Standiford v. Rodriguez-Hernandez et al
Filing
143
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Dismissing Action as to Def. Mauro Humberto Rodriguez-Hernandez,Granting Water Providers, LTD, d/b/a Sweet H20's 68 Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaitiff's 75 Motion for Summary Judgment: Denying as moot Motions in Limine Nos. 89 , 92 , 94 , 96 , 98], 100 , 102 , 104 , 106 ; Denying as moot 111 Motion for Leave to File; and Denying as moot 115 Motion to Amend/Correct. Civil Action to be dismissed and stricken from active docket of the Court; Clerk directed to enter Judgment pursuant to FRCP 58. Signed by Senior Judge Frederick P. Stamp, Jr on 1/26/12. (soa)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
TREVOR STANDIFORD,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 5:10CV24
(STAMP)
MAURO HUMBERTO RODRIGUEZ-HERNANDEZ1 and
WATER PROVIDERS LIMITED d/b/a SWEET H20,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DISMISSING ACTION AS TO DEFENDANT
MAURO HUMBERTO RODRIGUEZ-HERNANDEZ,
GRANTING WATER PROVIDERS, LTD. D/B/A SWEET H2O’s
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I.
Procedural History
The above-styled civil action arises out of a two-vehicle
automobile accident that occurred on November 16, 2009 in New
Martinsville, West Virginia.
Defendant Mauro Humberto Rodriguez-
Hernandez (“Rodriguez-Hernandez”), an employee of Water Providers
Limited d/b/a Sweet H2O (“Water Providers”) who was driving a Water
Providers truck, collided with the plaintiff’s vehicle.2
The
1
Mauro Humberto Rodriguez-Hernandez is a named defendant in
both this action, as well as Civil Action No. 5:10CV25. However,
the plaintiffs have failed to effectuate service of the complaint
on him.
Count I of the amended complaint alleges a claim for
negligence against Rodriguez-Hernandez, which this opinion does not
address, as Rodriguez-Hernandez was never served.
Because
Rodriguez-Hernandez was never served, the action against him is
dismissed pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
2
The owners and passengers of the vehicle driven by Trevor
Standiford also brought suit against Rodriguez-Hernandez and Water
Providers.
(Civil Action No. 5:10CV25.)
These cases were
consolidated for discovery purposes and dispositive motions per an
plaintiff and his passenger, Alyssa Warren, sustained significant
injuries.
Following the accident, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the
Circuit Court of Wetzel County, West Virginia alleging claims of
negligence, negligent entrustment, respondeat superior, and the
tort of outrage.
This case was subsequently removed by the
defendant, Water Providers, to this Court.
On March 16, 2010, defendant State Farm Fire & Casualty
Company (“State Farm”), the plaintiff’s purported underinsured
motorist insurer, filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s request
for injunctive relief contained in the ad damnum clause of his
complaint.3
After that motion had been fully briefed, this Court
entered a memorandum opinion and order granting as framed the
motion to dismiss the request for injunctive relief of State Farm.
Specifically, the Court granted the motion to dismiss the request
for injunctive relief because the plaintiff had failed to plead a
proper cause of action.
In addition to analyzing the complaint
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
order of this Court on July 1, 2010. Because the same dispositive
motions were filed in both cases, this opinion will, at times,
reference all plaintiffs, not just Trevor Standiford.
3
In the ad damnum clause of the complaint, the plaintiff
requested that the Court issue an order prohibiting State Farm and
other relevant insurance companies involved in the claim from
disseminating the plaintiff’s information obtained during the
course of litigation to third parties and indexing bureaus.
(Compl. 10.)
2
Court also analyzed the complaint under Rule 65, finding that the
issuance of an injunction was unwarranted.
On March 25, 2011, the plaintiff filed a motion for leave to
amend the complaint, to which Water Providers filed a response in
opposition.
After a hearing on the motion to amend the complaint,
this Court issued an order confirming the pronounced order of the
Court granting as framed the defendant’s motion to modify the
scheduling order and granting the motion for leave to amend the
complaint.
Subsequently, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint
which adds a cause of action for negligent hiring, a cause of
action for property damage, and removes State Farm as a defendant.
Later, the plaintiff filed another motion for leave to amend the
complaint to add additional parties.
This Court denied the
plaintiff’s request to join additional parties in a memorandum
opinion and order dated August 5, 2011.
On October 10, 2011, Water Providers filed a motion for
summary judgment. One week later, the plaintiff filed a motion for
summary judgment.
Both motions have been fully briefed and are
ripe for review. For the reasons set forth below, this Court finds
that Water Providers’ motion for summary judgment must be granted,
and the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment must be denied.4
4
On January 13, 2012, the undersigned judge sent a letter to
counsel setting forth its tentative rulings and vacating the trials
in both this case and Civil Action No. 5:10CV25. This memorandum
sets forth those rulings in greater detail.
3
II.
On
September
21,
2009,
Facts5
Rodriguez-Hernandez
completed
an
application for employment with Water Providers, in which he
provided an address in Denton, Texas, and stated that he had a
valid driver’s license issued by the state of New Mexico.
On
September 23, 2009, Water Providers ascertained that RodriguezHernandez did not possess a driver’s license, and that the address
that appeared on his New Mexico identification card was different
from the one he provided on his employment application.
no
evidence
that
Water
Providers
took
any
action
There is
to
verify
Rodriguez-Hernandez’s legal status.
Upon hiring Rodriguez-Hernandez, Water Providers provided him
with an expense card and sent him to live and work in Wetzel
County, West Virginia.
Water Providers did not assign a specific
employee to transport Rodriguez-Hernandez to and from work while he
was in West Virginia. Instead, Rodriguez-Hernandez was expected to
share company vehicles with other employees.
Rodriguez-Hernandez
was specifically told by Alex Morgan, the Pennsylvania Operations
Manager, that he was not permitted to drive any Water Providers’
vehicles.
5
On a motion for summary judgment, facts must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). In this case, both parties have filed motions for summary
judgment. Therefore, for the purpose of deciding these motions,
this Court considers the facts as presented by both the plaintiff
and the defendant.
4
On November 16, 2009, without permission from Water Providers
or any supervisor, Rodriguez-Hernandez borrowed a 2008 Chevrolet
2500 commercial vehicle truck from another employee after the work
day
had
ended
in
order
to
drive
to
the
Laundromat.
While
Rodriguez-Hernandez was doing his laundry, he drove to get a snack
at a nearby convenience store.
On his way back to the Laundromat,
on Route 2 in New Martinsville, West Virginia, Rodriguez-Hernandez
made a sudden left hand turn across multiple lanes of traffic,
causing a collision with the 1995 Toyota Land Cruiser driven by the
plaintiff.
New Martinsville Police Officer Friend V. Estep, responded to
the accident and charged Rodriguez-Hernandez with failure to yield,
making an improper turn, and failure to maintain control of his
vehicle.
Officer Estep determined that Rodriguez-Hernandez was an
illegal alien with no valid driver’s license.
After the accident,
Rodriguez-Hernandez was deported.
III.
Applicable Law
Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely
disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials
in the record, including depositions,
documents, electronically stored information,
affidavits or declarations, stipulations . .
. admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not
establish the absence or presence of a
genuine dispute, or that an adverse party
cannot produce admissible evidence to support
the fact.
5
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
The party seeking summary judgment bears
the initial burden of showing the absence of any genuine issues of
material fact.
(1986).
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23
“The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to come
forward with facts sufficient to create a triable issue of fact.”
Temkin v. Frederick County Comm’rs, 945 F.2d 716, 718-19 (4th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1095 (1992) (citing Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)). However, as the
United States Supreme Court noted in Anderson, “Rule 56(e) itself
provides that a party opposing a properly supported motion for
summary judgment may not rest upon the mere allegation or denials
of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Id. at 256.
“The inquiry
performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is
the need for a trial -- whether, in other words, there are any
genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a
finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of
either party.”
Id. at 250; see also Charbonnages de France v.
Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir. 1979)(Summary judgment “should
be granted only in those cases where it is perfectly clear that no
issue of fact is involved and inquiry into the facts is not
desirable to clarify the application of the law.” (citing Stevens
v. Howard D. Johnson Co., 181 F.2d 390, 394 (4th Cir. 1950))).
In Celotex, the Court stated that “the plain language of Rule
56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time
6
for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a
showing
sufficient
to
establish
the
existence
of
an
element
essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial.”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
Summary
judgment is not appropriate until after the non-moving party has
had sufficient opportunity for discovery.
See Oksanen v. Page
Mem’l Hosp., 912 F.2d 73, 78 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 1074 (1992). In reviewing the supported underlying facts, all
inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion.
See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
IV.
A.
Discussion
Water Providers’ Motion for Summary Judgment
In its motion for summary judgment, Water Providers argues:
(1) It is not liable for the accident because it expressly forbid
Rodriguez-Hernandez from using its vehicle and never authorized him
to drive the truck on the day of the accident; (2) It is not
vicariously liable for the accident because Rodriguez-Hernandez
took the truck after being told that he was not permitted to drive
any company vehicles, to perform a personal errand, after the work
day had ended; (3) The plaintiffs’ claim for negligent hiring fails
because there are no facts that Water Providers owed the plaintiffs
any duty with regard to hiring Rodriguez-Hernandez; (4) There is no
evidence to support the plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages
because there is no evidence that Water Providers’ actions were
7
willful, wanton, reckless, or committed with criminal indifference;
and (5) The plaintiffs failed to adduce any evidence to support a
claim under the tort of outrage because there is no evidence that
Water Providers’ actions “exceeded the bounds of decency,” or that
it acted intentionally or recklessly to inflict emotional distress
on the plaintiffs.
In his response in opposition, the plaintiff argues that the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment must be denied because: (1)
The vehicle collision was an ordinary and natural incident or
logical result of employment; (2) Water Providers entrusted its
vehicle to an employee with no valid driver’s license; (3) Water
Providers hired an illegal alien, placed that employee in the state
of West Virginia, and entrusted its vehicle to that illegal alien
employee which resulted in injuries to the plaintiff; (4) Water
Providers
failed
to
exercise
reasonable
and
prudent
hiring
practices which lead to the employment Rodriguez-Hernandez; and (5)
Water
Providers
must
answer
in
punitive
damages
to
prevent
repetitious conduct that causes injuries to the citizens of West
Virginia.
In its reply, Water Providers reasserts its previous arguments
and also contends that there is no dispute as to the fact that
Water Providers did not entrust its vehicle to Rodriguez-Hernandez.
B.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Predictably, the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment
presents arguments similar to those stated in his response to Water
8
Providers’ motion for summary judgment.
The plaintiff contends
that Water Providers should be held vicariously liable for the acts
of
its
employee,
Rodriguez-Hernandez,
respondeat superior.
under
the
doctrine
of
Further, the plaintiff asserts that the
public policy of the state of West Virginia mandates that foreign
companies that hire illegal aliens must be held liable when that
illegal employee causes harm to West Virginia citizens.
In response, Water Providers argues that it is not vicariously
liable for the accident because Rodriguez-Hernandez took the truck
after being told that he was not permitted to drive any company
vehicles, to perform a personal errand after the work day had
ended.
Water
Providers
further
argues
that
Officer
Estep’s
statements regarding the general practices of work crews in West
Virginia
are
disregarded.
not
relevant
to
this
accident
and
should
be
Finally, Water Providers contends that there is no
public policy basis to impose vicarious liability upon it because
Rodriguez-Hernandez was clearly outside the course and scope of
employment at the time of the accident.
In his reply, the plaintiff reasserts that Water Providers is
vicariously liable to him because it created and controlled the
circumstances that led to its employee causing an accident.
The
plaintiff
the
also
reiterates
that
public
policy
supports
application of the doctrine of respondeat superior in this case.
Finally, the plaintiff counters that the testimony of Officer Estep
should be considered in determining the facts at issue.
9
C.
Respondeat Superior
The
question
of
whether
Water
Providers
can
be
held
responsible for the negligent acts of Rodriguez-Hernandez hinges
upon whether, at the time of the accident, Rodriguez-Hernandez was
acting within the scope of his employment.
“The fundamental rule
in West Virginia is that if it can be shown that an individual is
an agent and if he is acting within the scope of his employment
when he commits a tort, then the principal is liable for the tort
as well as the agent.”
Barath v. Performance Trucking Co., Inc.,
424 S.E.2d 602, 605 (W. Va. 1992); see also Griffith v. George
Transfer & Rigging, Inc., 201 S.E.2d 281, 287 (W. Va. 1973) (“The
universally recognized rule is that an employer is liable to a
third person for any injury to his person or property which results
proximately from tortious conduct of an employee acting within the
scope of his employment.”).
“‘Scope of employment’ is a relative term and requires a
consideration of surrounding circumstances including the character
of the employment, the nature of the wrongful deed, the time and
place of its commission and the purpose of the act.” Griffith, 201
S.E.2d at 288.
West Virginia courts have held that an employee is
not within the scope of his employment when he is on a “frolic of
his own.”
Jenkins v. Spitler, 199 S.E. 368, 370 (W. Va. 1938).
Specifically, “the owner of an automobile is not liable for
injuries caused by a servant, while operating the car on his own
business or pleasure.”
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
10
The plaintiff argues that Water Providers must be held liable
under the doctrine of respondeat superior because it hired an
illegal alien in order to profit from the West Virginia Marcellus
shale oil and gas industry.
According to the plaintiff, Water
Providers required Rodriguez-Hernandez to be a transient resident
of West Virginia, but failed to assign him a driver or notify other
employees on the work crew that Rodriguez-Hernandez had no driver’s
license.
While all of these facts may be true, they do not prove
that Rodriguez-Hernandez was in the scope of employment at the time
of the accident.
A review of the entire record reveals that at the
time of the accident, Rodriguez-Hernandez was on a personal errand.
On November 16, 2009, the day of the accident, RodriguezHernandez’s shift ended around 6:00 p.m. (Morgan Aff. ¶ 4.) After
work, Rodriguez-Hernandez took the Water Providers truck without
permission to use for his own personal errand -- doing his laundry
and purchasing a snack.
April 28, 2011.)
(Morgan Aff. ¶ 5.) (Estep Dep. 39:4-13,
The plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence
to show that Rodriguez-Hernandez was acting within the scope of his
employment
Laundromat.
when
he
The
drove
from
plaintiff’s
the
gas
contention
station
that
back
Water
to
the
Providers
negligently failed to ensure transportation for Rodriguez-Hernandez
is not enough to hold Water Providers vicariously liable for
Rodriguez-Hernandez’s negligent acts that occurred while he was on
a personal errand.
11
The mere fact that Water Providers hired an illegal alien and
placed him in West Virginia to benefit the company cannot, by
itself, support a finding that Water Providers is liable for the
harm caused by Rodriguez-Hernandez.
As explained above, the key
inquiry is whether Rodriguez-Hernandez was acting within the scope
of his employment. The plaintiff’s public policy argument does not
answer that question. Similarly, the testimony of Officer Estep is
not relevant to a determination of whether Rodriguez-Hernandez was
in acting in the scope of his employment at the time of the
accident.
general
Officer Estep discusses what he believes to be the
practices
of
work
crews
in
West
Virginia,
but
this
testimony is not specific to the practices of Water Providers or
the individuals involved in this accident.
Thus, for these
reasons, Water Providers is entitled to summary judgment on the
claim of vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat
superior.
D.
Negligent Entrustment
A
negligent
entrustment
cause
of
action
exists
in
West
Virginia as recognized in Syllabus Points 11 and 12 of Payne v.
Kinder:
11. Liability for the negligence of an incompetent
driver to whom an automobile is entrusted does not arise
out of the relationship of the parties, but from the act
of entrustment of the motor vehicle, with permission to
operate it, to a person whose incompetency, inexperience,
or recklessness is known or should have been known by the
owner.
12. An owner who entrusts his motor vehicle to a person
whom he knows, or from the circumstances is charged with
12
knowing, to be incompetent or unfit to drive it is liable
for injury inflicted which results from the use of the
automobile by the driver if the injury was proximately
caused
by
the
disqualification,
incompetency,
inexperience, intoxication or recklessness of the driver.
Payne v. Kinder, 127 S.E.2d 726 (W. Va. 1962).
“[T]he critical
element of a negligent entrustment cause of action is the initial
improper loaning of the vehicle-improper in the sense that it is
given
to
a
person
who
is
known
to
be
unreasonable risk of harm to others.”
likely
to
cause
an
Huggins v. Tri-County
Bonding Co., 337 S.E.2d 12, 17 (W. Va. 1985).
In this case, the plaintiff’s claim for negligent entrustment
fails because there is no evidence that Water Providers improperly
loaned the vehicle to Rodriguez-Hernandez.
In fact, there is no
evidence that Water Providers even knew that Rodriguez-Hernandez
was driving on the day of the accident.
Rather, the only evidence
that appears in the record is that Rodriguez-Hernandez borrowed the
truck without authorization from any supervisor, at the end of the
work day, despite having been told that he was not authorized to
drive any company vehicle.
¶ 4).
(Morgan Aff. ¶¶ 3, 5) (Slavings Aff.
Because the plaintiff has not presented facts in support of
the element of entrustment, the negligent entrustment claim must
fail.
E.
Tort of Outrage
In his amended complaint, the plaintiff argues that Water
Providers’ conduct, which included hiring an illegal alien without
a driver’s license and entrusting him to operate the company’s
13
commercial vehicle, was extreme, outrageous, and exceeded all
bounds of decency.
The defendant counters that there is no
evidence that its actions “exceeded all bounds of decency” or that
it acted intentionally or recklessly to inflict emotional distress
on the plaintiff.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has explained
that “the tort of outrage is merely an extension of the right to
recover
damages
for
emotional
distress
nontraditional intentional torts.”
into
areas
involving
Harless v. First Nat. Bank in
Fairmont, 289 S.E.2d 692, 694 (W. Va. 1982).
The standard for
liability is high and requires “extreme and outrageous conduct
[that]
intentionally
distress.”
or
recklessly
Id. at syl. pt. 6.
causes
severe
emotional
To prevail on a claim for
intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, the
plaintiff must show:
(1) that the defendant’s conduct was atrocious,
intolerable, and so extreme and outrageous as to exceed
the bounds of decency; (2) that the defendant acted with
the intent to inflict emotional distress, or acted
recklessly when it was certain or substantially certain
emotional distress would result from his conduct; (3)
that the actions of the defendant caused the plaintiff to
suffer emotional distress; and, (4) that the emotional
distress suffered by the plaintiff was so severe that no
reasonable person could be expected to endure it.
Travis v. Alcon Laboratories, Inc., 504 S.E.2d 419, 425 (W. Va.
1998).
This Court finds that the plaintiff has failed to offer any
evidence to support the requisite elements to prove liability under
the tort of outrage.
As discussed above, Water Providers did not
14
negligently entrust its vehicle to Rodriguez-Hernandez.
Rather,
Water Providers instructed Rodriguez-Hernandez not to drive any
company vehicles.
Simply placing a transient worker in the state
of West Virginia without assigned transportation does not amount to
extreme
and
outrageous
conduct,
as
the
plaintiff
suggests.
Further, the plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence that he
has suffered severe emotional distress -- he simply claims that the
pain from the accident brought on depression for which he sought
help from a doctor at Bailey Behavioral Health.
However, the pain
of his injuries and the disruption of his senior year of high
school does not amount to “emotional distress . . . so severe that
no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.”
Id.
After
all, “[c]omplete emotional tranquility is seldom attainable in this
world, and some degree of transient and trivial emotional distress
is part of the price of living among people.”
Restatement of Torts (Second), § 46).
Id. at 430 (quoting
Thus, Water Providers is
entitled to summary judgment as to the plaintiff’s claim for the
tort of outrage.
F.
Negligent Hiring and Retention
Count V of the plaintiff’s amended complaint sets forth a
claim
of
negligent
hiring
and
retention.
According
to
the
plaintiff, Water Providers had a duty of reasonable care to hire
employees
who
were
fit
and
capable
of
performing
the
responsibilities assigned by Water Providers and who would not pose
a possible risk of harm or injury to others. The plaintiff further
15
argues that Water Providers had a duty to hire employees who were
authorized for employment in the United States.
Finally, the
plaintiff contends that Water Providers had a duty to conduct a
reasonable
investigation
into
the
background
of
Rodriguez-
Hernandez.
In response, the defendant argues that it owed no duty
to the plaintiff with regard to the hiring of Rodriguez-Hernandez.
This Court agrees.
In Evans v. Sanchez Rubio, No. 2:06-0995, 2007 WL 712291 (S.D.
W. Va. Mar. 6, 2007), a case cited by the defendant, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia
dismissed the plaintiff’s suit seeking damages based on negligent
hiring as a result of a motor vehicle accident involving a vehicle
allegedly driven by an illegal immigrant which collided with the
plaintiff’s vehicle during a drag race that occurred outside the
scope of employment.
Evans, 2007 WL 712291, at *3.
As the Evans
court acknowledged, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has
recognized a cause of action based upon a claim of negligent
hiring.
See McCormick v. W. Va. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 503 S.E.2d
502, 506 (W. Va. 1998) (per curiam).
To determine whether an
employer should be held liable for negligent hiring, courts apply
the following test:
[W]hen the employee was hired or retained, did the
employer conduct a reasonable investigation into the
employee’s background vis a vis the job for which the
employee was hired and the possible risk of harm or
injury to co-workers or third parties that could result
from the conduct of an unfit employee?
Should the
employer have reasonably foreseen the risk caused by
hiring or retaining an unfit person?
16
Id. (quoting State ex rel. W. Va. State Police v. Taylor, 499
S.E.2d 283, 289 n.7 (W. Va. 1997)).
In explaining why there was no
basis for liability on the negligent hiring claim, the Evans court
stated, “there must be at least some connection between the injured
plaintiff and the employment in order for the employer to owe a
duty to the plaintiff.”
Evans, 2007 WL 712291, at *2.
“A
connection between the plaintiff and the employment is required
because the duty the employer owes to members of the public stems
from the benefits the employer receives from having customers.”
Id.
Importantly, “while an employer owes a duty to the public to
investigate the driving record of employees hired as drivers, it
owes no such duty when employees are hired to perform other
duties.”
Id. at *3.
In this case, Water Providers did not hire Rodriguez-Hernandez
as a driver -- he was hired as a laborer and told that he could not
drive any company vehicles. Therefore, Water Providers did not owe
any duty to investigate Rodriguez-Hernandez’s driving record.
Moreover, there is no evidence that Water Providers knew that
Rodriguez-Hernandez was not authorized to work in the United States
at the time he was hired.
Water Providers is entitled to summary
judgment as to the plaintiff’s negligent hiring claim.
G.
Punitive Damages
The plaintiff argues that Water Providers must answer in
punitive damages because its actions were conducted with malice,
oppression, or wanton, willful, or reckless conduct, or criminal
17
indifference to civil obligations. This Court finds, however, that
the record contains no evidence that Water Providers’ actions rose
to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct necessary to merit
an award of punitive damages. Thus, Water Providers is entitled to
summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages.
V.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Water Providers’ motion for
summary judgment is GRANTED (ECF No. 68) and the plaintiff’s motion
for summary judgment is DENIED (ECF No. 75).
The pending motions
in limine are DENIED AS MOOT (ECF Nos. 89, 92, 94, 96, 98, 100,
102,
104,
106).
The
action
against
Rodriguez-Hernandez is DISMISSED.
defendant
Mauro
Humberto
It is ORDERED that this case be
DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the active docket of this Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Clerk is directed to transmit a copy of this memorandum
opinion and order to counsel of record herein. Pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 58, the Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment
on this matter.
DATED:
January 26, 2012
/s/ Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.
FREDERICK P. STAMP, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
18
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