Hicks v. Janiszewski et al
Filing
112
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF'S 111 REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS. It is ORDERED that defendant, James Spencer, shall pay the plaintiff's attorneys fees and costs in the total amount of $8,387.50, which represents $3,512.50 for Robert McCoid and $4,875.00 for Paul J. Harris in attorneys fees and costs. Signed by Senior Judge Frederick P. Stamp, Jr. on 10/15/15. (copy to counsel via CM/ECF)(lmm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
LAVEL HICKS,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 5:13CV140
(STAMP)
CECELIA JANISZEWSKI,
Medical Administrator,
Northern Regional Jail,
JOHN DOE, Doctor,
Northern Regional Jail,
JERRY HAHN, M.D., Doctor
and JAMES SPENCER,
Jail Administrator,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF’S
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS
I.
Background
On September 4, 2015, counsel for the plaintiff filed a
request for attorney’s fees and costs.
ECF No. 111.
Previously,
this Court conducted a hearing regarding the plaintiff’s motion for
default judgment against defendant James Spencer (“Spencer”).
At
that hearing, counsel for the plaintiff tendered their request for
attorney’s fees and costs to the Court.
Further, counsel for the
plaintiff indicated that they released any obligation of defendants
Jerry Hahn (“Hahn”) and Cecelia Janiszewski (“Janiszewski”) to pay
attorney’s fees.
It should be noted that those two defendants
obtained a settlement with the plaintiff to dismiss all the claims
against them.
ECF No. 100.
Following the hearing, this Court
granted default judgment as to defendant Spencer.
ECF No. 108.
Counsel for the plaintiff initially sought attorney’s fees and
costs, amounting to $25,711.66, against defendant Spencer. ECF No.
105.
This Court denied that prior request without prejudice,
noting
that
counsel
for
the
plaintiff
did
not
sufficiently
distinguish between what hours and fees were associated with
litigating the claims solely against defendant Spencer and those
that were associated with the other defendants.
plaintiff
released
defendants
Hahn
and
Because the
Janiszewski
from
any
obligation for attorney’s fees and costs, it did not appear
appropriate to require defendant Spencer to pay for the attorney’s
fees and costs that were solely or primarily incurred in litigating
against the other defendants. Therefore, this Court denied counsel
for the plaintiff’s initial request for attorney’s fees and costs
but without prejudice to file an amended request for the same. ECF
No. 109.
At issue now is counsel for the plaintiff’s second request for
attorney’s fees and costs.
ECF No. 111.
In particular, counsel
for the plaintiff seeks a total of $8,387.50 in attorney’s fees and
costs.
That amount represents $3,512.50 for Robert McCoid and
$4,875.00 for Paul J. Harris, which are the attorney’s fees and
costs related to litigating this civil action as to defendant
Spencer.
Counsel for the plaintiff supports their request with
affidavits and exhibits that provide their hourly billing rate and
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specific descriptions of activities related to defendant Spencer.
Based on those supporting documents, counsel for the plaintiff
seeks $8,387.50.00 in attorney’s fees and costs.
No other party
filed a response.
For the reasons set forth, counsel for the plaintiff’s request
is GRANTED.
II.
Applicable Law
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (“§ 1988”), a court may, within its
discretion, award the prevailing party in a civil rights action
reasonable attorney’s fees. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424
(1983); Hill v. Longini, 767 F.2d 332, 334 (7th Cir. 1985).
A key
point worth emphasizing is that “the district court has the
discretion in determining the amount of a fee award,” or if any
amount should be awarded. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 437. A plaintiff
is a “prevailing party” if he or she succeeds “on any significant
issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit of the
part[y] sought in bringing the suit.”
Id. at 433.
Stated more
narrowly, “‘[l]iability on the merits and responsibility for fees
go hand in hand; where a defendant has not been prevailed against,
either because of legal immunity or on the merits, § 1988 does not
authorize a fee award against the defendant.’”
Talley v. District
of Columbia, 433 F. Supp. 2d 5, 7-8 (D.D.C. 2006) (quoting Farrar
v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 109 (1992)).
“‘[T]he amount of attorney’s
fees they receive [prevailing plaintiffs] should be based on the
3
work performed on the issues in which they were successful.’”
Lenard v. Argento, 699 F.2d 874, 899 (7th Cir. 1983) (quoting
Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 279 (1st Cir. 1978)).
As the
Supreme Court of the United States stated in Hobby, “fee awards
under
§
1988
attorneys.”
were
never
intended
to
produce
windfalls
to
506 U.S. at 115 (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
III.
Discussion
Counsel for the plaintiff seeks attorney’s fees and costs from
defendant Spencer.
It should be noted that counsel for the
plaintiff confirmed that no obligations for attorney’s fees and
costs existed as to defendants Hahn and Janiszewski.
unlike
their
previous
request,
counsel
for
the
However,
plaintiff
specifically provides what portion of their representation was
attributable
to
litigating
against
defendant
Spencer.
More
specifically, counsel for the plaintiff describes what actions were
taken and billed as they relate to defendant Spencer, as well as
costs and fees incurred as they relate to the same.
In Eckerhart, the Supreme Court of the United States set forth
factors that should be assessed when determining whether a court
should award attorney’s fees and costs under § 1988, and if so, how
much. In order to recovery attorney’s fees and costs under § 1988,
a party must be a prevailing party.
461 U.S. at 433.
A prevailing
party in the § 1988 context means that the party “‘succeed[ed] on
4
any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the
benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.’” Id. (quoting Nadeau
v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978)).
The plaintiff
“must obtain an enforceable judgment against the defendant from
whom fees are sought.”
omitted).
must
Hobby, 506 U.S. at 111 (internal citation
Nonetheless, “[w]hatever relief the plaintiff secures
directly
benefit
him
at
the
time
of
the
judgment
or
settlement,” and only then “can civil rights litigation effect the
material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties, and
thereby transform the plaintiff into a prevailing party.”
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
Id.
Such a determination
is a “generous formulation that brings the plaintiff only across
the statutory threshold.
It remains for the district court to
determine what fee is ‘reasonable.’”
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 433.
In this case, the plaintiff should be considered a prevailing party
against defendant Spencer.
judgment
against
defendant
compensatory damages.
The plaintiff obtained a default
Spencer
ECF No. 108.
amounting
to
$6,500.00
in
Because the plaintiff is
entitled to enforce that judgment, a “material alteration of the
legal relationship” between the plaintiff and defendant Spencer has
occurred.
San Diego Police Officers’ Ass’n v. San Diego City
Employees’ Retirement System, 568 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2009).
By
obtaining an enforceable judgment against defendant Spencer, the
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plaintiff has clearly succeeded against defendant Spencer, and thus
the plaintiff is a prevailing party for § 1988 purposes.
After determining that the plaintiff is a prevailing party,
this Court must next consider what fee is reasonable. The Court in
Eckerhart
stated
that
the
“most
useful
starting
point
for
determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours
reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable
hourly rate.”
461 U.S. at 433.
The party requesting an award of
attorney’s fees and costs “should submit evidence supporting the
hours worked and rates claimed.”
Id.
Here, counsel for the
plaintiff presents their customary hourly billing rate multiplied
by the specific hours expended in litigating against defendant
Spencer.
their
This is proven by affidavits and invoices attached to
request.
Such
evidence
demonstrates
an
objectively
reasonable request for attorney’s fees and costs.
However, that determination “does not end the inquiry.”
at 434.
Id.
This Court must next consider the results obtained by the
plaintiff.
If a plaintiff obtained “excellent results,” then his
or her attorney “should recover a fully compensatory fee.” Id.
If
a plaintiff obtained “only partial or limited success,” the court
may reduce the requested fees to the extent the fees may be
considered excessive.
Id.
In this case, the plaintiff obtained a
default judgment against defendant Spencer regarding his claims for
pain and suffering caused by that defendant.
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ECF No. 108.
This
Court ultimately entered a default judgment against defendant
Spencer for $6,500.00 for compensatory damages. Id. Based on what
the plaintiff sought to recover and the resulting judgment in his
favor, the plaintiff obtained “excellent results” for § 1988
purposes.
Therefore, counsel for the plaintiff’s request for
$8,387.50 in attorney’s fees and costs is warranted.
Based on the
evidence
request
before
it,
this
Court
finds
that
the
for
attorney’s fees and costs is reasonable, and thus, counsel for the
plaintiff’s request is GRANTED.
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, counsel for the plaintiff’s
second request for attorney’s fees and costs (ECF No. 111) is
GRANTED.
It is ORDERED that defendant, James Spencer, shall pay
the plaintiff’s attorneys fees and costs in the total amount of
$8,387.50,
which
represents
$3,512.50
for
Robert
McCoid
and
$4,875.00 for Paul J. Harris in attorney’s fees and costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to transmit a copy of this memorandum
opinion and order to counsel of record herein.
DATED:
October 15, 2015
/s/ Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.
FREDERICK P. STAMP, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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