Buford v. Gilley et al

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER AFFIRMING AND ADOPTING THE REPORT ANDRECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE: The 14 report and recommendation of the magistrate judge is AFFIRMED AND ADOPTED. Accordingly, the plaintiffs 10 motion for a temporary res training order, or alternatively for a preliminary injunction is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Further, the plaintiffs 16 objections to the report and recommendation are OVERRULED. Signed by Senior Judge Frederick P. Stamp, Jr on 4/6/2015. (kac) (Copy to pro se plaintiff (via cm/rrr))

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
DR. GEORGE WILLIE BURFORD, III,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No. 5:14CV160
(STAMP)

CAPTAIN J. GILLEY, THOMAS MCGEE,
T. LANE, LT. WARE, C/O BISHOFF,
and J. CANFIELD, in their
individual and official capacities,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
AFFIRMING AND ADOPTING THE REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I.

Background

The pro se1 plaintiff filed this civil action asserting claims
under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971).

The plaintiff’s claims relate to events that

occurred at USP Hazelton.

Although the events occurred at USP

Hazelton, the plaintiff is currently incarcerated at USP Lewisburg,
and was incarcerated there at the time he initiated this civil
action. In the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the Bureau of
Prisons (“BOP”) conducted involuntary psychological experiments on
him, referred to as “SMU.” Further, he alleges claims of cruel and
unusual punishment, asserting that the defendants denied him access
to necessary medications, a back brace, and certain medical shoes.
1

“Pro se” describes a person who represents himself in a court
proceeding without the assistance of a lawyer.
Black’s Law
Dictionary 1416 (10th ed. 2014).

For relief, the plaintiff seeks several million dollars from the
defendants.
restraining

The plaintiff then filed a motion for a temporary
order,

or

alternatively

(“TRO”), which is currently at issue.

a

preliminary

injunction

In his motion for a TRO, the

plaintiff requests that he be released from the Management Unit of
USP Lewisburg, an order prohibiting the use of SMU on inmates, and
an order closing SMU at USP Lewisburg.

Although the plaintiff

initially indicates that he filed his motion for a TRO against the
listed

defendants,

the

plaintiff

appears

to

request

regarding the alleged actions by staff at USP Lewisburg.
10 at ¶¶ 8, 10, 11, 14, and 15.

relief
ECF No.

Therefore, this Court construes

his motion for a TRO as seeking relief from the actions of staff at
USP Lewisburg, where he is currently incarcerated.
United States Magistrate Judge Robert W. Trumble entered his
report and recommendation, recommending that the plaintiff’s motion
for a TRO be denied without prejudice.
found

an

issue

existed

as

to

ECF No. 14.

whether

there

The magistrate
was

personal

jurisdiction so as to rule on the plaintiff’s motion for a TRO.
The magistrate judge first found that subject matter jurisdiction
existed.

After

analyzing

West

Virginia’s

long-arm

statute,

however, the magistrate judge found that personal jurisdiction did
not exist because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate sufficient
contacts between the staff at USP Lewisburg and the State of West
Virginia.

Because of that, the magistrate judge found that this

2

Court could not entertain the issues asserted by the plaintiff in
his motion for a TRO.

For those reasons, the magistrate judge

recommended

plaintiff’s

that

the

motion

be

objections

to

denied

without

prejudice.
The

plaintiff

recommendation.

then

filed

ECF No. 16.

the

report

and

First, the plaintiff claims that “in

the ordinary course of commerce,” prison officials receive “slaves”
that are transported over highways and other locations. Due to the
repeated and routine receipt of human property in interstate
commerce, the plaintiff argues that sufficient contacts exist so as
to

provide

personal

jurisdiction.

Accordingly,

because

the

plaintiff is a “slave” under the prison system, the plaintiff
argues that contacts through interstate commerce exist, meaning
that personal jurisdiction exists.
II.

Applicable Law

Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), this Court must conduct a de
novo review of any portion of the magistrate judge’s recommendation
to which an objection is timely made.

Because the plaintiff filed

objections to the report and recommendation, the magistrate judge’s
recommendation will be reviewed de novo.
III.
As

indicated

in

the

Discussion
magistrate

judge’s

report

and

recommendation, the issue here is whether this Court has personal
jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s motion for a TRO.

3

ECF No. 10.

In his motion for a TRO, the plaintiff seeks release from the SMU
located in USP Lewisburg, an order prohibiting any future placement
of federal inmates into the alleged SMU program, and that USP
Lewisburg’s SMU be closed.

As will be discussed below, this Court

finds that it does not have personal jurisdiction regarding the
plaintiff’s motion for a TRO.
In order for a court to grant relief, the court must have
“jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties.”

Ins.

Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
U.S.

694,

701

(1982)

(citations

omitted).

Subject

matter

jurisdiction is derived from Article III of the Constitution of the
United States as well as statutory authority.

Id. at 702.

Under

28 U.S.C. § 1331, it states that “[t]he district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”

In this

civil action, the plaintiff appears to allege several violations of
his Eighth Amendment rights. Because this civil action arises from
an alleged violation of the Constitution, this Court has subject
matter jurisdiction.
The issue becomes, however, whether this Court has personal
jurisdiction.

“The

requirement

that

a

court

have

personal

jurisdiction flows not from [Article] III, but from the Due Process
Clause.”

Id.

The policy behind personal jurisdiction centers

around “individual liberty,” requiring that “the maintenance of the

4

suit . . . not offend ‘traditional notions for fair play and
substantial justice.’”

Id. at 702-3 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v.

Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S.

457,

463

(1940)).

When

attempting

to

assert

personal

jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, this Court must find
that two conditions are satisfied.

“First, the exercise of

jurisdiction must be authorized by the long-arm statute of the
forum state, and, second, the exercise of personal jurisdiction
must

also

comport

requirements.”

with

the

Fourteenth

Amendment

due

process

Christian Science Bd. of Dirs. of First Church of

Christ, Scientist v. Nolan, 259 F.3d 209, 215 (4th Cir. 2001).
Because the plaintiff, currently incarcerated in USP Lewisburg,
filed his motion for a TRO regarding the alleged conduct of staff
at USP Lewisburg, the two requirements must be satisfied.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
previously determined that West Virginia’s long-arm statute is
“coextensive with the full reach of due process [],” and therefore
“it is unnecessary in this case to go through the normal two-step
formula for determining the existence of personal jurisdiction.”
In re Celotex Corp., 124 F.3d 619, 627-28 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing
Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Mid Allegheny Corp., 831 F.2d 522, 525
(4th Cir. 1987)).

Therefore, the proper inquiry then becomes

“whether exercising personal jurisdiction over [the defendant] is
consistent with the Due Process Clause.”

5

In re Celotex Corp., 124

F.3d at 628.

Under that inquiry, a defendant must have sufficient

minimum contacts with West Virginia.

Id.

The contacts must be so

sufficient that “requiring the defendant to defend its interests in
the forum does not ‘offend “traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.”’”

Id. (citations omitted).

Those minimum

contacts must be purposeful, meaning that the individual or entity
“purposefully

availed

itself

of

the

privilege

of

conducting

activities within the forum, thus [] invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.”

Id. (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.

235, 253 (1958)); see Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
473-74 (1985)).

It should be noted that a court may sua sponte

raise issues of personal jurisdiction.

See, e.g., Hall v. Herman,

896 F. Supp. 588, 590 (N.D. W. Va. 1995).
The

facts

show

that

this

Court

does

not

have

jurisdiction regarding the plaintiff’s motion for a TRO.

personal
First,

the plaintiff filed his motion against the defendants, but seeks
relief from conduct that occurred at USP Lewisburg.

Some of the

defendants are located in West Virginia, while others are located
in

Maryland.

USP

Lewisburg,

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
points

to

actions

that

however,

is

located

in

the

Further, the plaintiff specifically

occurred

in

USP

allegedly conducted by USP Lewisburg staff.

Lewisburg

that

were

Second, the record

fails to show that the staff at USP Lewisburg had sufficient
contact with the State of West Virginia so as to satisfy the above

6

legal

standard.

In

his

objections

to

the

report

and

recommendation, the plaintiff claims that the “routine receipt of
human property in interstate commerce” between Pennsylvania and
West Virginia establishes sufficient minimum contacts.

Here, the

plaintiff appears to refer to federal inmates as “slaves” and
“human property,” and seems to argue that the transportation of
“human property” from West Virginia to Pennsylvania provides the
necessary contacts.

The plaintiff has not demonstrated that the

staff at USP Lewisburg have “purposely avail[ed] [themselves] of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state,”
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 235, or that the contacts “proximately result
from

the

actions

by

the

defendant

himself

that

create

a

‘substantial connection with the forum state,’” Burger King Corp.,
471 U.S. at 475 (emphasis in original).
requirement

prevents

a

defendant

That purposeful availment

from

being

“haled

into

a

jurisdiction solely as a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or
‘attenuated’ contacts.”
(internal

citations

Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475

omitted).

Although

filed

against

the

defendants, the plaintiff’s motion for a TRO discusses and seeks
relief from the actions by the staff at USP Lewisburg without any
indication or facts showing that their conduct created “sufficient
minimum contact” with the State of West Virginia.

Therefore, this

Court does not have personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s
motion for a TRO.

Accordingly, the report and recommendation of

7

the magistrate judge is affirmed and adopted, and the plaintiff’s
objections are overruled.
IV.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the report and recommendation
of the magistrate judge (ECF No. 14) is AFFIRMED AND ADOPTED.
Accordingly, the plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining
order, or alternatively for a preliminary injunction is DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Further, the plaintiff’s objections to the

report and recommendation are OVERRULED.
Should the petitioner choose to appeal the judgment of this
Court to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
on the issues to which objection was made, he is ADVISED that he
must file a notice of appeal with the Clerk of this Court within 60
days after the date of the entry of the judgment order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to transmit a copy of this memorandum
opinion and order to the pro se plaintiff by certified mail and to
counsel of record herein.
DATED:

April 6, 2015

/s/ Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.
FREDERICK P. STAMP, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

8