Ehrlich et al v. Crown Enterprises, Inc. et al

Filing 183

MEMORANDUM, OPINION AND ORDER Granting 129 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Defendant Central Transport Michigan, LLC: The Court FINDS no claims remain against Central Transport Michigan, LLC. Therefore, the Court ORDERS the Clerk to TERMINATE Defendant Central Transport Michigan, LLC from this action. Signed by District Judge Gina M. Groh on 3/24/2014. (cmd)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
MARTINSBURG

STEVE ALLEN EHRLICH and
JACQUELINE EHRLICH,
Plaintiffs,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-CV-23 (Lead Case)
(JUDGE GROH)

CROWN ENTERPRISES, INC.,
CENTRAL TRANSPORT
INTERNATIONAL, INC., CENTRAL
TRANSPORT NORTH AMERICA, INC.,
CENTRAL TRANSPORT LLC, CENTRAL
TRANSPORT MICHIGAN LLC and
GLS LEASCO, INC.,
Defendants,
and
PETER GARCIA, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-CV-42
(JUDGE GROH)

RONALD J. COFFEE and
CENTRAL TRANSPORT, LLC and
CENTRAL TRANSPORT MICHIGAN, LLC,
Defendants,
and
WILLIAM S. ALLEN,
Plaintiff,
v.

RONALD J. COFFEE and
CENTRAL TRANSPORT, LLC and

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-CV-43
(JUDGE GROH)

CENTRAL TRANSPORT MICHIGAN, LLC,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO DEFENDANT CENTRAL TRANSPORT
MICHIGAN, LLC
Currently pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
filed on February 11, 2014, in this consolidated action as to Plaintiff William S. Allen’s
claims [Doc. 129]. Pursuant to Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.02(b)(1) memoranda in
response to the motion for summary judgment “shall be filed and served within 21 days
from the date of service of the motion.” In addition, Local Rule of Civil Procedure 5.06(g)
provides an additional three days to the prescribed period to respond because service was
conducted by electronic means. Therefore, Plaintiff was required to file a response no later
than March 7, 2014. As of this date, Plaintiff has not filed a response. Accordingly, this
issue is ripe for the Court’s review.
I. UNDISPUTED FACTS
On March 21, 2011, Plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile on Route 340 at
the intersection of 340 North and Shore Line Drive in Jefferson County, West Virginia.
Pl.’s Third Am. Compl, ¶ 6; Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., ¶ 1-2. At the time of the collision,
Plaintiff’s car was stopped at the traffic light. Id. At the same time, Defendant Ronald J.
Coffee was driving a tractor with an attached trailer. Pl.’s Third Am. Compl. ¶ 7; Defs.’
Mot. Summ. J. ¶ 3. Defendant Coffee approached the traffic light from behind the car in
which Plaintiff was a passenger, and he failed to stop at the light and collided with the
vehicle in which Plaintiff was a passenger. Pl.’s Third Am. Compl. ¶ 7-8; Defs.’ Mot.
2

Summ. J. ¶ 4. As a result of the collision, Plaintiff was injured. Pl.’s Third Am. Compl. ¶
8; Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. ¶ 4.
Defendant Coffee was an employee of Defendant Central Transport, LLC at the
time of the collision. Defs.’ Ans., ¶ 3. Defendant GLS LeasCo owned the truck and the
trailer that was involved in the collision. Dep. Briand, p. 8, lns. 4-6, 18-19. However,
Defendant Central Transport, LLC leased the truck from GLS LeasCo pursuant to a
lease agreement dated December 21, 2009 and entered into by GLS LeasCo and
Central Transport, LLC.
Central Transport, LLC was responsible for servicing and maintaining the subject
truck. Dep. Briand, pgs. 29, 31, 34, 35; Ex. 1; Dep. Chapman, pgs. 26, 29. Additionally,
Central Transport, LLC was responsible for negotiating the load that was hauled by its
drivers, including Ronald Coffee, and negotiating labor contracts, if any. Id. Finally,
Central Transport, LLC was responsible for their drivers, including their qualification and
training, maintaining log books, determining their routes, and complying with safety
regulations. Dep. Briand, pgs. 33-35; Dep. Chapman, pgs. 29-31.
Central Transport Michigan, LLC is an entity that no longer exists, but it was a
more regional carrier covering predominantly the Michigan area. Dep. Briand, p. 12.
Central Transport Michigan, LLC did not have any ownership or interest in the subject
tractor and trailer on the date of the accident. Id.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 20, 2013, Plaintiff filed this action in the Circuit Court of Jefferson
County, West Virginia. On April 22, 2013, Defendants removed the case on grounds of

3

diversity of citizenship to this Court.
On May 10, 2013, this Court granted Defendants’ motion to consolidate the three
similar pending cases: Civil Action Number 3:13-CV-23, Civil Action Number 3:13-CV42, and Civil Action Number 3:13-CV-43. Then, on February 19, 2014, this Court sua
sponte consolidated the civil actions, and the lead case was designated as Civil Action
Number 3:13-CV-23.
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs summary judgment.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986). A genuine issue exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986). Thus, the Court must conduct “the threshold inquiry of determining
whether there is the need for a trial- whether, in other words, there are any genuine
factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may
reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
The party opposing summary judgment “must do more than simply show that
there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). That is, once the movant has met
its burden to show an absence of material fact, the party opposing summary judgment
must then come forward with affidavits or other evidence demonstrating there is indeed
4

a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323-25;
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Pursuant to Rule 56(c)(3), the court “need consider only the
cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(3). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary
judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (citations omitted).
IV. ANALYSIS
In this case, Plaintiff did not file a response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment. However, this Court is obligated to thoroughly analyze the motion and must
determine “whether the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
law.” Robinson v. Wix Filtration Corp., 599 F.3d 403, 409 n.8 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal
citation omitted).
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment as to Central
Transport Michigan, LLC because Plaintiff cannot sustain a claim against it for vicarious
liability. Plaintiff alleges that “Central Transport and Central Transport Michigan were
the owners of or otherwise responsible for the tractor trailer Coffee was driving . . . and
were Coffee’s employers.” Pl.’s Third Am. Compl. ¶ 11. Therefore, Plaintiff alleges that
Central Transport Michigan, LLC is liable for Plaintiff’s injuries based on a vicarious
liability/respondeat superior theory.
Because this Court is sitting in diversity, it will apply the substantive laws of West
Virginia. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Under West Virginia
law, the doctrine of respondeat superior “imposes liability on an employer for the acts of
its employees within the scope of employment, not because the employer is at fault, but
merely as a matter of public policy.” Dunn v. Rockwell, 689 S.E.2d 255, 274 (W. Va.
5

2009); see also Syl. Pt. 3, Musgrove v. Hickory Inn, Inc., 281 S.E.2d 499 (W. Va. 1981)
(holding that if an agent or employee is “acting within the scope of his employment, then
his principal or employer may also be held liable”). Therefore, if “it can be shown that
an individual is an agent and if he is acting within the scope of his employment when he
commits a tort, then the principal is liable for the tort as well as the agent.” Barath v.
Performance Trucking Co., Inc., 424 S.E.2d 602, 605 (W. Va. 1992).
In assessing whether an agency relationship exists, the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia has held that
[t]here are four general factors which bear upon whether a master-servant
relationship exists for purposes of the doctrine of respondeat superior:
(1) Selection and engagement of the servant; (2) Payment of
compensation; (3) Power of dismissal, and (4) Power of control. The first
three factors are not essential to the existence of the relationship; the
fourth, the power of control is determinative.
Timberline Four Seasons Resort Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Herlan, 679 S.E.2d 329, 334 (W.
Va. 2009) (citing Syl. Pt. 5, Paxton v. Crabtree, 400 S.E.2d 245 (W. Va. 1990)). An
essential element of the agency relationship is “the existence of some degree of control
by the principal over the conduct and activities of the agent.” Syl. Pt. 3, Teter v. Old
Colony, 441 S.E.2d 728 (W. Va. 1994).
In this case, the key issue is whether Defendant Coffee is an agent or employee
of Defendant Central Transport Michigan, LLC. First, the Court must evaluate whether
Central Transport Michigan, LLC selected or engaged Defendant Coffee. It is
undisputed that Central Transport Michigan, LLC did not select or engage Defendant
Coffee. Hal Briand, President of GLS LeasCo, testified that at the time of the collision,
Defendant Coffee was an employee of Central Transport. Ex. A, Dep. p. 7, ln. 13. Mr.
6

Briand also testified that Central Transport Michigan no longer exists as an entity
because it was merged into Central Transport, LLC. Id. at p. 12, lns. 14-18. Bill
Chapman, Central Transport, LLC’s Director of Safety, also testified that Defendant
Coffee was an employee of Central Transport, LLC at the time of the collision. Ex. B,
Dep. p. 23, lns. 14-21.
Second, the Court must determine whether Central Transport Michigan, LLC paid
or compensated Defendant Coffee. It is undisputed that Central Transport, LLC
compensated Defendant Coffee. Mr. Chapman testified that Defendant Coffee was
paid by the trip on a flat rate basis. Id. at p. 23, lns. 7-11.
Third, the Court must evaluate whether Central Transport Michigan, LLC had the
power to fire Defendant Coffee. It is also undisputed that Central Transport, LLC had
the power to fire Defendant Coffee. Mr. Chapman testified that Central Transport, LLC
had the power to fire and discipline Defendant Coffee. Id. at p. 25, lns. 8-12.
Finally, the most important factor the court must analyze is whether Central
Transport Michigan, LLC had any control over Defendant Coffee. It is undisputed that
Central Transport, LLC–not Central Transport Michigan, LLC--had the power to control
Defendant Coffee. Indeed, at Mr. Chapman’s deposition, he was asked “What
companies have the authority to control [Coffee’s] activities?” Id. at p. 25, lns. 4-5. Mr.
Chapman answered that Central Transport, LLC had control over his activities. Id. at p.
25, lns. 6-7. Indeed, Central Transport, LLC had sole management responsibility over
Defendant Coffee, including qualifying him, hiring him, training him, determining his
routes, and monitoring his log books. Id. at p. 29, lns. 20-24; p. 30, lns. 13-20; p. 31,
lns. 1-3
7

Therefore, in analyzing the undisputed facts, the four factors weigh heavily in
favor of finding no agency relationship between Defendant Coffee and Central
Transport Michigan, LLC. The Court FINDS that Defendant Coffee is not an agent or
employee of Central Transport Michigan, LLC and therefore GRANTS Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment.
V.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as
to Central Transport, Michigan, LLC. Because Plaintiff alleged Central Transport
Michigan, LLC is liable solely on a respondeat superior theory, the Court FINDS no
claims remain against Central Transport Michigan, LLC. Therefore, the Court ORDERS
the Clerk to TERMINATE Defendant Central Transport Michigan, LLC from this action.
It is so ORDERED.
The Clerk is directed to transmit copies of this Order to all counsel of record
and/or pro se parties.
DATED: March 24, 2014

8