Williams v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 25

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION adopting 19 Report and Recommendation; the Court OVERRULES Plaintiffs 20 objections; denying 14 Motion for Summary Judgment; and granting 16 Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court further ORDERS that this matter be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and that it be STRICKEN FROM THE DOCKET OF THIS COURT. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of the Commissioner. Signed by Chief Judge Gina M. Groh on 5/15/2015. (cwm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
MARTINSBURG
RONNIE JOE WILLIAMS, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:14-CV-24
(GROH)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court for consideration of the Report and Recommendation
(“R&R”) of United States Magistrate Judge James E. Seibert. By Standing Order, this
action was referred to Magistrate Judge Seibert for submission of a proposed R&R.
Magistrate Judge Seibert filed his R&R [ECF 19] on January 7, 2015. The R&R
recommends that the Court deny Plaintiff Ronnie Joe Williams, Jr.’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [ECF 14] and grant the Commissioner of Social Security’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [ECF 16] because substantial evidence supported the Administrative Law
Judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of Williams’ application for disability insurance benefits.
I. Background
On February 23, 2011, Ronnie Joe Williams, Jr. applied for disability insurance
benefits, alleging that he had a disability beginning on February 22, 2011. Williams’
application was denied initially and on reconsideration. Williams requested a hearing
before an ALJ. On August 17, 2012, the ALJ held a hearing. The ALJ issued a decision
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denying Williams benefits on August 31, 2012. The Appeals Council denied Williams’s
request for review, rendering the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner.
On February 24, 2014, Williams filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial
review of the Commissioner’s decision denying his claim for disability insurance benefits.
After submitting the administrative record, both parties moved for summary judgment.
Williams requests summary judgment on two grounds. First, he contends that substantial
evidence does not support the ALJ declining to find his voice loss a severe impairment.
Second, he avers that substantial evidence does not support the finding of no disability that
the ALJ based on the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”) because the VE testified in
response to a hypothetical that included a vague functional limitation–“work should consist
primarily of gross manipulation.” The Commissioner counters that substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s decision.
On January 7, 2015, the magistrate court issued an R&R recommending that the
Court grant summary judgment for the Commissioner. Williams timely objected to the
R&R, and the Commissioner responded to his objections.
II. Standards of Review
A.

Review of the R&R

This Court must review de novo those portions of the magistrate judge’s findings to
which Williams objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections, however,
permits the district court to review the R&R under the standards that the district court
believes are appropriate, and, if parties do not object to an issue, the parties’ right to de
novo review is waived as to that issue. See Webb v. Califano, 468 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Cal.
1979). Thus, this Court will review de novo those portions of the R&R to which Williams
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objects and the remaining portions of the R&R for clear error.
B.

Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A
genuine issue exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the non-moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Thus, the Court must conduct “the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the
need for a trial–whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly
can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor
of either party.” Id. at 250.
The party opposing summary judgment “must do more than simply show that there
is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). That is, once the movant has met its burden to
show an absence of material fact, the party opposing summary judgment must come
forward with affidavits or other evidence demonstrating there is a genuine issue for trial.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323-25; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. “If the
evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be
granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (citations omitted). A motion for summary judgment
should be denied “if the evidence is such that conflicting inferences may be drawn
therefrom, or if reasonable men might reach different conclusions.” Phoenix Savs. & Loan,
Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 381 F.2d 245, 249 (4th Cir. 1967); see also Anderson, 477
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U.S. at 253 (noting that “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the
drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge”).
C.

Review of the ALJ’s Decision

The Social Security Act limits this Court’s review of a final decision of the
Commissioner to: (1) whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision,
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971), and (2) whether the Commissioner
applied the correct legal standards. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990).
The phrase “supported by substantial evidence” means “more than a mere scintilla” and
“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Perales, 402 U.S. at 401 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
A reviewing court must not re-weigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that
of the Commissioner, so long as that decision is supported by substantial evidence. Hays,
907 F.2d at 1456.

Ultimately, it is the duty of the ALJ reviewing a case, not the

responsibility of the Court, to make findings of fact and to resolve conflicts in the evidence.
King v. Califano, 599 F.2d 597, 599 (4th Cir. 1979) (“This Court does not find facts or try
the case de novo when reviewing disability determinations.”).
III. The ALJ’s Evaluation Process
To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ conducts a five-step evaluation
process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). If the ALJ finds that the claimant is disabled or not
disabled at a step, the analysis ends. Id. The steps are:
Step One: Determine whether the claimant is engaging in substantial gainful
activity;
Step Two: Determine whether the claimant has a severe impairment;

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Step Three: Determine whether the claimant has a listed impairment (20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1) and conduct a Residual Functional
Capacity (“RFC”) assessment;
Step Four: Consider the RFC assessment to determine whether the claimant
can perform past relevant work; and
Step Five: Consider the RFC assessment, age, education, and work
experience to determine whether the claimant can perform any other work.
Davidson v. Astrue, Civil Action No. 2:11-CV-55, 2012 WL 667296, at *3 (N.D.W. Va. Feb.
28, 2012) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)).
At step one, the ALJ found Williams “has not engaged in substantial gainful activity”
since the alleged onset date. R. at 60. For step two, the ALJ determined that Williams
“had the following severe impairments: severe obstructive and restrictive lung disease; old
nonunion styloid fracture of the right wrist; spur formation of the bilateral elbows/chronic left
tennis elbow; diagnosis of essential/intentional tremors; and obesity.” Id. at 61.
At step three, the ALJ found Williams “has not had an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments
in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” Id. Then, the ALJ concluded that Williams
had the following RFC:
Since February 22, 2011, the claimant has had the residual functional
capacity to perform a range of work activity that: requires no more than a light
level of physical exertion; affords a sit/stand option without breaking task,
with the person having the ability to sit, stand and walk for at least 15 minutes
at a time each; requires no climbing of ladders, ropes or scaffolds, or more
than occasional balancing, climbing ramps/stairs, crawling, crouching,
kneeling and stooping; to the maximum extent possible involves walking on
level, even surfaces; work should consist primarily of gross manipulation; and
avoids exposure to temperature extremes, wet or humid conditions,
environmental pollutants, or hazards (e.g. dangerous machinery, unprotected
heights) . . . .
Id. at 62. At step four, the ALJ determined that Williams could not perform past relevant
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work. Id. at 65. Next, the ALJ found no disability at step five, stating that, “considering
[Williams’] age, education, work experience, and [RFC], there are jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy that [Williams] can perform.” Id. at 66.
IV. Discussion
The R&R recommends granting the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
Specifically, it recommends concluding that substantial evidence supports the ALJ finding
Williams’ alleged voice loss is not a severe impairment and reaching an RFC limiting
Williams to work consisting “primarily of gross manipulation.”
A.

Voice Loss Impairment

Williams does not object to the recommendation that substantial evidence supports
the ALJ finding that his alleged voice loss was not a severe impairment. Thus, the Court
reviews this recommendation for clear error and finds none.
B.

“Primarily of Gross Manipulation” RFC Limitation

Williams objects that the RFC limiting him to work consisting “primarily of gross
manipulation” was impermissibly vague and, as such, resulted in error on two grounds.
Specifically, Williams asserts that the ALJ needed to outline how much fine manipulation
he can perform. He does not argue that the ALJ erred in finding that he can perform work
requiring both gross and fine manipulation.
First, Williams argues that the vagueness of this limitation indicates that the ALJ did
not perform the function-by-function analysis ALJs must conduct to formulate an RFC
pursuant to Social Security Ruling 96-8p. He supports this argument with Young v. Astrue,
771 F. Supp. 2d 610, 621 (S.D.W. Va. 2011), where the court held that an ALJ failing to
include “the additional functional limitations or restrictions in [the claimant’s] RFC
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assessment constituted a significant omission that irreparably skewed the decision-making
process.”
Social Security Ruling 96-8p states that “[t]he RFC assessment must first identify
the individual’s functional limitations or restrictions and assess his or her work-related
abilities on a function-by-function basis, including the functions” listed in paragraphs (b)
through (d) of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545 and § 416.945. SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *1
(July 2, 1996). Paragraphs (b) through (d) enumerate three categories of functions, a
claimant’s: (1) physical abilities, including manipulative functions; (2) mental abilities; and
(3) “other work-related abilities affected by impairments.” Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632,
636 n.5 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.945(b)-(d)). Only after the ALJ conducts
the function-by-function analysis may he express the RFC “in terms of the exertional levels
of work, sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and very heavy.” SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184,
at *1. The Ruling further provides “that the [RFC] ‘assessment must include a narrative
discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical
facts (e.g., laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily activities,
observations).’” Mascio, 780 F.3d at 636 (quoting SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7).
Here, the “primarily of gross manipulation” limitation does not evidence that the ALJ
did not conduct the function-by-function analysis. To the contrary, this limitation is a
function that the ALJ considered as part of that analysis. The ALJ notes in his decision that
Williams testified that he “cannot do fine (manipulation) work.” R. at 62-63. He then
discredits that statement based on Williams’ testimony that he fished because fishing
involves using one’s hands to do fine work (e.g., by tying on hooks). Id. at 63. Thus, the
ALJ complied with Social Security Ruling 96-8P because he considered Williams’
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manipulation abilities based on the evidence of record, provided the requisite narrative
discussion of those abilities and included a manipulation limitation in the RFC.
The case Williams relies on for this argument–Young –is distinguishable. In Young,
the RFC stated that the claimant could “perform the ‘full range of sedentary work,’ except
for certain limitations,” but did not articulate those limitations. 771 F. Supp. 2d at 619. The
court held that substantial evidence did not support the sedentary exertional level because
the ALJ had not stated any functional limitations. Id. at 621. The opposite is true here.
The ALJ outlined Williams’ functional limitations, including the manipulation limitation, to
support his finding that Williams could do work requiring “no more than a light level of
physical exertion.”

R. at 62.

Thus, rather than supporting Williams’ argument,

Young demonstrates that the ALJ complied with Social Security Ruling 96-8p. See Berry
v. Colvin, Civil Action No. 3:14-9859, 2015 WL 1506128, at *12 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 31, 2015)
(distinguishing Young because, in addition to identifying the exertional category, the ALJ
“specifically delineated nonexertional limitations” that the record supported). Accordingly,
the ALJ properly performed the function-by-function analysis and, by extension, substantial
evidence supports the RFC.
Williams’ second argument centers on the ALJ including the manipulation limitation
in the hypothetical to the VE. The ALJ asked the VE the following hypothetical:
All right, then let me ask you to assume a hypothetical individual of the
claimant’s age, educational background and work history who could perform
a range of light work, could perform postural movements occasionally, except
could not climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds to the maximum extent possible,
should walk on level and even surfaces. The work should consist primarily
of gross manipulation. The person should not be exposed to temperature
extremes, whether humid conditions, environmental pollutants or hazards.
Would there be any work in the regional or national economy that such a
person could perform?
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R. at 86. The VE responded:
There would be the work of a [storage facility rental clerk]. This is a light and
unskilled job. In the local economy, there are 185 jobs. In the national
economy, 179,000 jobs. There would be the work of an office helper. In the
local economy, there are 85 jobs. In the national economy 86,200. There
would be the work of a mail clerk. This would be an individual working in the
mail room of a business as opposed to working for the postal service. In the
local economy, there are 60 jobs. In the national economy 70,800.
Id. at 86-87. In his decision, the ALJ stated that the VE had testified that Williams could
perform the requirements of these jobs. Id. at 66. Then, citing the VE’s testimony, the ALJ
concluded that jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Williams can
perform and accordingly found Williams not disabled at step five. Id.
Williams argues that, because the mail clerk and office helper jobs require the ability
to finger (a fine manipulation skill),1 one cannot determine whether the VE’s testimony that
he could perform these jobs was consistent with the manipulation abilities the ALJ intended
the RFC to reflect. Williams maintains that, in light of the possibility that this limitation may
have been unclear to the VE, the VE’s testimony cannot support the finding of no disability.
Essentially, Williams is challenging the hypothetical question. See White v. Colvin,
Civil Action No. CBD-12-2553, 2013 WL 4026921, at *5 (D. Md. Aug. 6, 2013) (considering
whether hypothetical was proper where claimant argued the ALJ erred by not defining for
the VE what the functional limitation “simple to moderately complex tasks” meant); Burnette
v. Astrue, Civil Action No. 2:08-cv-009, 2009 WL 863372, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 24, 2009)
(finding hypothetical was adequate where claimant argued it included impermissibly vague

1

Williams also asserts handling may involve fine manipulation, but courts have routinely noted
handling requires gross manipulation. See, e.g., Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 263 (4th Cir. 1981) (noting
handling as a type of gross manipulation when reviewing a physician’s testimony); Washington v. Astrue, 698
F. Supp. 2d 562, 566 n.1 (D.S.C. 2010).

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terms).
A VE helps an ALJ “determin[e] whether there is work available in the national
economy” a claimant can perform. Walker v. Brown, 889 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1989). For
a VE’s “opinion to be relevant or helpful, it must be based upon a consideration of all other
evidence in the record and it must be in response to proper hypothetical questions which
fairly set out all of claimant’s impairments.” Id. (citations omitted). The ALJ has “great
latitude in posing hypothetical questions and need only pose those that are based on
substantial evidence and accurately reflect the plaintiff’s limitations.” Farnsworth v. Astrue,
604 F. Supp. 2d 828, 853 (N.D.W. Va. 2009) (internal citations omitted). A hypothetical
question is unimpeachable if it adequately reflects an RFC for which the ALJ had sufficient
evidence. Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 659 (4th Cir. 2005). The hypothetical must
identify the “physical and mental limitations imposed by the claimant’s medical
impairment(s).” 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(b)(2); see also Russell v. Barnhart, 58 F. App’x 25,
30 (4th Cir. 2003). It “need not reference each of the claimant’s impairments or diagnoses
by name so long as it adequately reflects the limitations caused by those impairments.”
Brown v. Astrue, Civil Action No. CBD-10-1238, 2013 WL 937549, *6 (D. Md. Mar. 8,
2013). The ALJ also may “translate the claimant’s medical impairments into functional
limitations from which the vocational expert can determine whether work is available.” Id.
Here, “primarily gross manipulation” adequately communicated to the VE that
Williams could perform work that involved some fine manipulation but mostly gross
manipulation. See Burnette, 2009 WL 863372, at *4. Put another way, the hypothetical
conveyed the key information underlying this limitation–that Williams had some difficulty
with fine manipulation but could still perform work requiring it. See id. (holding limitation
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in hypothetical was not impermissibly vague because it “capture[d] the necessary
information . . . and communicate[d] it to the VE”). The fact that the VE, who is “highly
trained and experienced,” did not express any confusion regarding this limitation reinforces
that the VE understood what “primarily gross manipulation” meant. See White, 2013 WL
4026921, at *5 (citation and quotation marks omitted) (rejecting argument that ALJ erred
by not further defining a functional limitation in a hypothetical because the claimant did not
object to the question at the hearing and the VE did not indicate confusion about its
meaning). Thus, the hypothetical was adequate and the ALJ properly relied on the VE’s
testimony.2
Accordingly, the Court overrules the Plaintiff’s objections because the ALJ complied
with Social Security Ruling 96-8p in formulating the RFC and substantial evidence (the VE’s
testimony in response to a proper hypothetical) supports the finding of no disability.
IV. Conclusion
Upon review of the above, the Court OVERRULES the Plaintiff’s objections. It is
the opinion of this Court that the Report and Recommendation should be, and is, hereby
ORDERED ADOPTED.

For the reasons more fully stated in the Report and

Recommendation, the Court GRANTS the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment
and DENIES the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
Accordingly, the Court further ORDERS that this matter be DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE and that it be STRICKEN FROM THE DOCKET OF THIS COURT.

2

In addition, the DOT job descriptions for mail clerk and office helper show that the VE’s testimony
was consistent with the RFC. A mail clerk and office helper perform fingering “1/3 to 2/3 of the time.” DOT
§§ 209.687-026, 239.567-010. Because these jobs require fingering only some of the time, one could
reasonably view fingering as not the primary type of manipulation they require.

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The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of the Commissioner.
The Clerk is directed to transmit copies of this Order to all counsel of record.
DATED: May 15, 2015

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