The Hockey Club of the Ohio Valley, LLC et al v. Eagle Marketing Group, L.L.C.

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER CONFIRMING PRONOUNCED ORDER OF THE COURT GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUM CERTAIN JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING AND AWARDING GENERAL DAMAGES, TREBLE DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS' FEES AND C OSTS: Granting 11 Motion For Sum Certain Judgment; awarding total default judgment in the amount of $33,894.00 with post-judgment interest calculated from 12/9/13; and Dismissing and Striking civil action from active docket of this Court. Clerk directed to enter judgment pursuant to FRCP 58. Signed by Senior Judge Frederick P. Stamp, Jr on 12/11/13. (soa)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
THE HOCKEY CLUB OF THE OHIO VALLEY, LLC
and THE ECHL,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Civil Action No. 5:12CV161
(STAMP)

EAGLE MARKETING GROUP, L.L.C.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
CONFIRMING PRONOUNCED ORDER OF THE COURT
GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUM CERTAIN JUDGMENT,
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING,
AND AWARDING GENERAL DAMAGES, TREBLE DAMAGES
AND ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS
I.
This

trademark

Background

infringement

action

was

filed

by

the

plaintiffs, The Hockey Club of the Ohio Valley, LLC (“HCOV”) and
The ECHL, in this Court in October 2012.

In their complaint, the

plaintiffs argue that the defendant, Eagle Marketing Group, L.L.C.
(“Eagle Marketing”), used the trademark of the Wheeling Nailers in
its calendar in order to generate advertising revenue.

The

plaintiffs contend that the defendant used the Wheeling Nailers
trademark to sell marketing advertisements to local retailers of
whom the plaintiffs would have generated advertising revenue.
Further, the plaintiffs asserted that this was not the first time
that the defendant had engaged in such conduct and that the use of
the Wheeling Nailers trademark was intentional.

A 21-day summons was issued in December and was returned
executed as to the defendant.
without

the

defendant

After the 21-day deadline expired

answering

the

plaintiffs’

complaint

or

participating in the action otherwise, the plaintiffs filed a
motion for entry of default. The Clerk of Court entered default as
to Eagle Marketing thereafter.

The plaintiffs then filed a motion

for sum certain judgment or, in the alternative, for an evidentiary
hearing to determine damages.
In their motion, the plaintiffs provided four exhibits to
support their request for general damages, treble damages, and
attorneys’ fees and costs.

These exhibits included (1) a copy of

the calendar that the defendant used to obtain marketing revenue
with the Wheeling Nailers’ likeness; (2) an affidavit from Craig
Bommer (“Bommer”), the Vice President of Business Operations for
the Wheeling Nailers, stating that the cost of the advertisements
in the calendar would range from $500.00 for a small advertisement
to $700.00 for a large advertisement; (3) an affidavit from Kenneth
C. Otis, III (“Otis”), counsel for ECHL, who had written a “cease
and desist” letter to the defendant previously for infringing on
the trademarks of another ECHL team and stating that the use of the
Wheeling Nailers trademark was not the first instance where the
defendant used an ECHL affiliate hockey team to sell advertising;
and (4) a billing statement summarizing the attorneys’ fees and
costs of this litigation.

2

Despite the exhibits included in the plaintiffs’ motion, this
Court granted the motion, in the alternative, for an evidentiary
hearing which was held on December 9, 2013.

At the hearing, the

plaintiffs presented two witnesses and provided further affidavits
to the Court.
The first witness, Timothy Arthur Roberts (“Roberts”), was the
Director of Hockey Operations in 2012 for the plaintiff, HCOV.
Roberts testified that while he was employed by HCOV, he oversaw
sales calls and had a firm grasp on the marketing efforts of HCOV.
He stated that while he was having lunch at Nail City Brewing
Company in Wheeling, West Virginia,1 he saw a Wheeling Nailers’
calendar

and

thereafter

asked

Bommer

advertisements included in the calendar.
not.

if

HCOV

had

sold

the

Bommer stated HCOV had

Roberts further testified that he then called three of the

businesses who had advertised in the calendar that he knew either
professionally

or

personally

–

Fahey

Insurance,

Figaretti’s

Restaurant, and Rob Frank with Pickles’ Grog and Grill2 – about the
advertisements and each said that the defendant had contacted them
about advertising and had also used Roberts’ name as a reference
during their sales pitch.

Roberts then contacted the ECHL’s legal

1

This is a restaurant in Wheeling, West Virginia which is now
known as River City Restaurant and Banquet Facility.
2

These are three businesses located in Wheeling, West
Virginia. The advertisements that they placed are visible in the
exhibit included in the plaintiffs’ motion. ECF No. 11-1.
3

counsel to inquire as to whether the defendant was authorized to
use the Wheeling Nailers trademark; ECHL’s legal counsel stated it
was not.

Further, ECHL reported to Roberts that they had given a

cease and desist letter to the defendant because of similar conduct
with other teams in the league.

Roberts then clarified that ECHL

owns the Wheeling Nailers trademark.
The plaintiffs then called Bommer to testify.

Bommer first

indicated that he has been involved in the advertising sales for
HCOV for eight years.

He testified that the Wheeling Nailers

generated no revenue from the defendant’s calendar and that a
majority of the businesses in the advertisements were clients that
have not advertised with the Wheeling Nailers (two had advertised
with the Wheeling Nailers, Mountain Mama’s Kayak and Bike Rentals
(“Mountain Mama’s”) and River City Restaurant and Banquet Facility.
Further, Bommer stated that Mountain Mama’s had contacted him after
placing the advertisement with the defendant and informed Bommer of
the agreement with the defendant.

Finally, Bommer testified that

the Wheeling Nailers had lost potential advertising revenue that
would have equaled $9,300.00 if the Wheeling Nailers had charged
their advertising rates – $500.00 per small advertisement and
$700.00 per large advertisement.
Plaintiffs’ counsel then asserted that the plaintiffs were
entitled to damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1117 because the defendant
had willfully infringed on the Wheeling Nailers trademark. Counsel

4

contends that losses incurred are appropriate and that in the
affidavit

for

ECHL’s

legal

counsel,

defendant has done this before.

it

sets

forth

that

the

Further, counsel indicates that

six or seven months after the plaintiffs filed this suit, the
Illinois State Attorney General filed suit against the defendant
for similar trademark infringement of a college sports team.
Counsel further asserts that the plaintiffs entered this litigation
without knowing if it would lead anywhere in order to deter further
infringing behavior by the defendant.

Counsel stated that through

the exhibits provided, the plaintiffs had shown that they were
entitled to $9,300.00 in general damages for loss of advertising
revenue, $5,994.00 in reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of
litigation,

and

$33,894.00

in

treble

damages

(which

is

not

inclusive of attorneys’ fees and costs).3
Based on the reasons that follow, the plaintiffs’ motion for
a sum certain judgment is granted.
II.

Applicable Law

To obtain a default judgment, a party must first seek an entry
of default under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a). Under Rule
55(a), an entry of default is appropriate “[w]hen a party against

3

Although the plaintiffs stated during the hearing that the
treble damages amounted to $33,894.00, the Court believes that the
actual amount should be $27,900.00 which is three times the general
damages.
The $33,894.00 number that the plaintiffs cited was
likely the amount of treble damages plus the attorneys’ fees and
costs of litigation.
Thus, this Court is only adjudging the
amount of treble damages to equal $27,900.00.
5

whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to
plead or otherwise defend . . . .”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).

Once

default is entered by the clerk, the party may seek a default
judgment under Rule 55(b)(1) or (2), depending on the nature of the
relief sought.

If the plaintiff’s claim is for “a sum certain” or

a “sum that can be made certain by computation,” the plaintiff may
seek entry of default judgment from the Clerk under Rule 55(b)(1).
However, in cases in which the plaintiff seeks a form of relief
other than liquidated damages, Rule 55(b)(2) requires plaintiff to
seek an entry of default judgment from the court.
It is well-established in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit that default judgments are to be granted
sparingly.
951,

954

See, e.g., Lolatchy v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 816 F.2d
(4th

Cir.

1987).

“[T]rial

judges

are

vested

with

discretion, which must be liberally exercised, in entering such
judgments and in providing relief therefrom.”

United States v.

Moradi, 673 F.2d 725, 727 (4th Cir. 1982).

However, default

judgment is available “when the adversary process has been halted
because of an essentially unresponsive party.” S.E.C. v. Lawbaugh,
359 F. Supp. 2d 418, 421 (D. Md. 2005) (citing Jackson v. Beech,
636 F.2d 831, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
A defaulting party admits the plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual
allegations in the complaint, in contrast to the allegations
regarding damages. Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778,

6

780 (4th Cir. 2001).

The party in default, however, is not held to

admit conclusions of law.

Id.

III.
A.

Discussion

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2)
The plaintiffs seek damages under Rule 55(b)(1), or in the

alternative, under Rule 55(b)(2).

This Court proceeded under Rule

55(b)(2) because an evidentiary hearing was required in order to
determine the applicability of 15 U.S.C. § 1117 and also to
determine whether the factors required for a court to award
attorneys’ fees and costs were met.

Barber v. Kimbrell’s, Inc.,

577 F.2d 216, 226 (4th Cir. 1978).

The Court must consider, in

determining the damages in a default judgment, that “[a] judgment
by default shall not be different in kind or exceed in amount that
prayed for in the demand for judgment.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c).

Thus, this Court may not enter a judgment that is “in excess of
that demanded in the complaint.”

Eddins v. Medlar, 881 F.2d 1069

(4th Cir. 1989). However, “[a]lthough [the] rule governing default
judgment limits the damages recoverable by a plaintiff following a
default judgment to the type and quantity of damages demanded in
the complaint, it does not require plaintiff to have demanded a sum
certain in order to recover on default.”

Ames v. STAT Fire

Suppression, Inc., 227 F.R.D. 361 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
In this case, the plaintiffs requested relief in the form of
damages for profits realized by the defendant in using the Wheeling

7

Nailers trademark, treble damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees
and the costs of this litigation.

Accordingly, it is in this

Court’s discretion to award the plaintiffs all the damages they
have requested in their motion under Rule 55(b)(2) because they
requested the same damages (and more)4 in their complaint and thus
the defendant was on notice of the possible damages that could be
awarded by this Court.
B.

Title 15, United States Code, Section 1117
Under subsection (a) of 15 U.S.C. § 1117, a plaintiff may

recover, subject to the principles of equity, (1) defendant’s
profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the
costs

of

the

action.

The

plaintiff

only

has

to

prove

the

defendant’s sales; the defendant has the burden of disproving the
claims by the plaintiff. Id. Additionally, the Court cannot enter
judgment for any sum above three times the actual damages.

Id.

If

this Court finds that the amount of recovery based on profits is
inadequate or excessive, the Court may in its discretion enter a
judgment

for

a

sum

that

it

finds

circumstances of the individual case.

to
Id.

be

just

based

on

the

Finally, “[t]he court

in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the
prevailing party.”

Id.

4

Along with the damages the plaintiffs have sought in this
motion, the plaintiffs had also sought declaratory relief and
punitive damages in their complaint.
8

Under subsection (b), however, in assessing damages under
subsection (a), the Court shall enter judgment for three times the
profits or damages, whichever is greater, together with reasonable
attorneys’ fees, if the defendant intentionally used a trademark in
connection with the “sale, offering for sale, or distribution of
goods or services.”

15 U.S.C. § 1117(b).

Subsection (b) allows

for an exception to awarding those damages only if there are
“extenuating circumstances” that counsel against awarding such
damages.

Id.

The plaintiffs claim general damages, attorneys’ fees and
costs, and treble damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b).

Because the

Wheeling Nailers trademark was used by the defendant in connection
to

selling

advertisements

for

a

calendar

distributed

by

the

defendant, this Court finds that the plaintiffs have correctly pled
this motion under § 1117(b).

The three types of damages will thus

be discussed in turn.
1.

General Damages

As stated previously, the plaintiffs only have to prove the
defendant’s sales and the defendant has the burden of disproving
the plaintiffs’ claims.

15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).

In this case, the

defendant has failed to appear and thus this Court only has what
the plaintiffs have provided as evidence of what the defendant’s
sales likely were for the calendar.

9

The plaintiffs have provided an affidavit and testimony from
Bommer, as discussed earlier.

Bommer has stated that small

advertisements sell for $500.00, while large advertisements sell
for $700.00.

Thus, because there are six small advertisements and

nine large advertisements that appear on the calendar for the
Wheeling Nailers, Bommer concluded that the revenue lost by the
plaintiffs was $9,300.00.
This Court finds that the plaintiffs’ claim of $9,300.00 is
reasonable given the evidence provided. Further, the defendant did
not respond to the complaint and thus has foregone the opportunity
to argue that it charged less or more for the advertisements.
Accordingly, this Court will award the plaintiffs general damages
in the amount of $9,300.00.
2.

Treble Damages

The plaintiffs have also claimed that they are entitled to a
trebling of the general damages under § 1117(b).

The plaintiffs

claim that the defendant willfully infringed on the Wheeling
Nailers trademark and therefore its actions were intentional.
“Where . . . a registrant seeks the mandatory treble damages
and attorneys’ fees provided for in § 1117(b), the plaintiff must
prove the defendants’ intent to infringe.” Chanel, Inc. v. Italian
Activewear of Florida, Inc., 931 F.2d 1472, 1476 (11th Cir. 1991).
“Willful infringement may justify an enhancement, . . . [however,]
compensation must be the basis for the enhancement, and [an] . . .

10

enhancement based on willful conduct must not be punitive in
nature.”

Ramada Franchise Sys., Inc. v. Boychuk, 283 F. Supp. 2d

777, 791-92 (N.D.N.Y. 2003), aff’d, 124 F. App’x 28 (2d Cir. 2005).
The

plaintiffs

provided

evidence

that

the

defendant

intentionally infringed on the Wheeling Nailers trademark.
plaintiffs

provided

the

affidavit

of

Otis,

an

attorney

The
that

represents ECHL in trademark issues, as an exhibit with their
motion.

ECF No. 11-3.

Otis attested that he has sent a “cease and

desist” letter to the defendant for infringing on the trademarks of
an ECHL team.

Otis further states that the Wheeling Nailers’

calendar, at the center of this controversy, is not the first
instance where the defendant used an ECHL affiliate hockey team to
sell

its

advertising

and

calendars

without

compensating

the

affiliate.
The plaintiffs also provided the testimony of Roberts, as
discussed previously.

Roberts testified that after seeing the

calendar, he called some of the businesses that had advertised in
the

calendar

and

they

informed

him

that

the

defendant

had

specifically used Roberts as a reference for the sales calls.
Further, Roberts confirmed the allegations of prior bad conduct by
the defendant made by Otis in his affidavit.

Finally, through

plaintiffs’ counsel, this Court learned that the Illinois State
Attorney

General

has

brought

suit

11

against

the

defendant

for

trademark infringement of a college team in Illinois for similar
use of the team’s trademark.
This Court finds the affidavits and testimony of the witnesses
credible, and further finds that there was intent on the part of
the defendant to infringe on the Wheeling Nailers trademark.

The

defendant used Roberts’ name without permission, likely to bolster
its chances of making a sale within the local community, and thus
showed intent to defraud those clients and also to infringe on the
Wheeling Nailers trademark. Further, because this is not the first
instance of the defendant using such a scheme, it is unlikely that
the defendant was unaware of the fact that it was using the
trademark illegally.

Accordingly, this Court finds that there was

intent on behalf of the defendant and thus the plaintiffs are
entitled to a trebling of the damages.
Additionally, no extenuating circumstances have been brought
to light, and thus this Court finds that there are none that would
not allow the trebling of damages.

Thus, because the damages

amount to $9,300.00, without taking into account attorneys’ fees
and costs of the litigation, the plaintiffs are awarded $27,900.00
in trebled damages.
3.

Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

The plaintiffs provided three exhibits to support an award of
attorneys’ fees and costs.

First, the plaintiffs provided a

summary of attorneys’ fees and costs for this litigation.

12

ECF No.

11-4.

Further, the plaintiffs entered into evidence during the

motion

hearing

Wheeling,

two

West

affidavits,

Virginia

one

legal

from

an

community,

attorney
David

A.

in

the

Jividen

(“Jividen”), and one from counsel for the plaintiffs, Gerald
Lofstead, III (“Lofstead”).

ECF Nos. 14-1 and 14-2.

The Jividen affidavit states that the affiant is a licensed
attorney in West Virginia who has been practicing law for 34 years
in West Virginia.

He further states that he has reviewed the

pleadings and the billing statement provided to this Court.

He

attests that (1) Lofstead is an upstanding member of the legal
community;

(2)

the

time

and

labor

expended

by

Lofstead

is

reasonable given the nature of the case; (3) the hourly rate
charged by Lofstead of $175.00 per hour is both fair and reasonable
in the local community and is actually low considering the nature
of the case; and (4) the current litigation, because it is a
trademark violation case, is not desirable within the local legal
community because it requires specialized knowledge on behalf of
legal counsel.
Lofstead’s affidavit states that he is a licensed attorney in
the state of West Virginia and has been practicing law for 16 years
in West Virginia.

Further, he states that action in this matter

had to occur immediately because the plaintiffs were losing revenue
due to the defendant’s production of the calendar at the beginning
of

the

Wheeling

Nailers’

season.

13

He

also

attests

that

his

expectations for this case were to have the defendant cease and
desist its use of the Wheeling Nailers trademark and to obtain any
lost profits that plaintiffs incurred because of the defendant’s
violation.

Finally,

he

states

that

he

has

maintained

a

professional relationship with the plaintiffs for a period of one
year prior to the commencement of the current action and has had a
professional relationship with the Wheeling Nailers for over three
years prior to the commencement of the current action.
This Court must consider several factors before it may award
attorneys’ fees and costs to a party.

The United States Court of

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has set forth the following factors
to determine the reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees and costs
sought by a party: (1) the time and labor expended; (2) the novelty
and difficulty of the questions raised; (3) the skill required to
properly perform the legal services rendered; (4) the attorney’s
opportunity costs in pressing the instant litigation; (5) the
customary fee for like work; (6) the attorney’s expectations at the
outset of the litigation; (7) the time limitations imposed by the
client or circumstances; (8) the amount in controversy and the
results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the
attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case within the legal
community in which the suit arose; (11) the nature and length of
the professional relationship between attorney and client; and (12)
attorneys’ fees awards in similar cases.

14

Barber, 577 F.2d at 226.

The plaintiffs have clearly shown that these factors are met.
First, the summary of expenses provided by the plaintiffs show the
time and labor expended in this litigation.

Second and third, the

Jividen affidavit discusses the fact that trademark infringement
cases raise difficult questions for legal counsel to address and
require specialized knowledge.

Next, as this Court stated during

the hearing, it is likely that Lofstead, who has been practicing
law for 16 years, had to forego taking on other legal matters
because of his participation in this trademark infringement action
which would have likely dealt with complex legal issues.

In

addition, as stated in the Jividen affidavit, $175.00 per hour is
reasonable and fair and is likely less than what might be expected
for

this

type

of

litigation.

Further,

Lofstead’s

affidavit

provides his expectations for this litigation which included the
plaintiffs being placed in the position they would have been in
financially

but

for

the

defendant’s

trademark

infringement.

Accordingly, the plaintiffs would be worse off if they had to pay
the expense of attorneys’ fees and costs.
Additionally, Lofstead’s affidavit states that there were time
restrictions in pursuing this litigation because of the impending
start of the Wheeling Nailers’ season and the fact that the
defendant was distributing its calendars at that time.

Further,

the amount in controversy would likely have been much greater if
this case had not resulted in a default judgment.

15

The plaintiffs

claimed much more in damages in their complaint (their prayer for
relief included punitive damages), thus the results from this Court
granting attorneys’ fees and costs would actually be a better
outcome for the defendant than if the plaintiffs had obtained all
the relief that they initially requested in their complaint. Also,
the Jividen affidavit and Lofstead affidavit provide that Lofstead
is well regarded in the legal community and has been practicing for
a number of years, thus he has the experience and reputation that
would justify the amount that was charged for his services in this
litigation.

Moreover, the Jividen affidavit stated that trademark

infringement cases are undesirable in the legal community because
of the expertise that they require on behalf of the attorneys who
take them.

Likewise, this Court notes that because of the bad

faith

may

that

undesirable.

accompany

infringement

cases

they

are

also

In addition, the Lofstead affidavit provides that he

has worked with the plaintiffs for over a year and with the
Wheeling Nailers for over three years, accordingly, he has built a
relationship with the plaintiffs deserving of the legal fees the
plaintiffs are requesting.

Finally, as the Jividen affidavit

attested, $175.00 per hour is reasonable and fair for this type of
case and is actually a fee that he would consider on the low end
for a trademark infringement case.
Because the plaintiffs have met all the factors of Barber,
this Court finds that attorneys’ fees and costs should be awarded

16

to the plaintiffs in this action.

Additionally, as was discussed

in the treble damages section, this Court finds that the plaintiffs
have shown that the defendant acted intentionally in infringing on
the Wheeling Nailers trademark and thus are entitled to attorneys’
fees and costs under § 1117(b). Moreover, to reiterate, no showing
of extenuating circumstances on behalf of the defendant has been
shown.

Thus, based on the evidence provided by the plaintiffs,

they are entitled to $5,994.00 in attorneys’ fees and costs.
IV.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the plaintiffs’ motion for a sum
certain judgment or, in the alternative, an evidentiary hearing is
GRANTED.

Pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and 15 U.S.C. §§ 1117(a) and 1117(b), the plaintiffs are
hereby awarded general damages in the amount of $9,300.00, a
trebling of the general damages in the amount of $27,900.00, and
attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $5,994.00.

Thus, the

plaintiffs are granted a total default judgment of $33,894.00 with
post-judgment interest to be calculated from the date of the
original judgment, December 9, 2013, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter a judgment order pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 58 which reflects this award.

It is

further ORDERED that this civil action be DISMISSED and STRICKEN
from the active docket of this Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

17

The Clerk is DIRECTED to transmit a copy of this memorandum
opinion and order to counsel of record herein.
DATED:

December 11, 2013

/s/ Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.
FREDERICK P. STAMP, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

18