UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. One 2003 Chevrolet Impala, VIN 2G1WF52E039105400 et al

Filing 25

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING UNITED STATES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN CRIMINAL FORFEITURE PROCEEDING AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN CIVIL FORFEITURE PROCEEDING denying and dismissing with prejudice 7 AMENDED MOTION for the Re turn of Seized Property and granting 17 Motion for Summary Judgment. Further ORDERED that this case be DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the active docket of this Court. Clerk is directed to enter judgment on this matter. Signed by District Judge Gina M. Groh on 5/14/2013. Copy mailed to pro se claimant P. Brown by CMRR.(cwm) (Additional attachment(s) added on 5/14/2013: # 1 Certified Mail Return Receipt) (cwm).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
MARTINSBURG

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.

CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 3:12-CR-57-1
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12-CV-125
(JUDGE GROH)

LOREN CONSTANTINE BROWN,
Defendant,
PRINCESS LONGMORE BROWN,
Claimant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING UNITED STATES’ MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN CRIMINAL FORFEITURE PROCEEDING AND
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN CIVIL FORFEITURE PROCEEDING
Plaintiff United States of America (“Government”) filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
in the Criminal Forfeiture Proceeding [Doc. 192], Criminal Action No. 3:12-cr-57-1, and a
Motion for Summary Judgment in the Civil Forfeiture Proceeding [Doc. 17], Civil Action No.
3:12-cv-125, on March 27, 2013. The Claimant, Princess Longmore Brown, is proceeding
pro se. Therefore, on March 28, 2013, the Court sent Claimant a Roseboro notice advising
Claimant of her right to file responsive material, including counter-affidavits, and to alert her
to the fact that her failure to so respond might result in the entry of summary judgment
against her. Davis v. Zahradrich, 600 F.2d 458, 460 (4th Cir. 1979); Roseboro v.
Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1975). Claimant was ordered to file her Response
within thirty days from the date of the Roseboro notice. On April 26, 2013, Claimant filed
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her Response. On May 10, 2013, Government filed its Reply. For the following reasons,
this Court GRANTS Government’s Motion for Summary Judgment in the Criminal Forfeiture
Proceeding [Crim. Doc. 192] and Government’s Motion for Summary Judgment in the Civil
Forfeiture Proceeding [Civ. Doc. 17].
I. FACTS
Claimant immigrated to the United States from Jamaica in 1975, and she resides
in Maryland. Defendant Brown and Claimant began dating in 2000, when Claimant was
visiting family in Jamaica. Claimant traveled to Jamaica frequently to visit Defendant
Brown and left him her checkbook, as well as sent him money via Western Union from
the United States. Claimant and Defendant Brown married in Jamaica in 2001. In
2002, Defendant Brown immigrated to the United States to live with Claimant in
Maryland.
During their marriage, Claimant and Defendant Brown, on several occasions,
temporarily separated and reunited. In late 2003 or early 2004, Defendant Brown
temporarily left the marital home and resided elsewhere. After the last reconciliation in
2003, Defendant Brown permanently left the home in late 2005. In May 2006, Claimant
filed for divorce. In March 2007, a final divorce decree was granted.
On July 25, 2012, Loren Constantine Brown (“Defendant Brown”), Claimant’s exhusband, and others were charged in the Indictment in United States v. Loren
Constantine Brown, a/k/a “Jamaica,” Criminal Action No. 3:12-cr-57, in the Northern
District of West Virginia, with various violations of the Controlled Substances Act. The
Indictment contained a forfeiture allegation providing notice of the Government’s intent

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to seek forfeiture of property used or intended to be used to commit or to facilitate the
commission of violations of the Controlled Substances Act, and any property derived
from proceeds obtained as a result of such offense.
The forfeiture allegation sought a money judgment in the amount of $225,000, as
well as other items. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) and 21 U.S.C. § 853(p)(1), the
Government specifically named substitute property it intended to forfeit in the event that
property subject to direct forfeiture, namely the money judgment of $225,500 was
unavailable due to any act or omission of the defendants. The substitute property
included:
1.

One 2003 Chevrolet Impala, VIN 2G1WF52E039105400, bearing
Maryland registration number 9AS5281;

2.

One 2007 Chevrolet Avalanche, VIN 3GNFK12Y67G271025, bearing
Maryland registration number 08V253;

3.

One gold-in-color watch with gold-in-color watchband;

4.

One gold-in-color bracelet bearing the name “Brown”;

5.

One gold-in-color necklace bearing a gold-in-color cross emblem;

6.

Three gold-in-color rings bearing diamond-like stones; and

7.

One gold-in-color ring bearing the letter “B”.

On August 30, 2012, Defendant Brown executed a plea agreement agreeing to
forfeit to the United States all of the listed substitute property. In the plea agreement,
Defendant Brown stipulated the property constituted, or was derived from, proceeds
obtained directly or indirectly as a result of his violations of the Controlled Substances
Act, or was used to commit and facilitate such violation. On September 13, 2012, the
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Court entered and accepted Defendant Brown’s guilty plea to one count of violating 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
The Government moved for the entry of a Preliminary Order of Forfeiture, which
was granted. Notice of the forfeitures were made with information on how to file claims
to any of the property. Claimant made claims in both 3:12-cr-57-1 and 3:12-cv-125.
There are two separate proceedings for the return of the seized property.
Claimant’s Petition to recover the jewelry items proceeds under the criminal forfeiture
statute, 21 U.S.C. § 853. The 2003 Chevrolet Impala proceeds under the civil forfeiture
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 981. Civil forfeiture is an in rem proceeding, while criminal
forfeiture is an in personam proceeding. However, the district court may hear both
matters at the same time because the civil forfeiture action and the criminal forfeiture
action are related and substantial savings of judicial resources would result by allowing
both matters to proceed before the same court. United States v. Astra Motor Cars,
352 F. Supp. 2d 370 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); see also United States v. Dunn, 802 F.3d 646
(2nd Cir. 1986), cert den., 107 S. Ct. 1568 (1986) (holding that remedies of criminal
forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 852 and civil forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881 are not
mutually exclusive). Accordingly, this Court will first address the civil forfeiture
proceeding and then turn to the criminal forfeiture proceeding.
II. CIVIL FORFEITURE
United States v. One 2003 Chevrolet Impala, VIN 2G1WF52E039105400, et al.
A.

Procedural History

On October 17, 2012, the Government filed a Verified Complaint for Forfeiture In

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Rem of two vehicles: a 2003 Chevrolet Impala, VIN 2G1WF52E039105400, and a 2007
Chevrolet Avalanche, VIN 3GNFK12Y67G271025. The Government’s Verified
Complaint alleged that the two vehicles were subject to forfeiture pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
§ 881, because they were used to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession,
and/or concealment of controlled substances, specifically for some of the controlled
purchases made from Defendant Brown in the investigation. The Government initiated
this civil forfeiture action because it was determined that Claimant may have a putative
interest in the vehicles.
On November 13, 2012, Claimant filed a petition for the return of seized
properties in Civil Action No. 3:12-cv-125, seeking the return of the 2003 Chevrolet
Impala. In that petition, Claimant alleged that she was the sole title owner of the 2003
Chevrolet Impala. On November 28, 2012, the Court set an evidentiary hearing on the
petition. Subsequently, the Court authorized the Government to conduct discovery and
permitted Claimant additional time to amend her petition to correct procedural defects.
On January 23, 2013, Claimant filed an Amended Petition. The Court authorized the
parties to participate in discovery, and the Government engaged in discovery through
submitting interrogatories to and deposing Claimant.
B.

Legal Standard

The standards for summary judgment in civil forfeiture actions are based on the
parties’ respective burdens of proof at trial. First, the claimant bears the burden of
proving that she has standing to contest the forfeiture. Second, the Government must
prove only by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is subject to forfeiture.
Last, the claimant has the burden of proving that her interest in the property should not
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be forfeited because she is a valid “innocent owner.”
As a threshold matter in civil forfeiture proceedings, a claimant must have
standing, and the claimant opposing forfeiture bears the burden of establishing both
constitutional and statutory standing. See United States v. Munson, 477 Fed. Appx.
57, 62 (4th Cir. 2012). To establish Article III standing, “a claimant must have a
colorable ownership, possessory or security interest in at least a portion of the
defendant property.” Id. (citations omitted).
A claimant must also satisfy statutory standing requirements as a threshold
issue. See United States v. $38,000.00 Dollars in United States Currency, 816 F.2d
1538, 1544 (4th Cir. 1987). To satisfy the statutory standing requirements, a claimant
must comply with the procedural requirements for bringing a claim under the applicable
federal forfeiture statutes and the Supplemental Rules. Id. at 1544-45.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs summary judgment.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 56. Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322,
106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552, (1986). A genuine issue exists “if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). Thus, the Court must
conduct “the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trialwhether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be

6

resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of
either party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S. Ct. at 2511.
Once the claimant successfully asserts Article III and statutory standing, the
Government has the initial burden of demonstrating the “absence of a genuine issue of
material fact–that is, taking all the evidence in the light most favorable to the claimant,
has the government shown that no reasonable jury could award the property to the
claimant?” United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1439
(11th Cir. 1991); see United States v. Leak, 123 F.3d 787, 793 (4th Cir. 1997). To
satisfy its initial burden, the Government may establish for the Court specific portions of
the record which it believes demonstrate that the “claimant cannot show by a
preponderance of the evidence that [s]he is entitled to the property.” Id. The
Government can also meet its burden by “introducing evidence negating the claimant’s
case.” Id.
After the Government establishes forfeitability, the burden shifts to the claimant
to prove, through credible evidence, that there is an actual issue of material fact, and
that the claimant is entitled to the property. Id. at 463. The claimant, as the party
opposing summary judgment, “must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986). That is, once
the movant has met its burden to show an absence of material fact, the party opposing
summary judgment must then come forward with affidavits or other evidence
demonstrating there is indeed a genuine issue for trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 56; Celotex

7

Corp., 477 U.S. at 323-25, 166 S. Ct. at 2552-54; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; 106 S.
Ct. at 2510. “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative,
summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; 106 S. Ct. at 2511
(citations omitted).
C.

Analysis

The Government moves for summary judgment arguing that Claimant has failed
to follow the procedural rules and therefore lacks statutory standing. The Government
contends that Claimant was given additional time to comply with Rule G(5) and file a
proper Answer; however, Claimant has still failed to do so. In Claimant’s response, she
argues that her Amended Petition should have satisfied the Answer requirements.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recognizes that “[i]n addition to establishing
Article III standing, claimants also must satisfy applicable statutory standing
requirements. Thus . . . statutory standing also is a threshold issue.” $38,000.00
Dollars in U.S. Currency, 816 F.2d at 1544. The Supplemental Rules “must be strictly
enforced.” United States v. $ 12,914.00 in United States Currency, 828 F. Supp. 2d
822, 824 (D. Md. 2011) (citation omitted). “Courts consistently have required claimants
to follow the language of the Supplemental Rules to the letter.” United States v.
Borromeo, 945 F.2d 750, 752 (4th Cir. 1991).
Supplemental Rule G(5) provides that a person who is contesting the forfeiture
may file a claim in the court where the action is pending, and the claim must (1) identify
the specific property claimed; (2) identify the claimant and state the claimant’s interest in
the property; (3) be signed by the claimant under penalty of perjury; and, (4) be served

8

on the government attorney designed under Rule G(4)(a)(ii)(C) or (b)(ii)(D). Supp. R.
G(5)(a)(I); see also 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(4) (“any person claiming an interest in the seized
property may file a claim asserting such person’s interest in the property in the manner
set forth in the [Supplemental Rules]”). After filing the claim, a claimant must then serve
and file an answer to the Complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure “within 21 days after filing the claim.” Supp. R. G(5)(b). “Without filing
a claim and an answer in a timely manner and under the proper procedures set forth in
the Supplemental Rules a potential claimant lacks statutory standing to assert his or her
claim.” United States v. $25,790 U.S. Currency, Civil Action No. AW-09-3283, 2010
WL 2671754, *2 (D. Md. 2010).
In this case, the Court, in its discretion, allowed Claimant additional time to
perfect her claims and gave her instructions on how to comply with the statutory
procedural requirements set forth in Supplemental Rule G(5). Although Claimant
corrected part of her original Petition by signing the Amended Petition under penalty of
perjury by swearing before a notary, Claimant failed to properly state her interest in the
property. Claimant made only the following bare assertion of ownership, “Claimant is
the sole title owner of the said 2003 Chevrolet Impala.” It is undisputed that this is the
only statement of ownership in Claimant’s Amended Petition. Claimant’s sole statement
is too broad to establish ownership. To validly establish an interest in the property,
Claimant must state how and where she acquired the vehicle, including, but not limited
to, the person from whom she received it, the date of the receipt, the place of the
receipt, and a description of the transaction which established her ownership. See

9

United States v. $134,750 in United States Currency, 2010 WL 1741359) (D. Md.
2010).
Moreover, it is undisputed that Claimant did not file an Answer. She did not
request an extension, and in her Response, she asserts that the Amended Petition
should also serve as her Answer. However, Supplemental Rule 5 provides that a
Claimant must file their claim and an Answer to the Government’s Verified Complaint.
Supp. R. 5(G)(a)-(b). Because Claimant has failed to submit an Answer months after
the deadline, the Court FINDS Claimant lacks statutory standing. The Court will not
analyze whether Claimant is an innocent owner because Claimant lacks statutory
standing and she failed to raise or plead the innocent owner affirmative defense in an
Answer. See United States v. One Tyrannosaurus Bataar Skeleton, No. 12 Civ.
4760 (PKC), 2012 WL 5834899, *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2012) (recognizing that the
innocent owner defense is an affirmative defense). Accordingly, the United States’
Motion for Summary Judgment on the Civil Forfeiture Proceeding is GRANTED and
Claimant’s Amended Petition for the Return of Seized Properties for the 2003 Chevrolet
Impala1 is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

1

Claimant also failed, although given a second chance to do so, to delete the
items subject to criminal forfeiture from the Petition and Amended Petition for the Return
of Seized Properties in the Civil Forfeiture Action. Therefore, the Court notes that the
above-described jewelry is not subject to the civil forfeiture action.
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III. CRIMINAL FORFEITURE
United States v. Loren Constantine Brown, a/k/a “Jamaica”, 3:12-CR-57-1
A.

Procedural History

On October 10, 2012, this Court entered a Preliminary Order of Forfeiture as a
result of Defendant Brown’s guilty plea to the offense of violating the Controlled
Substances Act, specifically 21 U.S.C. § 841. The Preliminary Order of Forfeiture
forfeited to the Government the jewelry items2 because Defendant Brown stipulated in
his plea agreement that the jewelry was property constituting, or derived from, proceeds
obtained from his violation of the Controlled Substances Act offense of conviction, or
was used, or intended to be used, to commit or to facilitate such violation, which was in
his possession or his co-defendant’s possession at the time of its seizure.
The Government commenced the criminal forfeiture proceeding by sending
notice to the Claimant, which she received on October 19, 2012. Claimant filed her
Petition on November 13, 2012. The Court granted Claimant additional time to amend
her petition, and she filed an Amended Petition on January 23, 2013. On March 14,
2013, the Government deposed Claimant with respect to both the civil and criminal
forfeiture actions.
B. Legal Standard
Criminal forfeitures are governed by Rule 32.2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure and by the applicable forfeiture statute relating to the crimes of conviction. In
2

(1) One gold-in-color watch with gold-in-color watchband; (2) one gold-incolor bracelet bearing the name “Brown”; (3) one gold-in-color necklace bearing a goldin-color cross emblem; (4) three gold-in-color rings bearing diamond-like stones; and (5)
one gold-in-color ring bearing the letter “B”.
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this case, 21 U.S.C. § 853 governs the forfeiture claim as Defendant Brown’s offense of
conviction arises under the Controlled Substances Act.
Although summary judgment is not applicable in criminal cases, Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 32.2(c) allows the Court to “permit the parties to conduct discovery
in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . [w]hen discovery ends, a
party may move for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.” FED.
R. CRIM. P. 32.2 (C)(1)(B). Therefore, in reviewing the parties’ summary judgment
motions, the Court applies the same standard of review that would be applied in a civil
case. See United States v. Bailey, Criminal No. 1:11-cr-00010-MR-DLH, 2013 WL
677973, __ F. Supp. 2d __ (W.D.N.C. Feb. 25, 2013) (citing United States v. Corpus,
491 F.3d 205, 208-09 (5th Cir. 2007)).
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs summary judgment.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 56. Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322; 106 S. Ct.
at 2552. A genuine issue exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; 106 S. Ct. at
2510. Thus, the Court must conduct “the threshold inquiry of determining whether there
is the need for a trial--whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that
properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be
resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250; 106 S. Ct. at 2511.

12

The claimant, as the party opposing summary judgment, “must do more than
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. at 586; 106 S. Ct. at 1356. That is, once the movant has met its
burden to show an absence of material fact, the party opposing summary judgment
must then come forward with affidavits or other evidence demonstrating there is indeed
a genuine issue for trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 56; Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323-25; 166 S.
Ct. at 2552-54; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; 106 S. Ct. at 2510. “If the evidence is
merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; 106 S. Ct. at 2511 (citations omitted).
The standards for summary judgment are based on the parties’ respective
burdens of proof at trial. First, the claimant bears the burden of proving that she has
standing to file a claim contesting forfeiture. Second, the claimant bears the burden of
proving that she either had superior right, title, or interest in the property at the time the
crime occurred, or that she was a bona fide purchaser for value without cause to know
that the property was subject to forfeiture.
C. Analysis
The Government argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because
Claimant lacks both statutory and constitutional standing to contest the forfeiture.
Claimant argues that the jewelry worn by Defendant Brown belongs to her two minor
daughters and that simply because Defendant Brown wore the jewelry does not
constitute his ownership of the jewelry. Claimant also alleges she had a verbal contract
with Defendant Brown providing he could wear them, but that she had the power to

13

recall the jewelry at any time.
1. Statutory Standing
As stated above, the applicable forfeiture statute governing Claimant’s claim is
21 U.S.C. § 853. Section 853(n) provides that a Claimant’s petition “shall set forth the
nature and extent of the petitioner’s right, title or interest in the property, the time and
circumstances of the petitioner’s acquisition of the right, title, or interest in the property,
any additional facts supporting the petitioner’s claim, and the relief sought.”
Additionally, the claimant should provide sufficient detail regarding her alleged interest
in the property. See United States v. Ginn, 799 F. Supp. 2d 645, 647 (E.D. La. 2010).
In this case, Claimant’s Amended Petition simply asserts that she owns the
jewelry. It is undisputed that in Claimant’s Amended Petition, she does not state any
details regarding how she owns the jewelry or came into ownership of it. Additionally,
Claimant did not have possession of the jewelry, as it was being worn by her exhusband Defendant Brown or his girlfriend and co-defendant Crystal Metz. Petitioner
does not state the time she acquired the jewelry, either. In sum, Claimant has failed to
provide any details regarding her alleged ownership interest in the jewelry. Instead,
Petitioner makes only a bald assertion that she owns the jewelry items. Therefore,
Claimant lacks statutory standing.
2. Constitutional Standing
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized that the “touchstone for
standing is the possession of a legal interest in the forfeited property.” United States v.
Oregon, 671 F.3d 484, 490 (4th Cir. 2012). Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2), “any

14

person, other than the defendant, asserting a legal interest in property which has been
ordered forfeited to the United States may, . . . petition the court for a hearing to
adjudicate the validity of his alleged interest in the property. Although the forfeiture
issue is a matter of federal law, the courts refer to state law in determining whether a
petitioner has a legal interest in forfeited property.” Oregon, 671 F.3d at 490.
In this case, Maryland law applies to determine whether Claimant has a legal
interest in the jewelry as Claimant allegedly purchased the jewelry in the state of her
domicile or allegedly sent money to Defendant Brown to purchase the jewelry from
Maryland. First, Claimant has failed to provide receipts as proof of purchase for any
piece of jewelry subject to forfeiture. Second, Claimant did not maintain possession of
the property because it was constantly in the possession, dominion, and control of
Defendant Brown.
Last, even if Claimant did purchase the jewelry, then Claimant made a valid inter
vivos gift of the jewelry to Defendant Brown and does not possess a legal interest in the
jewelry. In Maryland, to create an inter vivos gift, the donor must intend to transfer the
property, and in addition there must be a delivery transferring the donor’s dominion over
the property without power of revocation or retention of dominion over the subject of the
gift, as well as acceptance by the donee. Brewer v. Brewer, 165 Md. App. 1, 846 A.2d
1 (Md. App. 2004).
Claimant admits that the jewelry was purchased by her and transferred to
Defendant Brown. The Government provided evidence from photographs and
statements from Claimant’s deposition to show that Claimant delivered the jewelry to

15

Defendant Brown, and he maintained sole possession and control over the jewelry.
Defendant Brown accepted the jewelry, he wore it on many occasions, as evidenced by
the photographs, he wore the jewelry on the date of his arrest, and the jewelry was in
his dominion, possession, and control even five years after his divorce from Claimant.
Claimant has failed to come forward with affidavits or other evidence demonstrating that
she had a power to recall the jewelry based on a verbal agreement with Defendant
Brown. Claimant provides no details regarding the agreement and no proof evidencing
the agreement. In fact, Claimant admitted that the ownership of the jewelry was never
included in their divorce decree or property settlement. Although Claimant asserts she
had the power to recall the jewelry, the evidence she presents is merely colorable and
not significantly probative. Claimant also states that jewelry items belong to Defendant
Brown’s minor children based upon the same undocumented agreement. However,
absent proof of a valid will, “rights of prospective heir do not vest until the death of the
intestate decedent.” United States v. Miscellaneous Jewelry, 667 F. Supp. 232, 247
(D. Md. 1987), aff’d, 889 F.2d 1317 (4th Cir. 1989). Therefore, Claimant has failed to
meet her burden of proving that she has standing to file a claim contesting forfeiture.
Accordingly, Claimant lacks statutory and constitutional standing to challenge the
criminal forfeiture, and the United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the
Criminal Forfeiture Proceeding is GRANTED and Claimant’s Amended Petition for the
Return of Seized Properties for the 2003 Chevrolet Impala3 is DISMISSED WITH

3

Claimant also failed, although given a second chance to do so, to delete the items
subject to criminal forfeiture from the Petition and Amended Petition for the Return of Seized
Properties in the Civil Forfeiture Action. Therefore, the Court notes that the above-described
jewelry is not subject to the civil forfeiture action.

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PREJUDICE.
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, for the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Government’s
Motion for Summary Judgment in the Criminal Forfeiture Proceeding [Doc. 192],
Criminal Action No. 3:12-cr-57-1, and GRANTS Government’s Motion for Summary
Judgment in the Civil Forfeiture Proceeding [Doc. 17], Civil Action No. 3:12-cv-125.
Accordingly, Claimant’s Amended Petition [Doc. 118] in Criminal Action No. 3:12-CR57-1 is DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and Claimant’s Amended Petition
[Doc. 7] in Civil Action No. 3:12-CV-125 is DENIED and DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE. It is further ORDERED that this case be DISMISSED and STRICKEN
from the active docket of this Court.
It is so ORDERED.
The Clerk is directed to transmit copies of this Order to all counsel of record
and/or pro se parties. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58, the Clerk is
directed to enter judgment on this matter.
DATED: May 14, 2013

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