Kartman v. Markle et al

Filing 314

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' FOURTH 268 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Signed by Senior Judge Frederick P. Stamp, Jr on 3/23/2015. (copy to counsel via CM/ECF)(lmm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
RICHARD E. KARTMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No. 5:10CV106
(STAMP)

SHANNON MARKLE, OFFICER LONG,
OFFICER STANCOTI, OFFICER SKIDMORE
and JOHN DOE MEDICAL EMPLOYEE,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANTS’ FOURTH MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I.

Procedural History

For purposes of this memorandum opinion and order, only the
most relevant procedural history and facts are presented.1

On

October 4, 2010, the previously pro se2 plaintiff filed a civil
rights complaint pursuant to § 1983 alleging that the defendants
violated his Eighth Amendment rights by acting with deliberate
indifference to his physical safety. Specifically, he asserts that
inmates at Central Regional Jail assaulted the plaintiff on two
separate instances, one in October and the other in November, and
that the defendants failed to intervene.

As a result of those

1

For a more thorough background of this civil action, see ECF
Nos. 155 and 188.
2

“Pro se” describes a person who represents himself in a court
proceeding without the assistance of a lawyer.
Black’s Law
Dictionary 1416 (10th ed. 2014).

assaults, the plaintiff alleges that he suffered injuries and was
denied certain medical attention.

Finally, the plaintiff later

claims, though not in his complaint, that he filed grievances with
both staff and defendant Shannon Markle (“Markle”) in particular,
indicating that prison officials were aware of the impending harm
and yet failed to intervene.
After the plaintiff filed his complaint, defendant Markle
filed

a

motion

to

dismiss

and

defendants

Officer

Skidmore

(“Skidmore”) and Officer Stancoti (“Stancoti”) filed a motion for
summary judgment.

In assessing those motions, the magistrate

judge’s report and recommendation recommended that this Court grant
the

defendants’

motions

and

also

dismiss

the

claims

against

defendants Officer Long (“Long”) and John Doe with prejudice.
After

reviewing

defendant

the

Markle’s

record
motion

at
to

that
dismiss

time,
and

this

Court

granted

denied

defendants

Skidmore and Stancoti’s motion under qualified immunity grounds.
ECF No. 98.

Further, this Court dismissed the claims against

defendants Long and John Doe.

Therefore, following that ruling,

which occurred on March 13, 2012, only defendant Markle remained a
defendant in the civil action.

Later, both the plaintiff and

defendant Markle filed motions for summary judgment.
and 173, respectively.

ECF Nos. 168

This Court granted defendant Markle’s

motion for summary judgment.

ECF No. 188.

2

The plaintiff appealed the following judgments:3 (1) the
dismissal of all defendants except defendant Markle (ECF No. 98);
(2) the denial of his motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 155); and
(3) the granting of defendant Markle’s motion for summary judgment
(ECF No. 188).

In a per curiam decision, the United States Court

of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (“the Fourth Circuit”) affirmed
this

Court’s

decision

regarding

the

following:

(1)

granting

defendant Stancoti’s motion for summary judgment regarding the
October incident, and (2) granting defendant Skidmore’s motion for
summary judgment.

ECF No. 231.

The Fourth Circuit, however,

vacated and remanded this Court’s judgments on several matters.
First, the Court found error in granting defendant Stancoti’s
motion for summary judgment regarding the November incident.

The

plaintiff alleged that during the November incident, defendant
Stancoti smiled and watched the plaintiff be assaulted and stated
that he wanted to “see how [the plaintiff] could fight.”

This

Court did not specifically address this claim in its opinion (ECF
No. 98).

Because of that, the Fourth Circuit vacated that portion

of the judgment regarding the November incident as to defendant
Stancoti.

Second, the Fourth Circuit found error in this Court’s

granting of summary judgment for defendant Markle, finding that
material issues of fact still remained. ECF No. 188. Accordingly,

3

On appeal, the plaintiff only pursued his claims against
defendants Skidmore, Stancoti, and Markle, but not defendants Long
or Doe.
3

the

Fourth

Circuit

proceedings.

remanded

this

civil

action

for

further

Therefore, following the Fourth Circuit’s mandate,

the only remaining claims were (1) those against defendant Shannon
Markle, and (2) those against Officer Stancoti as to the November
incident.
After receiving that mandate, this Court conducted a status
and scheduling conference and later appointed counsel for the
plaintiff.

ECF Nos. 234 and 241, respectively.

At issue now is the fourth motion for summary judgment of
defendants Markle and Stancoti (hereafter, “the defendants”).

ECF

No. 268. In that motion, the defendants first note that, regarding
defendant Stancoti, the Fourth Circuit only vacated and remanded
the judgment regarding the November incident.

With that in mind,

the defendants first argue that the claims against defendant
Stancoti should be dismissed as a matter of law.

In particular,

they assert that the plaintiff provides no evidence indicating that
defendant Stancoti delayed intervening in the November incident.
Further,

the

defendants

claim

that

defendant

Stancoti,

corrections officer, is entitled to qualified immunity.

as

a

Next,

concerning defendant Markle, the defendants point out that the
Fourth Circuit found that issues of material fact existed about
whether defendant Markle received the plaintiff’s grievances and
complaints pertaining to the plaintiff’s safety. Despite that, the
defendants argue that “the danger plaintiff allegedly felt was not

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the same danger that resulted in the subject altercations.” ECF No.
269. Here, they claim that no evidence exists to show that the
plaintiff was in danger.

Further, they assert that even if the

plaintiff experienced apprehension, no evidence exists to show that
the plaintiff’s alleged fear was related or connected to the
October and November incidents.

In addition to that lack of

connection, the defendants believe that the plaintiff voluntarily
interjected himself into those altercations.

Because of that, and

because no genuine issues of material fact exist, the defendants
request that this Court grant their motion for summary judgment.
The plaintiff then filed a response in opposition.
279.

ECF No.

Regarding defendant Stancoti, the plaintiff claims that

issues of material fact exist concerning the November incident.
Here, the plaintiff points to the facts that (1) defendant Stancoti
allegedly

knew

of

20

inmates

who

planned

on

assaulting

the

plaintiff, and (2) whether defendant Stancoti acted reasonably is
a

question

for

the

jury.

Concerning

defendant

Markle,

the

plaintiff asserts that the defendants are mischaracterizing the
issue. Here, he claims that the issue is not about the plaintiff’s
conduct, referring to his fear and alleged interjection into the
fight, but rather the deliberate indifference of defendant Markle
when he allegedly received the plaintiff’s grievances.

For those

reasons, the plaintiff argues that this Court should deny the

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defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

The defendants did not

file a reply.
For the reasons set forth below, the defendants’ motion is
granted in part and denied in part.
II.
On

October

2,

2008,

Facts

the

plaintiff

was

involved

altercation with two inmates (“October incident”).

in

an

Prior to the

October incident, the plaintiff allegedly submitted grievances to
defendant Markle regarding threats that the plaintiff claims he
received from other inmates, although the parties dispute whether
defendant Markle actually received those grievances.

Defendant

Markle is the Central Regional Jail Administrator, and allegedly
took no preventative action despite receiving the plaintiff’s
grievances. During the October incident, the plaintiff claims that
defendant

Stancoti,

despite

witnessing

the

aggressor-inmate

“pacing” for 20 minutes, did not sufficiently attempt to prevent
the altercation or end it.

As a result of the October incident,

the plaintiff suffered from abrasions and minor lacerations.
No. 279 Ex. 6.

ECF

Further, the prison officials created a list of 17

“Keep Away” inmates regarding the plaintiff.

The plaintiff later

alleges that he filed a grievance on November 2, 2008, indicating
his desire to place two more inmates on his “Keep Away” list.
Ex. 9.

6

Id.

Three days later, a physical altercation arose between the
plaintiff

and

those

plaintiff

claims

two

that

inmates

defendant

(“November
Stancoti

incident”).

again

stood

by

The
and

witnessed the November incident occur without intervening for a
significant amount of time.

ECF No. 2.

After that incident, the

plaintiff filed his civil rights complaint pursuant to § 1983
alleging that the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights
by acting with deliberate indifference to his physical safety.
Specifically,

the

plaintiff

claims

defendant

Markle,

despite

allegedly receiving his grievances, took insufficient preventative
action regarding his safety.

Further, the plaintiff claims that

defendant Stancoti, regarding the November incident, watched as the
inmates assaulted him for an extensive period of time before
acting.
III.

Applicable Law

As this Court has previously stated, summary judgment is
appropriate

if

interrogatories,

“the
and

pleadings,
admissions

on

depositions,
file,

answers

together

with

to
the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

The party seeking

summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing the absence of
any genuine issues of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

“The burden then shifts to the

7

nonmoving party to come forward with facts sufficient to create a
triable issue of fact.”

Temkin v. Frederick County Comm’rs, 945

F.2d 716, 718 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)).
However, as the Supreme Court of the United States noted in
Anderson, “Rule 56(e) itself provides that a party opposing a
properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial .” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.

“The inquiry performed is the

threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a
trial—whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues
that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they
may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”

Id. at 250;

see also Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th
Cir. 1979) (Summary judgment “should be granted only in those cases
where it is perfectly clear that no issue of fact is involved and
inquiry into the facts is not desirable to clarify the application
of the law.” (citing Stevens v. Howard D. Johnson Co., 181 F.2d
390, 394 (4th Cir. 1950))).
In Celotex, the Court stated that “the plain language of Rule
56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time
for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a
showing

sufficient

to

establish

8

the

existence

of

an

element

essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial.”

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

Summary

judgment is not appropriate until after the non-moving party has
had sufficient opportunity for discovery.

See Oksanen v. Page

Mem’l Hosp., 912 F.2d 73, 78 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 1074, 112 S. Ct. 973, 117 L.Ed.2d 137 (1992).

In reviewing

the supported underlying facts, all inferences must be viewed in
the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.

See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
IV.
A.

Discussion

Officer Stancoti
As stated earlier, defendant Stancoti argues that qualified

immunity

should

apply

regarding

the

November

incident.

The

plaintiff, however, argues that because a jury could deem defendant
Stancoti’s conduct as deliberate indifference, genuine issues of
material fact exist.

Because of that, the plaintiff argues that

this Court should deny the defendants’ motion.
An action under § 1983 allows a plaintiff to recover when he
or she is denied a federal civil right by someone acting “under
color of state law.”
1991).

Mensh v. Dyer, 956 F.2d 36, 39 (4th Cir.

If a violation of a federal right occurs, a government

official may be entitled to some form of immunity, either absolute
or qualified, from suits for damages.

9

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457

U.S. 800, 807 (1982).

For most government officials, such as the

defendants in this civil action, qualified immunity may apply. Id.
(providing

that

absolute

immunity

is

reserved

for

high-level

officials, such as presidents, legislators or judges).
Qualified immunity “is an affirmative defense that must be
pleaded by a defendant official.”

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815 (citing

Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980)).

It should be noted,

however, that qualified immunity serves as “‘an immunity from suit
rather than a mere defense to liability.’”

Pearson v. Callahan,

555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511, 526 (1985)).
government

officials

“The purpose of this immunity is to allow
to

carry

out

their

discretionary

duties

without the fear of personal liability or harassing litigation,
protecting from suit all but the plainly incompetent or one who is
knowingly violating the federal law.”

Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d

1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
Under Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), analysis of
a qualified immunity defense requires a two-part inquiry.

The

first question is whether the facts alleged, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the injured party, “show the officer’s
conduct violated a constitutional right.”

Id.

If the facts

alleged fail to make this showing, the inquiry is at an end, and
the official is entitled to dismissal of the claims against him.

10

Id.

If, however, the facts alleged do show a constitutional

injury, the second question is whether the constitutional right was
clearly established at the time of the violation.

Id.

Qualified

immunity is abrogated only upon a showing that the officer’s
conduct violated a constitutional right and that such right was
clearly established at the time the conduct occurred. Id.; but see
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 (permitting courts to “exercise their
sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs” of analysis
“should be addressed first in light of the circumstances.”).
Applying the facts to the law discussed above, qualified
immunity should apply to defendant Stancoti regarding his actions
during the November incident. The plaintiff alleges that defendant
Stancoti waited a significant amount of time near the cell door
before intervening in the November incident. That delay, according
to the plaintiff, amounted to deliberate indifference regarding his
physical

safety.

The

record

shows,

however,

that

defendant

Stancoti entered within several seconds after the altercation
occurred.

See ECF No. 269 Ex. L.

Further, any delay that may have

occurred appears to be the result of how the doors open rather than
any indifference by defendant Stancoti.

Id.

The facts, when

viewed in favor of the injured party, fail to show that defendant
Stancoti’s

conduct

violated

a

constitutional

right

of

the

plaintiff. Because of that, qualified immunity is not abrogated as
to

defendant

Stancoti.

Accordingly,

11

defendant

Stancoti

is

“entitled to the dismissal of the claims against him.”

Saucier,

533 U.S. at 201.
B.

Shannon Markle
As stated earlier, the Fourth Circuit provided that genuine

issues of material fact remained as to the plaintiff’s claims
concerning defendant Markle.
that

he

submitted

several

In particular, the plaintiff argues
grievances

November 2008 to defendant Markle.

throughout

October

and

In those grievances, the

plaintiff claims he indicated that a substantial risk of harm by
other inmates existed.

Through those grievances, defendant Markle

and the prison staff should have been aware of, and attempted to
prevent, the altercations.

The issue then is “whether Plaintiff

filed the disputed grievances and letters and, if so, whether
[defendant] Markle either received them or was willfully blind to
their existence.” ECF No. 231. As to that issue, defendant Markle
states that “[a]ny issue of whether plaintiff sent a grievance or
whether Mr. Markle received a grievance, has no effect on the fact
that

plaintiff

was

not

‘assaulted’

but

rather

he

admittedly

interjected himself into these situations voluntarily,” pointing to
certain statements made by the plaintiff.

ECF No. 269.

As the Court stated in Pressly v. Hutto, “The eighth amendment
protects a convicted inmate from physical harm at the hands of
fellow

inmates

resulting

from

the

deliberate

indifference

or

callous indifference of prison officials to specific known risks of

12

such

harm,

just

as

it

protects

against

harm

resulting

from

deliberate indifference of prison officials to serious medical
needs.”

816 F.2d 977 (4th Cir. 1987) (internal citations omitted)

(reversing and remanding in part the granting of summary judgment
when prison officials may or may not have been aware of an inmate’s
warnings of specific future harm); see Bowen v. Machester, 966 F.2d
13, 17 (1st Cir. 1992).
is

appropriate

interrogatories,

if

Also, as stated earlier, summary judgment

“the

and

pleadings,

admissions

on

depositions,
file,

answers

together

with

to
the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Based on the filings and evidence provided by the parties, it
is clear that genuine issues of material fact exist as to the
claims against defendant Markle.

On the one hand, if defendant

Markle did not receive the grievances that the plaintiff claims he
filed, and thus had no actual knowledge of the threats and risks to
the plaintiff’s safety, then perhaps a trier of fact could find for
defendant Markle.

On the other hand, if defendant Markle either

received and had actual knowledge of the plaintiff’s concerns in
his grievances, or displayed willful blindness to those concerns of
an elevated risk, then perhaps a trier of fact could find for the
plaintiff.

In his response in opposition, the plaintiff provides

copies of the grievances he allegedly submitted.

13

ECF No. 279 Ex.

9.

However, facts before this Court do not clearly show that

defendant Markle, as Administrator of the Central Regional Jail,
actually received and reviewed those grievances.

Therefore, it is

unclear whether defendant Markle was in possession of or was aware
of those documents and the warnings contained therein. The fact of
defendant Markle’s receipt of those grievances and knowledge of the
elevated risks that the plaintiff encountered clearly raise genuine
issues of fact. Therefore, because genuine issues of material fact
remain, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to defendant
Markle must be denied.
V.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the defendants’ fourth motion
for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to transmit a copy of this memorandum
opinion and order to counsel of record herein.
DATED:

March 23, 2015

/s/ Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.
FREDERICK P. STAMP, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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