CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Gilkison et al
Filing
1438
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 1316 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE COUNTERCLAIMS. Signed by Senior Judge Frederick P. Stamp, Jr on 11/26/2012. (kac)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 5:05CV202
(STAMP)
ROBERT V. GILKISON,
PEIRCE, RAIMOND & COULTER, P.C.,
a Pennsylvania professional corporation
a/k/a ROBERT PEIRCE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.,
a Pennsylvania professional corporation,
ROBERT PEIRCE, JR., LOUIS A. RAIMOND,
MARK T. COULTER and RAY HARRON, M.D.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE COUNTERCLAIMS
I.
Background
This is one of three motions for summary judgment before this
Court.1
On September 14, 2012, the plaintiff, CSX Transportation,
Inc. (“CSX”), filed this particular motion for summary judgment on
the counterclaims.
Within this motion, CSX argues this Court
should grant its motion for summary judgment on the counterclaims
because: (1) the lawyer defendants cannot prove that CSX made a
false representation in the amended complaint; (2) the lawyer
defendants
cannot
prove
that
they
relied
on
any
alleged
misrepresentation in the amended complaint; (3) Count II of the
1
For a brief procedural history of this case, please see this
Court’s memorandum opinion and order denying lawyer defendants’
motion for summary judgment related to CSX’s Earl Baylor
allegations and claims (ECF No. 1436).
counterclaims against CSX fails if Count I of the counterclaims
fails; (4) Count II of the counterclaims fails regardless of Count
I failing because the lawyer defendants cannot prove falsity,
justifiable reliance, and intent to defraud; and (5) the lawyer
defendants cannot prove the conduct necessary to merit an award of
punitive damages.
The lawyer defendants then filed a response to CSX’s motion
for summary judgment on the counterclaims.
In this response, the
lawyer defendants argue: (1) the full scope of the counterclaims as
pled
raises
numerous
factual
disputes
that
preclude
summary
judgment on Count I of the counterclaims; (2) even under the
refined version of the counterclaims, numerous factual issues exist
that preclude summary judgment on Count I of the counterclaims; (3)
numerous factual issues exist that preclude summary judgment on
Count II of the counterclaims; and (4) the lawyer defendants’ claim
for punitive damages is proper.
CSX then filed a reply in which it argued that the alleged
factual
preclude
disputes
this
identified
Court
from
by
the
granting
lawyer
summary
defendants
do
not
judgment
on
the
counterclaims in CSX’s favor. In its reply, CSX further argued the
reasons that this Court should grant summary judgment on the
counterclaims in CSX’s favor; again, stating that the lawyer
defendants cannot prove falsity, reliance, or an intent to defraud
as to either count in the counterclaim and in the alternative, CSX
2
is entitled to summary judgment on the requests for punitive
damages.
For the reasons stated below, this Court finds that CSX’s
motion for summary judgment on the counterclaims is denied, as
genuine issues of material fact exist.
II.
Applicable Law
Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely
disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in
the record, including depositions, documents,
electronically stored information, affidavits
or
declarations,
stipulations
.
.
.
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not
establish the absence or presence of a genuine
dispute, or that an adverse party cannot
produce admissible evidence to support the
fact.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
The party seeking summary judgment bears
the initial burden of showing the absence of any genuine issues of
material fact.
(1986).
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23
“The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to come
forward with facts sufficient to create a triable issue of fact.”
Temkin v. Frederick County Comm’rs, 945 F.2d 716, 718-19 (4th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1095 (1992) (citing Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)). However, as the
United States Supreme Court noted in Anderson, “Rule 56(e) itself
provides that a party opposing a properly supported motion for
3
summary judgment may not rest upon the mere allegation or denials
of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Id. at 256.
“The inquiry
performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is
the need for a trial -- whether, in other words, there are any
genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a
finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of
either party.”
Id. at 250; see also Charbonnages de France v.
Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir. 1979)(stating that summary
judgment “should be granted only in those cases where it is
perfectly clear that no issue of fact is involved and inquiry into
the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law.”
(citing Stevens v. Howard D. Johnson Co., 181 F.2d 390, 394 (4th
Cir. 1950))).
In Celotex, the Court stated that “the plain language of Rule
56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time
for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a
showing
sufficient
to
establish
the
existence
of
an
element
essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial.”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
Summary
judgment is not appropriate until after the non-moving party has
had sufficient opportunity for discovery.
See Oksanen v. Page
Mem’l Hosp., 912 F.2d 73, 78 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 1074 (1992). In reviewing the supported underlying facts, all
4
inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion.
See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Because the claims at issue in this particular motion for
summary judgment involve fraud, a higher standard of proof applies.
Under West Virginia law, “[a]llegations of fraud, when denied by
proper pleading, must be established by clear and convincing
proof.”
Calhoun County Bank v. Ellison, 54 S.E.2d 182, syl. pt. 5
(W. Va. 1949).
See also Tri-State Asphalt v. McDonough Co., 391
S.E.2d 907, 912 (W. Va. 1990) (same); Elk Refining Co. v. Daniel,
199 F.2d 479, 482 (4th Cir. 1952) (“The burden of proving fraud is
unquestionably heavy . . . and it is also well established that one
cannot
rely
blindly
upon
a
representation
investigation and reasonable basis.”).
without
suitable
Mere allegations in the
pleadings are not sufficient to survive a motion for summary
judgment.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
As the Supreme Court noted in
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, “the inquiry involved in a ruling on a
motion for summary judgment . . . necessarily implicates the
substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the
trial on the merits.”
Therefore, if CSX shows the absence of any
genuine issue of material fact, this Court must determine whether
the lawyer defendants have “brought forth sufficient facts to meet
the ‘clear and convincing’ standard of proof required to support an
allegation of fraud.”
Schleicher v. TA Operating Corp., No.
5
5:06CV133, 2008 WL 111338 (N.D. W. Va. Jan. 9, 2008), aff’d, 319 F.
App’x 303 (4th Cir. 2009).
III.
Discussion
The lawyer defendants’ counterclaims against CSX consist of
two counts. In Count I, the lawyer defendants allege that CSX made
fraudulent misrepresentations in its amended complaint.
In CSX’s
amended complaint, it alleged that the lawyer defendants committed
fraud by bringing the claims on behalf of Mr. Baylor against CSX.
The lawyer defendants claim that, in light of the release,2 CSX’s
assertions in the amended complaint concerning the claims filed by
the lawyer defendants on behalf of Mr. Baylor, were false.
In
Count II, the lawyer defendants argue that CSX made further
fraudulent misrepresentations in its discovery responses.
The
lawyer defendants allege that CSX’s failure to disclose the release
in
responding
defendants
and
to
discovery
resulted
in
intentionally
deceived
misrepresentations
the
lawyer
regarding
the
existence of the release.
Under West Virginia law, the essential elements in an action
for
fraud
are
as
follows:
“(1)
2
that
the
act
claimed
to
be
In 2001, Mr. Baylor was part of a lawsuit that alleged Mr.
Baylor was injured as a result of asbestos exposure. The lawyer
defendants did not represent Mr. Baylor in this action.
CSX,
however, settled this lawsuit and paid Mr. Baylor $7,500.00.
Thereafter, CSX and Mr. Baylor entered into a release as a result
of this settlement wherein the lawyer defendants assert that Mr.
Baylor released CSX from any future liability relating to any
asbestos injury.
6
fraudulent was the act of the defendant or induced by him; (2) that
it was material and false; that plaintiff relied upon it and was
justified under the circumstances in relying upon it; and (3) that
he was damaged because he relied upon it.”
Mull, 595 S.E.2d 308 (W. Va. 2004).
Syl. Pt. 5, Kidd v.
Further, actual fraud, which
is the fraud at issue here “is intentional, and consists of
intentional deception to induce another to part with property or to
surrender
some
legal
right,
and
which
accomplishes
the
end
designed.”
Stanley v. Sewell Coal Co., 285 S.E.2d 679, 683 (W.
Va. 1981).
There cannot be any dispute as to whether genuine
issues of material fact exist concerning these elements in order
for this Court to grant summary judgment in favor of CSX.
CSX
makes five arguments, as outlined above and discussed in further
detail
below,
regarding
why
this
Court
should
grant
summary
judgment in CSX’s favor on the lawyer defendants’ counterclaims.
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the lawyer
defendants, the nonmoving parties, however, this Court finds that
there are genuine issues of material fact that must be determined
at trial.
A.
Count I: False Representations in CSX’s Amended Complaint
CSX
states
that
Count
I
of
the
lawyer
defendants’
counterclaims alleges that the statements made in CSX’s amended
complaint “are false because the Baylor claim . . . was ‘barred by
the Release.’”
ECF No. 1316 Attach. 29 *10.
7
CSX’s first argument
is
that
to
prove
such
an
assertion
of
falsity,
the
lawyer
defendants must prove at least three things: (1) that CSX was
obligated to invoke the release; (2) that invoking the release
necessarily would have resulted in dismissal of the Baylor claim;
and (3) that CSX would have expended no money or resources in
obtaining dismissal of the claim on that basis.
CSX argues that
the lawyer defendants cannot prove these three things and thus,
summary judgment should be granted in its favor concerning Count I.
The lawyer defendants, however, assert that this argument ignores
the actual scope of the lawyer defendants’ counterclaims. Further,
the lawyer defendants state that, even under CSX’s version of the
counterclaims, numerous factual issues exist that preclude summary
judgment on Count I.
This Court finds that genuine issues of material fact do exist
as to whether CSX made false assertions in its amended complaint,
as a reasonable jury may find that CSX did not or could not have
reasonably relied on the lawyer defendants’ claims regarding Mr.
Baylor.
Although showing that the lawyer defendants could not
prove those three things may be evidence used to show that CSX’s
assertions in the amended complaint were not false because CSX did
reasonably rely on the claims involving Mr. Baylor, the lawyer
defendants still may be able to prove to a reasonable jury that
CSX’s assertions in the amended complaint were false.
As the
lawyer defendants indicate, the release itself may provide evidence
8
which a reasonable jury could use to conclude that CSX did not
reasonably rely on the lawyer defendants’ claims regarding Mr.
Baylor in incurring damages.
There are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether
CSX’s claims in the amended complaint were false.
Therefore, this
Court cannot grant summary judgment in favor of CSX based on the
above argument.
B.
Count
I:
Reliance
on
Misrepresentations
in
the
Amended
Complaint
CSX next argues that because the lawyer defendants have
consistently denied that CSX’s statements concerning the Baylor
asbestos claim are true, they cannot prove reliance.
upon
Basic
Inc.
v.
Levinson,
485
U.S.
224
(1988),
CSX relies
for
this
proposition. Basic involved an action brought under Securities and
Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5.
In this case, the Court gave the
following example of the way in which these particular defendants
could rebut the presumption of reliance under Rule 10b-5:
“For example, a plaintiff who believed that [defendant’s]
statements were false and that [defendant] was indeed
engaged in merger discussions, and who consequently
believed that [defendant’s] stock was artificially
underpriced, but sold his shares nevertheless because of
other unrelated concerns, e.g., potential antitrust
problems, or political pressures to divest from shares of
certain businesses, could not be said to have relied on
the integrity of a price he knew had been manipulated.”3
3
In CSX’s memorandum in support of its motion for summary
judgment on the counterclaims, CSX cites this sentence as follows:
“[A] plaintiff who believed that [the defendant’s] statements were
9
Basic, 485 U.S. at 249.
CSX argues that this quoted language
stands for the proposition that because the lawyer defendants
disputed CSX’s allegations of fraud, the lawyer defendants cannot
now claim to have relied upon those allegations.
This Court, however, does not find this argument to be
persuasive.
The claims in this case do not involve the same
subject matter, and thus they do not involve the same law as
applied in Basic.
Further, this Court cannot find, nor has CSX
provided, any case law standing for the proposition that the denial
of allegations in a complaint precludes a finding of reliance in a
later action for fraud concerning those allegations.
A reasonable
jury may still find that the lawyer defendants relied on the
allegations in defending against said allegations. Therefore, this
Court cannot grant summary judgment based on this argument.
C.
Count II: Falsity, Justifiable Reliance, and Intent to Defraud
in Responding to Discovery Requests4
CSX next argues that this Court should grant summary judgment
in
its
favor
counterclaims.
regarding
Count
II
of
the
lawyer
defendants’
Count II of the lawyer defendants’ counterclaims
false . . . could not be said to have relied on [them].”
1316 Attach. 29.
4
ECF No.
CSX also argues that if Count I fails, which concerns the
alleged fraudulent misrepresentations in the amended complaint,
then Count II concerning the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations
in the discovery responses should also fail. This Court need not
address this argument, however, because this Court did not find
that Count I failed.
10
alleges that CSX made fraudulent misrepresentations in responding
to the lawyer defendants’ discovery requests. CSX alleges that the
lawyer defendants cannot prove three separate essential elements of
fraud as to Count II: (1) falsity; (2) justifiable reliance; and
(3) intent to defraud.
This Court, however, finds that there are
genuine issues of material fact concerning these elements.
Thus,
this Court cannot grant summary judgment as to Count II of the
counterclaims.
1.
Falsity
CSX
first
alleges
that
it
did
not
make
any
false
representations in responding to the lawyer defendants’ discovery
requests.
CSX contends that the failure to produce the release
immediately was not a representation that it did not exist.
CSX
relies upon Anderson v. Criket Comms., Inc., No. 11-2004-STA-cgc,
2011 WL 4458758, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 23, 2011), for the
argument that “[a] failure to produce documents requested in
discovery, in reliance on clearly stated objections, is not fraud.”
In opposition to this argument, the lawyer defendants state that
the issue is not whether discovery was properly objected to, but
instead
it
is
about
whether
CSX’s
discovery
responses
were
intentionally misleading.
CSX argues that the privilege log also did not constitute a
representation that the release did not exist.
The privilege log
listed certain categories of information, including Mr. Baylor’s
11
personnel file, as being withheld.
It did not specifically list
the release that Mr. Baylor and CSX executed.
Specifically, CSX
states that it was apparent that CSX was listing only categories of
documents in the privilege log, so the log could not amount to a
representation that a particular individual document did or did not
exist. Further, CSX asserts that the privilege log must be read in
light
of
the
production.
corresponding
responses
to
the
requests
for
These responses state that CSX was withholding Mr.
Baylor’s “personal information” which consisted of “his medical
records,
personnel
files,
and
prohibited from disclosing”
added).
stating
other
documents
which
CSX
is
ECF. No. 852 Ex. B *9 (emphasis
The lawyer defendants respond to these contentions by
that
determination.
the
record
demonstrates
issues
for
the
jury’s
The lawyer defendants cite to specific deposition
testimony in support of this argument.
See ECF No. 1337 *10-13.
This Court agrees with the lawyer defendants, and finds that
there
are
genuine
issues
of
material
fact
that
a
jury
must
determine. First, this issue is not resolved by the merely stating
that “[a] failure to produce documents requested in discovery, in
reliance on clearly stated objections, is not fraud.”
2011 WL 4458758, at *3.
Anderson,
The lawyer defendants are alleging more
than objecting to and thus not producing the documents was fraud;
they
are
alleging
that
themselves fraudulent.
the
responses
provided
by
CSX
were
Further, the record evidence cited by the
12
lawyer defendants illustrates evidence which shows that there is a
genuine
issue
of
material
fact
concerning
whether
CSX
made
fraudulent statements in the discovery responses and privilege log.
See ECF No. 1337 *10-13.
Specifically, this Court finds that the
deposition testimony of CSX’s 30(b)(6) deponent, which provides
contradicting testimony concerning whether the release was left off
of the privilege log or whether it was subsumed within a general
category of documents, provides evidence that a jury could use to
find in favor of the lawyer defendants.
*12-15.
See ECF No. 1337 Ex. 12
Further, inconsistencies between the discovery responses
and deposition testimony regarding what is and is not contained
within a CSX employee’s personnel file also provides evidence that
a jury could use to find in favor of the lawyer defendants.
Therefore, this Court cannot grant summary judgment based on the
above arguments.
2.
Justifiable Reliance
CSX’s next argument regarding why this Court should grant
summary judgment in favor of CSX on Count II of the counterclaims,
is that the lawyer defendants cannot prove that they justifiably
relied on the supposed failure to state specifically that “other
documents” were being withheld on privacy grounds in the privilege
log.
CSX
argues
that
the
lawyer
defendants
could
not
have
justifiably relied on the failure because in CSX’s response to the
request for production of documents CSX said it was withholding
13
“other documents.”
CSX claims that due to this, the lawyer
defendants were fully apprised of the “other documents” category.
CSX
states
that
this
case
is
“just
like”
Strimbeck, 382 S.E.2d 507 (W. Va. 1989).
Rockley
Manor
v.
CSX states that in
Rockley Manor that court affirmed summary judgment “on the ground
that
there
was
insufficient
evidence
of
reliance,
where
the
plaintiff alleged that a document provided by the defendant had
misrepresented a fact but other documents provided by the defendant
did not.”
ECF No. 1316 Attach. 29 *21.
The lawyer defendants
argue that this case is inapplicable to this situation, because
“the defrauded party actually had possession of the documents . . .
that
were
directly
misrepresentations.”
contrary
to
the
allegedly
fraudulent
ECF No. 1337 *23.
This Court agrees with the lawyer defendants.
The court’s
holding in Rockley Manor is not applicable to this case.
Rockley
Manor dealt with a situation where a purchaser of property brought
an action for misrepresentation of the property’s boundaries based
on a document provided by the defendant. Rockley Manor, 382 S.E.2d
at
508.
The
purchaser,
however,
did
his
own
investigation
regarding the property and was also provided with other documents
that did not contain the inaccurate description.
Id. at 509.
The
lawyer defendants did not partake in any independent investigation,
nor did they have any documents that were directly in contrast to
either CSX’s representations in the privilege log or in its
14
discovery responses. Further, this Court finds that there are
genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the defendants
justifiably relied on CSX’s assertions in its privilege log and
discovery responses. Specifically, the use of “other documents” in
the discovery response could be seen by the jury to be too
ambiguous to provide the lawyer defendants of notification that
there was in fact a release executed by Mr. Baylor and CSX.
As a
result, a jury could find that the lawyer defendants justifiably
relied on CSX’s failure to inform the lawyer defendants of the
release.
Therefore, because there are genuine issues of material
fact, this Court cannot grant summary judgment in favor of CSX
based on their justifiable reliance argument.
3.
Intent to Defraud
CSX’s final argument concerning why this Court should grant
summary judgment in its favor on Count II of the counterclaims, is
that the lawyer defendants cannot prove an intent to defraud.
Because this case involves actual fraud, the lawyer defendants must
prove that CSX acted with the requisite fraudulent intent.
Stanley, 285 S.E.2d at 683.
See
“[T]he existence of fraud is not
deducible from facts and circumstances which would be equally
consistent with honest intentions.
In sum, a presumption always
exists in favor of innocence and honesty in a given transaction and
the burden is upon one who alleges fraud to prove it by clear and
15
distinct evidence.”
Steele v. Steele, 295 F. Supp. 1266, 1269
(S.D. W. Va. 1969).
CSX alleges that in at least four respects the facts and
circumstances involved in this case are at the very least equally
consistent with honest intentions and thus preclude the lawyer
defendants from establishing the requisite fraudulent intent.
First, CSX argues that the routine judgment calls parties make in
responding to discovery requests are not indicative of evil intent
or improper motive.
Second, CSX states that the invitation it
provided the lawyer defendants to provide an authorization that
could have resulted in the immediate production of the release is
inconsistent with an intent to keep the lawyer defendants from
learning about it.
Third, besides discovery, CSX argues that the
lawyer defendants could have learned about the release in other
ways, for instance, through Mr. Baylor. Fourth, CSX claims that it
would have been irrational for CSX to make the disclosure regarding
the Baylor case in its pretrial disclosures in August 2009 if its
intention had been to keep the lawyer defendants in the dark about
the release.
The lawyer defendants oppose this argument, and say that all
of these four instances may be argued by CSX to a jury and all may
weigh in favor of not finding that CSX acted with fraudulent
intent.
However,
based
on
the
factual
record,
the
lawyer
defendants state that the jury would still be entitled to find that
16
fraudulent intent did exist.
The lawyer defendants state that
based on the misleading discovery responses and privilege logs,
along with the publicly available complaint and dismissal order in
Mr. Baylor’s original case, which was not provided to the lawyer
defendants, a jury could find that CSX acted with fraudulent
intent.
This Court agrees with the lawyer defendants.
There are
genuine issues of material fact regarding CSX’s fraudulent intent,
as evidenced by the lawyer defendants’ argument above, which must
be left for a jury to determine.
Therefore, this Court cannot
grant summary judgment on CSX’s argument regarding its lack of
fraudulent intent.
D.
Punitive Damages
CSX lastly argues that even if CSX is not entitled to summary
judgment
on
Count
I
and
Count
II
of
the
lawyer
defendants’
counterclaims, it is at least entitled to summary judgment on the
lawyer defendants’ claim for punitive damages. Under West Virginia
law, punitive damages may be awarded “[i]n actions of tort, where
gross fraud, malice, oppression, or wanton, willful, or reckless
conduct or criminal indifference to civil obligations affecting the
rights of others appear.”
Wells v. Smith, 297 S.E.2d 872, 877 (W.
Va. 1982), overruled in part on other grounds by Garnes v. Fleming
Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897 (W. Va. 1991).
CSX states there is
no rational basis for the jury to find that CSX committed anything
more than ordinary fraud, as it claims there is no evidence of
17
aggravating circumstances. The defendants argue that whether CSX’s
alleged fraud merits punitive damages, is a jury question and at a
minimum, this Court should hear the evidence at trial before
deciding whether to let the issue of punitive damages go to the
jury.
This Court finds that based on the record before it, it cannot
say that a reasonable jury could not find the alleged fraud to be
gross fraud, and thus subject to an award of punitive damages.
Therefore, because there is a genuine issue of material fact
concerning whether an award of punitive damages may or may not be
appropriate, this Court cannot grant summary judgment in favor of
CSX on the lawyer defendants’ claim for punitive damages.
This
Court, however, will consider bifurcating the punitive damages
claim, and this procedure will be discussed at the pretrial
conference. “Whenever the district court orders a bifurcated trial
[for punitive damages], the jury should be required, in the first
phase, to determine whether punitive damages are to be awarded, and
only if its verdict so determines, should it be presented in the
second phase with the evidence relevant to the factors for finding
the appropriate amount.”
Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp., 947
F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1991).
18
IV.
For
the
above
stated
Conclusion
reasons,
CSX’s
motion
for
summary
judgment on the lawyer defendants counterclaims (ECF No. 1316) is
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to transmit a copy of this memorandum
opinion and order to counsel of record herein.
DATED:
November 26, 2012
/s/ Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.
FREDERICK P. STAMP, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
19
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?