Heavener v. Quicken Loans Inc. et al
Filing
60
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 51 DEFENDANT QUICKEN LOANS INC.S MOTION TO DISMISS ALL CLAIMS. The Court GRANTSDefendants Motion to Dismiss as to Count III, Unauthorized Practice of Law; Count IV, Fraud and Conspiracy; and Count VII, Joint Venture, Conspiracy and Agency. The Court DENIES Defendants Motion to Dismiss as to Count II, Predatory Lending. Signed by District Judge Gina M. Groh on 6/5/13. copy mailed to pro se dfts.(njz)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
MARTINSBURG
DWAYNE A. HEAVENER, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12-CV-68
(JUDGE GROH)
QUICKEN LOANS, INC.;
ADVANCED MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC.;
and ORTH APPRAISALS, LLC,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART DEFENDANT QUICKEN LOANS INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS ALL CLAIMS
I. Introduction
This matter is currently before the Court on Defendant Quicken Loans, Inc’s
(“Quicken Loans”) “Motion To Dismiss All Claims Against Defendant Quicken Loans” [Doc.
56], filed on April 11, 2013. Defendant moves to dismiss all four claims alleged against it.
On April 26, 2013, Plaintiff filed his response to Defendant Quicken Loans’ Motion for
Summary Judgment.
On May 3, 2013, Defendant Quicken Loans filed its Reply.
Therefore, Defendant Quicken Loans’ motion is ripe for this Court’s review. For the
following reasons, this Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant
Quicken Loans’ Motion to Dismiss All Claims.
II. Factual Allegations
This case involves a loan that was allegedly made in excess of the market value
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of Plaintiff’s property. In Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, he alleges that on or about
June 2004, Plaintiff, Dwayne A. Heavener, Jr., purchased real property located at HC
87 23-4, Yellow Spring, Hampshire County, West Virginia, 26865. In or around August
2005, Plaintiff obtained a mortgage loan from Bank of America in the amount of
$154,400.
Then, in 2007, Plaintiff alleges he was solicited by Defendant Quicken Loans
regarding a possible refinance of his existing mortgage loan with Bank of America.
Plaintiff alleges that he had numerous telephone conversations with an individual
named Adam, who he believed was a representative of Quicken Loans. In those
conversations, Adam reviewed the terms of the proposed loan. Defendant Quicken
Loans offered for Plaintiff to participate in the Smart 30 program whereby he would pay
interest only for the first five years, and then the loan would automatically roll over into a
thirty year fixed rate not to exceed the rate of 5.75%. Plaintiff’s loan closing was
conducted at his home by an agent of Quicken Loans. Plaintiff states he was given little
time to review the loan documents prior to signing them. He ultimately received a loan
that allowed him to pay interest only for ten years. The loan also included finance
charges in the principal.
Then, Defendant Advanced Mortgage, a mortgage broker, arranged for
Defendant Orth Appraisals, LLC (“Orth Appraisals”) to conduct an appraisal of Plaintiff’s
property. Orth Appraisals conducted an appraisal of Plaintiff’s property. The appraisal
indicated that the market value of the property Plaintiff had purchased in 2004 was
approximately $193,000. Plaintiff alleges that the actual market value of Plaintiff’s
property at the time of appraisal was substantially less than the appraised value given
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by Orth Appraisals. The alleged fraudulent appraisal ultimately resulted in Plaintiff
receiving a loan in excess of the value of his home and a transferal of additional
unsecured debt into home secured debt.
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint has seven counts. The first count alleges a
breach of fiduciary duty against Defendant broker, Advanced Mortgage. The second
count alleges unlawful predatory lending against Defendant Quicken Loans. The third
count alleges the unauthorized practice of law by Defendant Quicken Loans. The fourth
count alleges fraud and conspiracy against all of the defendants. The fifth count alleges
dishonesty, misrepresentation, and breach of professional standards against Defendant
Orth Appraisals. The sixth count alleges that Defendant Orth Appraisals accepted a fee
contingent on a predetermined conclusion. Last, the seventh count alleges that
defendants acted in a joint venture, conspiracy, and agency relationship.
III. Procedural Background
On June 25, 2012, Plaintiff filed, by counsel, his Complaint in the Circuit Court of
Hampshire County, West Virginia, against Defendants Quicken Loans, Indymac/OneWest,
Advanced Mortgage, and Orth Appraisals [Doc. 1-2]. On July 27, 2012, Defendant Quicken
Loans, with the consent of all defendants, removed the civil action to the Northern District
of West Virginia pursuant to this Court’s diversity jurisdiction [Doc. 1]. On August 16, 2012,
OneWest filed its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, and the Court granted OneWest’s
motion on November 7, 2012.
On January 8, 2013, Plaintiff filed his Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint.
On January 11, 2013, Defendant Quicken Loans filed its “Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion
for Leave to File Amended Complaint.” Plaintiff did not file a reply. On March 26, 2013,
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the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint. Upon direction
from the Court, the Clerk re-filed Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.
On April 11, 2013, Defendant Quicken Loans filed its “Motion To Dismiss All Claims
Against Defendant Quicken Loans.” On April 26, 2013, Plaintiff filed his response. On May
3, 2013, Defendant Quicken Loans filed its reply.
IV. Legal Standard
When reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, the Court must assume all of the allegations to be true, must resolve all
doubts and inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and must view the allegations in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243-44 (4th Cir.
1999). But, a complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127
S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007) (emphasis added). “A complaint need only give ‘a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” In re Mills, 287 Fed.
Appx. 273, 280 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). “Specific facts are not
necessary; the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
However, “[t]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require detailed factual
allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation. A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked
assertions devoid of further factual enhancements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129
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S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
When rendering its decision, the Court may also consider facts derived from sources
beyond the four corners of the complaint, including documents attached to the complaint,
documents attached to the motion to dismiss “so long as they are integral to the complaint
and authentic,” and facts subject to judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201.
Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Blankenship
v. Manchin, 471 F.3d 523, 526 n. 1 (4th Cir. 2006)); see also Katyle v. Penn Nat’l
Gaming, Inc., 637 F.3d 462, 466 (4th Cir. 2011).
V. Discussion
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint asserts four causes of action against Defendant
Quicken Loans including predatory lending, the unauthorized practice of law, fraud, and
joint venture. Each claim is analyzed below.
A.
Count II: Predatory Lending
Plaintiff contends Defendant Quicken Loans engaged in a pattern of home equity
predatory lending practices to make unfair loans in order to transfer the home equity
from borrowers to the lender. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Quicken Loans’ conduct
violated West Virginia Code § 46A-2-121, which prohibits unconscionable contracts.
Defendant Quicken Loans argues that Plaintiff failed to allege any facts regarding the
procedural and substantive unconscionability of the contract.
West Virginia Code § 46A-2-121 states, in pertinent part:
With respect to a transaction which is or gives rise to a consumer credit sale,
consumer lease or consumer loan, if the court as a matter of law finds:
(a) The agreement or transaction to have been unconscionable at the time it is
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made, or to have been induced by unconscionable conduct, the court may refuse
to enforce the agreement, or
(b) Any term or part of the agreement or transaction to have been
unconscionable at the time it was made, the court may refuse to enforce the
agreement, or may enforce the remainder of the agreement without the
unconscionable term or part, or may so limit the application of any
unconscionable term or part as to avoid any unconscionable result.
W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-121(1)(a-b). However, “a charge or practice expressly permitted
by this chapter is not unconscionable.” W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-121(3).
The Act does not define the term “unconscionable.” The West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals “has relied on the definition provided in the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code (“Consumer Credit Code”), the unconscionability provisions of which are identical
to West Virginia Code § 46A-2-121(2)(a) and (b).” Quicken Loans, Inc. v. Brown, 737
S.E.2d 640, 656-67 (W. Va. 2012) (citations omitted). In relying on the drafters of the
Consumer Credit Code’s comments, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
stated that “[t]he basic test is whether, in the light of the background and setting of the
market, the needs of the particular trade or case, and the condition of the particular
parties to the conduct or contract, the conduct involved is, or the contract or clauses
involved are so one sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at
the time the conduct occurs or is threatened or at the time of the making of the
contract.” Quicken Loans, Inc., 737 S.E.2d at 657 (citing Arnold v. United Cos.
Lending Corp., 511 S.E.2d 854, 860 (W. Va. 1998), overruled, in part, on other
grounds, Dan Ryan Builders, Inc. v. Nelson, 737 S.E.2d 550 (2012)). A contract is
not unconscionable “merely because the parties to it are unequal in bargaining position,
nor even because the inequality results in allocation of risks to the weaker party. But
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gross inadequacy in bargaining power, together with terms unreasonably favorable to
the stronger party, may confirm indications that the transaction involved elements of
deception or compulsion or may show that the weaker party had no meaningful, no real
alternative, or did not in fact assent or appear to asset to the unfair terms.” Id. Thus, in
examining whether a contract or its terms are unconscionable, a court “must focus on
the relative positions of the parties, the adequacy of the bargaining position, the
meaningful alternatives available to the plaintiff, and the existence of unfair terms in the
contract.” Quicken Loans, Inc., 737 S.E.2d at 657 (citations omitted).
Also, a party claiming a contract is unconscionable must demonstrate both
procedural and substantive unconscionability. Nelson, 737 S.E.2d at 558 (citations
omitted). In establishing procedural unconscionability, courts look at “inequities,
improprieties, or unfairness in the bargaining process and the formation of the contract,
inadequacies that suggest a lack of a real and voluntary meeting of the minds of the
parties.” Nelson, 737 S.E.2d at 558. In assessing the substantive unconscionability, a
court may look to the “unfairness in the terms of the contract itself, and arises when a
contract term is so one-sided that it has an overly harsh effect on the disadvantaged
party.” Id. Finally, “[u]nconscionability claims should but rarely be determined based on
the pleadings alone with no opportunity for the parties to present relevant evidence of
the circumstances surrounding the consummation of the contractual relationship.”
Mallory v. Mortg. Am., Inc., 67 F. Supp. 2d 601, 612 (S.D.W. Va. 1999) (citation
omitted); W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-121(2) (providing “[i]f it is claimed or appears to the
court that the agreement or transaction or any term or part thereof may be
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unconscionable, the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present
evidence as to its setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the
determination”).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Quicken Loans engaged in predatory lending as a
national lender that solicited an unsophisticated consumer to enter into an unwise home
loan. Compl., p. 1. Plaintiff states that an appraisal of his property was conducted by
defendants, and the actual market value of his property at the time of the appraisal was
substantially less than the appraised value. Compl., ¶¶ 12, 13. Plaintiff contends that
this fraudulent appraisal resulted in Plaintiff’s loan in excess of the value of his home
and a transferal of additional unsecured debt into home secured debt. Compl., ¶ 14.
Plaintiff alleges that the loan closing was conducted at his home by an agent of
Defendant Quicken Loans. Compl., ¶ 9. He alleges that the loan was conducted in a
hurried manner, and he was given little time to review the loan documents prior to
signing them. Id. Thus, Plaintiff relied on the mortgage broker’s previous
representations regarding the terms of his loan. Id. Later, Plaintiff discovered that his
loan did not contain the terms that were previously represented to him. Compl., ¶ 10.
Taking the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff for purposes of a
motion to dismiss, the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim of
unconscionability. In this case in examining procedural unconscionability, Plaintiff
alleged he is an unsophisticated consumer and Defendant Quicken Loans is a large
national lender. See Petty v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., Civil Action No. 3:126677, 2013 WL 1837932, *5 (S.D.W. Va. May 1, 2013); Arnold, 511 S.E.2d at 861
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(national corporate lender and unsophisticated, uneducated consumers is a “great
disparity in bargaining power”). These factual allegations raise a plausible issue
regarding inequities in the bargaining process. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that an
agent of Defendant Quicken Loans conducted the loan closing in a hurried manner and
gave Plaintiff little time to review the loan documents prior to signing them. See Koontz
v. Wells Fargo, N.A., Civil Action No. 2:10-CV-864, 2011 WL 1297519, *5 (S.D.W. Va.
Mar. 31, 2011) (“allegations that the closing was ‘rushed and hurried’ so that Plaintiff
went ‘without a sufficient explanation of the loan documents and loan terms’ ring of
compulsion, another indicator of unconscionable conduct”).
In analyzing substantive unconscionability, Plaintiff alleges that defendants
significantly inflated the value of his house over its actual market value to induce him
into signing the loan. See Petty, 2013 WL 1837932, *5 (finding substantive
unconscionability when Plaintiff alleged Defendant “significantly inflated the value of
their house over its actual market value to induce them into agreeing to a larger loan”).
Plaintiff also contends that Defendant Quicken Loans misrepresented the type of loan
he received. Plaintiff states he thought he was receiving the Smart 30 loan where he
paid interest only for five years but he actually received a loan where he paid interest
only for a period of ten years. See Koontz, 2011 WL 1297519, *5 (finding that Plaintiff
sufficiently alleged elements of deception when Defendant “induced her to sign the
agreement by misrepresenting the nature of the contract’s adjustable interest rate”). In
viewing the totality of Plaintiff’s allegations as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss,
the Court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged both procedural and substantive
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unconscionable inducement. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant Quicken
Loans’ motion to dismiss Count II.
B.
Count III: Unauthorized Practice of Law
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Quicken Loans engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law when it prepared Plaintiff Heavener’s loan documents.
Defendant Quicken Loans argues that this claim is time barred by West Virginia
Code § 55-2-12. Plaintiff did not respond to this argument in his response.
West Virginia Code § 55-2-12 provides:
Every personal action for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed shall be
brought: (a) Within two years next after the right to bring the same shall have
accrued, if it be for damage to property; (b) within two years next after the right to
bring the same shall have accrued if it be for damages for personal injuries; and
(c) within one year next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued if it
be for any other matter of such nature that, in case a party die, it could not have
been brought at common law by or against his personal representative.
Therefore, a claim seeking damages for the unauthorized practice of law is governed by
a two-year statute of limitations. Also, the principle that “equity follows the law” creates
a presumption that a defendant would be prejudiced by a plaintiff’s failure to bring an
equitable claim within the statute of limitations period applicable to an analogous action
at law. See Consolidation Coal Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d
764, 768-69 (N.D.W. Va. 2001) (“Under equitable principles the statute of limitations
applicable to analogous actions at law is used to create a ‘presumption of laches.’ This
principle ‘presumes’ that an action is barred if not brought within the period of the
statute of limitations and is alive if brought within the period.”) (quoting Tandy Corp. v.
Malone & Hyde, Inc., 769 F. 2d 362, 365 (6th Cir. 1985)). Plaintiff waited almost five
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years after he executed the loan documents at issue before filing this action. This Court
presumes that Defendant Quicken Loans would be prejudiced by allowing Plaintiff to
seek equitable relief on a claim for the unauthorized practice of law. Therefore, Plaintiff
has failed to state a possible claim against Defendant Quicken Loans for the
unauthorized practice of law as it is time-barred. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count III.
C.
Count IV: Fraud and Conspiracy
Plaintiff alleges that the defendants intentionally obtained a fraudulent appraisal
indicating that the market value of the Plaintiff’s property was approximately $193,000,
when the market value was far less, in order to induce him into signing a loan.
Defendant Quicken Loans argues that Plaintiff’s Complaint falls well short of stating the
who, what, when, how, or why required to alleged fraud. Defendant Quicken Loans
states that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails for three reasons: (1) it fails to inform each
defendant of his participation in the fraud; (2) it fails to allege fraud with particularity with
respect to when it allegedly took place; and (3) it fails to describe the time, place and
contents of the false representations as well as the identity of the person making the
misrepresentation.
Under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, when a party alleges
fraud or mistake, “a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting
fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind
may be alleged generally.” FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
has stated that “the ‘circumstances’ required to be pled with particularity under Rule 9(b)
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are ‘the time, place, and contents of the false representations, as well as the identity of
the person making the misrepresentation and what he obtained thereby.’” Harrison v.
Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 785 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing 5
WRIGHT & MILLER, FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV., § 1297, at 590 (2d ed. 1990)). Where
multiple defendants are asked to respond to allegations of fraud, “the complaint should
inform each defendant of the nature of his alleged participation in the fraud.” Bluestone
Coal Corp. v. CNX Land Res., Inc., Civil Action No. 1:07-00549, 2007 WL 6641647
(S.D.W. Va. Nov. 16, 2007) (citing DiVittorio v. Equidyne Extractive Indus., Inc., 822
F.3d 1242, 1247 (2d Cir. 1987)); see also Juntti v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 993
F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1993) (affirming district court’s dismissal of complaint because
complaint referenced “defendants” generally, not to action of specific defendants
regarding the alleged fraud and thus failed to meet the pleading requirement). A district
court “should hesitate to dismiss a complaint under Rule 9(b) if the court is satisfied (1)
that the defendant has been made aware of the particular circumstances for which she
will have to prepare a defense at trial, and (2) that plaintiff has substantial prediscovery
evidence of those facts.” Harrison, 176 F.3d at 784.
When a plaintiff seeks to establish a claim of fraud under West Virginia law, the
plaintiff must prove (1) the alleged fraudulent act is that of the defendant, (2) the act was
material, false, and the plaintiff justifiably relied upon it, and (3) the plaintiff suffered
injury as a result of the act. Ashworth v. Albers Med., Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 471, 477
(S.D.W. Va. 2005) (citing Lengyel v. Lint, 280 S.E.2d 66, 67 (W. Va. 1981)).
In this case, Plaintiff alleges that the defendants obtained an appraisal indicating
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that the market value of the Plaintiff’s property was approximately $193,000. Compl, ¶
34. Multiple defendants are involved in this case, and Plaintiff fails to specify the
defendants role in the alleged fraudulent appraisal. Plaintiff does not say which
Defendant ordered a fraudulent appraisal, and the allegations are insufficient to provide
a defendant with fair notice of the claim.1 See Harrison, 176 F.3d at 789 (“The ‘clear
intent of Rule 9(b) is to eliminate fraud actions in which all the facts are learned through
discovery after the complaint is filed.’”) (citation omitted); see also Juntii, 993 F.2d 228,
*2 (stating that aggregation of defendants “is insufficient either to provide a defendant
with fair notice of the claim against him or to protect a defendant from harm to his
reputation or good will.”). Also, Plaintiff states that the misrepresentation of the market
value of the home was intentional and material; however, Plaintiff does not allege in his
Complaint what the property’s actual market value was at the time of the fraudulent
appraisal or plead facts otherwise indicating that the misrepresentation was intentional
and material. Finally, Plaintiff does not state when the fraudulent activity took place.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Advanced Mortgage arranged for the Defendant Orth
Appraisals to conduct an appraisal of the Plaintiff’s property; however, Plaintiff fails to
allege which loan the appraisal was obtained for, the 2005 loan or the 2007 loan.
Additionally, Plaintiff fails to allege an approximate date or time period that the appraisal
was performed. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant Quicken Loans’ motion to
1
Alternatively, at Paragraph 11 of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
Advanced Mortgage arranged for the Defendant Orth Appraisals to conduct an appraisal
of the Plaintiff’s property. Therefore, if Plaintiff did specifically state which Defendant
obtained the fraudulent appraisal, it would be Defendant Advanced Mortgage and not
Defendant Quicken Loans as Defendant Advanced Mortgage was the only defendant which
Plaintiff identified as obtaining the appraisal.
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dismiss Count IV.
D.
Count VII: Joint Venture, Conspiracy, and Agency
Defendant Quicken Loans argues that Plaintiff alleged no facts in support of his
claims of an alleged joint venture between Quicken Loans, Advanced Mortgage, and
Orth Appraisals other than a conclusory recitation of the legal elements. Plaintiff does
not respond to this argument in his response.
West Virginia law defines a joint venture as “‘an association of two or more
persons to carry out a single business enterprise for profit, for which purpose they
combine their property, money, effects, skill and knowledge.’” Armor v. Lantz, 535
S.E.2d 737, 742 (W. Va. 2000) (quoting Syl. Pt. 2, Price v. Halstead, 355 S.E.2d 380
(W. Va. 1987)). The party’s contributions “need not be equal or of the same character.
There must, however, be some contribution by each party of something promotive of the
enterprise.” Armor, 535 S.E.2d at 743. A joint venture “arises out of a contractual
relationship between the parties. The contract may be oral or written, express or
implied.” Price, 355 S.E.2d at 384 (citation omitted). Additionally, “[a]n agreement,
express or implied, for the sharing of profits is generally considered essential to the
creation of a joint adventure, and it has been held that at common law, in order to
constitute a joint adventure, there must be an agreement to share in both the profits and
the losses.” Armor, 535 S.E.2d at 743 (quotation omitted). Courts have also
recognized the “necessity of joint venturers having equal control over the common
commercial pursuit.” Id. at 745.
First, Plaintiff does not assert in his Complaint that each Defendant had an
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agreement, express or implied, for the sharing of profits. Second, Plaintiff does not
allege that each Defendant shared in the profits or losses. Third, Plaintiff does not state
that Defendants combined their money, skill or knowledge to carry out a business
enterprise or committed acts in furtherance of a joint venture. Finally, Plaintiff has not
alleged nor offered evidence of the exercise of a means of joint control as set forth in
Armor. Plaintiff simply provides no facts in his Complaint to support this claim against
Defendant Quicken Loans. Additionally, Plaintiff failed to provide any argument
addressing Defendant’s motion to dismiss this count. Therefore, the Court GRANTS
Defendant’s motion to dismiss Count VII.
VI. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, this Court hereby GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES
IN PART Defendant Quicken Loans’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 51]. The Court GRANTS
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as to Count III, Unauthorized Practice of Law; Count IV,
Fraud and Conspiracy; and Count VII, Joint Venture, Conspiracy and Agency. The
Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as to Count II, Predatory Lending.
It is so ORDERED.
The Clerk is directed to transmit copies of this Order to all counsel of record
and/or pro se parties herein.
DATED: June 5, 2013
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