Greenbrier Royalty Fund II, LLC v. Antero Resources Corporation

Filing 75

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT (ECF NO. 60 ). Count Three is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and Count One is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE IN PART, to the extent that it requests a declaratory judgment. Signed by Chief District Judge Thomas S Kleeh on 8/30/2024. (dk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
GREENBRIER ROYALTY FUND II, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL NO. 1:21-CV-134
(KLEEH)

ANTERO RESOURCES CORPORATION,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART
AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S PARTIAL MOTION
TO DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT [ECF NO. 60]
Pending before the Court is a partial motion to dismiss the
First Amended Complaint.

For the reasons discussed herein, the

motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
I.

BACKGROUND

The Plaintiff, Greenbrier Royalty Fund II, LLC (“Plaintiff”),
brings this action against Defendant Antero Resources Corporation
(“Defendant”).

Plaintiff is the owner of the oil and gas, or a

fraction thereof, in and under several tracts or parcels of land
in

Doddridge

Virginia.

County,

Ritchie

County,

and

Tyler

First Am. Compl., ECF No. 42, at ¶ 6.

County,

West

Defendant is

engaged in the development and production of oil and gas in West
Virginia.

Id. ¶ 213.

Plaintiff and Defendant are parties to

numerous oil and gas leases relating to the oil and gas owned by
Plaintiff.

Id. ¶ 212.

GREENBRIER ROYALTY FUND II V. ANTERO

1:21-CV-134

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART
AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S PARTIAL MOTION
TO DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT [ECF NO. 60]
In

the

Defendant

First

Amended

improperly

paid

Complaint,
royalties

contractual terms of the leases.

Plaintiff
to

alleges

Plaintiff

Id. ¶ 218.

that

under

the

Defendant has

allegedly done so by unlawfully deducting costs from royalties and
by failing to pay royalties for production and sale of natural gas
liquids (“NGLs”).

Id. ¶¶ 218-45.

Plaintiff further asserts that

Defendant concealed its production of NGLs.
Finally,

Plaintiff

asserts

that

Defendant

statutory protections under West Virginia law.
Plaintiff

brings

three

causes

of

Id. ¶¶ 246–57.
violated

certain

Id. ¶¶ 258–77.

action:

(1)

Breach

of

Contract, (2) Violation of W. Va. Code § 37C-1-1, et. seq., and
(3)

Fraudulent

Misrepresentation

and

Constructive

Fraud.

Defendant filed a partial motion to dismiss, which is fully briefed
and ripe for review.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows
a defendant to move for dismissal upon the ground that a complaint
does not “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”

In

ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court “must accept as
true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.”
Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 188 (4th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)).
2

A court is

GREENBRIER ROYALTY FUND II V. ANTERO

1:21-CV-134

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART
AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S PARTIAL MOTION
TO DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT [ECF NO. 60]
“not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
A court should dismiss a complaint if it does not contain
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.”

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

Plausibility exists “when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Ashcroft v.

A motion to dismiss “does not

resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or
the applicability of defenses.”
Martin,

980

appropriate

F.2d
only

942,
if

952

“it

(4th

appears

Republican Party of N.C. v.
Cir.
to

be

1992).
a

Dismissal

certainty

that

is
the

plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts
which could be proven in support of its claim.”

Johnson v.

Mueller, 415 F.2d 354, 355 (4th Cir. 1969).
III. DISCUSSION
As discussed herein, the Court finds that Count Three should
be dismissed in its entirety, Count Two should not be dismissed,
and Count One should be dismissed to the extent that it requests
a declaratory judgment.

3

GREENBRIER ROYALTY FUND II V. ANTERO

1:21-CV-134

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART
AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S PARTIAL MOTION
TO DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT [ECF NO. 60]
A.

Because Count Three is barred by the Gist of the Action
Doctrine, it is dismissed.

In Count Three, Plaintiff asserts a claim of Fraudulent
Misrepresentation

and

Constructive

Fraud.

It

argues

that

Defendant violated its statutory, legal, and equitable duties by
acting deceptively and fraudulently.

Specifically, Plaintiff

asserts that Defendant intentionally and willfully did not provide
truthful information to Plaintiff about production of oil and gas,
that

Defendant

Defendant

falsely

provided

reported

falsely

information

reported

about

royalty

NGLs,

statements

that
to

Plaintiff, and that Defendant improperly concealed its extraction
and sale of NGLs.

Defendant has moved to dismiss the claim,

arguing that it is (1) barred by the Gist of the Action Doctrine,
(2) barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and (3)
insufficiently pled.

The Court finds that Count Three is barred

by the Gist of the Action Doctrine and need not consider the
alternative arguments in support of dismissal.
Under West Virginia law, “[i]f the action is not maintainable
without pleading and proving the contract, where the gist of the
action is the breach of the contract, either by malfeasance or
nonfeasance, it is, in substance, an action on the contract,
whatever may be the form of the pleading.”

4

Cochran v. Appalachian

GREENBRIER ROYALTY FUND II V. ANTERO

1:21-CV-134

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART
AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S PARTIAL MOTION
TO DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT [ECF NO. 60]
Power Co., 246 S.E.2d 624, 628 (W. Va. 1978).

The purpose of the

Gist of the Action Doctrine is to “prevent the recasting of a
contract claim as a tort claim.”

See Rodgers v. Sw. Energy Co.,

No. 5:16-CV-54, 2016 WL 3248437, at *4 (N.D.W. Va. June 13, 2016)
(citing Covol Fuels No. 4, LLC v. Pinnacle Min. Co., LLC, 785 F.3d
104, 115 (4th Cir. 2015)).
Under the Gist of the Action Doctrine, “a tort claim arising
from a breach of contract may be pursued only if the action in
tort would arise independent of the existence of the contract.”
Corder v. Antero Res. Corp., 322 F. Supp. 3d 710, 722 (N.D.W. Va.
2018) (quotation marks omitted) (citing Secure US, Inc. v. Idearc
Media Corp., No. 1:08CV190, 2008 WL 5378319, at *3–4 (N.D.W. Va.
Dec. 24, 2008) (quoting Syl. Pt. 9, Lockhart v. Airco Heating &
Cooling, 567 S.E.2d 619 (W. Va. 2002)).

The Supreme Court of

Appeals has found that “recovery in tort will be barred” where any
of the following four factors is present:
(1)

where liability arises solely from the
contractual relationship between the
parties;

(2)

when the alleged duties breached were
grounded in the contract itself;

(3)

where any liability
contract; and

(4)

when
the
tort
claim
essentially
duplicates the breach of contract claim
5

stems

from

the

GREENBRIER ROYALTY FUND II V. ANTERO

1:21-CV-134

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART
AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S PARTIAL MOTION
TO DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT [ECF NO. 60]
or where the success of the tort claim is
dependent on the success of the breach of
contract claim.
Gaddy Eng’g Co. v. Bowles Rice McDavid Graff & Love, LLP, 746
S.E.2d 568, 577 (W. Va. 2013).

A plaintiff may not maintain a

separate tort claim if the defendant’s “obligations are defined by
the terms of the contract” between the parties.

Id. (citation

omitted).
As recently as 2018, this Court applied the Gist of the Action
Doctrine in a factually similar case, and in 2023, the decision
was deemed “well-supported” by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit.

See Corder v. Antero Res. Corp., 57 F.4th

384, 404 n.12 (4th Cir. 2023).

In Corder, this Court wrote,

Here, the alleged fraud arises solely from the
contractual
relationship
between
the
plaintiffs and the defendants (i.e., the
leases at issue). As noted, the plaintiffs’
fraud claims are grounded in allegations that
the
defendants
have
made
material
misrepresentations related to royalties owed
to the plaintiffs under the relevant leases,
and that the defendants have wrongfully
reduced the plaintiffs’ royalty payments. It
is clear that the misrepresentations alleged
in the amended complaints all relate to
royalty payments owed to the plaintiffs and
are thus directly tied to the duties and
obligations assumed in the relevant leases.
Gaddy, 746 S.E.2d at 586. In other words, the
claims do not arise independently of the
existence of a contract. CWS Trucking, 2005
WL 2237788, at *2. Rather, Antero’s alleged
liability for these claims “stems from” the
6

GREENBRIER ROYALTY FUND II V. ANTERO

1:21-CV-134

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART
AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S PARTIAL MOTION
TO DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT [ECF NO. 60]
leases and the plaintiffs’ fraud claims
against Antero thus are barred by the gist of
the action doctrine.
Corder v. Antero Res. Corp., 322 F. Supp. 3d 710, 723 (N.D.W. Va.
2018), aff’d, 57 F.4th 384 (4th Cir. 2023).
Here, as in Corder, Plaintiff claims that Defendant made
material misrepresentations related to royalties owed to Plaintiff
under the relevant leases and that Defendant wrongfully reduced
Plaintiff’s royalty payments.

Additionally, as in Corder, “the

misrepresentations . . . all relate to royalty payments owed to
the plaintiff[] and are thus directly tied to the duties and
obligations assumed in the relevant leases.”
at 723 (citing Gaddy, 746 S.E.2d at 586).

Corder, 322 F. Supp.

In other words, again,

“the claims do not arise independently of the existence of a
contract.”

Id.

Rather, Defendant’s “alleged liability ‘stems

from’ the leases” here as well.

Id.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant has independent statutory and
common law duties not to commit fraud, but Corder makes clear that
the type of fraud alleged can fall within the Gist of the Action
Doctrine.
the

Action

To the extent that Plaintiff argues that the Gist of
Doctrine

should

not

be

applied

at

this

stage

of

litigation, the Court notes that the Fourth Circuit took no issue
with application of the doctrine at the pleading stage in Corder.
7

GREENBRIER ROYALTY FUND II V. ANTERO

1:21-CV-134

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART
AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S PARTIAL MOTION
TO DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT [ECF NO. 60]
Here, the Gaddy factors necessitate application of the Gist of the
Action Doctrine.

Defendant’s liability to Plaintiff arises from

the contractual relationship between the parties.

The duties

allegedly breached were grounded in the leases, and the success of
the Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Constructive Fraud claim is
dependent upon the success of the breach of contract claim.

In

other words, without a breach of the leases, Plaintiff cannot
succeed

on

a

Constructive

claim

Fraud.

of

Fraudulent

This

Court

Misrepresentation

recently

reached

the

and
same

conclusion in Allen v. Antero Resources Corp., No. 1:22-CV-56,
2024 WL 778396 (N.D.W. Va. Feb. 26, 2024).
Count

Three

is

barred

by

the

Gist

of

The Court finds that
the

Action

Doctrine.

Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED in this respect, and Count
Three is DISMISSED.
B.

Because
Plaintiff
has
sufficiently
alleged
that
Defendant violated section 37C-1-1 of the West Virginia
Code, Count Two is not dismissed.

In Count Two, Plaintiff brings a cause of action pursuant to
section 37C-1-1, et. seq., of the West Virginia Code, asserting
that

Defendant

Specifically,

failed

Plaintiff

to

comply

alleges

that

with

section

Defendant

has

37C-1-1.
failed

to

provide required information to Plaintiff and failed to make timely
payments.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim should be
8

GREENBRIER ROYALTY FUND II V. ANTERO

1:21-CV-134

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART
AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S PARTIAL MOTION
TO DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT [ECF NO. 60]
dismissed

because

Plaintiff

failed

section 37C-1-1’s condition precedent.

to

plead

compliance

with

Defendant also argues that

Plaintiff’s claim is moot because Defendant sent the requested
information to Plaintiff in a letter dated June 30, 2023. Finally,
Defendant argues that Plaintiff lacks a private right of action
and is barred from recovery, and that the claim is insufficiently
pled.
1.
Section

Condition Precedent and Mootness
37C-1-1

requires

operators

to

provide

royalty

interest holders with certain information on their royalty check
statements, including gas volume, gas quality, gross value of
proceeds
expenses.

from

gas

sales,

and

deductions

for

post-production

It imposes a condition precedent on parties seeking a

private right of action for an operator’s alleged failure to
provide such information on their royalty statements:
An interest owner who does not receive the
information required to be provided under this
section in a timely manner may send a written
request for the information by certified mail.
Not later than the 60th day after the date the
operator or producer receives the written
request for information under this section,
the operator or producer shall provide the
requested information to the interest owner.
If the interest owner makes a written request
for information under this section and the
operator or producer does not provide the
information within the 60-day period, the
interest owner may bring a civil action
9

GREENBRIER ROYALTY FUND II V. ANTERO

1:21-CV-134

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART
AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S PARTIAL MOTION
TO DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT [ECF NO. 60]
against the operator or producer to enforce
the provisions of this section, and a
prevailing interest owner shall be entitled to
recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and court
costs incurred in the civil action.
W. Va. Code § 37C-1-1(b).
Here, Plaintiff pleads that it informed Defendant, by letter
dated May 1, 2023, that Defendant had failed to comply with the
Act and requested the required information.
Am. Compl., at ECF No. 42-75.

See Exh. 75, First

Defendant claims that it sent all

requested information to Plaintiff in a letter dated June 30, 2023.
See Exh. 1, Memo. in Support, at ECF No. 61-1.

Plaintiff filed

the First Amended Complaint on August 28, 2023.

In it, Plaintiff

does

not

mention

Defendant’s

letter.

Plaintiff

pleads

that

“[Defendant] has failed to provide the information required by the
Act, including but not limited to: Total number of MCF, MMBTU, or
DTH of natural gas; and volume of natural gas liquids produced
from each well and sold; gross value of the total proceeds from
the sale; and the aggregate amount of deductions which affected
GRFII’s payment and which are allowed by law.”

First Am. Compl.,

ECF No. 42, at ¶ 262.
Based

on

the

described

timeline,

the

Court

finds

that

Plaintiff satisfied the condition precedent by pleading that it
sent

Defendant

a

request

and

Defendant
10

did

not

provide

the

GREENBRIER ROYALTY FUND II V. ANTERO

1:21-CV-134

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART
AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S PARTIAL MOTION
TO DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT [ECF NO. 60]
requested information.
Defendant responded.

Plaintiff was not required to plead that

Plaintiff clearly believes that any response

it received was deficient.

Accordingly, the Court disagrees with

Defendant’s argument that Count Two should be dismissed for failure
to plead compliance with a condition precedent. Taking Plaintiff’s
allegations as true, the Court also disagrees with Defendant’s
contention that the issue is moot.
2.

Independent Cause of Action and Sufficiency of
Pleading

Defendant further argues that section 37C-1-3 does not create
an independent cause of action, and that it is insufficiently pled.
In McArdle v. Antero Resources Corp., No. 1:22-CV-01, 2024 WL
1287617, at *3 (N.D.W. Va. Mar. 26, 2024), this Court held that
section 37-1-3 does not create an independent cause of action.
The Court’s holding in McArdle was consistent with its decision in
Armstrong v. Antero Resources Corp., Case No. 1:19-CV-173, at ECF
No. 28.
In response, Plaintiff asks the Court to reconsider its prior
decisions.

It argues that section 37C-1-3 creates an implied

private cause of action in favor of interest owners, such as
Plaintiff, to compel the payment of penalty interest.

Plaintiff

argues that the factors set forth in Hurley v. Allied Chemical

11

GREENBRIER ROYALTY FUND II V. ANTERO

1:21-CV-134

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART
AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S PARTIAL MOTION
TO DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT [ECF NO. 60]
Corp., 262 S.E.2d 757 (W. Va. 1980), weigh in favor of finding
that a private cause of action exists pursuant to section 37C-13.
The Court need not delve into a full Hurley analysis here
because

this

Armstrong.

case

is

distinguishable

from

both

Mcardle

and

In both of those cases, the plaintiff(s) specifically

pleaded a violation of section 37C-1-3.1

Here, Plaintiff pleads a

violation of section 37C-1-1, et seq., alleging that Defendant
violated section 37C-1-1.

Section 37C-1-1, in stark contrast to

section 37C-1-3, clearly creates a cause of action.

See W. Va.

Code § 37C-1-1(b) (“[T]he interest owner may bring a civil action
against the operator or producer to enforce the provisions of this
section, and a prevailing interest owner shall be entitled to
recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and court costs incurred in the
civil action.”).
Further,
sufficiently

Plaintiff’s
pled.

claim

under

Plaintiff

section
has

37C-1-1
pled

is
that

“[Defendant] . . . failed to provide the information required by
the Act, including but not limited to: Total number of MCF, MMBTU,
or DTH of natural gas; and volume of natural gas liquids produced
See Mcardle, Case No. 1:22-CV-01, Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 95,
at ¶¶ 47, 80–88; see also Armstrong, Case No. 1:19-CV-173, First
Am. Compl., ECF No. 1-1, at ¶ 38.
1

12

GREENBRIER ROYALTY FUND II V. ANTERO

1:21-CV-134

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART
AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S PARTIAL MOTION
TO DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT [ECF NO. 60]
from each well and sold; gross value of the total proceeds from
the sale; and the aggregate amount of deductions which affected
GRFII’s payment and which are allowed by law.”
ECF No. 42, at ¶ 262.

First Am. Compl.,

This is sufficient to survive a motion to

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to

dismiss is DENIED with respect to Count Two.
C.

To the extent that Plaintiff requests a declaratory
judgment, Count One is dismissed as duplicative.

In Count One, Plaintiff “requests that this Court enter an
Order

declaring

that

[Defendant]

is

required

to

pay

future

royalties to [Plaintiff] based upon prices received on the actual
sale of natural gas and natural gas liquids at the point of
sale[.]”

First Am. Compl., ECF No. 42, at ¶ 286.

Defendant argues

that Plaintiff lacks standing to assert this claim and, in the
alternative, that the request should be dismissed as duplicative.
“The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, creates a
remedy, not a substantive cause of action.

Its operation ‘is

procedural only. Congress enlarged the range of remedies available
in the federal courts but did not extend their jurisdiction.’”
Goodno v. Antero Res. Corp., No. 5:20-CV-100, 2020 WL 13094067, at
*3 (N.D.W. Va. 2020) (citing Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum
Co.,

339

U.S.

667,

671

(1950)).

13

“Its

purpose

is

to

allow

GREENBRIER ROYALTY FUND II V. ANTERO

1:21-CV-134

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART
AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S PARTIAL MOTION
TO DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT [ECF NO. 60]
‘prospective defendants to due to establish their nonliability,’
not create a substantive tack-on claim for an already-existing
plaintiff who is adjudicating an already-live issue.”

Id. (citing

Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504 (1959)).
“When

declaratory

relief

would

be

already alleged, dismissal is warranted.”

duplicative

of

claims

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.

Apex Oil Co., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 3d 807, 824 (D. Md. 2015) (citation
omitted).

A claim for declaratory relief is duplicative “where

the same conduct underlies claims for declaratory judgment and
breach of contract[.]”

Geist v. Hispanic Info. & Telecomms.

Network, Inc., No. PX-16-3630, 2018 WL 1169084, at *7 (D. Md. Mar.
6, 2018).
In Goodno, the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment from
the Court that “Antero is required to pay future royalties to
Plaintiffs and the Class members under the Class Leases at issue,
based upon prices received by Antero on its sale of natural gas
and natural gas liquid products at the point of sale, without
deduction of post-production costs.”

Compl., Goodno, No. 5:20-

cv-100, 2020 WL 13094067, ECF No. 1, at ¶ 37.

The Court dismissed

the claim as duplicative of plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim,
reasoning that “[t]he declaratory judgment count . . . seeks a
declaration that Antero did exactly that with which they are
14

GREENBRIER ROYALTY FUND II V. ANTERO

1:21-CV-134

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART
AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S PARTIAL MOTION
TO DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT [ECF NO. 60]
charged in the breach of contract count” and “is not a freestanding
claim” because “the issue it raises is already a part of what is
squarely presented in this case.”
*4.

Goodno, 2020 WL 13094067, at

The Court reached the same conclusion in Allen, 2024 WL

778396.

The Court agrees with Defendant that the same issue is

presented here.

Because the declaratory judgment request is

duplicative of the breach of contract claim, the motion to dismiss
is GRANTED in this respect.

Count One is DISMISSED to the extent

that it requests a declaratory judgment.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the partial motion to dismiss
the First Amended Complaint is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART
[ECF No. 60].

The Court hereby ORDERS as follows:



Count Three is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE,
and



Count One is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE IN
PART, to the extent that it requests a
declaratory judgment.

It is so ORDERED.
The Clerk is directed to transmit copies of this Memorandum
Opinion and Order to counsel of record.

15

GREENBRIER ROYALTY FUND II V. ANTERO

1:21-CV-134

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART
AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S PARTIAL MOTION
TO DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT [ECF NO. 60]
DATED: August 30, 2024
____________________________
THOMAS S. KLEEH, CHIEF JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

16