearing

Arbitrator William A. Babiskin (the “Arbitrator”). Id. ¶

before
11. In

his award, the Arbitrator discusses general principles of contract
interpretation. ECF No. 1-1 at 3–4. He also discusses, generally,
that employers retain managerial rights under the NBCWA, including
the right to schedule work. Id. at 4. The Arbitrator found that
because there was no monetary loss by the grievants, “there [was]
nothing to be remedied” and, therefore, denied the grievance. Id.
at 6. The Arbitrator chose not to address the substantive issue of
whether a violation occurred, finding it unnecessary because the
lack of monetary loss meant that there would be no award. Id. at
5. Specifically, the Arbitrator wrote that he “strongly believe[s]
in the principle of ‘no harm, no foul,’” and that “[i]t is not
necessary to decide the issues raised by the parties as there was
no financial loss to the employees in this case.” Id.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant
“bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court
3

UMWA V. MCCC

1:18-CV-126

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 12] AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 11]
of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of
‘the

pleadings,

depositions,

answers

to

interrogatories,

and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which
it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The
nonmoving party must “make a sufficient showing on an essential
element of its case with respect to which it has the burden of
proof.” Id. at 317–18. Summary judgment is proper “[w]here the
record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to
find for the non-moving party, there [being] no ‘genuine issue for
trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
IV.

GOVERNING LAW

This Court may review labor arbitrators’ decisions under
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29
U.S.C. § 185, but this power of review is “extremely limited.”
Cannelton Indus., Inc. v. Dist. 17, UMWA, 951 F.2d 591, 593 (4th
Cir.

1991).

bargaining

This

is

agreement

because

“[t]he

bargained

parties
for

to

the

a

collective

arbitrator’s

interpretation, and ‘so far as the arbitrator’s decision concerns
construction

of

the

contract,

the

courts

have

no

business

overruling him because their interpretation . . . is different
4

UMWA V. MCCC

1:18-CV-126

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 12] AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 11]
from his.’” Island Creek Coal Co. v. Dist. 28, UMWA, 29 F.3d 126,
129 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing United Steelworkers of America v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960)). The
Supreme Court of the United States, in the “Steelworkers Trilogy,” 1
has “emphasized that federal courts should refuse to review the
merits of an arbitration award under a collective bargaining
agreement.” Mutual Mining, Inc. v. Dist. 17, UMWA, 47 F.3d 1165,
at *2 (4th Cir. 1995) (unpublished). Both an arbitrator’s findings
of fact and interpretation of the law are accorded great deference.
Upshur Coals Corp. v. UMWA, Dist. 31, 933 F.2d 225, 229 (4th Cir.
1991).

In

addition,

“[t]he

selection

of

remedies

is

almost

exclusively within the arbitrator’s domain.” Cannelton, 951 F.2d
at 593–54 (citing United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, 484
U.S. 29 (1987)).
Still, there are some limitations on arbitration awards. The
award “must draw its essence from the contract and cannot simply
reflect

the

arbitrator’s

own

notions

of

industrial

justice.”

Misco, 484 U.S. at 38. In addition, an arbitrator may not “impose
a punitive award or punitive damages” unless a provision in the

1

The Steelworkers Trilogy includes the following cases: United
Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); and United Steelworkers of
America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
5

UMWA V. MCCC

1:18-CV-126

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 12] AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 11]
collective bargaining agreement provides for them. Island Creek,
29 F.3d at 129 (citing Cannelton, 951 F.2d at 594). In deciding
whether an award is punitive or whether it draws its essence from
the agreement, courts should be mindful that arbitrators “need not
give

their

reasons

for

an

award,”

but

courts

may

rely

on

arbitrators’ reasoning to determine whether the arbitrator has
applied “his own brand of industrial justice.” Cannelton, 951 F.2d
at 594.
In reviewing arbitration awards, courts “must be concerned
not

to

broaden

the

scope

of

judicial

review

of

arbitration

decisions nor to lengthen a process that is intended to resolve
labor disputes quickly.” Id. at 595; see also Upshur Coals Corp.,
933 F.2d at 231 (writing that “[l]abor arbitration serves the
important

goal

disputes”).

of

“[A]s

providing
long

as

swift
the

resolution

arbitrator

is

to

contractual

even

arguably

construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of
his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error
does not suffice to overturn his decision.” Dist. 30, UMWA v.
Agipcoal

USA,

Inc.,

889

F.2d

1087,

at

*2

(6th

Cir.

1989)

(unpublished) (citing Misco, 484 U.S. at 38).
As

the

Fourth

Circuit

has

written,

“Above

all,

we

must

determine only whether the arbitrator did his job — not whether he
6

UMWA V. MCCC

1:18-CV-126

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 12] AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 11]
did it well, correctly, or reasonably, but simply whether he did
it.” Mountaineer Gas Co. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l
Union, 76 F.3d 606, 608 (4th Cir. 1996). In this determination,
the Court considers “(1) the arbitrator’s role as defined by the
CBA; (2) whether the award ignored the plain language of the CBA;
and (3) whether the arbitrator’s discretion in formulating the
award comported with the essence of the CBA’s proscribed limits.”
Id.

Furthermore,

“the

arbitrator

must

take

into

account

any

existing common law of the particular plant or industry, for it is
an integral part of the contract.” Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock
Corp. v. Local No. 684, 671 F.2d 797, 799–800 (4th Cir. 1982). The
common law, as described above, does not allow the arbitrator to
impose

punitive

damages

unless

they

are

provided

for

in

the

agreement. See Cannelton, 951 F.2d at 594).
V.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Parties’ Contentions
Plaintiffs argue that the arbitration award fails to draw its

essence

from

the

NBCWA.

They

believe

the

Arbitrator

did

not

consider the evidence and arguments presented by the parties and
ignored the issues presented, including, mainly, whether there was
a violation. Furthermore, they argue, the principle of “no harm,
no foul,” which the Arbitrator cited, appears nowhere in the NBCWA.
7

UMWA V. MCCC

1:18-CV-126

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 12] AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 11]
Plaintiffs point out that the Arbitrator did not cite to, analyze,
or reference any of the grievance settlements or arbitration
decisions that were submitted to him for review. They believe the
Arbitrator exceeded his authority by applying a non-contractual
standard to the dispute and applying his own notions of industrial
justice.
Defendant argues that the award should be upheld because it
draws its essence from the NBCWA. The NBCWA, it argues, does not
provide for punitive damages, and the grievants did not suffer
economic loss, so no monetary award is appropriate. Defendant
believes the “no harm, no foul” phrase is simply an informal
restatement of this concept. Defendant argues that the NBCWA
requires only that an arbitrator “conduct a hearing, . . . hear
testimony,

receive

evidence,

and

consider

arguments”

before

rendering a decision. The Arbitrator, Defendant argues, complied
with these requirements.
B.

Review of the Arbitrator’s Award
This

Court

recognizes

its

limited

role

in

deciding

arbitration disputes. As discussed above, an arbitration award is
entitled to great deference. Plaintiffs’ concern with the award’s
“no harm, no foul” language is misplaced. First, Plaintiffs ignore
the Award’s summary of applicable doctrine. Second, the NBCWA
8

UMWA V. MCCC

1:18-CV-126

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 12] AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 11]
incorporates the common law rule 2 that monetary awards in the
absence of compensatory damages are improper. While it is true
that “no harm, no foul” does not appear in the NBCWA, and the Court
is inclined to agree that the Arbitrator could have used more
artful

language,

the

language

used

was

clearly

an

effort

to

summarize long-standing applicable law. The NBCWA does not provide
for punitive damages. Thus, the Arbitrator analyzed the contract
itself, applied long-standing legal principles, and did not apply
his own brand of industrial justice.
Further, Plaintiffs’ reliance on Monongalia County Coal Co.
v. UMWA, 234 F.Supp.3d 797 (N.D.W. Va. 2017), is unpersuasive. In
that case, the Court analyzed the arbitrator’s decision whether
the work at issue was “construction” work or “repair” work. If
construction, the Company could have contracted out the work, but
if repair, it could not (aside from limited exceptions). The Court
ultimately found that the arbitrator misapplied prior arbitral
decisions and incorrectly classified the work. Further, the Court
found that it was not necessary to calculate damages but noted
that had the work been repair work, the damages drew their essence
from the contract. To the contrary, here, the Court is not being

2

As discussed above, the common law is an “integral part of the
contract.” Norfolk, 671 F.2d at 799–800.
9

UMWA V. MCCC

1:18-CV-126

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 12] AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 11]
asked to find that the Arbitrator incorrectly classified the work
at issue. In the same vein, the Court has not been asked to analyze
the calculation of damages because the Arbitrator did not award
any. Therefore, the two cases, while involving the same parties,
involve different issues, and Plaintiffs have overly relied on the
earlier decision in crafting an argument here.
The Arbitrator here did not ignore issues or fail to undertake
analysis.

To

summarizes

the

the

contrary,

evidence

the

and

the

award

outlines

record,

and

the

issues,

provides

the

Arbitrator’s findings. The Court’s role is to decide whether the
Arbitrator did his job, not whether he did it well or whether the
Court would have done it differently. See Mountaineer Gas, 76 F.3d
at 608. Stating the governing law broadly, there is no doubt that
the Arbitrator was “arguably” applying the contract. See Misco,
484 U.S. at 38. The arbitration award issued here is entitled to
significant deference, and the Court will not substitute its own
judgment based on Plaintiffs’ preference for an arbitration award
with a less-casual statement of a long-standing legal principle.
VI.
For

the

reasons

CONCLUSION

discussed

above,

Plaintiffs’

Motion

for

Summary Judgment is DENIED [ECF No. 12], and Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment is GRANTED [ECF No. 11]. The arbitration award
10

UMWA V. MCCC

1:18-CV-126

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 12] AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 11]
is CONFIRMED. It is further ORDERED that this action be and hereby
is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and STRICKEN from the active docket of
the Court.
It is so ORDERED.
The Clerk is directed to transmit copies of this memorandum
opinion and order to counsel of record.
DATED: August 8, 2019

___________________________
THOMAS S. KLEEH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

11