Jackson v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER AFFIRMING AND ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE: denying 11 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; granting 12 Motion for Summary Judgment; Adopting Report and Recommendations 14 in its entirely; Ordered case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Clerk directed to enter judgment in favor of the defendant. Signed by Senior Judge Frederick P. Stamp, Jr on 12/18/2012. (copy to counsel of record via CM/ECF)(rjs)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
RAYMOND V. JACKSON, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No. 5:11CV185
(STAMP)

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
AFFIRMING AND ADOPTING REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I.

Background

The plaintiff in this civil action filed claims for Disability
Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security
Act, claiming that he suffered from disability beginning September
28, 2006.

His application for benefits was denied both initially

and upon reconsideration.

The plaintiff then requested a hearing,

which was granted and held before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
Stephen R. Woody. At this hearing, the plaintiff testified and was
represented by an attorney.

Vocational expert Larry Ostrowski,

Ph.D. appeared and testified at the hearing as well.

The ALJ

affirmed the denial of the plaintiff’s application for benefits on
the grounds that the plaintiff was not disabled as that term is
defined by the Social Security Act.

The Appeals Council denied

review, and the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”).

The plaintiff then filed this action against the Commissioner
seeking review of the final decision of the ALJ.

The plaintiff

filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and the defendant
filed a motion for summary judgment.

United States Magistrate

Judge James E. Seibert reviewed the plaintiff’s complaint, the
motions by the parties and the administrative record, and issued a
report and recommendation recommending that the defendant’s motion
for summary judgment be granted, that the plaintiff’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings be denied, and that the matter be
dismissed.

Upon submitting his report, Magistrate Judge Seibert

informed the parties that if they objected to any portion of his
proposed findings of fact and recommendation for disposition, they
must file written objections within fourteen days after being
served with a copy of the report.
objections

which

argue

that

the

The plaintiff filed timely
magistrate

judge

placed

insufficient emphasis upon evidence in the record which suggests
that the plaintiff is disabled, and focused only on the evidence
which supported the ALJ’s findings to the contrary.
II.

Applicable Law

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), this Court must conduct
a

de

novo

review

of

any

portion

of

the

magistrate

recommendation to which objection is timely made.

judge’s

As to those

portions of a recommendation to which no objection is made, a
magistrate judge’s findings and recommendation will be upheld

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unless they are clearly erroneous.

Because the plaintiff has

objected to the entire report and recommendation, this Court will
undertake a de novo review of all of the magistrate judge’s
findings recommendations therein.
III.

Discussion

The plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s decision denying his
claims should be overturned because the ALJ failed to properly
assess

his

residual

functional

capacity

(“RFC”)

by

not

incorporating all of the plaintiff’s limitations caused by all of
his significant impairments.

As such, the plaintiff argues, the

testimony of the vocational expert and the ALJ’s ultimate decision
were erroneous.

The magistrate judge reviewed the findings of the

ALJ to determine whether they were “supported by substantial
evidence and whether the correct law was applied.”

Hays v.

Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). Stated another way,
review is based upon whether evidence existed in the record to
support the findings so as to allow a reasonable person to conclude
similarly to the ALJ.

After reviewing the standard for disability

and the five-step evaluation process for determining if a claimant
is disabled, the magistrate judge set forth the findings of the
ALJ. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (defining disability); 20 C.F.R.
§

404.1520

(explaining

the

five-step

process).

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sequential

evaluation

The magistrate judge noted that the error claimed by the
plaintiff falls into the considerations made between steps three
and

four

of

the

claimant’s RFC.

analysis,

wherein

the

ALJ

must

determine

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) and (e).

a

An RFC is

defined as “the most you can still do despite your limitations.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1).

Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545, the

determination of an RFC must be based upon all relevant evidence,
including descriptions of limitations that go beyond the symptoms,
and observations by treating physicians, psychologists, family,
neighbors, friends, or other persons.

All of this evidence is

considered alongside medical records to allow the ALJ to form a
complete determination of the claimant’s RFC.

Magistrate Judge

Seibert also correctly noted that, under Fourth Circuit precedent,
an

ALJ,

in

determining

an

RFC,

is

only

required

to

include

limitations which he believes to be supported by the record, and
that, in forming the hypothetical question for a vocational expert,
the ALJ need only address limitations found to be both severe, and
supported by the record.

Gross v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1163, 1165

(4th Cir. 1986); Russell v. Barnhart, 58 F. App’x 25, 30 (4th Cir.
Feb. 7, 2003).

This is also true in the ALJ’s decision to “accept

or reject restrictions included in hypothetical questions suggested
by a Claimant’s counsel.”

France v. Apfel, 87 F. Supp. 2d 484, 490

(D. Md. 2000) (citing Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 774 (9th
Cir. 1986)).

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In finding that the ALJ’s determination of the plaintiff’s RFC
was based upon substantial evidence, Magistrate Judge Seibert first
explained that the ALJ sufficiently explained the substantial
evidence upon which he based his decision to not entirely credit
the

plaintiff’s

limitations.

subjective

description

of

his

symptoms

and

The evidence used to support this decision included

the fact that, while the plaintiff claimed disability onset of
September 28, 2006, he did not file for benefits until June 18,
2008.

Substantial evidence in this regard was also found in the

ALJ’s determination that the plaintiff’s daily activities were not
consistent with his description of the severity of his condition.
The magistrate judge then concluded that the ALJ properly
considered

all

of

the

medical

evidence,

and

that

his

RFC

determination that the plaintiff’s medical records did not support
a finding that the plaintiff is unable to sustain employment was
supported by substantial evidence.
note

of

a

number

of

medical

Magistrate Judge Seibert took
records

which

indicated

improvement and lack of severe movement impairment.

pain

These records

also indicated that the plaintiff himself often indicated in the
medical records that his pain and limitations were less severe than
he described them at the hearing.
The

magistrate

consideration

of

the

judge

also

plaintiff’s

concluded
daily

that

activities,

the

ALJ’s

which

the

plaintiff testified included exercising, walking in the woods,

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lifting 30 to 40 pounds with his arms and 20 to 25 pounds when
bending over, properly led to the conclusion that the plaintiff was
not

limited

to

the

point

of

inability

to

perform

any

work.

Finally, the magistrate judge took note of the ALJ’s explanation of
his

decision

to

credit

the

RFC

assessments

of

State

Agency

Consultants Thomas Lauderman, D.O. and Porfirio Pascasio, M.D. The
ALJ supported this decision by explaining that these assessments
were “generally based upon the full longitudinal record.” As such,
Magistrate Judge Seibert reported that the ALJ’s RFC determination
was adequately supported and was based in substantial fact within
the record.

For the reasons that follow, by de novo review, this

Court agrees with the magistrate judge’s findings and will affirm
and adopt the report and recommendation in its entirety.
In

the

plaintiff’s

objections

to

the

report

and

recommendation, he argues that the magistrate judge erred in
focusing

only

on

evidence

which

supported

the

ALJ’s

RFC

determination, and seemingly failing to consider evidence which
supports a finding otherwise. The plaintiff then lays out evidence
which he believes supports a finding that the ALJ erred as the
plaintiff claims. This Court does not quarrel with the plaintiff’s
presentation of the existence of facts which may support a finding
other than that reached by the ALJ.

However, the plaintiff’s

objection misconstrues the standard for review with which this
Court is charged in this case.

It is not the position of the

6

district court in cases such as this to independently determine the
plaintiff’s RFC, or even to decide whether it agrees with the
findings of the ALJ in this regard.

Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d

650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589
(4th Cir. 2001).

Rather, as was well articulated by Magistrate

Judge Seibert in his report and recommendation, the role of this
Court is only to determine whether the ALJ’s determination was
supported by “substantial evidence.”

Id.

This standard requires

only that this Court find that “such relevant evidence [exists] as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion”
in line with that reached by the ALJ.

Pierce v. Underwood, 487

U.S. 552, 664-65 (1988). As such, while evidence may well exist to
support the conclusion opposite to that reached by the ALJ, such is
not a concern of this Court–even if the evidence on either side
could reasonable be considered to be equal–so long as substantial
evidence exists to support the decision of the ALJ.
Considering the above standard of review, upon de novo review
of the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the briefing
submitted by the parties, and the administrative record, along with
the opinion of the ALJ, this Court agrees with the magistrate judge
that the ALJ’s RFC determination was supported by substantial
evidence.

The ALJ properly considered the testimony of the

plaintiff as required under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545.

However, he

found a basis in the medical records, which is detailed in depth by

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the

magistrate

judge

in

his

report

and

recommendation

and

summarized above, to not entirely credit the plaintiff’s subjective
testimony regarding the severity of his pain and his limitations
therefrom.

Such a finding is well within the discretion of the

presiding ALJ.

See Gross, 785 F.2d at 1165.

Further, the

hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert was one that
the ALJ found to be supported by the record and which included
limitation

which

the

ALJ

determined

to

be

severe.

determination is also within the discretion of the ALJ.

all
This
See

Russell, 58 F. App’x at 30; and see France, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 490.
Further, each of these determinations were supported by substantial
evidence

as

outlined

in

the

magistrate

judge’s

report

and

recommendation and summarized above.
This Court does not disagree with the plaintiff’s contention
that evidence can be found on the record to support the conclusions
which the plaintiff urges this Court to adopt. However, this Court
has considered the entirety of the evidence presented along with
the opinion of the ALJ, and substantial evidence exists on the
record to allow a reasonable mind to reach the conclusion reached
by the ALJ.

Accordingly, this Court overrules the plaintiff’s

objections and affirms and adopts the report and recommendation of
the magistrate judge.

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IV.

Conclusion

After a de novo review, this Court AFFIRMS and ADOPTS the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation in its entirety.

The

defendant’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 12) is thus
GRANTED and the plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings
(ECF No. 11) is DENIED. The decision of the Commissioner is hereby
AFFIRMED.

It is further ORDERED that this case be DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE and STRICKEN from the active docket of this Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to transmit a copy of this memorandum
opinion and order to counsel of record herein. Pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 58, the Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment
in favor of the defendant.
DATED:

December 18, 2012

/s/ Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.
FREDERICK P. STAMP, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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