Dytko et al v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC
Filing
38
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 32 MOTION TO DISMISS REMAINING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS AND GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 32 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. It is ORDERED that this civil action be DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the active docket of this Court. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgmenton this matter. Signed by Senior Judge Frederick P. Stamp, Jr. on 7/25/16. (copy to counsel via CM/ECF)(lmm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
BRIAN DYTKO and HOLLY DYTKO,
individually and as the
parents and next friends of
J.D. and R.D., minors,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Civil Action No. 5:13CV150
(STAMP)
CHESAPEAKE APPALACHIA, LLC,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
REMAINING PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS AND
GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I.
Background
The plaintiffs originally brought this action in the Circuit
Court of Ohio County, West Virginia.
The claims arise out of an
oil and gas lease, right of way/pipeline, and well-site agreements.
Plaintiff, Brian Dytko, entered into an oil and gas lease dated
November 7, 2008, (“the lease”) with the defendant, Chesapeake
Appalachia, LLC.
The lease covers a 41-acre tract of land located
in Ohio County, West Virginia. The plaintiffs filed this civil
action in the Circuit Court of Ohio County, West Virginia, based on
the
negotiation
and
execution
of
such
lease
and
based
on
the defendant’s operations on the land subject to the lease. The
plaintiffs allege that the defendant made false representations
regarding the well-site agreements.
The plaintiffs assert the following claims based on the
defendant’s actions: (1) fraudulent inducement; (2) breach of
contract;
(3)
negligence/intentional
tort;
and
(4)
private
nuisance. The defendant removed this action to this Court on
October 28, 2013. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion to
compel arbitration and dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint, or in the
alternative, stay the plaintiffs’ complaint pending arbitration.
The plaintiffs also filed an amended complaint. In the amended
complaint, the plaintiffs added a fifth count titled, “No Valid
Enforceable
Agreement
to
Arbitrate
Exists.”
Thereafter,
the
defendant filed its reply, but also filed a second motion to compel
arbitration and dismiss the plaintiffs’ amended complaint.
This
Court granted the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration and
dismiss the plaintiffs’ amended complaint insomuch as it sought to
arbitrate and dismiss the claims of plaintiff Brian Dytko. ECF No.
20. As to the remaining claims in that amended complaint as they
pertained to plaintiffs Holly Dytko, J.D. and R.D. (“Remaining
Plaintiffs”), this Court denied the defendant’s motion.
However,
this Court also found that those remaining claims should be stayed
pending the outcome of the arbitration of plaintiff Brian Dytko’s
claims.
Accordingly, this civil action has been stayed since that
order was entered on May 30, 2014.
2
In the matter of the arbitration between Brian Dytko as the
Claimant and Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., as the Respondant, the
arbitrator determined the Paid-Up Oil and Gas Lease dated November
7, 2008 and the Surface Use Agreement dated December 8, 2010 were
both valid and binding on the respective parties and awarded as
follows in paragraph one: “Each claim of CLAIMANT whether at law or
in equity, is hereby denied in its entirety.” The award of the
arbitrator concluded that “[t]his AWARD is in full settlement of
all claims submitted to this arbitration.” ECF No. 35-1 at 2.
On March 23, 2016, the plaintiffs sent this Court a letter,
which stated that all relevant arbitration proceedings had ended.
After conducting a status and scheduling conference, this Court
lifted the stay, and set forth an amended scheduling order. ECF No.
27.
At
issue
now
is
the
defendant’s
motion
to
dismiss
the
Remaining Plaintiffs’ claims for fraudulent inducement, breach of
contract and negligence/intentional tort, and motion for summary
judgment
as
to
the
Remaining
Plaintiffs’
claim
for
private
nuisance. ECF No. 32. In its motion, the defendant first alleges
that the plaintiffs stated that the sole claim remaining in this
matter was for private nuisance. Further, the defendant also moves
for summary judgment in its favor regarding the plaintiffs’ claim
for private nuisance. The defendant then turns to the plaintiffs’
claims
for
fraudulent
inducement,
3
breach
of
contract,
and
negligent/intentional torts. Regarding the claims for fraudulent
inducement and breach of contract, the defendant points out that
the remaining plaintiffs were not parties to the lease. Rather,
Brian Dytko is the sole owner of the subject property, and Brian
Dytko
entered
into
the
lease
which
formed
the
basis
of
the
fraudulent inducement and breach of contract claims. Because the
remaining plaintiffs were neither signatories to the subject lease
nor appropriate interest holders in the property, the defendant
believes the fraudulent inducement and breach of contract claims
should be dismissed.
Concerning the negligence/intentional tort
claim, the defendant asserts that the remaining plaintiffs have not
alleged any injury. Rather, only Brian Dytko is stated as having
suffered an injury under that claim in the complaint. Therefore,
the defendant contends that the negligence/intentional tort claim
should be dismissed. Finally, as to the private nuisance claim, the
defendant asserts that the operations causing the alleged nuisance
were authorized under the lease and surface use agreement.
The Remaining Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition. ECF
No. 34. At the outset of the response, the plaintiffs state that
“they agree that they are not parties to the contracts and do not
present breach of contract and/or fraudulent inducement claims.”
Regarding the negligence/intentional tort claim, however, the
Remaining
Plaintiffs
believe
that
such
claim
should not
be
dismissed. Although they did not specifically allege damages under
4
the negligence/intentional tort claim, the plaintiffs rely on other
provisions
of
the
complaint
which
incorporate
sufficient
allegations to plead their claim. Turning to the private nuisance
claim, the Remaining Plaintiffs argue that the defendant’s motion
for summary judgment should be denied. In particular, the Remaining
Plaintiffs believe that the defendant and its employees exceeded
the scope of operations permitted under the lease and surface use
agreement. Further, the Remaining Plaintiffs believe that the lease
and surface use agreements were
improperly entered into by the
plaintiffs based on the defendant’s fraudulent conduct.
The defendant filed a reply. ECF No. 35. In that reply, the
defendant again points out that the plaintiffs are no longer
proceeding under their claims for breach of contract and fraudulent
inducement.
Concerning
negligence/intentional
plaintiffs
inadequately
tort,
the
the
pleaded
plaintiffs’
defendant
that
claim.
claim
argues
for
that
the
Furthermore,
the
defendant argues that the plaintiffs have attempted to reassert
arguments they raised during the arbitration proceeding. Because
the plaintiffs already raised several of the arguments during the
arbitration proceeding, the defendant believes that the Remaining
Plaintiffs are precluded from raising them again. The defendant
also contends that no genuine issues of material fact have been
raised.
5
For the reasons set forth below, the defendant’s motion to
dismiss
Remaining
Plaintiffs'
claims
and
motion
for
summary
judgment as to Remaining Plaintiffs' claim (ECF No. 32)is GRANTED.
II.
Applicable Law
A. Motion to Dismiss
In assessing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
court must accept all well-pled facts contained in the complaint as
true.
Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc, 591 F.3d
250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009). However, “legal conclusions, elements of
a cause of action, and bare assertions devoid of further factual
enhancement fail to constitute well-pled facts for Rule 12(b)(6)
purposes.” Id.
(citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009)).
Court
This
inferences,
also
unreasonable
declines
conclusions,
to
or
consider
“unwarranted
arguments.”
Wahi
v.
Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 615 n.26 (4th Cir.
2009).
It has often been said that the purpose of a motion under Rule
12(b)(6) is to test the formal sufficiency of the statement of the
claim for relief; it is not a procedure for resolving a contest
about the facts or the merits of the case.
5B Charles Alan Wright
& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (3d ed.
1998).
The Rule 12(b)(6) motion also must be distinguished from a
6
motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56, which goes to the merits of the claim and is designed to test
whether there is a genuine issue of material fact.
Id.
For
purposes of the motion to dismiss, the complaint is construed in
the
light
most
essentially
the
favorable
court’s
to
the
inquiry
party
is
making
directed
the
to
claim
and
whether
the
allegations constitute a statement of a claim under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8(a).
Id. § 1357.
A complaint should be dismissed “if it does not allege ‘enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on is face.’”
Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“Facial
plausibility is established once the factual content of a complaint
‘allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Nemet Chevrolet,
591 F.3d at 256 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Detailed factual
allegations are not required, but the facts alleged must be
sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
B. Motion for Summary Judgement
Summary
judgment
is
appropriate
if
“the
pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
7
to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The
party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing
the absence of any genuine issues of material fact.
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
See Celotex
“The burden then
shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with facts sufficient
to create a triable issue of fact.”
Temkin v. Frederick County
Comm’rs, 945 F.2d 716, 718 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)).
However, as the Supreme Court of the United States noted in
Anderson, “Rule 56(e) itself provides that a party opposing a
properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial .” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
“The inquiry performed is the
threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a
trial — whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual
issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact
because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”
Id. at 250; see also Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406,
414 (4th Cir. 1979) (Summary judgment “should be granted only in
those cases where it is perfectly clear that no issue of fact is
involved and inquiry into the facts is not desirable to clarify the
application of the law.” (citing Stevens v. Howard D. Johnson Co.,
181 F.2d 390, 394 (4th Cir. 1950)).
8
In Celotex, the Court stated that “the plain language of Rule
56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time
for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a
showing
sufficient
to
establish
the
existence
of
an
element
essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial.”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
Summary
judgment is not appropriate until after the non-moving party has
had sufficient opportunity for discovery.
See Oksanen v. Page
Mem’l Hosp., 912 F.2d 73, 78 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 1074 (1992). In reviewing the supported underlying facts, all
inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion.
See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587(1986).
III.
Discussion
As stated earlier, the defendant’s motion to dismiss concerns
the following claims of the Remaining Plaintiffs: (1) fraudulent
inducement; (2) breach of contract; and (3) negligence/intentional
tort. Further, Defendant’s motion for summary judgement concerns
the Remaining Plaintiffs’ claim of private nuisance. This Court
will first address the defendant’s motion to dismiss the Remaining
Plaintiffs’ claims for fraudulent inducement, breach of contract
and negligence/intentional tort, and then turn to the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment as to the Remaining Plaintiffs’ claim
for private nuisance.
9
A. Motion to Dismiss Remaining Plaintiffs’ Claims
1. Fraudulent Inducement and Breach of Contract
Based on the representations of counsel, it appears that the
Remaining Plaintiffs have withdrawn the fraudulent inducement and
breach
of
contract
claims.
Therefore,
this
Court
GRANTS
the
defendant’s motion to dismiss as to the claims for fraudulent
inducement and breach of contract.
2. Negligence/Intentional Tort
Under West Virginia law, to succeed in a negligence suit, “the
plaintiff
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant owed a legal duty to the plaintiff and that by breaching
that duty the defendant proximately caused the injuries of the
plaintiff.” Strahin v. Cleavenger, 603 S.E.2d 197, 205 (W. Va.
2004).
Defendant argues that “Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint (ECF No.
8) did not allege damages on behalf of the Remaining Plaintiffs as
a
result
of
[Chesapeake
Appalachia,
L.L.C.’s]
alleged
negligence/intentional tort,” and should be dismissed. ECF No. 33
at 7. Defendant asserts that “[b]ecause the Remaining Plaintiffs
did not allege an injury under the claim for negligence/intentional
tort, they have failed to plead a prima facie claim for which
relief may be granted requiring dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).” Id.
at
9.
Remaining
Plaintiffs
argue
that
their
claims
for
negligence/intentional tort should not be dismissed and assert that
10
the “[R]emaining Plaintiffs did allege injury and damages in their
complaint related to negligence and/or intentional acts.” ECF. No.
34 at 3.
As the court stated in Webb v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co.,
2 S.E.2d 898, 899 (W. Va. 1939), “In every action for damages
resulting from injuries to the plaintiff, alleged to have been
inflicted by the negligence of the defendant, it is incumbent upon
the plaintiff to establish, by a preponderance of the testimony,
three propositions: (1) A duty which the defendant owes to him; (2)
A negligent breach of that duty; (3) Injuries received thereby,
resulting proximately from the breach of that duty.” (emphasis
added).
Under
their
negligence/intentional
tort
claim,
the
Remaining Plaintiffs state that “Plaintiff Bryan Dytko has suffered
breathing difficulties and problems as a direct result of the dust,
dirt and other contaminants being kicked up and/or released into
the air and/or surrounding land.” ECF No. 8. The claim asserts no
injury to the Remaining Plaintiffs. West Virginia law clearly
provides
that
injury
is
a
necessary
element
for
a
claim
of
negligence. In this case, the complaint fails to allege such
resulting injury or damages to the Remaining Plaintiffs, and thus,
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Therefore,
this Court GRANTS the defendant’s motion to dismiss the Remaining
Plaintiffs’ claim for negligence/intentional tort.
11
B. Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Remaining Plaintiffs’
Claim for Private Nuisance
The Remaining Plaintiffs in this civil action argue that the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment regarding the private
nuisance claim must be denied. Remaining Plaintiffs assert that
“the defendant has not and cannot meet its burden of demonstrating
that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on the [R]emaining
Plaintiffs’ private nuisance claims.” ECF No. 34 at 12. Defendant
argues that “[t]hese were the same arguments advanced by Mr. Dytko
and decided in the arbitration, who the Remaining Plaintiffs
readily acknowledged was the only signatory to the agreements.” ECF
No. 35 at 4.
Accordingly, “the Remaining Plaintiffs cannot
relitigate those arbitrable issues here to support their private
nuisance claim and to oppose [Chespeake, L.L.C.’s] summary judgment
motion.” Id.
After reviewing the parties’ arguments and filings, it appears
that the primary issue is whether the arbitrator’s ruling as to the
private nuisance claim binds the Remaining Plaintiffs. This Court
will first determine whether res judicata applies to arbitration
awards, and if so, whether it would specifically apply to the
Remaining Plaintiffs’ claim in this case.
1.
Res Judicata Applies to Arbitration Awards
12
Res judicata bars a cause of action adjudicated between the
same parties or their privies in a prior case.
Parklane Hosiery
Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979)(“Under the doctrine of res
judicata, a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second
suit involving the same parties or their privies based on the same
cause of action.”); Jones v. S.E.C., 115 F.3d 1173, 1178 (4th Cir.
1997); see also Meekins v. United Transp. Union, 946 F.2d 1054,
1057 (4th Cir. 1991). Phrased another way, a final judgment on the
merits bars further claims “by parties or their privies based on
the same cause of action.” Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147,
153 (1979). Claims that were previously available to the parties,
regardless of whether they were asserted or determined in the first
proceeding are precluded. E.E.O.C. v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts,
Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 462-63 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Brown v. Felsen,
442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979)). Res judicata ensures the finality of
decisions and the party or privy bound by the doctrine must enjoy
a “full and fair opportunity” to participate in some adjudication
or resolution of the claim in question. Montana, 440 U.S. at 153.
Arbitration proceedings are given preclusive effect in a later
suit if “the earlier proceeding involved: 1) an identity of
parties, 2) an identity of the cause of action, and 3) a full and
fair opportunity to litigate this matter.” Monahan v. Paine Webber
Group,
Inc.,
724
F.
Supp.
224,
226
(S.D.N.Y.
1989).
An
arbitration’s “‘full and final settlement’ . . . stands as res
13
judicata barring relitigation of [an] identical claim in the
complaint[.]” Pujol v. Shearson/American Exp., Inc., 829 F.2d 1201,
1207 (1st Cir. 1987). Accordingly, a court will give an arbitration
decision preclusive effect where the traditional prerequisites for
preclusion are met. Id. (citing Mignocchi v. Merrill Lynch, 707 F.
Supp. 140, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Norris v. Grosvenor Marketing Ltd.,
632 F. Supp. 1193, 1195-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). Furthermore, numerous
cases
support
the
application
of
res
judicata
or
collateral
estoppel when the losing party in an arbitration proceeding seeks
to reopen its case in federal court. Little Six Corp. v. United
Mine Workers of America, Local Union No. 8332, 701 F.2d 26, 29 (4th
Cir. 1983); see, e.g., Milos v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 464
F. Supp. 754 (M.D.N.C. 1979).
When, as here, a federal court’s jurisdiction is based upon
diversity of citizenship, the court must look to state law to
determine whether res judicata applies. Witthohn v. Federal Ins.
Co., 164 Fed. Appx. 395, 397 n. 2 (4th Cir. 2006) (stating West
Virginia law controls whether the plaintiff's claim was barred by
res judicata); Graves v. Associated Transport, Inc., 344 F.2d 894,
896 (4th Cir. 1965) (holding that state law governs the parties'
rights and obligations when diversity of citizenship is the sole
basis of jurisdiction); Braxton v. Matthews, 883 F. Supp. 1068
(S.D.W. Va. 1995) (applying West Virginia law with respect to
collateral
estoppel).
Under
West
14
Virginia
law,
“res
judicata
applies when three criteria are met: (1) there must have been a
final adjudication on the merits in the prior action by a court
having jurisdiction of the proceedings; (2) the two actions must
involve either the same parties or persons in privity with those
same parties; and (3) the cause of action identified for resolution
in the subsequent proceeding either must be identical to the cause
of action determined in the prior action or must be such that it
could have been resolved, had it been presented, in the prior
action.” Seventeenth Street Associates, LLC v. Cole ex rel. Hayne,
855 F. Supp. 2d 606, 609 (S.D.W. Va. 2012). Based on the law
discussed above, it is clear that res judicata may apply to
arbitration proceedings. This Court will next turn to whether res
judicata applies to the Remaining Plaintiffs’ claim.
2.
Res Judicata May Apply to Non-Signatory Privies
A
lingering
Plaintiffs
are
issue
here,
however,
non-signatories
to
the
is
that
lease
the
Remaining
agreement.
Non-
signatories to the agreement may not necessarily be bound by the
prior judgement. However, res judicata may still apply to a nonsignatory under the legal principle of privity. The court in West
Virginia Human Rights Com’n v. Esquire Group, Inc., 618 S.E.2d 463,
470 (W. Va. 2005) stated that “[p]rivity, in a legal sense,
ordinarily denotes ‘mutual or successive relationship to the same
rights of property’.” (quoting Cater v. Taylor, 196 S.E. 558 (W.
15
Va. 1938). In State v. Miller, 459 S.E.2d 114, 124 (1995), the
court explained that the concept of privity in the claim preclusion
context is difficult to precisely define.
However, the court
pointed out that a “key consideration for its existence is the
sharing of the same legal right by parties allegedly in privity,”
so as “to ensure that the interests of the party against whom”
preclusion is asserted have been adequately represented. Id. at
124.
Put
another
way,
“[p]reclusion
is
fair
so
long
as
the
relationship between the nonparty and a party was such that the
nonparty had the same practical opportunity to control the course
of the proceedings that would be available to a party.” Gribben v.
Kirk, 466 S.E.2d 147, 157 n. 21 (W. Va. 1995) (internal citations
and quotations omitted); see
Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177
F.3d at 448(“Prior proceedings may bind a nonparty as a privy where
the relationship between the nonparty and a party is such as to
legally entitle the latter to stand in judgment for the former, or
where the nonparty’s interests were adequately represented by a
party with the same interests”)(citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S.
32, 41–43 (1940)). Therefore, literal privity is not a requirement
for res judicata to apply; rather, a party will be bound by a
previous judgment if his interests were adequately represented by
another vested with the authority of representation. Ray Legal
Consulting Group v. Gray, 37 F. Supp. 3d 689, 701-02 (S.D.N.Y.
2014). Moreover, where the non-party’s interests are adequately
16
represented by a party to the prior action, there is sufficient
identity between the parties to apply the principles of res
judicata and give preclusive effect to the prior judgment. Meza,
908 F.2d at 1266. Therefore, based on the case law above, it is
well-settled that, under certain circumstances, a judgment may bar
a subsequent action by a person who was not a party to the original
litigation. Eubanks v. F.D.I.C., 977 F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir.
1992)(citing Meza v. General Battery Corp., 908 F.2d 1262, 1266
(5th Cir. 1990)).
In
this
civil
action,
Defendant
argues
the
Remaining
Plaintiffs’ claims fall within the rights conveyed by the lease
signed by Mr. Dytko. ECF No. 33 at 11.
This Court found all claims
pertaining to plaintiff Brian Dytko were subject to arbitration,
and those claims which concerned the Remaining Plaintiffs were
stayed pending the outcome of the arbitration proceedings. ECF No.
20 at 23-24. The Remaining Plaintiffs’ claim for private nuisance
is closely aligned, if not identical, to the claim Brian Dytko was
compelled to arbitrate. ECF No. 32. As stated earlier, in the
arbitration between Brian Dytko as the Claimant and Chesapeake
Appalachia, L.L.C., as the Respondant, the arbitrator determined
the Paid-Up Oil and Gas Lease dated November 7, 2008 and the
Surface Use Agreement dated December 8, 2010 were both valid and
binding on the respective parties. Further, the arbitrator awarded
the following: “Each claim of CLAIMANT whether at law or in equity,
17
is hereby denied in its entirety.” The Award of the Arbitrator
concluded:
“This
AWARD
is
in
full
settlement
of
all
claims
submitted to this arbitration.” ECF No. 35-1 at 2.
After reviewing the parties’ filings and the law discussed
above, this Court finds that res judicata applies. First, the
ruling by the arbitrator is a prior final judgment on the merits
regarding this claim. Second, the claims determined in the prior
arbitration
and
the
claims
under
the
Remaining
Plaintiffs’
complaint are substantially similar in identity. Finally, there is
an identity of the parties as privies in this case. Regardless of
the familial relationship between Brian Dytko and the Remaining
Plaintiffs, privity exists as a result of substantially similar
claims
stemming
from
the
same
lease.
Those
claims
concern
individual persons all deriving interests from one particular
property interest under a common lease agreement. Despite not being
parties to the arbitration, the judgment affects the Remaining
Plaintiffs’ interests involved in the action as if they were
parties.
Furthermore,
claim
preclusion
is
fair
so
long
as
the
relationship between the non-parties and a party was such that the
non-parties had the same practical opportunity to control the
course of the proceedings that would be available to a party. Here,
the Remaining Plaintiffs opposed the defendant’s motion to compel
18
arbitration and sought to avoid arbitration of their claims. ECF
No. 9 at 1. More importantly, although ”the Remaining Plaintiffs
did not have the requisite property interest to execute the Lease,
[and] were not signatories to the Lease,” the Remaining Plaintiffs’
interest in the case were adequately represented by Brian Dytko in
the
prior
arbitration
proceeding.
In
that
proceeding,
the
arbitrator denied all claims asserted by Brian Dytko, which are the
same as those of the Remaining Plaintiffs. ECF No. 33 at 8.
Applying
the
principles
of
res
judicata,
this
Court
gives
preclusive effect to the prior arbitration award in the instant
case. Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons described above, the defendant’s motion to
dismiss the Remaining Plaintiffs’ claims and motion for summary
judgment as to Remaining Plaintiffs’ claim for private nuisance
(ECF No. 32)is GRANTED.
Further, it is ORDERED that this civil
action be DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the active docket of this
Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to transmit a copy of this memorandum
opinion and order to counsel of record herein. Pursuant to Federal
19
Rule of Civil Procedure 58, the Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment
on this matter.
DATED:
July 25, 2016
/s/ Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.
FREDERICK P. STAMP, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
20
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