Kile v. Pinnacle Wind, LLC et al

Filing 6

ORDER EXTENDING TIME PERIOD FOR SERVICE BY THIRTY DAYS. Plaintiff is ORDERED to serve Defendants with service of process within (30) days from the date of this order. Signed by District Judge Gina M. Groh on 3/12/2014. (tlg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
MARTINSBURG

RANDY KILE,
Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-CV-147
(JUDGE GROH)

PINNACLE WIND, LLC, and
MISSION WIND PINNACLE, INC.,
Defendants.

ORDER EXTENDING TIME PERIOD FOR SERVICE BY THIRTY DAYS
On October 17, 2013, Plaintiff, by counsel, filed a Complaint in the United States
District Court for the Northern District. On the same date, a summons was issued and
returned to Plaintiff’s attorney for service. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c),
“[t]he plaintiff is responsible for having the summons and complaint served within the time
allowed by Rule 4(m).”

In this case, Plaintiff filed the Complaint and was issued a

summons on October 17, 2013. On February 27, over 120 days since issuance of the
summons, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause within fourteen days why the case
should not be dismissed for failure to serve Defendants within the 4(m) period.
On March 10, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Response to the Order to Show Cause. In that
Response, Plaintiff stated that his counsel has been in conversation with counsel for
Defendant Pinnacle Wind, LLC since November, 2013. Additionally, Plaintiff stated that
Defendants do not oppose a ninety-day extension to effectuate service of process while

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informal discussions continue between the parties.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) governs the time period for effectuating service
of process, which provides
If a defendant is not served within 120 days after the complaint is filed, the
court-on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff-must dismiss the
action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made
within a specific time. But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the
court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “if the complaint
is not served within 120 days after it is filed, the complaint must be dismissed absent a
showing of good cause.” Mendez v. Elliot, 45 F.3d 75, 78 (4th Cir. 1995). However, in an
opinion entered by the United States Supreme Court after the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in
Mendez, the Supreme Court stated that “courts have been accorded discretion to enlarge
the 120-day period even if there is no good cause shown.” Henderson v. United States,
517 U.S. 654, 662 (1996). Subsequently courts, including the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, have questioned the validity of the Mendez holding in light of Henderson. Hanson
v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 405 F. App’x 793, 793-94 (4th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (stating
the “district court has discretion to extend the period [to effectuate service] if the plaintiff
can show excusable neglect for his failure to serve”); Giacomo-Tano v. Levine, 199 F.3d
1327, *2 (4th Cir. 1999) (unpublished) (nothing that “[e]ven if a plaintiff does not establish
good cause, the district court may in its discretion grant an extension of time for service”);
Scruggs v. Spartanburg Reg’l Med. Ctr., 198 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 1999) (unpublished)
(regarding the Supreme Court’s statements in Henderson as “persuasive as to the meaning
of Rule 4(m) and noting that the Fourth Circuit “believe[d] that the district court, in its
discretion, could have extended the time for proper service of process”); Morgan v.
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Sebelius, Civil Action No. 3:09-1059, 2010 WL 1404100 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 31, 2010)
(holding that courts have discretion to enlarge the 120-day period even in the absence of
good cause); Vantage, Inc. v. Vantage Travel Serv., Inc., C.A. No. 6:08-2765-HMH, 2009
WL 735893, *3 (D.S.C. Mar. 20, 2009) (finding that “the Plaintiff was not required to show
good cause for the extension and the court in its discretion extended the deadline”).
In this case, the Court does not find that informal discussions or conversations
between Defendants’ counsel and Plaintiff’s counsel constitutes good cause as Plaintiff’s
counsel has not stated how settlement negotiations affected his ability to serve Defendants.
See Mendez, 45 F.3d at 78 (noting that district judge rejected the Plaintiff’s notion that
“settlement efforts constituted good cause”). However, the Court finds good cause for a
brief thirty-day extension to permit Plaintiff to serve Defendants because Plaintiff’s counsel
has over thirty similar cases in front of this Court involving the same Defendants, the
volume of cases, number of parties, as well as the issues are relatively complex, and
Plaintiff’s counsel has represented that Defendants do not object to a brief continuance.
Accordingly, Plaintiff is ORDERED to serve Defendants with service of process within thirty
(30) days from the date of this order. Otherwise, the case is subject to being dismissed
without prejudice.
It is so ORDERED.
The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Order to all counsel of record and any
pro se parties herein.
DATED: March 12, 2014

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