Belkadi v. Mayle

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL DISMISSAL (ECF NO. 3 ). Signed by Chief District Judge Thomas S Kleeh on 3/5/2025. (dk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CLARKSBURG
MASSINISSA BELKADI,
Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:24-CV-14
(KLEEH)

C.C. MAYLE, a police officer
for the City of Morgantown,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL DISMISSAL [ECF NO. 3]
Pending before the Court is Defendant C.C. Mayle’s Motion
[to] Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint In lieu of Answer [ECF No. 3].
For the reasons discussed herein, Defendant C.C. Mayle’s Motion is
GRANTED.

On

February

I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1,

2024,

Plaintiff

Massinissa

Belkadi

(“Plaintiff” or “Belkadi”) against C.C. Mayle, a police officer
for the City of Morgantown. Compl., ECF No. 1. Specifically, Counts
One through Four are brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and allege (1)
Excessive Force; (2) False Arrest; (3) Unlawful Search and Seizure;
and (4) Unlawful Detainment. Counts Five and Six are brought under
West Virginia common law and allege (5) Battery and (6) Assault.
Id.
On March 27, 2024, Defendant C.C. Mayle (“Defendant” or

“Mayle”) moved to dismiss Counts One through Four of the Complaint
to the extent they are brought under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and also asserts
Counts Three and Four should be dismissed as duplicative of Count
Two. ECF No. 3. On April 10, 2024, Plaintiff filed his response in
opposition to partial dismissal [ECF No. 5] and Defendant filed
his reply in support of dismissal on April 17, 2025 [ECF No. 6].
The Court additionally convened for a hearing on the subject Motion
on January 13, 2025, and heard arguments from the parties. The
Motion for Partial Dismissal [ECF No. 3] is thus fully briefed and
ripe for review.
II.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on the evening of
February 2, 2023, he was in downtown Morgantown, West Virginia and
planned to meet up later in the night with his girlfriend. ECF No.
1

at

¶¶

4-5.

When

meeting

up,

Plaintiff’s

girlfriend

was

intoxicated, and he attempted to help her get back to his apartment
– as previously planned. Id. at ¶¶ 6-8. During this time, one of
the girlfriend’s friends yelled at Plaintiff and a stranger then
picked up Plaintiff’s girlfriend and carried her away. Id. at ¶¶
8-10.
Soon

after,

Defendant

Officer

C.C.

Mayle

arrived

and

approached Plaintiff. Id. at ¶¶ 15-16. Plaintiff claims that Mayle
physically placed his hands on him and forced him to sit on steps
2

outside a restaurant – detaining him. Id. at ¶¶ 17-18. Plaintiff
alleges Mayle then started questioning and yelling at him. Id. at
¶¶

19-20.

Mayle

allegedly

accused

Plaintiff

of

pulling

his

girlfriend into a car and told Plaintiff he would arrest Plaintiff
if Plaintiff did not stop yelling at him. Id. at ¶¶ 21-23.
Plaintiff asserts that Mayle failed to de-escalate the situation.
Id. at ¶ 24.
Mayle asked Plaintiff for his name, and he initially refused,
but then gave his full name and offered up his identification. Id.
at ¶¶ 26-29. During this time, Mayle ordered Plaintiff to stand,
and when he did not stand, Mayle allegedly grabbed Plaintiff and
lifted him up to a standing position. Id. at ¶¶ 28-30. Plaintiff
claims he repeatedly asked the officer “for what?” during the
interaction. Id. at ¶ 31. Then, Mayle allegedly swung Plaintiff
from a standing position and slammed his head on a concrete
sidewalk. Id. at ¶ 32.
At this time, Mayle and another officer handcuffed Plaintiff
and told him to stop resisting. Id. at ¶ 37. Plaintiff told the
officers he was not doing anything. Id. at ¶ 38. After handcuffing
Plaintiff and walking him towards a police vehicle, Mayle told him
he was under arrest for disorderly conduct and public intoxication.
Id. at ¶ 41. Plaintiff was not read his Miranda rights upon arrest.
Id. at ¶ 40. After the arrest, the police did not conduct a
breathalyzer test or a field sobriety test. Id. at ¶¶ 43-44.
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Plaintiff alleges he suffered physical injuries to his head
and a finger as a result of Mayle’s actions. Id. at ¶ 45.

He was

treated at Mon Health Medical Center for the alleged injuries and
was diagnosed with a concussion and facial abrasions. Id. at ¶¶
46-47.

Though

Plaintiff

was

charged

with

disorderly

conduct,

obstructing an officer; fleeing from officer, public intoxication,
and underage possession/consumption of alcohol – all the charges
were later dismissed. Id. at ¶¶ 48-49.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows
a defendant to move for dismissal upon the ground that a Complaint
does not “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” In
ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court “must accept as true all of
the factual allegations contained in the Complaint.” Anderson v.
Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 188 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). A court is “not bound to accept
as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(6)(b) tests the “legal
sufficiency of a Complaint.” Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186,
192 (4th Cir. 2009). A court should dismiss a Complaint if it does
not contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). Plausibility exists “when the plaintiff pleads
4

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft

v.

Iqbal,

556

U.S.

662,

678

(2009).

The

factual

allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above a
speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545. The facts must
constitute more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action.” Id. at 555. A motion to dismiss “does not resolve
contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the
applicability of defenses.” Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin,
980 F.2d 942, 952 (4th Cir. 1992).
IV.

DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, Defendant does not dispute that Counts
One through Four are adequately pled under a Fourth Amendment
theory of liability. However, even under the Fourth Amendment,
Defendant

contends

Counts

Three

and

Four

are

duplicative

or

encompassed by Count Two of the Complaint. Defendant further does
not challenge the adequacy of the pleadings for the assault and
battery claims. Thus, the parties’ arguments and the Court’s
analysis focuses on (1) the applicability of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments as a basis for Counts One through Four and
(2) whether Counts Three and Four are viable separate claims. For
the reasons elaborated upon below, Defendant’s Motion for Partial
Dismissal [ECF No. 3] is GRANTED.

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A. Counts One through Four are Dismissed to the Extent the
Claims Rely Upon the Eighth Amendment.
Defendant argues that the § 1983 claims cannot be based upon
the

Eighth

Amendment

because

punishment

protects

individuals

incarcerated.

ECF

No.

4

at

it’s

pp.

ban

on

post

6-7.

In

cruel

and

adjudication
his

reply

unusual
when

briefing,

Plaintiff concedes this point and acknowledges that his claims
“should

not

be

analyzed

under

the

Eighth

Amendment

since

Defendant’s actions against Plaintiff detailed in the Complaint
did not occur after any ‘conviction’. . .” ECF No. 5 at p. 6. Thus,
Counts One through Four are DISMISSED to the extent they rely upon
the Eighth Amendment.
B. Counts One through Four are Dismissed to the Extent the
Claims Rely Upon the Fourteenth Amendment.
Defendant moves to dismiss Counts One through Four as they
are alleged under the Fourteenth Amendment because Plaintiff did
not specify whether the claims are substantive or procedural due
process violations. ECF No. 4 at p. 3. Further, assuming the claims
are substantive Fourteenth Amendment claims, Defendant asserts
that they are duplicative of the more specific rights afforded
under the Fourth Amendment. Id. In support of his Fourteenth
Amendment claims, Plaintiff argues that the claims should survive
to the extent Plaintiff was treated as a pretrial detainee at any
point during the subject events. ECF No. 5 at p. 5 (arguing it
remains unclear when an individual’s rights prior to the completion
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of an arrest end under the Fourth Amendment, and the protection to
pretrial detainees analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment begin).
Defendant rebuts Plaintiff’s argument stating that Plaintiff was
not

a

pretrial

detainee

during

the

subject

conduct

because

Plaintiff had not yet been formally charged – rather the conduct
was incident to arrest. ECF No. 6 at p. 3.
The Supreme Court has held that “if a constitutional claim is
covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth
or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard
appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of
substantive due process.” United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259,
272 n.7 (1997) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989)).
“The Court may not entertain a due process claim where Plaintiffs
allege a Fourth Amendment claim arising from the same abusive
government conduct.” Spry v. W. Virginia, 2017 WL 440733, at *6
(S.D.W. Va. Feb. 1, 2017) (dismissing Fourteenth Amendment claim
“[b]ecause Plaintiffs' textually-specific Fourth Amendment claim
affords her decedent ample protection”). See Zsigray v. Cnty.
Comm'n of Lewis Cnty., 2017 WL 462011, at *3 (N.D.W. Va. Feb. 2,
2017), aff'd sub nom. Zsigray v. Cnty. Comm'n of Lewis Cnty., W.
Virginia, 709 F. App'x 178 (4th Cir. 2018) (dismissing Fourteenth
Amendment claim because “the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit
textual source of constitutional protection against this sort of
physically intrusive governmental conduct, that Amendment, not the
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more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the
guide for analyzing these claims.”).
Here, Plaintiff’s claims in Counts One through Four are
appropriately brought pursuant to the Fourth Amendment because
they all relate to the alleged unlawful arrest on February 1, 2024.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides,
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
pretrial

Plaintiff’s argument that he could be

considered

a

difference

and

Fourteenth

Amendment

claim

Amendment

provides

the

is

not

detainee

is

a

relevant

to

determining

exists

specific

distinction

because,

if

here,

constitutional

without

a

a

viable

the

Fourth

protections

Plaintiff alleges were infringed by Mayle before and during his
arrest. The Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim is
duplicative and arises from the same alleged abusive government
conduct. Plaintiff’s claims are thus properly alleged under the
Fourth Amendment. Thus, Counts One through Four are DISMISSED to
the extent they rely upon the Fourteenth Amendment.

8

C. Counts Three and Four are Dismissed Because the Claims
are Subsumed by Count Two.
Defendant argues Count Three for Unlawful Seizure and Count
Four for Unlawful Detainment should be dismissed because they are
duplicative of Count Two for False Arrest. ECF No. 4 at p. 7.
According to Defendant, the facts pled in support of Counts Three
and Four are the same as Count Two – one encounter, one set of
facts, and one event. In contrast, Plaintiff argues he should be
able to proceed on all three independent claims because he provided
facts to support each claim. Alternatively, he argues he is
entitled to plead alternative claims. ECF No. 5, at p. 8. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2).
“Claims

are

duplicative

if

they

‘stem

from

identical

allegations, that are decided under identical legal standards, and
for which identical relief is available.’ Doe v. Cmty. Coll. of
Balt. Cnty., 595 F. Supp. 3d 392, 417 (D. Md. 2022) (quoting Wultz
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 81 (D.D.C. 2010)).
Furthermore,

a

“district

court

‘has

discretion

to

dismiss

duplicative claims where they allege the same facts and the same
injury’” in the interest of judicial economy. Id. Additionally,
the Court can read the duplicative claims as being subsumed by the
overarching Fourth Amendment claim. See Williamson v. Mills, 65
F.3d 155, 158–59 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding excessive force claim
subsumed by the false arrest claim because the damages recoverable

9

on the false arrest claim included damages suffered because of use
of force in affecting arrest); Richmond v. Badia, 47 F.4th 1172,
1180 (11th Cir. 2022) (“Unlike a genuine excessive force claim, an
artificial excessive force claim – that force was excessive merely
because another Fourth Amendment violation occurred – is subsumed
in the illegal stop or arrest claim and is not a discrete excessive
force claim.”).
Here, Counts Three and Four assert the same Fourth Amendment
violations relating to Plaintiff’s arrest and the interactions
leading up to the arrest. While Plaintiff is the master of his
complaint, the Court finds little difference in facts or legal
rights between Counts Two, Three, and Four. Thus, the facts alleged
in support of unlawful detention and unlawful seizure can be used
to support the false arrest claim in Count Two and Counts Three
and Four are DISMISSED.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant C.C. Mayle’s Motion [to]
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint In lieu of Answer [ECF No. 3] is
GRANTED. Counts Two and Three of Plaintiff’s Complaint for False
Arrest and Unlawful Search and Seizure are DISMISSED because the
alleged unlawful conduct is duplicative and included within Count
Two. Plaintiff’s claims in Counts One through Four are further
DISMISSED to the extent the claims are brought under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Thus,
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Plaintiff’s remaining claims are Count One for Excessive Force and
Count Two for False Arrest under the Fourth Amendment and Counts
Five and Six for Battery and Assault under West Virginia common
law.
It is so ORDERED.
The Clerk is directed to transmit copies of this Memorandum
Opinion and Order to counsel of record by the CM/ECF system.
DATED:

March 5, 2025

____________________________
THOMAS S. KLEEH, CHIEF JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

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