East Sussex Children Services v. Morris et al

Filing 36

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING VERIFIED PETITION 1 FOR RETURN OF CHILD TO THE UNITED KINGDOM. Signed by District Judge Gina M. Groh on 1/22/2013. Certified copies mailed to United States Department of State, counsel of record and copy sent certified mail, return receipt to pro se Respondents.(tlg) (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/22/2013: # 1 certified mail receipt)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
MARTINSBURG

EAST SUSSEX CHILDREN SERVICES,
Petitioner,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12-CV-141
(JUDGE GROH)

CARLY LOUISE MORRIS and
RALPH REGIS MORRIS,
Respondents.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING VERIFIED PETITION FOR
RETURN OF CHILD TO THE UNITED KINGDOM
I. Introduction
This matter is currently before the court on Petitioner East Sussex Children Services’
Verified Petition For Return of Child to United Kingdom (“Petition”) [Doc. 1]. For the
following reasons, the Court GRANTS the Petition.
II. Facts and Procedural History
The Court finds the following facts based upon the evidence and testimony
adduced at the final hearing. This action involves a minor child, S.A.M., born in 2000.
Pet.’s Ex. 1.1 Respondent Carly Louise Morris (“Mother”) is S.A.M.’s mother and a
citizen of the United Kingdom. Respondent Ralph Regis Morris (“Step-Father”) is the
Mother’s husband, S.A.M’s step-father, and a citizen of the United States. Mother and

1

Because Respondents submitted no Exhibits, all references to Exhibits are to Petitioner’s
Exhibits.
1

Step-Father met on the internet through mutual friends on Facebook while playing a
vampire application game. They were married on September 27, 2010 in Cecil County,
Maryland. Pet.’s Ex. 2.
Petitioner, East Sussex Children Services (“East Sussex”), is the social services
division of the East Sussex County Council. East Sussex has supervised S.A.M. since
February 21, 2010 because S.A.M. is subject to a Child Protection Plan after East
Sussex found neglect and risk of emotional harm to S.A.M. and her half-brother, A.2
Since October 2010, there have been ongoing proceedings regarding S.A.M.’s care,
residence, and contact in the Hastings County Court in England and in the High Court of
Justice, Principal Registry of the Family Division in England. Katie Smee-Giles, a senior
practitioner at East Sussex, has supervised S.A.M.’s case since July 11, 2011.
In the proceedings involving S.A.M., Mother sought leave of court to remove
S.A.M. permanently from the United Kingdom and to relocate S.A.M. to the United
States to live with Step-Father. See Pet.’s Ex. 3. In December 2011, the Hastings
County Court did not grant Mother permission to relocate with S.A.M., and the court
ordered Mother to file a statement with the court “(a) setting out the status and
chronology of any application for a visa for herself and S.A.M. to move to the USA,
(b) her intention as to her domestic arrangement if and when she relocates, and © her
proposal for the future contact of S.A.M. and herself with A. If and when she does settle
in the USA.” Id. Mother and Step-Father were also ordered to cooperate in a
background check to be conducted by Children and Families Across Borders, which
2

A. is not subject to this proceeding as he is still in the United Kingdom, residing with his
biological father.
2

included a background check in the United States of the Step-Father. Id.
On February 1, 2012, the Hastings County Court ordered Mother to file S.A.M.’s
passport with the solicitors for the guardian or with the court office at Hastings County
Court within 48 hours of being served with the order. Pet.’s Ex. 4. On February 20,
2012, Mother filed S.A.M.’s passport with Mother’s solicitor. Pet.’s Ex. 5. Mother’s
solicitor undertook to the court “not to release the passport of [S.A.M.] nor to release the
passport to any other party without the prior consent of the court.” Pet.’s Ex. 5. Thus, in
order for Mother to have S.A.M.’s passport returned to her, she would need the consent
of the court.
Mother alleged in her testimony that about a month later she was planning for
holiday in the United States and she forgot that she had lodged S.A.M.’s passport with
her solicitor. As a result, Mother alleged she filed for replacement passports for herself3
and S.A.M. on April 7, 2012. Pet.’s Ex. 6. Mother told the passport agency that she
needed a replacement passport for S.A.M. because she had put the passport in a safe
place at home and could not locate it. Id. Mother and Step-Father testified that Mother
did not remember that S.A.M.’s passport was with Mother’s solicitor until Mother spoke
with Step-Father the evening after she applied for the replacement passports. At that
time, Step-Father reminded Mother that S.A.M.’s passport was with Mother’s solicitor.
On April 24, 2012, Mother received replacement passports for herself and S.A.M. from
the United Kingdom’s Passport Agency. Pet.’s Ex. 8, 9. Mother did not notify her
solicitor or the court that she had applied for and received a replacement passport for
3

Mother testified that her passport was damaged when her home in East Sussex was
flooded. Therefore, she applied for a replacement passport.
3

S.A.M. On April 27, 2012, Mother also applied for and obtained a travel visa for the
United States for herself and S.A.M. Pet.’s Ex. 10.
On May 31, 2012, Ms. Smee-Giles met with Mother. Ms. Smee-Giles testified
that at the meeting, Mother informed Ms. Smee-Giles that her Visa application had been
delayed for some time. However, only one day after the meeting, on June 1, 2012,
Mother removed S.A.M. from the United Kingdom to Canada. On June 4, 2012, Mother
and S.A.M. entered the United States via the Rainbow Bridge in Niagara Falls. Pet.’s
Ex. 8, 9. Mother and S.A.M. met Step-Father at Niagara Falls. Mother testified that
S.A.M. was so happy to be with Step-Father that she could not separate them. In the
following days, Mother traveled with S.A.M. to Step-Father’s home in Hedgesville, West
Virginia. Since this time, S.A.M. has resided in Hedgesville, West Virginia with Mother
and Step-Father. Until S.A.M.’s removal from the United Kingdom on June 1, 2012,
S.A.M. has always lived there. She attended school in the United Kingdom, and she
had friends and extended family there.
On June 11, 2012, Mother e-mailed Ms. Smee-Giles to inform her that a
scheduled supervised visit between S.A.M. and her half-brother A. could not take place
because S.A.M. had chicken pox.4 Pet.’s Ex. 17. The Court finds that Mother wrote the
e-mail to deceive East Sussex as to her and S.A.M.’s whereabouts. Ms. Smee-Giles
testified that Mother’s e-mail was unusual as she had never received an e-mail from

4

Although Mother testified she thought she could leave and the English Court’s Order
was not prohibiting her from removing S.A.M. from the United Kingdom, the Court notes that
when Mother subsequently spoke with Ms. Smee-Giles she did not disclose her and S.A.M.’s
whereabouts. Therefore, based upon the inconsistencies in Mother’s testimony, the Court finds
she is not credible.
4

Mother, so, on June 12, 2012 she conducted an unannounced visit to the family home.
When she arrived at the family home, it was clear that Mother and S.A.M. had left the
address. Ms. Smee-Giles testified that the house was locked up and that there was a
mattress sitting in the doorway. At that point, Ms. Smee-Giles notified S.A.M.’s
guardian, and S.A.M.’s guardian called an emergency hearing in Hastings County
Court. At the emergency hearing, the Hastings County Court entered an Interim Care
Order placing the Child in the care of East Sussex County Council Social Services.
Pet.’s Ex. 11. The Order granted East Sussex Children Services and East Sussex
County Council shared parental responsibility over S.A.M. under the Children Act of
1989. The Order also provides the following:
WARNING: Where a Care Order is in force no person may cause the child
to be known by a new surname or remove the child from the United
Kingdom without written consent of every person with parental
responsibility for the child or leave of court. However, the local authority,
in whose care the child is, may remove the child from the United Kingdom
for a period of less than 1 month. It may be a criminal offence under the
Child Abduction Act 1984 to remove the child from the United Kingdom
without the leave of the court.
On June 28, 2012, prior to discovering that Mother had removed S.A.M. from the
United Kingdom, Justice Moylan of the High Court of Justice, Principal Registry of the
Family Division, entered a Passport Order ordering the Mother to hand over to the
Tipstaff all of S.A.M.’s and Mother’s passports and any and all other travel documents,
prohibiting Mother from obtaining or attempting to obtain replacement passports for
herself or S.A.M., and prohibiting Mother from removing S.A.M. from the United
Kingdom. Pet.’s Ex. 13. After learning of S.A.M.’s removal from the United Kingdom,
East Sussex prepared and filed its Application for Return of the Child and submitted the

5

Application to the Central Authority for England and Wales on July 5, 2012. Pet.’s Ex.
14. The Application was transmitted to the United States Central Authority.
On December 3, 2012, Petitioner filed its Verified Petition for the Return of the
Child to the United Kingdom and Issuance of Show Cause Order. Petitioner contends
that Mother illegally and wrongfully removed S.A.M. from her habitual residence of the
United Kingdom, and both Mother and Step-Father have wrongfully retained S.A.M. in
West Virginia. On December 11, the Respondents filed their Response to the Petition.
Respondents allege that they have sole custody of S.A.M., and removal was not
wrongful. Additionally, Respondents allege that S.A.M. has a home, friends, and family
in the United States and that she has easily adjusted to life in the United States.
On December 13, 2012, the Court conducted a hearing to show cause why the
Petition should not be enforced. Among other things, the Court ordered the
Respondent Ralph Morris to provide his social security number to the Court. Then, the
Court ordered the United States Probation Office to conduct a background check on
Step-Father. The Court also ordered Mother to turn into the Clerk of Court her passport
and S.A.M.’s passport on December 19, 2012, which was the day after the
Respondents and S.A.M. were required to attend a previously scheduled immigration
interview in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, regarding their application for United States
citizenship. On December 19, Mother turned in her passport and S.A.M.’s passport to
the Clerk of Court for safe-keeping until the case was resolved. On December 21,
2012, Mother and S.A.M. received their green cards.
On January 4, 2013, the Court conducted a final evidentiary hearing to determine
whether the Petitioner’s Verified Petition for Return of Child to United Kingdom should
6

be enforced. At the hearing, the Court listened to testimony, received evidence, and
heard arguments from the parties on the Petition. The Court reserved ruling on this
matter until January 18, 2013 at 9:00 a.m. Mother was ordered to surrender S.A.M.’s
green card to the clerk of the court for safe-keeping.
III. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to The Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction (“Hague Convention”)5 and the International Child
Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”). The district courts of the United States have been
granted original jurisdiction over actions arising under the Hague Convention. 42
U.S.C. § 11603.
Venue is appropriate because ICARA provides that a Hague Convention
petitioner can only bring a Hague Convention action in the place where the child is
located. 42 U.S.C. § 11603. In this case, S.A.M. resides in Hedgesville, West Virginia.
Therefore, she is located in the Northern District of West Virginia.
IV. Legal Standard
In adopting the Hague Convention, the signatory nations sought “to protect
children internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention
and to establish procedures to ensure their prompt return to the State of their habitual
residence, as well as to secure protection for rights of access.” Miller v. Miller, 240

5

Both the United States and the United Kingdom are signatories to the Hague
Convention.
7

F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2001).6 Therefore, the primary purpose of the Hague
Convention is “to preserve the status quo and to deter parents from crossing
international boundaries in search of a more sympathetic court.” Id.
Under the Hague Convention, the scope of a court’s inquiry is limited to the
merits of the abduction claim. 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(4); see Miller, 240 F.3d at 398
(noting that under the Hague Convention, the court’s inquiry is limited to the merits of
the abduction claim and the underlying custody case is not at issue). Thus, the issue is
whether the removal and retention of the Child is wrongful under Article III of the Hague
Convention. If the removal is wrongful, the next inquiry is whether Respondents have a
valid defense.
V. Discussion
A. Petitioner’s Burden of Proof
Petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the evidence “in the case of an
action for the return of a child, that the child has been wrongfully removed or retained
within the meaning of the Convention.” 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(1)(A). A child’s removal
or retention is wrongful where:
a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or
any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which
the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or
retention; and
b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised,
either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the
removal or retention.
6

The United States implemented the Convention through ICARA, and the Act authorizes
a person who seeks a child’s return to file a petition in state or federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 11603.
The court must decide the case in accordance with the Hague Convention. Id.
8

Hague Convention, art. 3, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670 at 2, 19 I.L.M. at 1501.
In this case, the Petitioner must prove that:
(1) S.A.M. is under the age of sixteen (16) (Hague Convention, Art. 3(a));
(2) S.A.M. was “habitually resident” in the United Kingdom at the time Mother
removed her to the United States;
(3) the removal was in breach of Petitioner’s custody rights under the United
Kingdom’s laws (removal was “wrongful”); and
(4) Petitioner had been exercising its custody rights at the time of Mother’s
removal of S.A.M. See id.; see also Bader v. Kramer, 484 F.3d 666 (4th Cir.
2007).
1.

S.A.M. is Under Sixteen Years Old

At the final evidentiary hearing, Petitioner moved into evidence a certified copy of
S.A.M.’s birth certificate. Petitioner’s witness, Ms. Smee-Giles, identified the document
as S.A.M.’s birth certificate, and Respondents did not object to its admission. The birth
certificate, marked and admitted as Petitioner’s Exhibit 1, clearly shows that S.A.M. is
twelve years old and that she was born in 2000. Therefore, the first element has been
met.
2.

S.A.M. was Habitually Resident in the United Kingdom

The Hague Convention does not define “habitual residence.” In making this
determination the Fourth Circuit has concluded that:
there is no real distinction between ordinary residence and habitual
residence. . . . A person can have only one habitual residence. On its
face, habitual residence pertains to customary residence prior to the
removal. The court must look back in time, not forward. This is a fact9

specific inquiry that should be made on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, .
. . a parent cannot create a new habitual residence by wrongfully removing
and sequestering a child.
Miller, 240 F.3d at 400 (citations omitted). Habitual residence “pertains to customary
residence prior to the removal. The court must look back in time, not forward.” Id. In
determining habitual residence, “a parent cannot create a new habitual residence by
wrongfully removing and sequestering a child.” Id. (citation omitted).
Here, Mother made a unilateral decision to remove S.A.M. from the United
Kingdom. On the date of removal, Petitioner was unaware of Mother’s intention to
remove the child, and Petitioner had not acquiesced to S.A.M.’s removal. In fact, the
day before S.A.M.’s removal, Mother met with Petitioner and stated her travel Visa was
delayed, so they would not be leaving the United Kingdom for a few months. Prior to
S.A.M.’s removal, Mother and S.A.M. resided in St. Leonards on Sea in East Sussex.
According to Ms. Smee-Giles’ testimony, S.A.M. had lived in the United Kingdom her
whole life. S.A.M. attended school in the United Kingdom, and she had extended
family and friends there. On April 27, 2012, Mother applied for a travel visa to the United
States, and Mother listed S.A.M.’s country of residence as the United Kingdom. Pet.’s
Ex. 10. Additionally, Step-Father and Mother testified that on June 1, 2012, Mother’s
intention was merely to vacation in Canada and then in the United States at Niagara
Falls. Step-Father admitted on cross-examination that, at the time S.A.M. entered the
United States, her home was in the United Kingdom. Moreover, Mother could not
create a new habitual residence by wrongfully removing S.A.M. Therefore, the Court
finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the United Kingdom was the habitual

10

residence of S.A.M. immediately before her removal to the United States.
3.

Removal was in Breach of Petitioner’s Custody Rights Under
the United Kingdom’s Laws

The Hague Convention provides that removal of a Child to a foreign country is
“wrongful” if it amounts to a breach of the custody rights of the left-behind parent, or
institution with custody rights, according to the law of the country that is the Child’s
habitual residence, and the Court is permitted to take judicial notice of that country’s
laws. See Hague Convention, art. 14, FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1. Having found that the
United Kingdom was the habitual residence of S.A.M., the Court takes judicial notice of
the Children Act of 1989, the Affidavit of English and Welsh Law (Pet.’s Ex. 16), and the
following two cases: Re: E. (Abduction: Rights of Custody), [2005] EWHC (Fam), 2 FLR
759 and X County Council v. B (Abduction: Rights of Custody in the Court), [2009]
EWHC (Fam), 1 FLR 1197.7 Thus, whether S.A.M.’s removal was wrongful depends on
whether her removal was in breach of East Sussex Children Services’ custody rights
and the United Kingdom’s court’s custody rights under the United Kingdom’s laws.
Under the Hague Convention, “rights of custody” are defined as including “rights
relating to the care of the person of the child, and in particular, the right to determine the
child’s residence.” Hague Convention, art. 5; see Child Abduction and Custody Act
1985, Schedule 1, Article 5 (United Kingdom adopting Hague Convention’s definition of
custody rights). Custody rights have been broadly interpreted, but custody rights do not
7

The Court does not find X County Council v. B to be on point. In that case, care
proceedings were already instituted against the parents, and the court clearly had discretion and
jurisdiction to determine the child’s place of residence. In this case, care proceedings were not
initiated until after removal. However, as discussed below, the English court had “custody
rights” pursuant to the Hague Convention.
11

include rights of access alone. The Supreme Court set forth four sources for
interpreting parental custody rights: (1) the Hague Convention’s text, (2) the Hague
Convention’s purposes, (3) the view of the U.S. State Department, and (4) decisions of
sister signatory states to the Hague Convention. Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. ___, 130
S. Ct. 1983 (2010).8 Abbott addressed the issue of whether a ne exeat9 clause,
coupled with rights of visitation, constituted sufficient “custody rights” under the
Convention. In Abbott, mother, father, and child lived in Chile since the child was an
infant. The Chilean court granted mother the daily care and control of the child, and
father was granted “direct and regular” visitation. According to Chilean statute, once a
parent is granted visitation rights, a ne exeat right is conferred, requiring the custodial
parent’s permission before the child may be removed from the country. While custody
proceedings were still pending in Chile, the mother took the child to Texas in violation of
the Chilean court order. Father filed a petition under the Hague Convention. The
Supreme Court held that father’s statutory ne exeat clause gave him both the right to
determine the child’s place of residence and a joint right relating to the care of the child.
The Court noted that although a ne exeat clause did not fit within “traditional notions of
physical custody,” the Convention nevertheless established an increasingly broad
definition of custody rights. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1991. Thus, father had “custody
8

Abbott is the only United States Supreme Court case to date applying and discussing in
detail the Hague Convention.
9

A ne exeat clause is “An equitable writ restraining a person from leaving, or removing a
child or property from, the jurisdiction. A ne exeat is often issued to prohibit a person from
removing a child or property from the jurisdiction . . . .” Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004).
In the United States, these orders are routinely referred to as “restraining orders,” which prohibit
removal of a child from a state or local jurisdiction.
12

rights” for purposes of the Hague Convention. Id. at 1992-93.
Custody rights, though, must be more than mere visitation or “access” rights. See
Bromley v. Bromley, 30 F. Supp. 2d 857, 860 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Although the vast
majority of cases involve parents or relatives claiming custody rights, administrative
agencies or other bodies may claim custody rights. See In Re S.J.O.B.G., 292 S.W.3d
764 (Tex. App. 2009) (custody rights claimed by the Child Welfare Services of
Norwegian Municipality); L.H. v. Youth Welfare Office of Wiesbaden, 568 N.Y.S.2d
852 (Fam. Ct. 1991) (holding that where a child is placed by the German Child Welfare
Office into foster care, the child’s biological mother’s custody rights can be taken by the
court declaring the child a ward of the German court); Brown v. Orange Cnty. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 91 F.3d 150, 1996 WL 366366 (9th Cir. 1996) (alleging wrongful removal
of child by child welfare agency). Additionally, under English law, a court is “obliged not
simply to give effect to the Hague Convention on the basis of breach of the rights of an
individual; the infringement of the rights of custody of an ‘institution or any other body’ . .
. would also lead to a finding that a removal or retention was wrongful.” Re: E.
(Abduction: Rights of Custody), [2005] EWHC (Fam), 2 FLR 759 (finding the Spanish
Court, the court in the State in which the Child was habitually resident at the time of
removal, was an institution whose rights relating to custody were infringed by the
mother’s wrongful removal of the child).
In this case, East Sussex Children Services asserted the United Kingdom’s
court’s custody rights under the Hague Convention prior to S.A.M.’s removal. On
February 21, 2010, S.A.M. was under a Child Protection Plan, enacted due to the risk of

13

emotional harm to S.A.M. According to Ms. Smee-Giles’ testimony, she was required
under United Kingdom law to see children on those plans at least every ten days in
person. Therefore, East Sussex Children Services regularly supervised S.A.M.’s wellbeing. In addition, the Child Protection Plan at issue in this case required Mother to
notify East Sussex of any intention to remove the child from the country, or even when
moving addresses within the country. When Mother removed S.A.M. from the United
Kingdom, the Child Protection Plan was still in place.
Most importantly, on February 1, 2012, the Hastings County Court ordered
Mother to “lodge the passport of [S.A.M.] . . . with either Elaine Parkes & Co., as
solicitors for the guardian, or with the court office at Hastings County Court.” Pet.’s Ex.
4. Mother lodged S.A.M.’s passport with her Solicitor, who took an oath to the court not
to release S.A.M.’s passport “to any other party without the prior consent of the court.”
Pet.’s Ex. 5. Ms. Smee-Giles testified that the Court’s order regarding S.A.M.’s
passport was to ensure that should S.A.M. be removed from the country, the court
would be made aware of that intention prior to her removal. Pursuant to Petitioner’s
Exhibit 4, Mother would need consent of the court to obtain S.A.M.’s passport in order to
leave the country. Thus, if Mother desired to remove S.A.M. from the country, she must
inform and receive permission from the English court. According to Petitioner’s Exhibit
16, an Affidavit of English and Welsh Law admitted pursuant to Article 14 of the Hague
Convention, the English Court exercised its rights of custody on February 20, 2012,
when Mother’s solicitor undertook to the court not to release S.A.M.’s passport to any
other party without the prior consent of the court. Pet.’s Ex. 16. The Court finds that the
February 1, 2012 and February 20, 2012 orders created a ne exeat right, and the United
14

States Supreme Court has concluded that “ne exeat rights are rights of custody . . . .”
Abbott, 130 S.Ct. at 1993.
Respondents argue that the February 2012 orders were insufficient to establish
custody rights because Mother was never directly ordered that she could not leave the
country with S.A.M. Respondent Carly Morris also contends, and Ms. Smee-Giles
admitted, that she alone had sole custody and parental responsibility over S.A.M. until
the June 12, 2012 Interim Care Order, which was issued after S.A.M.’s removal.
However, the Court finds that the Hastings County Court’s February 1, 2012
order is a ne exeat order that conferred custody rights upon the court. Petitioner, East
Sussex Children Services, asserting the court’s custody rights, could determine
S.A.M.’s residence by requiring East Sussex Children Services’ and the Hastings
County Court’s consent for S.A.M. to leave the United Kingdom. This case is similar to
Abbott, where the United States Supreme Court found that a parent with only access
rights acquired custody rights because a ne exeat clause accompanied the access
rights. See 560 U.S. ___. 130 S. Ct. 1983. Here, Petitioner and the United Kingdom’s
courts acquired custody rights through the court’s ne exeat order. Although a ne exeat
order does not fit within “traditional notions of physical custody,” the Convention
nevertheless established an increasingly broad definition of custody rights. Abbott, 130
S. Ct. at 1991. Therefore, construing the definition of custody rights broadly pursuant to
the text and purpose of the Hague Convention, the Court finds that Petitioner had
custody rights over S.A.M. at the time of removal.
The Court notes that the Interim Care Order issued on June 12, 2012, conferred

15

custody rights under the Children Act 1989, Section 38, undoubtedly gave East Sussex
custody rights under the Hague Convention. However, the Hague Convention requires
the Petitioner to have custody rights prior to the removal of the Child. Here, S.A.M. was
removed on June 1, 2012. The Interim Care Order was not issued until June 12, 2012.
Therefore, it is irrelevant whether this conferred custody rights as the Petitioner must
have had custody rights prior to June 1, 2012.
4.

Petitioner Was Exercising its Custody Rights at the Time of the
Removal

In determining whether removal is wrongful, the Petitioner must prove that it had
been exercising its custodial rights at the time of removal. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(1).
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals will liberally find “exercise” of a nonremoving
parent’s custodial rights, as required for removal to be wrongful under the Hague
Convention whenever a parent with de jure custody rights keeps, or seeks to keep, any
sort of regular contact with his or her child. Bader, 484 F.3d at 671. Under this
approach,
a person [who] has valid custody rights to a child under the law of the
country of the child’s habitual residence . . . cannot fail to “exercise” those
custody rights under the Hague Convention short of acts that constitute
clear and unequivocal abandonment of the child.
Id. (affirming district court’s finding that petitioner had exercised his right to joint custody
because he had actual physical custody of the child on at least three occasions since
his release from prison).
As explained above, the Petitioner had custody rights under the February 2010
Child Protection Plan. Petitioner regularly monitored and supervised Mother and S.A.M.

16

pursuant to the plan, and this included an in person visit with S.A.M. every ten days.
Also, in February 2012, the Court instructed Mother to lodge S.A.M.’s passport with
S.A.M.’s solicitor or the Court for safe-keeping. Although Mother ultimately turned
S.A.M.’s passport into Mother’s solicitor, the solicitor undertook not to release the
passport to any other party. The Court’s order exercised custody rights as it was
designed to prevent Mother from unilaterally removing S.A.M. from the United Kingdom.
Therefore, the Court finds that Petitioner was exercising its custody rights at the time of
S.A.M.’s removal.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that pursuant to the Hague Convention and
ICARA, Petitioner has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that on June 1, 2012,
Mother wrongfully removed S.A.M. from the United Kingdom–S.A.M.’s habitual
residence at that time.
B. Respondent’s Burden of Proof
Upon a showing of wrongful removal, return of the child is required under the
Hague Convention unless Respondents can establish one of four available defenses.
See 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(A-B) (requiring Respondent to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that one of the exceptions set forth in article 13b or 20 of the
Convention applies or establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that any other
exception set forth in article 12 or 13 of the Convention applies). Respondents may
prevail if they can prove one of the following defenses by clear and convincing
evidence:
(1) that there was a grave risk that the child’s return to Petitioner would

17

expose them to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place them in
an intolerable situation, see Hague Convention, art. 13b, or
(2) that the return of the child to the United Kingdom would not be
permitted by the fundamental principles of the United States “relating to
the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms[,]” see Hague
Convention, art. 20.
The Respondents could also prevail if they establish by a preponderance of the
evidence, that:
(1) this action was not commenced within one year of the abduction, and the
child is now well-settled in her new environment, see Hague Convention, art.
12, or
(2) that Petitioner “consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal[,]”
Hague Convention, art. 13a.
See also 42 U.S.C. § 11601(a)(4); Judge v. Williams, No. 4:11-CV-119-F, 2011 WL
3100346 (E.D.N.C. July 25, 2011). Also, “the courts retain the discretion to order return
even if one of the exceptions is proven.” Miller, 240 F.3d at 402 (quoting Feder v.
Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 226 (3d Cir. 1995)). The Fourth Circuit has stated that
courts in the abducted-from country are as ready and able as we are to
protect children. If return to a country, or to the custody of a parent in that
country, is dangerous, we can expect that country’s courts to respond
accordingly . . . . When we trust the court system in the abducted-from
country, the vast majority of claims of harm—those that do not rise to the
level of gravity required by the Convention–evaporate.
Miller, 240 F.3d at 402 (quoting Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1068 (6th Cir.
1996)).
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In this case, Respondents have raised only one defense: that there was a grave
risk that S.A.M.’s return to Petitioner would expose her to physical or psychological
harm or otherwise place her in an intolerable situation. See Hague Convention, art.
13b. Courts have indicated that the grave risk defense was not intended to be used as
a vehicle to litigate the child’s best interests or place the child where he or she would be
happiest. See Gaudin v. Remis, 415 3d. 1028 (9th Cir. 2005); Blondin v. DuBois, 238
F.3d 153, 163 (2d Cir. 2001). The defense does not apply to evidence relating to
economic conditions, educational benefits, lifestyles, or disparate quality of parenting
styles. Cuellar v. Joyce, 596 F.3d 505, 509 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[t]he fact that a child has
grown accustomed to her new home is never a valid concern under the grave risk
exception, as ‘it is the abduction that causes the pangs of subsequent return.’”). The
situation contemplated by Article 13(b) would include sending a child back to a “zone of
war, famine, or disease” as well as “cases of serious abuse or neglect . . . .” See
Danaipour v. McLarey, 286 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2002).
Respondents have failed to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that
returning S.A.M. to the United Kingdom would result in a grave risk that would expose
her to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place her in an intolerable situation.
Mother testified that S.A.M. would be exposed to a grave risk because of the emotional
harm and distress of the proceedings as well as being returned to a completely
intolerable situation. However, the emotional harm and distress resulting from this
proceeding was created by Mother’s wrongful removal of S.A.M. This is not the “grave
risk” contemplated by the Hague Convention. Thus, the Respondents have failed to

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present any valid defenses under the Hague Convention. Accordingly, the Court
GRANTS Petitioner’s petition and ORDERS S.A.M.’s return to the United Kingdom.
C. Fees and Costs
The Hague Convention and its enabling legislation require a court to order the
respondent to pay the petitioner’s necessary expenses if the court orders the return of
the child, unless such an award would be “clearly inappropriate.” Hague Convention,
art. 26; 42 U.S.C. § 11607; 42 U.S.C. § 11607(b)(3). With respect to the award of
attorney’s fees and costs, ICARA provides:
Any Court ordering the return of a child pursuant to an action brought
under section 11603 of this title shall order the respondent to pay
necessary expenses incurred by or on behalf of the petitioner, including
court costs, legal fees, foster home or other care during the course of the
proceedings in the action, and transportation costs related to the return of
the child, unless the respondent establishes that such an award would be
clearly inappropriate.
42 U.S.C. § 11607(b)(3). Under the Hague Convention, an award of fees and costs
serves two purposes: (1) “to restore the applicant to the financial position he or she
would have been in had there been no removal or retention” and (2) “to deter such
removal or retention.” Hague Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg.
10494-01, 10511 (Mar. 26, 1986).
A party seeking an award of attorney’s fees must submit adequate evidence
detailing the hours worked and his or her rates. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S., 424,
433, 103 S. Ct. 1933 (1983). Although Petitioner sought attorneys fees in its petition, no
evidence has been presented to the Court regarding the hours worked or his or her
rates. Additionally, given the Respondents’ financial conditions, they would be entirely

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unable to pay such an award. Thus, it would be clearly inappropriate to grant an award
of attorneys fees and costs as Petitioner has not presented adequate evidence to
substantiate such a request and Respondents would be unable to pay any amount of an
award.
VI. Conclusion
Because S.A.M. was wrongfully removed from the United Kingdom, her preremoval habitual place of residence, and because Respondents have not proven any of
the defenses to return under the Hague Convention or ICARA, it is hereby ORDERED
that:
1. Petitioner East Sussex Children Services’s petition for the return of S.A.M.,
pursuant to the Hague Convention, is GRANTED.
2. Respondent Carly Morris has agreed to accompany S.A.M. back to the United
Kingdom if she is physically able to travel in light of her pregnancy and health
conditions. Respondent Carly Morris has testified under oath to her health conditions,
and the Court finds that she is genuinely concerned about her well-being and the wellbeing of her unborn child. Because of the Court’s concern and the parties’ mutual
concern for the well-being of Respondent Carly Morris and her unborn child, the Court
ORDERS that the enforcement of the Petition is temporarily STAYED pursuant to this
Court’s authority under 42 U.S.C. § 11604, and the following conditions are ORDERED
to protect the well-being of S.A.M. and her return to the United Kingdom:
a. Respondent Carly Morris’ passport and S.A.M.’s passport and green
card must remain in the custody of the Court;

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b. S.A.M. may not travel outside the counties of Berkeley, Jefferson, and
Morgan, West Virginia;
c. Respondents Carly and Ralph Morris are prohibited from obtaining any
other travel documents for themselves or S.A.M. until this proceeding is resolved in its
entirety;
d. Respondent Ralph Regis Morris is no longer required to be supervised
during his contact with S.A.M.;
e. Respondent Carly Morris is ordered to call her physician at
Shenandoah Women’s Health to confirm the date of her next appointment and to alert
the physician that she is need of an evaluation and report regarding her ability to travel
to the United Kingdom;
f. Respondent Carly Morris is ordered to file with this Court, by Tuesday,
January 22, 2013, in written form, a note clarifying the date and time of her next
appointment;
g. Respondent Carly Morris shall file the physician’s report regarding her
ability to travel to the United Kingdom as soon as she receives the report, and the report
will be filed under seal;
h. Respondents shall not change their physical address or place of
residence without prior consent of the Court;
3.

Petitioner and Respondents are ordered to appear before the Court on

February 12, 2013 at 1:00 p.m. in Martinsburg District Judge Courtroom. S.A.M. is not
ordered to attend the hearing.
4.

This Order shall be transmitted by the Clerk of the Court to the United
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States Department of State for transmittal to the Central Authority of the United
Kingdom.
5.

The Clerk is directed to mail a certified copy of this Order to all counsel of

record and pro se parties. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58, the Clerk is
directed to enter judgment on this matter.
DATED: January 22, 2013

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