CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Gilkison et al

Filing 1561

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER CONFIRMING THE PRONOUNCED ORDER OF THIS COURT DENYING LAWYER DEFENDANTS' 1329 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ALL COUNTS OF THE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT. Signed by Senior Judge Frederick P. Stamp, Jr on 1/14/13. (mji) Modified on 1/14/2013 to add relationship to 1329 (mji).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No. 5:05CV202
(STAMP)

ROBERT V. GILKISON,
PEIRCE, RAIMOND & COULTER, P.C.,
a Pennsylvania professional corporation
a/k/a ROBERT PEIRCE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.,
a Pennsylvania professional corporation,
ROBERT PEIRCE, JR., LOUIS A. RAIMOND,
MARK T. COULTER and RAY HARRON, M.D.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
CONFIRMING THE PRONOUNCED ORDER OF THIS COURT
DENYING LAWYER DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON ALL COUNTS OF THE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT1
I.

Background

This is one of three motions for summary judgment before this
Court.2

On September 25, 2012, the lawyer defendants, Robert

Peirce, Jr. (“Peirce”) and Louis A. Raimond (“Raimond”), filed this
particular motion for summary judgment on all counts of the third
amended complaint of plaintiff, CSX Transportation, Inc. (“CSX”).

1

On December 7, 2012, a letter was issued to the parties
indicating the tentative ruling of this Court regarding the lawyer
defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all counts of the third
amended complaint (ECF No. 1494). At that time, this Court denied
such motion. This order sets forth the ruling in more detail.
2

For a brief procedural history of this case, please see this
Court’s memorandum opinion and order denying lawyer defendants’
motion for summary judgment related to CSX’s Earl Baylor
allegations and claims (ECF No. 1436).

Within this motion, the lawyer defendants make the following four
arguments regarding why this Court should grant summary judgment in
the lawyer defendants’ favor on all counts of the third amended
complaint:

(1)

CSX’s

claims

are

barred

by

the

statute

of

limitations; (2) CSX cannot prove the requisite reasonable reliance
required to establish fraud because CSX had prior knowledge of the
key aspects of the Peirce firm’s practice that CSX alleges amounts
to fraud; (3) summary judgment should be entered under the NoerrPennington Doctrine; and (4) because Federal Employer’s Liability
Act

(“FELA”)

complaints

contained

valid

medical

monitoring

allegations, CSX cannot establish fraud-based damages.
CSX then responded to the lawyer defendants’ motion for
summary judgment by making the following arguments: (1) the lawyer
defendants have failed to conclusively establish as a matter of law
that any of CSX’s claims are time-barred; (2) summary judgment is
inappropriate based on any alleged lack of reasonable reliance; (3)
even assuming the lawyer defendants may invoke the Noerr-Pennington
Doctrine, a jury issue exists as to whether the sham exception
applies; and (4) the lawyer defendants’ damages argument is without
merit.

The lawyer defendants filed a reply to CSX’s response that

put forth further argument in support of their initial contentions.
II.

Applicable Law

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely
disputed must support the assertion by:
2

(A) citing to particular parts of materials in
the record, including depositions, documents,
electronically stored information, affidavits
or
declarations,
stipulations
.
.
.
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not
establish the absence or presence of a genuine
dispute, or that an adverse party cannot
produce admissible evidence to support the
fact.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

The party seeking summary judgment bears

the initial burden of showing the absence of any genuine issues of
material fact.
(1986).

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23

“The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to come

forward with facts sufficient to create a triable issue of fact.”
Temkin v. Frederick County Comm’rs, 945 F.2d 716, 718-19 (4th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1095 (1992) (citing Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)). However, as the
United States Supreme Court noted in Anderson, “Rule 56(e) itself
provides that a party opposing a properly supported motion for
summary judgment may not rest upon the mere allegation or denials
of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.”

Id. at 256.

“The inquiry

performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is
the need for a trial -- whether, in other words, there are any
genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a
finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of
either party.”

Id. at 250; see also Charbonnages de France v.

3

Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir. 1979)(stating that summary
judgment “should be granted only in those cases where it is
perfectly clear that no issue of fact is involved and inquiry into
the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law.”
(citing Stevens v. Howard D. Johnson Co., 181 F.2d 390, 394 (4th
Cir. 1950))).
In Celotex, the Court stated that “the plain language of Rule
56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time
for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a
showing

sufficient

to

establish

the

existence

of

an

element

essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial.”

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

Summary

judgment is not appropriate until after the non-moving party has
had sufficient opportunity for discovery.

See Oksanen v. Page

Mem’l Hosp., 912 F.2d 73, 78 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 1074 (1992). In reviewing the supported underlying facts, all
inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion.

See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Because the claims at issue in this particular motion for
summary judgment involve fraud, a higher standard of proof applies.
Under West Virginia law, “[a]llegations of fraud, when denied by
proper pleading, must be established by clear and convincing
proof.”

Calhoun County Bank v. Ellison, 54 S.E.2d 182, syl. pt. 5

4

(W. Va. 1949).

See also Tri-State Asphalt v. McDonough Co., 391

S.E.2d 907, 912 (W. Va. 1990) (same); Elk Refining Co. v. Daniel,
199 F.2d 479, 482 (4th Cir. 1952) (“The burden of proving fraud is
unquestionably heavy . . . and it is also well established that one
cannot

rely

blindly

upon

a

representation

investigation and reasonable basis.”).

without

suitable

Mere allegations in the

pleadings are not sufficient to survive a motion for summary
judgment.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

As the Supreme Court noted in

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, “the inquiry involved in a ruling on a
motion for summary judgment . . . necessarily implicates the
substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the
trial on the merits.” Therefore, if the lawyer defendants show the
absence of any genuine issue of material fact, this Court must
determine whether CSX has “brought forth sufficient facts to meet
the ‘clear and convincing’ standard of proof required to support an
allegation of fraud.”

Schleicher v. TA Operating Corp., No.

5:06CV133, 2008 WL 111338 (N.D. W. Va. Jan. 9, 2008), aff’d, 319 F.
App’x 303 (4th Cir. 2009).

5

III.
A.

Discussion

Statute of Limitations3
The lawyer defendants first argue that almost all of CSX’s

claims against them are time-barred as a result of the applicable
statutes of limitations.
1.

Counts 1 and 2: Civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations Act (“RICO”)
A four-year statute of limitations applies to private civil
RICO claims. Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Electric Motor and Supply,
Inc., 262 F.3d 260, 266 (4th 2001) (citing Klehr v. A.O. Smith
Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 183 (1997), and Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549,
555 (2000)).

The limitations period “runs from the date when the

plaintiff discovered, or should have discovered, the injury.”

Id.

The relevant date in this action is the date that CSX filed its
amended complaint, wherein it alleged civil RICO claims against the
individual lawyer defendants Peirce and Raimond, which is July 5,
2007.

ECF No. 207.

Thus, to prove a statute of limitations

defense, the lawyer defendants must show that CSX “discovered, or
should have discovered, the injury” on or after July 5, 2003

--

four years before CSX filed the amended complaint. Such an inquiry
is “extremely fact-specific.”

Matthews v. Kidder, Peabody & Co.,

Inc., 260 F.3d 239, 250 (3d Cir. 2001) (discussing the RICO statute

3

At trial, the parties expressly waived the statute of
limitations argument, and therefore this issue was not presented to
the jury.
6

of limitations) (citing Davis v. Grusemeyer, 996 F.2d 617, 623 n.10
(3d Cir. 1993) (“[T]he applicability of the statute of limitations
usually

implicates

factual

questions

as

to

when

plaintiff

discovered or should have discovered the elements of the cause of
action; accordingly, ‘defendants bear a heavy burden in seeking to
establish as a matter of law that the challenged claims are
barred.’”) (quoting Van Buskirk v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 760
F.2d 481, 498 (3d Cir. 1985))).
The lawyer defendants claim the factual record illustrates
that CSX had knowledge of its alleged injury based on the RICO
statute prior to July 5, 2003.

The lawyer defendants specifically

cite various contentions which they believe the record establishes.
The lawyer defendants state that based on the record, CSX:
(1) had access to the x-rays and ILO forms of Peirce Firm
clients and, on occasion had its own B-readers review the
x-rays, (2) was aware of Dr. Harron’s reading practices,
believed his reads were inaccurate and was suspicious of
his conduct, (3) had the ability to judge the quality of
Mr. Corbitt’s x-rays, (4) was aware of the Peirce Firm
screening process, including that employees were
attending multiple screenings, (5) did not trust Mr.
Peirce and (6) was aware of the Peirce Firm’s claimed
improper coaching of clients on issues such as smoking
history and asbestos exposure.
ECF No. 1329 *20.

The lawyer defendants claim that as a result of

CSX having such information, all of its RICO and RICO conspiracy
claims are time barred.
CSX takes issue with the contentions put forth by the lawyer
defendants.

First, CSX states that there are factual disputes as

7

to

whether

it

had

access

to

the

x-rays

and

other

medical

information of the claimants at issue as alleged by the lawyer
defendants.

For instance, CSX claims that the mediation order,

cited by the lawyer defendants as evidence that CSX had access to
the x-rays, does not support such a contention because it did not
apply to lawsuits like that of the earliest claim at issue, that of
claimant Collier.

Second, CSX states that there are factual

disputes regarding CSX’s alleged knowledge of Dr. Harron.

CSX

states that all of the evidence cited by the lawyer defendants for
the contention that CSX knew of Dr. Harron’s reading practice
involves other lawsuits filed at other times involving other
plaintiffs, not the claimants herein involved.

Moreover, CSX

states that CSX’s belief that Dr. Harron’s B-reads were inaccurate
and its assumption that it could gather contrary medical evidence
does not establish that CSX knew or should have known that the Breads were fraudulent.

CSX asserts that at no time before Judge

Jack’s 2005 opinion in the matter In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig.,
398 F. Supp. 2d 563 (S.D. Tex. 2005), could it have known that Dr.
Harron was manufacturing B-reads for money. Third, CSX states that
the lawyer defendants’ other factual contentions are disputed or
immaterial.

CSX states that it is disputed whether CSX knew or

should have know that the screeenings were being taken illegally
and

classified

fraudulently.

Further,

CSX

states

that

one

employee’s personal feelings of distrust cannot establish as a

8

matter of law that CSX knew or should have known that every lawsuit
lacked a good faith basis in fact.

As to the lawyer defendants’

last contention, CSX states that there is no evidence that it knew
of the letters that the lawyer defendants assert establish CSX’s
knowledge of the alleged coaching of the claimants.
Based on the record, this Court agrees with CSX, that factual
disputes do remain as to whether CSX “discovered, or should have
discovered, the injury” on or after June 5, 2003.

This Court need

not address the parties’ arguments concerning whether or not the
separate accrual rule applies4 to the RICO statute of limitations
in this case, as there are factual disputes regarding whether or
not CSX knew or should have known of the injury before July 5,
2003.

Such disputes must be resolved by the jury.
2.
CSX’s

Common Law Claim of Fraud and Civil Conspiracy
common

law

fraud

and

civil

conspiracy

claims

are

governed by the two-year “catch-all” statute of limitations found
in West Virginia Code § 55-2-12.5

See Alpine Property Owners

4

If a Court applies to the rule of separate accrual, the
“plaintiff may recover for any injury caused by defendants’ RICO
violation if plaintiff discovered or should have discovered that
injury within four years of the commencement of this action.”
Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096, 1105 (2d Cir. 1988).
The Fourth Circuit has not expressly adopted this rule.
See
Potomac, 262 F.3d 2603.
5

West Virginia Code § 55-2-12 provides:

Every personal action for which no limitation is
otherwise prescribed shall be brought: (a) Within two
years next after the right to bring the same shall have
9

Assoc. Inc. v. Mountaintop Development Co., 365 S.E.2d 57, 66 (W.
Va. 1987).

Rather than the applicable cut-off date being July 5,

2003, as it is with CSX’s RICO claims, it is instead July 5, 2005
for CSX’s common law claims based on the applicable two-year
statute of limitations.

Like the RICO statute, West Virginia

applies the injury discovery rule to the instant state claims,
wherein the statute accrues when the plaintiff “knew or should have
known by the exercise of reasonable diligence of the nature of
their claims.”
1990).

Stemple v. Dobson, 400 S.E.2d 561, 564 (W. Va.

Further, determining whether the plaintiff “knew or should

have known” is “a question of fact to be answered by the jury.”
Id. at 565.
The lawyer defendants assert that the same contentions, as
outlined above in Section III.A.1., also support the argument that
CSX “knew or should have known by the exercise of reasonable
diligence of the nature of their claims.”

However, the lawyer

defendants do state that certain common law claims concerning four
of the eleven claimants are not barred by the two-year statute of

accrued, if it be for damage to property; (b) within two
years next after the right to bring the same shall have
accrued if it be for damages for personal injuries; and
(c) within one year next after the right to bring the
same shall have accrued if it be for any other matter of
such nature that, in case a party die, it could not have
been brought at common law by or against his personal
representative.
W. Va. Code § 55-2-12.
10

limitations. The Peirce firm filed these four claimants’ claims at
a later time than they filed the other seven claimants’ claims.
CSX argues that at least five sets of its common law claims
are indisputably timely.

CSX states that as to the six remaining

claims, the lawyer defendants have failed to conclusively establish
that those claims are time-barred as there are multiple factual
disputes as indicated in their argument above. As it argued above,
CSX contends that it could not have known of its injuries until it
became aware of the opinion by Judge Jack regarding Dr. Harron,
which occurred after the applicable cutoff date of July 5, 2005.
This Court agrees with CSX, in that there are factual disputes
as to whether or not CSX “knew or should have known by the exercise
of reasonable diligence of the nature of their claims.” Therefore,
these factual disputes must be left for the jury to determine.
B.

Reasonable Reliance
The lawyer defendants next argue that CSX cannot prove the

requisite RICO causation or justifiable reliance required for the
claims involved.
1.

Counts 1 and 2: Civil RICO

Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008),
eliminated the requirement that a plaintiff prove reliance in order
to prove a violation of RICO predicated on mail fraud.
Eaglewood Mortg., LLC., 353 F. App’x 864 (2009).

Biggs v.

As the United

States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated in Biggs,

11

[T]hough common law fraud required a showing of reliance,
‘nothing on the face of the relevant statutory provisions
imposes such a requirement.’ Instead, using the mail in
furtherance of a scheme to defraud is a predicate act of
racketeering under RICO, even if there is no reliance on
the misrepresentation. Id. If the defendant has engaged
in a pattern of such behavior, he will be liable under
RICO, without anyone actually relying on a fraudulent
misrepresentation.
Id. (citing Bridge, 553 U.S. at 648).
The lawyer defendants argue that in order to prove its fraudbased

RICO

reliance.

claims,

CSX

must

establish

justifiable

reasonable

They state that based on the record, CSX had prior

knowledge of the key aspects of the Peirce firm’s practice and
therefore they cannot prove reliance. CSX counters by arguing that
based on the holding in Bridge, no such showing of reliance is
required.

The

lawyer

defendants,

however,

claim

that

CSX

overstates the holding in Bridge, and assert that “whether couched
in terms of reliance or as part of RICO’s causation requirement
whereby an injury must be ‘by reason of’ the RICO conduct, the same
rationale applies.”

Such rationale, they argue, is that an injury

cannot be caused by reason of a scheme if the party is aware of the
alleged scheme.
This Court agrees with CSX, in that no such showing of
reliance is necessary based on the holdings in Bridge. Even so, as
stated above in regards to the statute of limitations arguments,
there are disputes of fact involved here concerning the factual
contentions that the lawyer defendants are relying on.

12

Therefore,

such disputes are for the jury to decide and are not appropriate
for this Court to determine on summary judgment.
2.

Common Law Claim of Fraud and Civil Conspiracy

The essential elements of a claim of fraud under West Virginia
law includes the element “that the plaintiff relied upon [the act]
and it was justified under the circumstances in relying upon it.”
Kidd v. Mull, 595 S.E.2d 308, 313 (citations omitted).

Therefore,

a party must show that it justifiably relied on the alleged
fraudulent act committed by the plaintiff.

“[R]eliance can be

justifiable even where it is unreasonable and negligent, and
strains the credulity of a reasonable person.” In re Giovanni, 324
B.R.

586

omitted).

(E.D.

Va.

2005)

(internal

quotations

and

citations

The only requirement the justifiable reliance standard

imposes is “the requirement that [the plaintiff] not ‘blindly
rel[y] upon a misrepresentation the falsity of which would be
patent to him if he had utilized his opportunity to make a cursory
examination or investigation.” Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 541 cmt. a (1976)).
The lawyer defendants argue that based on the record, CSX was
aware of key aspects of the Peirce firm practice on which it based
its fraud claims and therefore cannot prove reasonable reliance.
These

key

aspects

are

the

same

contentions

that

the

lawyer

defendants argued established knowledge of the alleged fraud for
purposes of their statute of limitations argument.

13

CSX responds by first stating that the correct standard is
justifiable reliance.

Second, CSX states that there is a strong

presumption that litigants are entitled to assume that their
adversaries are complying with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and not filing fraudulent claims.

Third, CSX states that whether

or not reliance was justifiable is ordinarily a question of fact to
be determined by the trier of fact and in this instance, a trier of
fact could reasonably conclude that CSX was justified in relying on
the alleged misrepresentations.
As previously stated, this Court agrees that there are factual
disputes concerning the contentions that the lawyer defendants rely
upon to establish that CSX did not justifiably rely on the alleged
misrepresentations.

Therefore, the jury must be presented with

this issue for determination.
C.

Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine “grants First Amendment immunity

to those who engage in petitioning activity.”

IGEN Intern., Inc.

v. Roche Diagnostics GmBH, 335 F.3d 303, 310 (4th Cir. 2003)
(citations omitted).
Id.

“This includes the pursuit of litigation.”

The doctrine, however, does not protect those who file “sham”

lawsuits.

Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures

Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 51 (1993).

Litigation is a “sham”

if the underlying lawsuit was (1) objectively baseless and (2)
subjectively intended to abuse process.

14

Id. at 60-61.

A lawsuit

is

objectively

baseless

if

“no

reasonable

realistically expect success on the merits.”

litigant

could

Id. at 60.

The lawyer defendants argue that based on the record, the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine precludes CSX’s claims because its claims
seek to hold the lawyer defendants liable based on the Peirce
firm’s filing of lawsuits on behalf of its clients.

The lawyer

defendants also argue that because CSX cannot establish fraud based
on the record, it cannot carry its burden of demonstrating the
inapplicability of the doctrine based on the sham litigation
exception.
CSX, however, states that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine does
not apply in this case.
refuge

in

their

It argues that lawyers who wish to seek

clients’

Noerr-Pennington

immunity

should

be

required to show that the disputed conduct was undertaken in the
lawyer’s capacity as a bona fide agent of the client. CSX contends
that the lawyer defendants cannot show this as, among other things,
the lawyer defendant’s clients were not aware of their claims
against CSX nor were they consulted about them.

Further, even if

the doctrine does apply to the lawyer defendants, CSX asserts that
the sham exception applies as there is evidence to show that the
claims were objectively baseless, and subjectively intended to
abuse litigation process.
This Court finds that evidence does exist that creates a
factual dispute as to whether the claims filed on behalf of the

15

claimants

by

the

Peirce

firm

were

objectively

baseless

subjectively intended to abuse the litigation process.

and
Such

factual disputes must be presented to the jury for its decision and
therefore, this Court cannot grant summary judgment on the basis of
the lawyer defendants’ Noerr-Pennington argument.
D.

Fraud-Based Damages
The final argument the lawyer defendants assert concerns CSX’s

request for fraud-based damages.

“A claim for medical monitoring

seeks to recover the anticipated costs of long-term diagnostic
testing necessary to detect latent diseases that may develop as a
result of tortious exposure to toxic substances.”

Bower v.

Westinghouse Elec. Corp, 522 S.E.2d 424, 429 (W. Va. 1999).

Under

West Virginia law, plaintiffs that assert such a claim are not
required “to prove present physical harm” nor are they required “to
demonstrate the probable likelihood that a serious disease will
result from the exposure.”

Id. at 431.

“[A] cause of action

exists

law

recovery

under

West

Virginia

for

the

of

medical

monitoring costs, where it can be proven that such expenses are
necessary and reasonably certain to be incurred as a proximate
result of a defendant’s tortious conduct.”
The
contained

lawyer
valid

defendants
medical

argue

that

monitoring

Id. at 431.

because

allegations,

the

complaints

which

do

not

require any evidence of the actual disease or injury, but are
premised simply upon exposure, CSX cannot establish fraud-based

16

damages. They claim that because the claims for medical monitoring
damages can stand independently, any action CSX took to dismiss the
FELA actions would have been taken regardless of any fraud.
CSX argues that the complaints contain no claim for medical
monitoring damages in the absence of any actual physical injury.
Instead, CSX asserts that the complaints do contain allegations
that the claimants suffer from an occupationally-related lung
disease caused by CSX.

CSX also indicates that conflicting

deposition testimony exists regarding whether the lawyer defendants
did

include

medical

monitoring

claims

in

their

complaints.

Further, CSX states that other witnesses have said it was necessary
to have a positive ILO in order to have a good faith basis to file
the claims, and files were not even opened until a B-read was
obtained.

In light of this evidence, CSX argues that a jury could

conclude that the lawyer defendants did not believe that the
complaints filed on behalf of the claimants included a stand alone
claim for medical monitoring.

Moreover, CSX states that there is

no record evidence that the lawyer defendants ever pursued a
medical monitoring claim for damages against CSX.

Therefore, CSX

assets that a jury could conclude the lawyer defendants were
actually

prosecuting

claims

for

asbestosis

or

other

existing

diseases and CSX’s damages were caused by that conduct.
This Court finds that based on the evidence presented to this
Court, factual disputes remain as to whether medical monitoring

17

claims

were

involved.

in

fact

made

on

behalf

of

the

eleven

claimants

Therefore, such issue must be presented to a jury for

its determination. This Court cannot grant summary judgment on the
issue of fraud-based damages as a result.
IV.

Conclusion

For the above stated reasons, the lawyer defendants’ motion
for summary judgment on all counts of CSX Transportation, Inc.’s
third amended complaint (ECF No. 1329) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to transmit a copy of this memorandum
opinion and order to counsel of record herein.
DATED:

January 14, 2013

/s/ Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.
FREDERICK P. STAMP, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

18