Brunner et al v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company
Filing
35
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION 6 TO DISMISS COUNT V AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS REQUEST TO AMEND COUNT V WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO REFILING. signed by Senior Judge Frederick P. Stamp, Jr on 6/20/12. (mji)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
MICHAEL D. BRUNNER and ROBIN A. BRUNNER,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Civil Action No. 5:11CV40
(STAMP)
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY
d/b/a STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANIES,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT V
AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ REQUEST TO AMEND
COUNT V WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO REFILING
I.
Background
The plaintiffs, Michael D. Brunner and Robin A. Brunner,
commenced this action in the Circuit Court of Ohio County, West
Virginia on February 15, 2011.
The complaint alleges numerous
causes of action against State Farm Fire and Casualty Company
(“State Farm”), including common law misconduct, violation of the
Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act, W. Va. Code § 33-11-4(9),
breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, and violation of fiduciary duty.
The plaintiffs’ allegations arise due to the purchase of a
homeowners
insurance
policy
from
defendant
State
Farm.1
On
February 11, 2010, the plaintiffs’ home sustained a loss covered
under the policy.
1
The complaint alleges that the full loss is
Homeowners Insurance Policy No. 48-07-3439-8.
covered under the insurance plan; the defendant responds that only
certain losses are covered under the dwelling coverage portion of
the plan.
Both parties agree that two estimates to repair the
damaged property were submitted to State Farm and that State Farm
agreed to replace one-half (1/2) of the plaintiffs’ roof.
The
plaintiffs claim, however, that the defendant ignored the two
estimates submitted with regard to repair of the damaged property,
while the defendant argues that both estimates were beyond the
scope
of
damages
proximately
caused
in
February
2010.
The
complaint states that the plaintiffs’ home contains mold growth and
presents unhealthy and/or unsanitary conditions as a result of
State Farm’s failure to honor the insurance policy.
State Farm
denies that any of its acts caused the growth of mold or other
“unhealthy and/or unsanitary conditions.”
(Def.’s Answer 5.)
State Farm removed the case to this Court on March 14, 2011
and simultaneously filed a motion to dismiss Count V of the
complaint for failure to state a cause of action upon which relief
can be granted.
According to the defendant, Count V asserts a
cause of action entitled “violation of a fiduciary duty” but that
West Virginia “has never recognized a fiduciary duty . . . between
an insurer and its insureds.”
(Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 1.)
Before the plaintiffs responded to the motion to dismiss Count
V, the parties filed a joint motion to stay proceedings, which this
Court granted. A second joint motion to stay was then filed, which
2
this Court also granted.
Subsequently, this Court held a status
and scheduling conference and established a new briefing schedule
for the motion to dismiss.
Pursuant to the briefing schedule, the
plaintiffs filed a response to the defendant’s motion to dismiss,
conceding
that
West
Virginia
fiduciary
relationship
does
between
not
insureds
expressly
and
recognize
insurers.
a
The
plaintiffs maintain, however, that a quasi-fiduciary duty exists
that requires an insurer to deal fairly with the insured in the
handling and disposition of any claim.
The plaintiffs further
request leave to amend their complaint to clarify factual and legal
allegations.
The defendant then filed a reply in support of its motion to
dismiss.
State Farm asserts that, because the plaintiffs concede
that West Virginia law does not impose a fiduciary duty on a firstparty insurer, its motion to dismiss should be granted. State Farm
also argues that the plaintiffs’ assertion of a quasi-fiduciary
duty is misplaced.
Finally, the defendant requests that this
Court, in addition to granting the motion to dismiss, preclude any
further attempts by the plaintiffs to amend the complaint.
II.
A.
Applicable Law
Motion to Dismiss
In evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
court must accept all well-pled facts contained in the complaint as
3
true. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. V. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d
250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009). However, “legal conclusions, elements of
a cause of action, and bare assertions devoid of further factual
enhancement fail to constitute well-pled facts for Rule 12(b)(6)
purposes.”
(2009)).
Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677
This
Court
also
declines
to
consider
“unwarranted
inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.”
Wahi v.
Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 615 n.26 (4th Cir.
2009).
The purpose of a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the
formal sufficiency of the statement of the claim for relief; it is
not a procedure for resolving a contest about the facts or the
merits of the case.
5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (3d ed. 2004); see also
Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999).
Such a motion must also be distinguished from a motion for summary
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
A motion for
summary judgment is designed to test whether there is a genuine
issue of material fact.
Wright & Miller, supra, at § 1356.
For
purposes of the motion to dismiss, however, the court’s inquiry is
directed
to
whether
the
allegations
made
by
the
complainant
constitute statement of a claim under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a).
Id. § 1357.
4
When a complaint “does not allege ‘enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’” the complaint
should be dismissed. Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th
Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)).
“Facial plausibility is established once the factual
content of a complaint ‘allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference
that
alleged.’”
U.S.
at
the
defendant
is
liable
for
the
misconduct
Nemet Chevrolet, 591 F.3d at 256 (quoting Iqbal, 556
677
(2009)).
Detailed
factual
allegations
are
not
required, but the facts alleged must be sufficient “to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555.
B.
Motion to Amend
Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grants this
Court broad discretion concerning motions for leave to amend
pleadings.
See Keller v. Prince George’s Cnty., 923 F.2d 30, 33
(4th Cir. 1991) (“Motions to amend are committed to the discretion
of the trial court.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
Rule 15 states, in
pertinent part, that “[a] party may amend its pleading once as a
matter of course within . . . 21 days after serving it, or . . . 21
days after service of . . . a motion under Rule 12(b).”
Civ. P. 15(a)(1).
Fed. R.
If a party seeks to amend its pleadings in all
other cases, it may only do so “with the opposing party’s written
5
consent or the court’s leave.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”
“The
Id.
Further, leave to amend should be granted absent some reason
“such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of
the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments
previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue
of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of the amendment.”
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); see also Ward Elec. Serv.
v. First Commercial Bank, 819 F.2d 496, 497 (4th Cir. 1987);
Gladhill v. Gen. Motors Corp., 743 F.2d 1049, 1052 (4th Cir. 1984).
III.
A.
Discussion
Motion to Dismiss
The
defendant
argues
that
Count
V
of
the
plaintiffs’
complaint, “violation of a fiduciary duty,” should be dismissed
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
for failure to state a cause of action upon which relief can be
granted.
The defendant cites Elmore v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 504 S.E.2d 893, 898-901 (W. Va. 1998), in support of its
assertion
that
West
Virginia
does
not
recognize
that
the
relationship between an insurer and an insured rises to the level
of a fiduciary relationship. Citing to Shamblin v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 396 S.E.2d 766, 774 (W. Va. 1998), the plaintiffs concede
that West Virginia law does not expressly recognize a fiduciary
6
duty between an insurer and its insured, but argue that a quasifiduciary duty exists.
In Elmore, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
stated that it “has never recognized that the relationship between
an insurer and its insured is in the nature of a fiduciary
relationship.”
Elmore, 504 S.E.2d at 900.
In Shamblin, the court
discussed the applicable standard of proof in actions against
insurers by their insureds for failure to settle third-party
liability claims against them within the policy limits.
Although
the court stated that an insurance company must take into account
the interest of its insured, this standard of duty is less than a
Elmore, 504 S.E.2d at 900.
fiduciary duty.
Therefore, this Court
agrees that violation of a fiduciary duty is not a basis for a
claim upon which relief can be granted and this Court grants the
motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ Count V.
B.
Leave to Amend
In their response to the motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs
request leave to amend their complaint to clarify factual and legal
allegations against the defendant.
Although they recognize that
there is no fiduciary duty between an insurer and its insured, they
argue
that
an
relationship.
complaint
insurance
policy
creates
a
“quasi-fiduciary”
The defendant responds that any amendment of the
would
be
duplicative
7
of
the
plaintiffs’
other
allegations, thus, the defendant argues that any further attempts
at amendment by the plaintiffs should be precluded.
This Court construes the plaintiffs’ request for leave to
amend as a motion to amend pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules
of
Civil
Procedure.
Upon
review
of
the
record,
this
Court
concludes that the plaintiffs have not exhibited any undue delay,
bad faith, or dilatory motive.
Additionally, this Court cannot
conclude either that the plaintiffs’ amendment would be futile or
that the prejudice to the defendant is so significant as to prevent
allowance of the amendment. However, Local Rule of Civil Procedure
15.01 states that “[a]ny party filing a motion to amend a pleading
that requires leave of court to file, shall attach to that motion
a signed copy of the proposed amended pleading.”
LR Civ P 15.01.
Because the plaintiffs did not comply with Local Rule of Civil
Procedure 15.01, this Court finds that the motion to amend must be
denied
without
prejudice
to
refiling
a
motion
to
amend
the
complaint with a copy of the proposed amended complaint attached as
required by Local Rule of Civil Procedure 15.01.
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the defendant’s motion to
dismiss Count V of the plaintiffs’ complaint (ECF No. 6) is
GRANTED.
The plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend is DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE to refiling a motion to amend the complaint in
the manner described above.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to transmit a copy of this memorandum
opinion and order to counsel of record herein.
DATED:
June 20, 2012
/s/ Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.
FREDERICK P. STAMP, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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