Kartman v. Markle et al
Filing
188
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 173 AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 168 . Signed by Senior Judge Frederick P. Stamp, Jr. on 8/6/2013. (copy to all counsel of record via CM/ECF; copy to Defendant via U.S. Mail)(nmm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
RICHARD E. KARTMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 5:10CV106
(STAMP)
SHANNON MARKLE, OFFICER LONG,
OFFICER STANCOTI, OFFICER SKIDMORE
and JOHN DOE MEDICAL EMPLOYEE,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I. Background1
The plaintiff, Richard E. Kartman, filed a civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of West Virginia.
The complaint names
certain employees of the Central Regional Jail in Sutton, West
Virginia as defendants and asserts multiple claims based on alleged
violations
of
the
plaintiff’s
Eighth
Amendment
rights.
Specifically, the plaintiff claims that he was assaulted by other
inmates at the Central Regional Jail and that the defendants were
deliberately indifferent to a threat to his physical safety.
The
case was later transferred to this district.
Thereafter, defendant Shannon Markle (“Markle”) filed a motion
to dismiss and defendants Officer Stancoti (“Stancoti”) and Officer
1
For a more detailed background of this case, see ECF No. 155.
Skidmore (“Skidmore”) filed a motion to dismiss.
The plaintiff
responded to both motions. United States Magistrate Judge David J.
Joel then issued a report and recommendation recommending that
defendant
Markle’s
motion
to
dismiss
be
granted,
and
that
defendants Skidmore and Stancoti’s motion for summary judgment be
granted.
The
plaintiff
made
objections
to
the
report
and
recommendation.
Upon review of the report and recommendation, this Court
affirmed and adopted in part and declined to affirm and adopt in
part.
First,
this
Court
declined
to
adopt
and
affirm
the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation regarding defendant
Markle.
found
The magistrate judge in his report and recommendation
that
the
plaintiff
did
not
exhaust
his
administrative
remedies as is required by the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”) because he did not produce evidence showing he complied
with the administrative grievance process provided by the West
Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority.
The
plaintiff objected to this finding by providing this Court with
grievances that he allegedly filed against defendant Markle.
This
Court reviewed this evidence de novo and found that although it
could not be sure of the authenticity of the evidence, the evidence
at least suggested that the plaintiff attempted to exhaust his
administrative remedies.
Further, this Court found that based on
these grievances, defendant Markle was not entitled to qualified
2
immunity at that time.
Therefore, this Court denied defendant
Markle’s motion to dismiss.
Second, this Court affirmed and adopted the magistrate judge’s
report
and
Skidmore.
recommendation
regarding
defendants
Stancoti
and
This Court found that Officers Stancoti and Skidmore
were entitled to qualified immunity because the plaintiff failed to
state a deprivation of a constitutional right.
This Court did
review the plaintiff’s objections; however, the objections did not
alter
this
Court’s
determination
and,
therefore,
this
Court
dismissed the complaint as to defendants Stancoti and Skidmore.
After
this
Court
issued
its
rulings
on
the
report
and
recommendation, the plaintiff filed various motions, including a
motion for reconsideration and a motion to continue the trial.
This Court denied the motion for reconsideration, granted the
motion to continue the trial, and vacated generally the trial date.
This Court then issued an amended scheduling order for defendant
Markle, the only remaining defendant, and the plaintiff, which
provided deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions.
The plaintiff first filed his motion for summary judgment
arguing that no genuine issue of material fact exists concerning
whether Markle entirely failed to acknowledge or respond to the
grievances filed by plaintiff. Defendant Markle responded, arguing
that: (1) the plaintiff’s interpretation of the facts of this case
contains inaccuracies and/or misrepresentations and therefore his
3
motion for summary judgment based on such facts should be denied;
and (2) the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment specifically
describes questions of fact and, therefore, the motion should be
denied.
The plaintiff did not file a reply.
Defendant
judgment.
Markle
then
filed
his
own
motion
for
summary
Defendant Markle argues that summary judgment should be
granted in his favor because: (1) the evidence or lack of evidence
produced to date, clearly demonstrates that no claim is viable
against
defendant
Markle
in
this
matter;
(2)
the
evidence
demonstrates that defendant was not responsible for making inmate’s
housing decisions; and (3) even if defendant Markle was responsible
for making housing decisions, he is immune from any liability which
may have resulted therefrom.
The plaintiff responded by arguing
that: (1) defendant Markle has not shown that there is no genuine
issue of material fact; (2) defendant Markle’s claim that no claim
is viable against him is conclusory and there is a clear dispute as
to
the
facts
surrounding
defendant
Markle’s
deliberate
indifference; (3) defendant Markle was responsible for responding
to
inmate
grievances
and
his
failure
to
do
so
resulted
in
plaintiff’s injuries; and (4) defendant Markle is not entitled to
immunity as he acted with deliberate indifference.
Markle
replied
and
provided
arguments
plaintiff’s contentions.
4
in
Defendant
opposition
to
the
For the reasons stated below, this Court grants defendant
Markle’s motion for summary judgment and denies the plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment.
II.
Applicable Law
Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely
disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the
record, including depositions, documents, electronically
stored
information,
affidavits
or
declarations,
stipulations . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or
other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not
establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute,
or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible
evidence to support the fact.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
The party seeking summary judgment bears
the initial burden of showing the absence of any genuine issues of
material fact.
(1986).
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23
“The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to come
forward with facts sufficient to create a triable issue of fact.”
Temkin v. Frederick County Comm’rs, 945 F.2d 716, 718 (4th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1095 (1992) (citing Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)). However, as the
United States Supreme Court noted in Anderson, “Rule 56(e) itself
provides that a party opposing a properly supported motion for
summary judgment may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials
of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
5
Id. at 256.
“The
inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether
there is the need for a trial -- whether, in other words, there are
any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a
finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of
either party.”
Id. at 250; see also Charbonnages de France v.
Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir. 1979) (Summary judgment “should
be granted only in those cases where it is perfectly clear that no
issue of fact is involved and inquiry into the facts is not
desirable to clarify the application of the law.” (citing Stevens
v. Howard D. Johnson Co., 181 F.2d 390, 394 (4th Cir. 1950))).
In Celotex, the Supreme Court stated that “the plain language
of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after
adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
In reviewing the supported underlying facts, all inferences must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
III.
Discussion
Both the plaintiff and defendant Markle argue that no factual
disputes exist that would prevent this Court from entering summary
judgment in either of the parties’ favor. Based on the plaintiff’s
6
complaint, the plaintiff is asserting that defendant Markle is
liable for the plaintiff’s injuries because he was deliberately
indifferent and failed to protect him from the other inmates, who
defendant Markle knew were a danger to the plaintiff.
Defendant
Markle, however, argues that he was not deliberately indifferent
and he is further entitled to qualified immunity for his actions.
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials
performing discretionary functions are generally shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate a clearly established constitutional right of which a
reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982).
As stated in this Court’s prior denial of
defendant Markle’s motion to dismiss, it was clearly established at
the time of the filing of the plaintiff’s complaint that an
inmate’s constitutional rights could be violated if government
officials allowed him to be kept in dangerous conditions of
confinement.
See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833 (stating that the Eighth
Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials to protect prisoners
from violence at the hands of other prisoners).
However, to prove such a claim under the Eighth Amendment’s
cruel and unusual punishment clause, and thus under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, he must show that “he is incarcerated under conditions
posing a substantial risk of serious harm,” and that prison
officials acted with “‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health
7
and safety.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
In Farmer, the
Supreme Court held that, while it left open the level at which the
risk of harm to a prisoner becomes a “substantial risk of serious
harm” (Id. at n.3), no prison official can be held liable for
“deliberate indifference” to that risk unless he subjectively
“knows of and disregards” it.
Id. at 837.
In order to possess
this level of culpability, “the official must be aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw that inference.”
Id.
“[A]n official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he
should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation,
cannot . . . be condemned as the infliction of punishment.”
Id. at
838.
The plaintiff argues that Markle “must have known” about the
danger to plaintiff and must have known about his many grievances.
Therefore,
the
plaintiff
states
that
defendant
Markle
was
deliberately indifferent as a result of this knowledge and is not
entitled to qualified immunity.
Based on the evidence in this
case, there is no indication that Markle knew of the danger to the
plaintiff or knew of the grievances.
In fact, as defendant Markle
argues, the evidence actually indicates the opposite.
Assuming without deciding that the plaintiff actually filed
the grievances he produced which were addressed to defendant
8
Markle,
there
is
no
evidence
that
defendant
Markle
actually
received these grievances or had any knowledge of the plaintiff’s
concerns regarding the inmates who caused his injuries.
The
grievances filed by the plaintiff that he allegedly addressed to
defendant Markle request that based on altercations with certain
inmates, he be moved from his housing pod.
and 3.
See ECF No. 97 Exs. 2
Based on defendant Markle’s deposition, defendant Markle
was not responsible for making prisoner’s housing decisions. These
decisions, he stated, are made by shift supervisors or booking
officers.
have
been
See ECF No. 181.
the
person
to
Therefore, defendant Markle would not
respond
to
these
grievances,
which
indicates that he would not be knowledgeable about these alleged
requests.
Further, it is suspect as to whether these grievances were
actually filed at all because the remaining grievances filed by the
plaintiff concerning his housing requests were addressed to various
shift supervisors. See ECF No. 180 Exs. 7-11. This indicates that
he knew who to address his housing requests to, which was not
defendant Markle.
The plaintiff also indicated on his complaint
that he had not filed grievances regarding the facts at issue in
this case.
Both of these facts indicate that the plaintiff never
filed these alleged grievances with defendant Markle. Therefore,
based on this evidence that defendant Markle would not have had nor
did he have knowledge of any risk of harm to the plaintiff, this
9
Court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact
concerning
whether
indifference.
defendant
Markle
acted
with
deliberate
Thus, this Court must grant defendant Markle’s
motion for summary judgment as it finds that defendant Markle did
not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional right against cruel and
unusual punishment and is therefore entitled to qualified immunity.
IV.
Conclusion
For the above stated reasons, defendant Shannon Markle’s
motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 173) is hereby GRANTED and the
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 168) is DENIED.
It is ORDERED that this case be DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the
active docket of this Court.
Should the plaintiff choose to appeal the judgment of this
Court to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
on the issues to which objection was made, he is ADVISED that he
must file a notice of appeal with the Clerk of this Court within 30
days after the date of the entry of the judgment order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to transmit a copy of this memorandum
opinion and order to counsel of record herein. Pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 58, the Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment
on this matter.
10
DATED:
August 6, 2013
/s/ Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.
FREDERICK P. STAMP, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
11
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?