Neff et al v. Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC
Filing
18
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING 6 DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS. Further, the 7 defendant's motion for a hearing regarding the motion to dismiss is DENIED AS MOOT. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment. Signed by Senior Judge Frederick P. Stamp, Jr. on 10/21/2014. (copy to counsel of record via CM/ECF) (nmm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
RICHARD C. NEFF and
SHARON L. NEFF,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Civil Action No. 5:14CV107
(STAMP)
COLUMBIA GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
I.
Background
This civil action began when the plaintiffs filed their
complaint on July 17, 2014, in the Circuit Court of Tyler County,
West Virginia.
The defendant removed the civil action to this
Court on August 13, 2014.
ECF No. 1.
The plaintiffs allege one
count of trespass and seek nominal, compensatory, and punitive
damages.
The plaintiffs owned land where the defendant had an already
existing natural gas line (“Line 3662”). On or about May 2013, the
defendant planned to replace Line 3662, and provided two contracts
to the plaintiffs: an amended right of way agreement (“agreement”)
and a valve site agreement.
August 14, 2013.
The parties executed the agreement on
However, the plaintiffs allege that they have
neither agreed to nor executed the valve site agreement.1
1
The defendant engaged in a condemnation
plaintiffs, but that has since been dismissed.
action
After
against
executing the right of way agreement, the defendant began replacing
Line 3662.
As part of the project, the defendant built a valve
site, which the plaintiffs allege fell outside of the area provided
under the agreement.
In their complaint, the plaintiffs allege a claim of trespass
against the defendant for allegedly building the valve site without
the
plaintiffs’
permission.
The
plaintiffs
claim
to
suffer
irreparable damage, extreme hardship, injury, and loss causing
equitable and legal damages.
Thus, the plaintiffs seek an order
declaring trespass, nominal and compensatory damages, punitive
damages, legal fees, and all other remedies this Court finds
proper.
In response, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss. ECF No.
6.
In its motion to dismiss, the defendant first argues that the
plain language of the agreement clearly authorizes the construction
of
the
valve
site.
Second,
the
defendant
argues
that
the
plaintiffs fail to satisfy the minimum pleading standards under
either Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), or Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Third, the defendant claims
that the Natural Gas Act preempts the state law trespass action
that the plaintiffs allege.
Finally, the defendant argues that it
had permission to enter plaintiffs’ land under the agreement, and
that punitive damages are inappropriate here because no wrong and
willful conduct occurred.
2
In addition to its motion to dismiss, the defendant also filed
a motion for a hearing regarding its motion to dismiss.
ECF No. 7.
Plaintiffs have failed to respond to those motions within the time
required under Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.02(b)(1). Moreover,
no other filings concerning the motion to dismiss have been filed
with this Court as of the date of this memorandum opinion and
order.2
For the reasons set forth below, the defendant’s motion to
dismiss is GRANTED.
Further, the defendant’s motion for a hearing
about the motion to dismiss will be DENIED AS MOOT.
III.
Applicable Law3
In assessing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
2
The only filings since then are the following: (1) motion for
an extension of time to file a notice of appearance and an order
granting the motion; (2) notices of appearance; and a scheduling
order. See ECF Nos. 9, 10, 11, 15, and 14, respectively.
3
This Court could in theory treat the defendant’s motion to
dismiss as unopposed and thus subject to dismissal without a merits
analysis due to the lack of response by the plaintiffs.
See
Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (3d Cir. 1992)
(explaining that if a party represented by counsel fails to oppose
a motion to dismiss, the district court may treat the motion as
unopposed and subject to dismissal without a merits analysis); see
also Hollister v. United States Postal Service, 142 F. App’x 576,
577 (3d Cir. 2005). Instead, this Court will address the merits as
ascertained from the available filings. However, “it is not this
Court’s obligation to do” the “research or make arguments for” the
parties. Rangel v. Schmidt, 2:09-CV-071, 2009 WL 5068351 (N.D.
Ind. Dec. 16, 2009); see also United States v. Smith, 26 F.3d 739,
743 (7th Cir. 1994) (courts need not research and construct legal
arguments for parties).
3
court must accept all well-pled facts contained in the complaint as
true.
Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc, 591 F.3d
250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009). However, “legal conclusions, elements of
a cause of action, and bare assertions devoid of further factual
enhancement fail to constitute well-pled facts for Rule 12(b)(6)
purposes.”
(2009)).
Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949
This
Court
also
declines
to
consider
“unwarranted
inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.”
Wahi v.
Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 615 n.26 (4th Cir.
2009).
It has often been said that the purpose of a motion under Rule
12(b)(6) is to test the formal sufficiency of the statement of the
claim for relief; it is not a procedure for resolving a contest
about the facts or the merits of the case.
5B Charles Alan Wright
& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (3d ed.
1998).
The Rule 12(b)(6) motion also must be distinguished from a
motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56, which goes to the merits of the claim and is designed to test
whether there is a genuine issue of material fact.
Id.
For
purposes of the motion to dismiss, the complaint is construed in
the
light
essentially
most
the
favorable
court’s
to
the
inquiry
party
is
making
directed
the
to
claim
and
whether
the
allegations constitute a statement of a claim under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8(a).
Id. § 1357.
4
A complaint should be dismissed “if it does not allege ‘enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on is face.’”
Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Facial
plausibility is established once the factual content of a complaint
‘allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Nemet Chevrolet,
591 F.3d at 256 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949).
Detailed
factual allegations are not required, but the facts alleged must be
sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
III.
A.
Discussion
Language of the Right-of-Way Agreement
As discussed above, the plaintiffs allege that the defendant
trespassed
property.
by
constructing
a
valve
site
on
the
plaintiffs’
In its motion to dismiss, the defendant argues that the
plain language of the agreement authorized the construction of the
disputed valve site.
Under West Virginia law, a “valid contract
expressing the intent of the parties in unambiguous language will
be
applied
and
enforced
according
to
such
intent.”
Cotiga
Development Co. v. United Fuel Gas Co., 128 S.E.2d 626, 631-32 (W.
Va. 1962) (quoting Syl. Pt. 1, Babcock Coal & Coke Co. v. Brackens
Creek Coal Land Co., 37 S.E.2d 519 (W. Va. 1946)); see also Syl.
Pts. 1 & 2,
Magnus v. Halltown Paper Board Co., 100 S.E.2d 201 (W.
5
Va. 1957) (“When the language of a valid written instrument is
plain and unambiguous such instrument is not subject to judicial
interpretation,” and “[w]hen the terms of a valid written contract
are clear and unambiguous, full force and effect will be given to
the language used by the parties.”). Further, this legal principle
for interpreting contract language has been applied in numerous
contexts.
See, e.g., In re Hillcrest Memorial Gardens, Inc., 119
S.E.2d 753 (W. Va. 1961) (statutes); Christopher v. U.S. Life Ins.
Co. in City of N.Y., 116 S.E.2d 864 (W. Va. 1960) (insurance
policies); Babcock Coal & Coke Co., 37 S.E.2d at Syl. Pt. 1 (mining
leases); In Re Conley, 12 S.E.2d 49, 50 (W. Va. 1940) (wills);
White Flame Coal Co. v. Burgess, 102 S.E. 690 (W. Va. 1920)
(deeds). Accordingly, the principle applies in this case involving
a right-of-way agreement.
In this case, the plain language of the agreement defeats the
plaintiffs’ trespass claim.
First, no indications or allegations
exist that the contract is invalid, meaning the above principles of
interpretation
apply.
Second,
the
agreement
authorizes
the
defendant to build the valve site at issue. The agreement provides
the defendant the right to “construct, operate, maintain, replace,
repair, (anywhere within the right-of-way area defined below), and
remove pipeline . . . and appurtenant facilities.”
Ex. 1.
hydrate
ECF No. 1
Later in the agreement, it provides that “valves, drips,
removal
systems
and
other
6
appurtenances
reasonably
required,
shall
be
buried
cultivation of the land.”
agreement
provide
that
so
as
Id.
not
to
interfere
with
the
Accordingly, the terms of this
appurtenant
facilities,
include valves, are within the agreement’s scope.
which
seem
to
This contrasts
with a claim of trespass, which the plaintiffs allege, defined as
“an entry on another man’s ground without lawful authority, and
doing some damage, however inconsiderable, to his real property.”
Hark v. Mountain Fork Lumber Co., 34 S.E.2d 348, 352 (W. Va. 1945)
(emphasis added).
Here, the agreement granted the defendant lawful entry to
construct the valve site.
Looking at the plain and unambiguous
language of this assumed-valid agreement, the intent appears to
grant the defendant the right to build the valve site.
Because of
the defendant’s authority under the agreement, the plaintiffs’
trespass claim must be dismissed.
B.
The Defendant’s Remaining Arguments
The defendant next argues that the plaintiffs fail to satisfy
the minimum pleading standards under either Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662 (2009), or Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 535 U.S. 544
(2007).
However, as discussed above, this Court finds that the
plaintiffs failed to state a claim of trespass.
Therefore, this
Court will not address whether the plaintiffs sufficiently complied
with the requirements under Iqbal and Twombly.
The defendant also
claims that the Natural Gas Act preempts the state law trespass
7
action that the plaintiffs allege.
Under the Natural Gas Act, a
natural gas company can receive a power of eminent domain after the
Federal
Energy
Regulatory
Commission
(“FERC”)
provides
a
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity authorizing routine
activities (such as replacing Line 3662). Because of its authority
under
the
Act,
the
defendant
argues
plaintiffs’ state law trespass claim.
that
the
Act
preempts
Thus, the defendant asserts
that the plaintiffs’ only remedy lies in an inverse condemnation
action. However, as discussed above, this Court already finds that
the plaintiffs fail to state a trespass claim.
Therefore, this
Court does not find it necessary to address the preemption argument
advanced by the defendant.
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the defendant’s motion to
dismiss (ECF No. 6) is GRANTED.
Further, the defendant’s motion
for a hearing regarding the motion to dismiss (ECF No. 7) is DENIED
AS MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to transmit a copy of this memorandum
opinion and order to counsel of record herein. Pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 58, the Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment
on this matter.
8
DATED:
October 21, 2014
/s/ Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.
FREDERICK P. STAMP, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
9
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?