Bertrand et al v. Gastar Exploration, Inc.
Filing
16
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' 4 MOTION TO REMAND: For the reasons set forth above, the plaintiffs motion to remand is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that this civil action be DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the active doc ket of this Court. The Clerk is DIRECTED to transmit a copy of this memorandum opinion and order to counsel of record herein and to the Clerk ofthe Circuit Court of Marshall County, West Virginia. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment on this matter. Signed by Senior Judge Frederick P. Stamp, Jr on 3/20/2015. (kac) (Copy to Marshall County Circuit Clerk w/docket sheet)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLES E. BERTRAND and
DEBRA K. BERTRAND,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Civil Action No. 5:14CV147
(STAMP)
GASTAR EXPLORATION, INC.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO REMAND
I.
Background
The plaintiffs originally filed their complaint in the Circuit
Court of Marshall County, West Virginia.
The plaintiffs own a
residence and property that are adjacent to the defendant’s land.
The
defendant
engages
in
oil
and
gas
operations,
and
is
incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in
Texas. The defendant’s operations on the land allegedly caused the
following damages in this private nuisance action: (1) contaminated
the
plaintiffs’
water
supply;
(2)
created
noise
pollution
throughout the day and night; (3) resulted in unbearable odors and
fumes
on
the
plaintiffs’
plaintiffs’ land.
property;
and
(4)
littered
on
the
Despite repeated attempts at contacting the
defendant to resolve the dispute, the plaintiffs claim that the
defendant remains unresponsive.
actions,
the
defendant
has
As a result of the defendant’s
substantially
and
unreasonably
interfered with the plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of their land.
Accordingly, they request compensatory damages, general damages,
punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and any other relief the Court
deems necessary.
The defendant then filed a notice of removal, arguing that
diversity jurisdiction exists.
ECF No. 1.
In addition, the
defendant also filed an answer and counterclaim.
ECF No. 5.
In
its counterclaim, the defendant argues that the plaintiffs breached
the contract between them.
Specifically, the defendant alleges
that the plaintiffs agreed to permit the defendant to build and
maintain a well pad on the adjacent property for $25,000.00, which
the
defendant
paid.
Further,
the
defendant
claims
that
by
executing the contract, the plaintiffs waived any objection to the
construction and use of the well pad. By filing this civil action,
the defendant claims that the plaintiffs breached their agreement,
and now it seeks damages for that breach.
At issue now is the plaintiffs’ motion to remand.
ECF No. 4.
In their motion, the plaintiffs argue that the defendant fails to
demonstrate
satisfied.
that
the
amount
in
controversy
requirement
is
The plaintiffs claim that the defendant simply recited
the facts from the complaint and provided no evidence that the
amount in controversy exceeded $75,000.00.
Because the defendant
failed to satisfy its burden, the plaintiffs believe their motion
should be granted.
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The defendant filed a response in opposition. ECF No. 6. The
defendant claims that the amount in controversy is satisfied for
three reasons.
First, the defendant claims that prior to filing
their complaint, the plaintiffs agreed to allow the defendant to
build and maintain a well pad adjacent to the plaintiffs’ land for
$25,000.00.
Second, because the plaintiffs seek punitive damages,
the defendant claims that if those damages are awarded, then the
claim will greatly exceed $75,000.00.
argues
that
because
the
plaintiffs
Finally, the defendant
seek
attorney’s
fees
and
expenses, those costs combined with the previously discussed costs
amount to over $75,000.00.
Therefore, the defendant requests that
this Court deny the plaintiffs’ motion to remand.
The plaintiffs
then filed a reply, in which they assert that the defendant’s
arguments for the amount in controversy requirement are still
speculative.
ECF
No.
7.
Therefore,
they
believe
that
the
defendant has not met its burden.
For the reasons set forth below, the plaintiffs’ motion to
remand is granted.
II.
Applicable Law
A defendant may remove a case from state court to federal
court in instances where the federal court is able to exercise
original jurisdiction over the matter.
28 U.S.C. § 1441.
Federal
courts have original jurisdiction over primarily two types of
cases: (1) those involving federal questions under 28 U.S.C.
3
§ 1331, and (2) those involving citizens of different states where
the
amount
in
controversy
exceeds
$75,000.00,
interests and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
exclusive
of
However, if
federal jurisdiction arises only by virtue of the parties’ diverse
citizenship, such an action “shall be removable only if none of the
. . . defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is
brought.”
Tomlin
v.
Office
of
Law
Enforcement
Tech.
Commercialization, Inc., 5:07CV42, 2007 WL 1376030, at *1 (N.D. W.
Va. May 7, 2007).
The party seeking removal bears the burden of
establishing federal jurisdiction.
See In re Blackwater Security
Consulting, LLC, 460 F.3d 576, 583 (4th Cir. 2006); Mulcahey v.
Columbia Organic Chems. Co., Inc., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir.
1994).
Removal jurisdiction is strictly construed, and if federal
jurisdiction is doubtful, the federal court must remand.
Hartley
v. CSX Transp., Inc., 187 F.3d 422 (4th Cir. 1999); Mulcahey, 29
F.3d at 151.
Further, the court is limited to a consideration of facts on
the record at the time of removal.
See Lowrey v. Alabama Power
Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1213–15 (11th Cir. 2007) (“In assessing whether
removal was proper . . . the district court has before it only the
limited universe of evidence available when the motion to remand is
filed.”); O’Brien v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 5:10CV110, 2011 WL
2551163 (N.D. W. Va. June 27, 2011); Marshall v. Kimble, No.
5:10CV127, 2011 WL 43034, at *3 (N.D. W. Va. Jan. 6, 2011) (“The
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defendant’s removal cannot be based on speculation; rather, it must
be based on facts as they exist at the time of removal.”);
Fahnestock v. Cunningham, 5:10CV89, 2011 WL 1831596, at *2 (N.D. W.
Va. May 12, 2011) (“The amount in controversy is determined by
considering the judgment that would be entered if the plaintiff
prevailed on the merits of his case as it stands at the time of
removal”
(internal
citations
omitted)).
Regarding
punitive
damages, the mere likelihood of punitive damages, without more,
does not give rise to federal jurisdiction.
Cunningham, 2011 WL
1831596, at *2 (citing Landmark Corp. v. Apogee Coal Company, 945
F. Supp. 932 (S.D. W. Va. 1996)).
III.
Discussion
The facts show that the plaintiffs are citizens of West
Virginia, and the defendant is a citizen of Delaware with its
principal place of business in Texas.
The only issue in dispute,
however, is the amount in controversy requirement under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441.
Based on the record before this Court, the plaintiffs’ motion
to remand must be granted. The defendant fails to demonstrate that
the amount in controversy requirement has been satisfied.
In its
response in opposition to the plaintiffs’ motion, the defendant
points out that the plaintiffs accepted $25,000.00 in exchange for
the construction of the nearby well pad.
ECF No. 6.
The
defendant, however, then argues that “[d]espite being aware of this
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situation, Plaintiffs accepted $25,000 and waived any objection to
the
construction
of
the
future
[well-pad]
.
.
.
That
is,
Plaintiffs evaluated the consequences of living close to a working
well pad and valued their situation at $25,000.”
Id. (internal
citations and emphasis omitted). The defendant also notes that the
plaintiffs seek punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and costs.
Thus, the defendant argues that when one considers the compensatory
damages that the plaintiffs seek as well as what the plaintiffs may
receive if successful, then the amount in controversy requirement
is satisfied.
That calculation, however, fails to satisfy the
defendant’s burden.
First,
as
stated
earlier,
the
amount
in
controversy
requirement cannot be based on speculation or “what ifs” that may
occur. Rather, the court is limited to a consideration of facts on
the record at the time of removal.
1213–15.
See Lowrey, 483 F.3d at
At this time in the civil action, the amount of damages
that may or will be recovered is completely unknown and speculative
at
best.
Speculation
regarding
the
amount
in
controversy
requirement fails to satisfy the burden that the removing party
bears.
See In re Blackwater Security Consulting, LLC, 460 F.3d at
583.
Second, the mere likelihood of punitive damages, without more,
does not give rise to federal jurisdiction.
1831596, at *2.
Cunningham, 2011 WL
Although the plaintiffs assert a claim for
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punitive damages, that does not “relieve the defendant, as the
removing party, of its burden to establish the propriety of removal
jurisdiction nor necessarily establish that it is more likely than
not
that
the
amount
in
controversy”
will
exceed
$75,000.00.
Wiemers v. Good Samaritan Society, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1046 (N.D.
Iowa 2002).
Here, the defendant still fails to show that the
amount in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, at this
time
satisfies
the
requirement
under
diversity
jurisdiction.
Therefore, because the defendant only speculates the amount of
damages,
removal
is
improper.
As
stated
earlier,
removal
jurisdiction is strictly construed, and if federal jurisdiction is
doubtful, the federal court must remand. Hartley, 187 F.3d at 422;
Mulcahey,
29
jurisdiction.
F.3d
at
151.
Here,
doubts
exist
as
to
that
Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ motion is granted, and
the case is remanded to the Circuit Court of Marshall County, West
Virginia.
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the plaintiffs’ motion to
remand is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that this civil action be
DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the active docket of this Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to transmit a copy of this memorandum
opinion and order to counsel of record herein and to the Clerk of
the Circuit Court of Marshall County, West Virginia.
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Pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58, the Clerk is DIRECTED to enter
judgment on this matter.
DATED:
March 20, 2015
/s/ Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.
FREDERICK P. STAMP, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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