Ehrlich et al v. Crown Enterprises, Inc. et al

Filing 185

MEMORANDUM, OPINION AND ORDER Granting 117 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Defendants Crown Enterprises, Inc., Central Transport International, Inc., Central Transport North America, Inc., Central Transport Michigan, LLC, and GLS Leasco, Inc.: The Court FINDS no claims remain against them. Therefore, the Court ORDERS the Clerk to TERMINATE Defendants Crown Enterprises, Inc., Central Transport International, Inc., Central Transport North America, Inc., Central Transport Michigan, LLC, and GLS LeasCo, Inc. from this action. Signed by District Judge Gina M. Groh on 3/24/2014. (cmd)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
MARTINSBURG

STEVE ALLEN EHRLICH and
JACQUELINE EHRLICH,
Plaintiffs,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-CV-23 (Lead Case)
(JUDGE GROH)

CROWN ENTERPRISES, INC.,
CENTRAL TRANSPORT
INTERNATIONAL, INC., CENTRAL
TRANSPORT NORTH AMERICA, INC.,
CENTRAL TRANSPORT LLC, CENTRAL
TRANSPORT MICHIGAN LLC and
GLS LEASCO, INC.,
Defendants,
and
PETER GARCIA, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-CV-42
(JUDGE GROH)

RONALD J. COFFEE and
CENTRAL TRANSPORT, LLC and
CENTRAL TRANSPORT MICHIGAN, LLC,
Defendants,
and
WILLIAM S. ALLEN,
Plaintiff,
v.

RONALD J. COFFEE and
CENTRAL TRANSPORT, LLC and

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-CV-43
(JUDGE GROH)

CENTRAL TRANSPORT MICHIGAN, LLC,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO DEFENDANTS CROWN ENTERPRISES, INC.,
CENTRAL TRANSPORT INTERNATIONAL, INC., CENTRAL TRANSPORT NORTH
AMERICA, INC., CENTRAL TRANSPORT MICHIGAN, LLC, and GLS LEASCO, INC.
Currently pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
filed on February 11, 2014, in this consolidated action as to the claims of Plaintiffs Steve
Allen Ehrlich and Jacqueline Ehrlich [Doc. 117]. Pursuant to Local Rule of Civil Procedure
7.02(b)(1) memoranda in response to the motion for summary judgment “shall be filed and
served within 21 days from the date of service of the motion.” In addition, Local Rule of
Civil Procedure 5.06(g) provides an additional three days to the prescribed period to
respond because service was conducted by electronic means. Therefore, Plaintiffs were
required to file a response no later than March 7, 2014. As of this date, Plaintiffs have not
filed a response. Accordingly, this issue is ripe for the Court’s review.
I. UNDISPUTED FACTS
On March 21, 2011, Plaintiff Steve Ehrlich was driving a federal governmentowned vehicle on official government business in Jefferson County, West Virginia.
Compl. ¶ 14; Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. ¶ 1. At the time of the collision, Mr. Ehrlich’s vehicle
was stopped at a traffic light behind a tractor-trailer owned by J.B. Hunt Transport on
Route 340 at the intersection of 340 North and Shore Line Drive. Compl. ¶ 14; Defs.’
Mot. Summ. J. ¶ 2-3.
At about the same time, Defendant Ronald J. Coffee was operating a 2006

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International Tractor with an attached trailer. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. ¶ 4. Defendant
Coffee was traveling in the eastbound lane of Route 340, and he was directly behind
Mr. Ehrlich’s vehicle. Compl. ¶ 15; Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. ¶ 6. However, as Defendant
Coffee approached the traffic light, he failed to stop and crashed into the rear of Mr.
Ehrlich’s vehicle. Compl. ¶ 15; Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. ¶ 7.
At the time of the collision, Defendant Coffee was an employee of Defendant
Central Transport, LLC. Defs.’ Ans., ¶ 7. Defendant Coffee was operating the subject
tractor and trailer under Central Transport, LLC’s sole authority. Defendant GLS
LeasCo owned the tractor and the trailer that was involved in the collision. Dep. Briand,
p. 8, lns. 4-6, 18-19. However, Defendant Central Transport, LLC leased the tractor and
trailer from GLS LeasCo pursuant to a lease agreement dated December 21, 2009 and
entered into by GLS LeasCo and Central Transport, LLC. The lease agreement
provided that Central Transport, LLC retained sole possession and control over the
tractor and trailer until the expiration of the lease. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. ¶ 15; Ex. C., ¶
10. The lease agreement also provided that all risk of loss and damage to the
equipment is placed upon Central Transport, LLC. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. ¶ 16; Ex. C., ¶
11.
Central Transport, LLC was responsible for servicing and maintaining the subject
truck. Dep. Briand, pgs. 29, 31, 34, 35; Ex. 1; Dep. Chapman, pgs. 26, 29. Additionally,
Central Transport, LLC was responsible for negotiating the load that was hauled by its
drivers, including Ronald Coffee, and negotiating labor contracts, if any. Id. Finally,
Central Transport, LLC was responsible for their drivers, including their qualification and
training, maintaining log books, determining their routes, and complying with safety
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regulations. Dep. Briand, pgs. 33-35; Dep. Chapman, pgs. 29-31.
Central Transport Michigan, LLC is an entity that no longer exists, but it was a
more regional carrier covering predominantly the Michigan area. Dep. Briand, p. 12.
Central Transport Michigan, LLC did not have any ownership or interest in the subject
tractor and trailer on the date of the accident. Id.
On the date of the accident, Defendants Central Transport International, Inc. and
Central Transport North America, Inc. were inactive and inoperable entities. Defs.’ Mot.
Summ. J. ¶ 10; Ex. A. Dep. Briand, p. 26, lns. 10-24. Also on the date of the collision,
Defendant Crown Enterprises, Inc. conducted business solely as a real estate
ownership and management company. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. ¶ 11; Ex. A. Dep. Briand,
p. 23, lns. 19-22.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 1, 2013, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of West Virginia. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1332 pursuant to diversity of citizenship because Plaintiffs are completely
diverse from Defendants and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. On April 29,
2013, Defendants filed their answer and affirmative defenses.
On May 10, 2013, this Court granted Defendants’ motion to consolidate the three
similar pending cases: Civil Action Number 3:13-CV-23, Civil Action Number 3:13-CV42, and Civil Action Number 3:13-CV-43. Then, on February 19, 2014, this Court sua
sponte consolidated the civil actions, and the lead case was designated as Civil Action
Number 3:13-CV-23.

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III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs summary judgment.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986). A genuine issue exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986). Thus, the Court must conduct “the threshold inquiry of determining
whether there is the need for a trial- whether, in other words, there are any genuine
factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may
reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
The party opposing summary judgment “must do more than simply show that
there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). That is, once the movant has met
its burden to show an absence of material fact, the party opposing summary judgment
must then come forward with affidavits or other evidence demonstrating there is indeed
a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323-25;
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Pursuant to Rule 56(c)(3), the court “need consider only the
cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(3). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary
judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (citations omitted).

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IV. ANALYSIS
In this case, Plaintiffs did not file a response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment. However, this Court is obligated to thoroughly analyze the motion and must
determine “whether the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
law.” Robinson v. Wix Filtration Corp., 599 F.3d 403, 409 n.8 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal
citation omitted).
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment as to Crown
Enterprises, Inc., Central Transport International, Inc., Central Transport North America,
Inc., Central Transport Michigan, LLC, and GLS LeasCo, Inc. (collectively referred to as
the “Corporate Defendants”) because Plaintiffs cannot sustain a claim against the
entities for vicarious liability. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Coffee was an agent
and/or employee of the Corporate Defendants. Pls.’ Compl. ¶¶ 15, 17-19. Therefore,
Plaintiffs allege that the Corporate Defendants are liable for Plaintiffs’ injuries based on
a vicarious liability/respondeat superior theory.
Because this Court is sitting in diversity, it will apply the substantive laws of West
Virginia. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Under West Virginia
law, the doctrine of respondeat superior “imposes liability on an employer for the acts of
its employees within the scope of employment, not because the employer is at fault, but
merely as a matter of public policy.” Dunn v. Rockwell, 689 S.E.2d 255, 274 (W. Va.
2009); see also Syl. Pt. 3, Musgrove v. Hickory Inn, Inc., 281 S.E.2d 499 (W. Va. 1981)
(holding that if an agent or employee is “acting within the scope of his employment, then
his principal or employer may also be held liable”). Therefore, if “it can be shown that
an individual is an agent and if he is acting within the scope of his employment when he
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commits a tort, then the principal is liable for the tort as well as the agent.” Barath v.
Performance Trucking Co., Inc., 424 S.E.2d 602, 605 (W. Va. 1992).
In assessing whether an agency relationship exists, the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia has held that
[t]here are four general factors which bear upon whether a master-servant
relationship exists for purposes of the doctrine of respondeat superior:
(1) Selection and engagement of the servant; (2) Payment of
compensation; (3) Power of dismissal, and (4) Power of control. The first
three factors are not essential to the existence of the relationship; the
fourth, the power of control is determinative.
Timberline Four Seasons Resort Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Herlan, 679 S.E.2d 329, 334 (W.
Va. 2009) (citing Syl. Pt. 5, Paxton v. Crabtree, 400 S.E.2d 245 (W. Va. 1990)). An
essential element of the agency relationship is “the existence of some degree of control
by the principal over the conduct and activities of the agent.” Syl. Pt. 3, Teter v. Old
Colony, 441 S.E.2d 728 (W. Va. 1994).
In this case, the key issue is whether Defendant Coffee is an agent or employee
of the Corporate Defendants. First, the Court must evaluate whether the Corporate
Defendants selected or engaged Defendant Coffee. It is undisputed that the Corporate
Defendants did not select or engage Defendant Coffee. Hal Briand, President of GLS
LeasCo, testified that at the time of the collision, Defendant Coffee was an employee of
Central Transport. Ex. A, Dep. p. 7, ln. 13. Bill Chapman, Central Transport, LLC’s
Director of Safety, also testified that Defendant Coffee was an employee of Central
Transport, LLC at the time of the collision. Ex. B, Dep. p. 23, lns. 14-21.
Second, the Court must determine whether the Corporate Defendants paid or
compensated Defendant Coffee. It is undisputed that Central Transport, LLC
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compensated Defendant Coffee. Mr. Chapman testified that Defendant Coffee was
paid by the trip on a flat rate basis. Id. at p. 23, lns. 7-11.
Third, the Court must evaluate whether the Corporate Defendants had the power
to fire Defendant Coffee. It is also undisputed that Central Transport, LLC had the
power to fire Defendant Coffee. Mr. Chapman testified that Central Transport, LLC had
the power to fire and discipline Defendant Coffee. Id. at p. 25, lns. 8-12.
Finally, the most important factor the court must analyze is whether the
Corporate Defendants had any control over Defendant Coffee. It is undisputed that
Central Transport, LLC–not the Corporate Defendants--had the power to control
Defendant Coffee. Indeed, at Mr. Chapman’s deposition, he was asked “What
companies have the authority to control [Coffee’s] activities?” Id. at p. 25, lns. 4-5. Mr.
Chapman answered that Central Transport, LLC had control over his activities. Id. at p.
25, lns. 6-7. Indeed, Central Transport, LLC had sole management responsibility over
Defendant Coffee, including qualifying him, hiring him, training him, determining his
routes, and monitoring his log books. Id. at p. 29, lns. 20-24; p. 30, lns. 13-20; p. 31,
lns. 1-3
Therefore, in analyzing the undisputed facts, the four factors weigh heavily in
favor of finding no agency relationship between Defendant Coffee and the Corporate
Defendants: Crown Enterprises, Inc., Central Transport International, Inc., Central
Transport North America, Inc., Central Transport Michigan, LLC, and GLS LeasCo, Inc.
Accordingly, the Court FINDS that Defendant Coffee is not an agent or employee of the
Corporate Defendants, Crown Enterprises, Inc., Central Transport International, Inc.,
Central Transport North America, Inc., Central Transport Michigan, LLC, and GLS
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LeasCo, Inc., and therefore GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
V.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as
to Defendants Crown Enterprises, Inc., Central Transport International, Inc., Central
Transport North America, Inc., Central Transport Michigan, LLC, and GLS LeasCo, Inc.
Because Plaintiffs alleged Defendants Crown Enterprises, Inc., Central Transport
International, Inc., Central Transport North America, Inc., Central Transport Michigan,
LLC, and GLS LeasCo, Inc. are liable solely on a respondeat superior theory, the Court
FINDS no claims remain against them. Therefore, the Court ORDERS the Clerk to
TERMINATE Defendants Crown Enterprises, Inc., Central Transport International, Inc.,
Central Transport North America, Inc., Central Transport Michigan, LLC, and GLS
LeasCo, Inc. from this action.
It is so ORDERED.
The Clerk is directed to transmit copies of this Order to all counsel of record
and/or pro se parties.
DATED: March 24, 2014

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