HCR ManorCare, Inc. et al v. Youngblood

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 5 TO DISMISS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION TO ABSTAIN AND GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 7 TO COMPEL ARBITRATION. The parties are directed to proceed to arbitration. This case is ordered closed and stricken from the docket. The clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs. Signed by Chief Judge Gina M. Groh on 9/2/2016. (tlg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
MARTINSBURG

HCR MANORCARE, INC., and
HEARTLAND OF MARTINSBURG WV, LLC,
Plaintiffs,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:16-CV-32
(GROH)

MARY BETH YOUNGBLOOD, Administratrix
for the Estate of Mary Etta Youngblood,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION TO ABSTAIN
AND GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
Currently pending before the Court is the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the
Alternative, Motion to Abstain [ECF No. 5] and the Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Arbitration
[ECF No. 7]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the Defendant’s Motion
to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion to Abstain and GRANTS the Plaintiffs’ Motion to
Compel Arbitration.
I. Background
Mary Etta Youngblood (“the decedent”) was a nursing home resident at Heartland
of Martinsburg WV, LLC (“Heartland”)—a subsidiary of HCR ManorCare, Inc.
(“ManorCare”)—during May 13, 2014, through May 30, 2014. On May 15, 2014, the
decedent signed an admission agreement with Heartland and the following day she
executed a separate voluntary arbitration agreement.
provided, in pertinent part:

The arbitration agreement

All claims arising out of or relating to this Agreement, the
Admission Agreement or any and all past or future admissions
of the Patient at this Center, or any sister Center operated by
any subsidiary of HCR ManorCare, Inc. (“Sister Center”),
including claims for malpractice, shall be submitted to
arbitration.
ECF No. 1-1 at 1. As a result of alleged medical negligence during her residency at
Heartland, the decedent suffered physical and emotional injury and subsequently died on
June 25, 2014.
On February 16, 2016, the Estate of Mary Etta Youngblood (“the Estate”) served
a notice of claim and certificate of merit upon ManorCare; HCR ManorCare, LLC; HCR
MC Operations, LLC; Manor Care, Inc.; HCR Manor Care Services, LLC; Heartland
Employment Services, LLC; Heartland; and Nancy Mason. The notice of claim stated the
Estate’s intent to file a medical malpractice suit “relate[d] to the care and treatment
provided to [the decedent] at Heartland.” ECF No. 7-2 at 4. More specifically, the notice
of claim alleged that during her residency at Heartland, the decedent “suffered permanent
and irreparable injury and death resulting from Defendants [sic] failure to follow the
accepted standard of care.” ECF No. 7-2 at 4. Following their receipt of the notice of
claim, on March 17, 2016, ManorCare and Heartland sent the Estate a letter demanding
that arbitration be initiated, pursuant to the May 16, 2014 arbitration agreement, within
seven days. Absent any reply from the Estate, on March 28, 2016, ManorCare and
Heartland filed a complaint with this Court to compel arbitration against the Estate
pursuant to the arbitration agreement. One week later, on April 4, 2016, the Estate filed
a wrongful death action in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, West Virginia, against
HCR ManorCare, LLC; ManorCare; HCRMC Operations, LLC; Manor Care, Inc.; HCR
Manor Care Services, LLC; HCR IV Healthcare, LLC; Heartland Employment Services,

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LLC; Heartland; Nancy Mason; John Does 1 through 10; and Unidentified Entities 1
through 10.
On April 18, 2016, the Estate filed its motion to dismiss or abstain in this case,
raising several arguments. First, the Estate argues that the arbitration agreement signed
by the decedent does not apply to it as a nonsignatory. Next, the Estate contends that
the complaint filed by ManorCare and Heartland should be dismissed because they failed
to join Nancy Mason, the licensed nursing home administrator of Heartland during the
decedent’s residency, who the Estate avers is a necessary and indispensable party.
Additionally, the Estate claims that the relief sought by ManorCare and Heartland is
improper in light of the Anti-Injunction Act (“AIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2283. Finally, the Estate
argues that the Court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction pursuant to Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,
424 U.S. 800 (1976). On May 5, 2016, ManorCare and Heartland filed their motion to
compel arbitration, arguing that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, is
applicable to the Estate’s claims presented in the state court wrongful death action and
requesting that this Court compel the Estate to arbitrate pursuant to the terms of the May
16, 2014 arbitration agreement. Both parties’ motions have been fully briefed and are
ripe for review.
II. Standards of Review
A.

Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a defendant to
challenge the sufficiency of a complaint by moving to dismiss it for failing “to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When reviewing a motion to

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dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must assume all of the allegations contained
within the complaint to be true, resolve all doubts and inferences in favor of the plaintiff
and view the allegations in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Edwards v. City of
Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243-44 (4th Cir. 1999). Nevertheless, if a complaint fails to
allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” it must be
dismissed. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Even though “detailed
factual allegations” are not required, a complaint must offer “more than an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (internal quotations and citation omitted). For example, a complaint that provides
“labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). Likewise, a complaint that tenders
only “naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement” does not suffice. Id.
(alteration in original) (internal quotations and citation omitted). A plaintiff is required to
articulate facts that, when accepted as true, “show” he is plausibly entitled to relief.
Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts may consider facts derived from sources
beyond the four corners of the complaint, including documents attached to the complaint
and the motion to dismiss, “so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic.”
Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem’l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009).
B.

Rule 12(b)(7) Motion to Dismiss

Rule 12(b)(7) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows for dismissal of an
action when a necessary and indispensable party has not been joined as required by Rule
19. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7). In considering a 12(b)(7) motion, the court must first

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determine, pursuant to Rule 19(a), whether the absent party “is necessary to a proceeding
because of its relationship to the matter under consideration.” Owens-Illinois, Inc. v.
Meade, 186 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
Teamsters Local Union No. 171 v. Keal Driveaway Co., 173 F.3d 915, 917-18 (4th Cir.
1999)). If the absent party is necessary, then the court will order its joinder. Id. However,
if joinder will destroy diversity, then the court must determine, pursuant to Rule 19(b),
whether the case can continue in the party’s absence. Id. If not, then “the party is
indispensable and the action should be dismissed.”

Teamsters, 173 F.3d at 918.

Dismissal for nonjoinder is disfavored, see Meade, 186 F.3d at 441, and the moving party
bears the burden of demonstrating that joinder is required, see Am. Gen. Life and
Accident Ins. Co. v. Wood, 429 F.3d 83, 92 (4th Cir. 2005).
III. Discussion
A.

Joinder of Nancy Mason

The Court will first consider the Estate’s argument regarding the joinder of Nancy
Mason as it implicates the Court’s jurisdiction to hear this case. In its motion to dismiss,
the Estate argues that dismissal of this action is required because ManorCare and
Heartland failed to join Nancy Mason, a resident of West Virginia who the Estate claims
is a necessary and indispensable party, “in an attempt to manufacture federal diversity
jurisdiction.” ECF No. 6 at 2. The Estate avers that Nancy Mason is a necessary and
indispensable party in light of her status as the licensed nursing home administrator of
Heartland during the decedent’s residency. However, “in the case of nursing home
administrators . . . courts have held that those administrators are not necessary parties
under Rule 19 when another alleged joint tortfeasor seeks to enforce arbitration.” Canyon

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Sudar Partners, LLC v. Cole, Civil Action No. 3:10-1001, 2011 WL 1233320, at *3 (S.D.
W. Va. Mar. 29, 2011); see also Northport Health Servs. of Ark., LLC v. Rutherford, 605
F.3d 483, 491 (8th Cir. 2010) (collecting cases) (“In the arbitration context, to our
knowledge every circuit to consider the issue has concluded that a party joined in a
parallel state court contract or tort action who would destroy diversity jurisdiction is not an
indispensable party under Rule 19 in a federal action to compel arbitration.”) Here, other
alleged tortfeasors, ManorCare and Heartland, are seeking to enforce arbitration.
Therefore, Nancy Mason is not a necessary party to this case. Consequently, she is not
required to be joined as a plaintiff and, as a result, complete diversity remains between
the parties.
B.

The Arbitration Agreement

The principal argument set forth by the Estate is that the arbitration agreement
entered into between ManorCare, Heartland and the decedent does not apply to it
because “as a nonsignatory [it] cannot be compelled to arbitrate claims he or she never
agreed to so arbitrate.” ECF No. 6 at 2. In response, ManorCare and Heartland aver
that, based upon the derivative nature of wrongful death actions, because the decedent’s
“right to maintain an action was subject to the ADR Agreement, the [Estate] is likewise
bound to arbitrate under the agreement.” ECF No. 8 at 15 (internal quotations omitted).
It is well settled that “the interpretation of an arbitration agreement is generally a
matter of state law.” Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 681
(2010) (citation omitted). Therefore, a federal court sitting in diversity interprets the
language and meaning of an arbitration agreement according to state law. See Adkins v.
Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 501 (4th Cir. 2002). Specifically, “[w]hether a party

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agreed to arbitrate a particular dispute is a question of state law governing contract
formation.” Id. (citing First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995)). In
addition, federal courts must pay heed to the law set forth in the FAA. See 9 U.S.C. §§
1-16. The FAA applies to “[a] written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof.” 9 U.S.C.
§ 2. The FAA favors arbitration of disputes. Adkins, 303 F.3d at 500. This policy of
favoring arbitration reflects “Congress’s view that arbitration constitutes a more efficient
dispute resolution process than litigation.” Id. (citing Hightower v. GMRI, Inc., 272 F.3d
239, 241 (4th Cir. 2001)). In fact, the inclination toward arbitration is so strong that “when
the scope of an arbitration clause remains ‘open to question’ regarding the inclusion of a
particular issue, a court must declare that the issue is subject to arbitration.” Great Am.
Ins. Co. v. Hinkle Contracting Corp., 497 F. App’x 348, 352 (4th Cir. 2012) (emphasis
added) (citing Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 809, 812
(4th Cir. 1989)).
1.

Enforceability of the Arbitration Agreement Against the Estate

Before this Court is able to address whether or not ManorCare and Heartland can
compel arbitration under the FAA, it must determine whether the Estate, as a
nonsignatory, is bound by the arbitration agreement.1 The Estate’s state court cause of
action alleges negligence, medical malpractice, fraud and violations of the West Virginia
Consumer Credit and Protection Act against ManorCare, Heartland and other corporate

1

The Estate does not call into question the legal validity of the arbitration agreement between ManorCare,
Heartland and the decedent; it argues only that the arbitration agreement does not apply to it as a
nonsignatory.

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and individual defendants. The Estate contends that these alleged violations caused the
decedent to sustain physical and emotional injury and, ultimately, death. West Virginia’s
wrongful death statute provides, in pertinent part:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful
act, neglect, or default, and the act, neglect or default is such
as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party
injured to maintain an action to recover damages in respect
thereof, then, and in every such case, the person who, or the
corporation which, would have been liable if death had not
ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages,
notwithstanding the death of the person injured.
W. Va. Code § 55-7-5. As evident from the statute, wrongful death actions in West
Virginia are derivative in nature. See Syl. Pt. 4, Davis v. Foley, 457 S.E.2d 532 (W. Va.
1995) (“The damages in a wrongful death action arise out of the death of the decedent
thereby making a wrongful death action a derivative claim.”). Section 55-7-5 “preserve[s]
a deceased person’s right of action after the person’s death, by permitting the claim to be
brought by the deceased person’s personal representative,” Brooks v. Weirton, 503
S.E.2d 814, 821 n.7 (W. Va. 1998), and thus a wrongful death cause of action may be
maintained only if “the deceased person himself could have maintained an action for
damages had he survived,” Panagopoulous v. Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220, 223 (S.D. W.
Va. 1969) (first citing Hoover’s Adm’x v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 33 S.E. 224 (W.
Va. 1899); then citing Wright v. Davis, 53 S.E.2d 335 (W. Va. 1949)). Accordingly, an
administrator cannot bring a wrongful death suit “where the deceased was guilty of
contributory negligence, or received satisfaction or executed a release during his lifetime”
because the statute gives rise to a cause of action “only where the deceased [himself]
might have maintained an action.” Hoover’s Adm’x, 33 S.E. at 225.

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According to West Virginia law, the Estate’s state court wrongful death action
exists only insofar as the decedent herself could have maintained an action for
negligence, or other wrongful acts, against HCR ManorCare and Heartland. The state
court action, and any potential recovery resulting therefrom, is thus derivative based upon
the decedent’s own ability to recover. Here, had the decedent survived, she would have
been “limited in form to arbitration.” See Wilkerson ex rel. Estate of Wilkerson v. Nelson,
395 F. Supp. 2d 281, 289 (M.D.N.C. 2005). Accordingly, the Estate is likewise limited,
and bound, by the arbitration agreement.
2.

Compelling Arbitration Under the Federal Arbitration Act

Upon finding that the Estate is subject to the arbitration agreement, the Court must
next consider whether ManorCare and Heartland can compel arbitration under the FAA.
A litigant can compel arbitration under the FAA
if he can demonstrate (1) the existence of a dispute between
the parties, (2) a written agreement that includes an arbitration
provision which purports to cover the dispute, (3) the
relationship of the transaction, which is evidenced by the
agreement, to interstate or foreign commerce, and (4) the
failure, neglect or refusal of [the other party] to arbitrate the
dispute.
Adkins, 303 F.3d at 500-01 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Whiteside v. Teltech
Corp., 940 F.2d 99, 102 (4th Cir. 1991)).

Here, ManorCare and Heartland have

demonstrated all four necessary elements. First, there is a dispute between the parties.
On February 16, 2016, the Estate notified ManorCare and Heartland of its intent to file
suit by serving its notice of claim and screening certificate. In response, on March 17,
2016, ManorCare and Heartland sent the Estate a letter demanding that arbitration be
initiated, pursuant to the arbitration agreement, within seven days. The Estate did not

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reply to the letter and, instead, on April 4, 2016, filed a wrongful death suit in the Circuit
Court of Kanawha County, West Virginia.

Second, there is a written arbitration

agreement—applicable to the Estate—which purports to cover the wrongful death claims.
The agreement defines “disputes” as
[a]ll claims arising out of or relating to this Agreement, the
Admission Agreement or any and all past or future admissions
of the Patient at this Center, or any sister Center operated by
any subsidiary of HCR ManorCare, Inc. (“Sister Center”),
including claims for malpractice.
ECF No. 1-1 at 1. The state court complaint alleges that instances of negligence, medical
malpractice and fraud occurred during the decedent’s residency at Heartland, a “sister
center” of HCR ManorCare, Inc.

Thus it is clear that these claims are considered

“disputes” under the arbitration agreement. Third, the agreement is related to interstate
commerce because it stipulates by its very own terms that “the Admission Agreement and
the Patient’s stays at the Center substantially involve interstate commerce.” ECF No. 11 at 1; see GGNSC Morgantown, LLC v. Phillips, Civil Action No. 1:14CV118, 2014 WL
5449674, at *2 (N.D. W. Va. Oct. 24, 2014) (finding the third element satisfied where “the
ADR Agreement by its terms” stated that it “evidence[d] a transaction in interstate
commerce governed by the [FAA]”). Finally, it is evident that the Estate refuses to
arbitrate. On April 4, 2016, it filed its wrongful death suit in state court and, more recently,
on May 19, 2016, it filed its response in opposition to the Plaintiff’s motion to compel
arbitration with this Court. Therefore, because the arbitration agreement applies to the
Estate’s state court wrongful death action, and because ManorCare and Heartland have
demonstrated the four elements under Adkins, arbitration may be compelled under the
FAA.

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C.

Anti-Injunction Act

Notwithstanding the existence of an enforceable arbitration agreement against it,
the Estate contends that this Court is unable to grant the relief requested by ManorCare
and Heartland because such relief would be in violation of the AIA. The AIA prohibits
federal courts from granting injunctions to stay proceedings in state courts unless such
action is “expressly authorized by Act of Congress,” “necessary in aid of its jurisdiction”
or necessary “to protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283. Simply put, the
AIA works to preserve federalism. See Emp’rs Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Shannon, 65 F.3d 1126,
1130 (4th Cir. 1995).
The underlying complaint filed by ManorCare and Heartland requests that this
Court enter an order compelling the Estate to arbitrate its wrongful death claims and,
additionally, “[e]nter an Order staying and enjoining any other civil proceedings arising
out of the matters threatened through, or related to the matters threatened through, [the
Estate’s] February 16, 2016 notice of claim and screening certificate of merit.” ECF No.
1 at 9. The Court is aware of no authority suggesting that it may, in violation of the AIA,
“grant a stay of state court proceedings in conjunction with a motion to compel arbitration.”
See Canyon Sudar, 2011 WL 1233320, at *11 (emphasis omitted). Federal courts in this
circuit have, however, issued orders compelling arbitration, thereby indirectly restricting
plaintiffs from prosecuting their claims in parallel state court proceedings. See, e.g., Nat’l
Home Ins. Co. v. Bridges, 142 F. Supp. 3d 425, 433-35 (D.S.C. 2015); Canyon Sudar,
2011 WL 1233320, at *11-12; Galloway and Assocs., PLLC v. Fredeking & Fredeking
Law Offices, LC, Civil Action No. 3:10-0830, 2010 WL 3955790, at *8-9 (S.D. W. Va. Oct.
8, 2010). Therefore, considering the “serious concerns of federalism and comity” arising

11

from a federal court’s stay of state court proceedings, United Serv. Prot. Corp. v. Lowe,
354 F. Supp. 2d 651, 659 (S.D. W. Va. 2005), although the Court finds that the Estate is
bound by the arbitration agreement, it declines to enjoin the related state court proceeding
in this case. See Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281,
297 (1970) (“Any doubts as to the propriety of a federal injunction against state court
proceedings should be resolved in favor of permitting the state courts to proceed in an
orderly fashion to finally determine the controversy.”) Therefore, insofar as ManorCare
and Heartland request an order from this Court staying the proceeding in Kanawha
County Circuit Court, the request is denied.
D.

Abstention

Finally, the Estate argues that the Court should exercise abstention pursuant to
Younger and Colorado River. Upon review, the Court finds that neither doctrine applies
to the circumstances of this case.
1.

Younger

Because “a federal court’s obligation to hear and decide a case is virtually
unflagging,” Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 591 (2013) (internal
quotations and citation omitted), “[a]bstention is not in order simply because a pending
state-court proceeding involves the same subject matter,” id. at 588 (citation omitted). In
Sprint, the Supreme Court of the United States recently clarified the three “exceptional
circumstances” warranting Younger abstention: (1) when a federal court would have to
intrude in an ongoing state criminal prosecution; (2) in certain “civil enforcement
proceedings”; and (3) in “civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in
furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.” Id. (internal

12

quotations and citations omitted). None of these circumstances are present in the instant
case.
First, the state court proceeding is not a criminal prosecution. Second, the state
court case is not akin to a criminal prosecution and thus it does not involve the particular
kind of civil enforcement proceeding anticipated by Younger. See id. (“This Court has
extended Younger abstention to particular state civil proceedings that are akin to criminal
prosecutions.” (citing Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975))). Finally, there
is no apparent state court order that is “uniquely in furtherance of the state court[’]s ability
to perform [its] judicial function[ ].” See id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Therefore, because this case does not present any one of the three exceptional
circumstances described in Sprint, abstention pursuant to the Younger doctrine is not
justified.
2.

Colorado River

Under the Colorado River doctrine, federal courts may refrain from hearing claims
“in favor of ongoing, parallel state proceedings in cases where ‘considerations of wise
judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and
comprehensive disposition of litigation’ clearly favor abstention.”

Ackerman v.

ExxonMobil Corp., 734 F.3d 237, 248 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S.
at 817). The Court weighs six factors, “with the balance heavily weighted in favor of the
exercise of jurisdiction,” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1, 16 (1983), in determining whether Colorado River abstention is proper:
(1) whether the subject matter of the litigation involves
property where the first court may assume in rem jurisdiction
to the exclusion of others; (2) whether the federal forum is an
inconvenient one; (3) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal

13

litigation; (4) the relevant order in which the courts obtained
jurisdiction and the progress achieved in each action;
(5) whether state law or federal law provides the rule of
decision on the merits; and (6) the adequacy of the state
proceeding to protect the parties' rights.
Chase Brexton Health Servs., Inc. v. Maryland, 411 F.3d 457, 463-64 (4th Cir. 2005)
(citations omitted). Similar to Younger, courts should apply the Colorado River doctrine
only in exceptional circumstances. See id. at 463. However, before considering the
Colorado River factors, courts must first determine whether there are actively pending
and parallel federal and state cases. Id. (“The threshold question . . . is whether there
are parallel federal and state suits.”) State and federal actions are considered parallel
when “substantially the same parties litigate substantially the same issues in different
forums,” id. at 464 (internal quotations and citation omitted), and “there is a substantial
likelihood that the [state litigation] will dispose of all claims presented in the federal case,”
AAR Int’l, Inc. v. Nimelias Enters. S.A., 250 F.3d 510, 518 (7th Cir. 2001) (internal
quotations and citation omitted). If the court determines that the federal and state cases
are not parallel, then the Colorado River doctrine is inapplicable. Interstate Material Corp.
v. Chicago, 847 F.2d 1285, 1287 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Am. Family Life Assurance Co.
of Columbus v. Biles, 714 F.3d 887, 892 (5th Cir. 2013); Al-Abood v. El-Shamari, 217
F.3d 225, 232 (4th Cir. 2000); Crawley v. Hamilton Cty. Comm’rs, 744 F.2d 28, 31 (6th
Cir. 1984); Shields v. Murdoch, 891 F. Supp. 2d 567, 578 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Hayes v. City
of Columbus, No. 2:10 CV 0513, 2011 WL 2174973, at *4 (S.D. Ohio June 3, 2011).
Here, the state and federal cases are not parallel. Although the underlying facts
overlap, factual commonality alone does not lead to a finding that two proceedings are
parallel. See New Beckley Mining Corp. v. Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am., 946
F.2d 1072, 1074 (4th Cir. 1991) (“[S]ome factual overlap does not dictate that proceedings
14

are parallel.”). Of greater importance is the fact that the state complaint and federal
complaint allege completely different causes of action. The state complaint raises claims
of corporate and individual negligence, nursing home violations, medical malpractice,
fraud and violations of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act. In contrast,
the complaint before this Court alleges only one claim for failure to arbitrate under the
FAA—a federal act reflecting “a national policy favoring arbitration.” See Southland Corp.
v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). Unlike the state proceeding, the instant case does not
involve wrongful death claims but rather raises only one question: whether the Estate may
be compelled to arbitrate. See American Family, 714 F.3d at 892. Therefore, because
the Court does not find the state and federal cases to be parallel, the Colorado River
doctrine is inapplicable.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the
Alternative, Motion to Abstain [ECF No. 5] is DENIED. The Court further ORDERS that
the Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Arbitration [ECF No. 7] is GRANTED. The parties are
DIRECTED to proceed to arbitration consistent with the terms of the arbitration
agreement. As mentioned above, the Court declines to issue a stay of the related state
court proceeding.
There being no other issues to address, the Court ORDERS this case CLOSED
and STRICKEN from its active docket.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter a separate judgment order in favor of the
Plaintiffs.

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The Clerk is DIRECTED to transmit copies of this Order to all counsel of record
herein.
DATED: September 2, 2016

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