Riggans v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA
Filing
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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND (DKT. NO. 6): Granting 6 Motion to Remand; Case is remanded to Circuit Court of Ohio Co, WV, and removed from active docket of the Court. Clerk directed to enter judgment. Signed by District Judge Irene M. Keeley on 9/9/15. (copy to Clerk of Circuit Courrt of Ohio Co.)(soa)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
EDWARD L. RIGGANS, III,
Plaintiff,
v.
//
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:15CV91
(Judge Keeley)
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NA,
Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND (DKT. NO. 6)
Pending before this Court is the motion to remand filed on
August
10,
2015,
by
the
(“Riggans”) (Dkt. No. 6).
plaintiff,
Edward
L.
Riggans,
III
On August 26, 2015, the defendant, JP
Morgan Chase Bank, NA (“Chase”), responded, opposing Riggans’
motion (Dkt. No. 7).
Riggans filed his reply on September 1, 2015
(Dkt. No. 8). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Riggans’
motion and REMANDS the case to the Circuit Court of Ohio County,
West Virginia.
BACKGROUND
On June 3, 2015, Riggans filed suit in the Circuit Court of
Ohio County, West Virginia, alleging claims of breach of contract
and violations of the West Virginia Consumer Credit Protection Act
(“WVCCPA”) (Dkt. No. 1 at 1; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 6-9).
On July 10,
2015, Chase filed a notice of removal, invoking this Court’s
diversity jurisdiction (Dkt. No. 1 at 1).
West Virginia.
Id. at 2.
Riggans is a citizen of
Chase is a national banking association
RIGGANS V. JP MORGAN CHASE NA
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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND [DKT. NO. 6]
with its principal place of business in Ohio.
Id.
Chase claims,
“[u]pon information and belief,” that the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000.00.
Id.
Riggans had obtained a mortgage on his property with a
predecessor of Chase on August 20, 2004, following which he leased
his mineral rights to Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC (“Chesapeake”) on
December 5, 2011 (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 4).
Chesapeake issued royalty
checks addressed both to Riggans and Chase due to the latter’s lien
on Riggans’ property.
Id.
Chase refused either to endorse the
checks or accept the checks endorsed by Riggans as payment on the
mortgage.
As a consequence, Riggans has been unable to benefit
from the royalty checks.
Id. at 4-5.
Riggans’ complaint alleges
that Chase breached the terms of the deed of trust by failing to
endorse or accept royalty checks issued by Chesapeake.
Id. at 4.
He also alleges three separate counts under the WVCCPA.
Id. at 6-
9.
On August 10, 2015, Riggans filed a motion to remand, arguing
that, in removing the case, Chase had failed to satisfy its burden
of proving that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 (Dkt. No.
6 at 1).
III,
and
Chase opposes Riggans’ motion, arguing that Counts II,
IV
of
the
complaint,
standing
jurisdictional minimum (Dkt. No. 7 at 6-7).
2
alone,
exceed
the
On September 1, 2015,
RIGGANS V. JP MORGAN CHASE NA
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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND [DKT. NO. 6]
Riggans filed a reply, contending that Chase improperly calculated
statutory damages under the WVCCPA (Dkt. No. 8 at 2). According to
Riggans, a single act in violation of the WVCCPA supports a single
penalty, regardless of whether the single act violates multiple
provisions of the WVCCPA.
Because Riggans only alleged seven
single acts, his statutory penalties are capped at $32,900.
Id.
The matter is now fully briefed and ripe for disposition.
APPLICABLE LAW
When an action is removed from state court, a federal district
court must determine whether it has original jurisdiction over the
plaintiff’s claims. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511
U.S. 375, 377 (1994).
jurisdiction.
“Federal courts are courts of limited
They possess only that power authorized by the
Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial
decree.”
Id. at 377.
Federal courts have original jurisdiction primarily over two
types of cases.
under
28
U.S.C.
They include those involving federal questions
§
1331,
and
those
citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
involving
diversity
of
When a party seeks to remove
a case based on diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332,
that party bears the burden of establishing that “the amount in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of
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interests and costs, and is between citizens of different states.”
28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Generally, § 1332 requires complete diversity among parties,
which
means
that
the
citizenship
of
all
defendants
must
be
different from the citizenship of all plaintiffs. See Caterpillar,
Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996).
“[A] defendant seeking to
remove a case to a federal court must file in the federal forum a
notice of removal ‘containing a short and plain statement of the
grounds for removal.’”
Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v.
Owens, 135 S.Ct. 547, 553 (2014) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a)).
If
the plaintiff contests the defendant’s allegations, the defendant
must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000 and the parties are diverse.
Id.
ANALYSIS
Riggans argues that the Court should remand this case because
the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000 (Dkt. No. 6 at
1).
He contends that, because seven royalty checks were involved,
“Chase cannot be liable for any more than seven civil penalties,”
which only amount to $32,900
(Dkt. No. 8 at 2).
argues
Court
that,
calculation
even
that
if
it
the
“repeatedly
accepts
Riggans further
Chase’s
threatened
“creative”
foreclosure”
in
violation of the WVCCPA, the complaint would allege, at most, 10
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statutory
violations,
threshold.
Id. at 3.
still
far
below
the
$75,000
statutory
Finally, Riggans contends that “allegations
of general, unliquidated damages are too speculative to constitute
‘proof’ of the claim’s value,” pointing the Court to Jefferson v.
Quicken Loans, Inc., No. 5:13CV59, 2013 WL 3812099, at *2-3 (N.D.W.
Va. July 19, 2013) (Stamp, J.).
In Jefferson, Judge Stamp remanded the plaintiffs’ WVCCPA
case, finding that, although statutory damages amounted to nearly
$55,000, the remaining damages were too speculative.
Id. at *1-3.
The defendants claimed that attorneys’ fees, to which they were
entitled by statute, sufficed to prove the amount in controversy by
a preponderance of the evidence.
Id. at *1.
The Court found that
an attorneys’ fee valuation of $25,000 was “too speculative,”
noting that the award of attorneys’ fees are left to the discretion
of the court, that the factors used to calculate such fees are
“difficult to assess in advance of a trial,” and that the defendant
bears the burden of demonstrating jurisdiction.
Id. at *2-3.
“Where the complaint does not specifically set forth the amount of
damages sought, as is the case here, the defendants must present
actual evidence that the amount in controversy is exceeded; simple
conjecture will not suffice.”
Id. at *3.
The Court therefore
found that “[b]ecause the potential attorney fees must amount to at
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least $20,000.00 to justify diversity jurisdiction, and the fees in
this case are so unpredictable, . . . the defendant has not met its
burden of proving diversity jurisdiction” and remanded the case.
Id.
In Count I of his complaint, Riggans alleges that Chase
breached its contract and acted in bad faith by refusing to accept
his royalty checks as payment on the mortgage loan (Dkt. No. 1-1 at
6). In Count II, Riggans claims statutory violations of the WVCCPA
based on Chase’s failure to apply the seven royalty checks to
Riggans’ mortgage account.
Id. at 7.
In Count III, Riggans
alleges that Chase violated the WVCCPA by engaging in unfair debt
collection practices, including mishandling the royalty checks,
contacting him directly after he had notified Chase that he had
retained legal counsel, and threatening foreclosure. Id. at 8. In
Count IV, Riggans claims that Chase violated the WVCCPA by engaging
in unlawful acts or practices, including refusing to accept and
apply the royalty checks, resulting in actual damages of $4,367.17.
Id. at 9; Dkt. No. 7 at 7.
Riggans does not contest that the maximum amount of the civil
penalty, adjusted for inflation, would be approximately $4,700 per
WVCCPA violation (Dkt. No. 7 at 6; Dkt. No. 8 at 2-3).
For the
purposes of this motion, he likewise does not contest that his
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complaint alleged three distinct violations on the part of Chase
for “repeatedly” threatening foreclosure, bringing the total number
of potential WVCCPA violations to ten (Dkt. No. 8 at 3).
It is well-established that “each act of a debt collector
which violates the WVCCPA creates a single cause of action to
recover a single penalty.”
In re Machnic, 271 B.R. 789, 794
(S.D.W. Va. 2002) (citing Sturm v. Providian Nat’l Bank, 242 B.R.
599 (S.D.W. Va. 1999)).
Riggans is prohibited from recovering
twice for each WVCCPA violation.
See Machnic, 271 B.R. at 794.
The total amount of his recovery for Counts II, III, and IV
therefore is $47,000.
Seven royalty checks at $4,700 each:
Three foreclosure threats at $4,700 each:
Total WVCCPA damages:
$32,900
$14,100
$47,000
Chase contends that, with respect to Riggans’ breach of
contract
claim,
his
actual
damages
“appear
to
be
at
least
$4,367.17,” the amount of the royalty checks (Dkt. No. 7 at 8).
It
argues that the Court should also consider “emotional distress
stemming from the alleged wrongful refusal to accept multiple
mortgage payments,” citing Weddington v. Ford Motor Credit, 59 F.
Supp. 2d 578, 584 (S.D.W. Va. 1999)(Hallanan, J.), for support.
Id.
In Weddington, after considering damages for “mental anxiety,
suffering, annoyance, aggravation, inconvenience, and humiliation,”
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the district court concluded that such claims, standing alone, were
sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement after the
plaintiff’s credit report was mistakenly tarnished.
Id.
In doing
so, it noted that “[i]n this day and age credit has become the
backbone of American Society,” and that without good credit, “an
individual is often foreclosed from making large purchases unless
accompanied with a large sum of cash.”
Id.
After a careful review, the Court finds the situation in
Weddington is inapposite to the case at bar.
The plaintiffs there
filed suit after the defendant allegedly forged their signatures on
a retail installment contract for the purchase of a 1995 Chrysler
Sebring.
Id. at 580.
According to the plaintiffs, the forged
contract provided for a balance of approximately $10,000 more than
the amount they previously had agreed to pay.
Id.
The plaintiffs
returned the vehicle to the defendants, stating that they refused
to pay under the terms of the forged contract.
Id.
The defendant
then reported the car as “repossessed” on the plaintiffs’ credit
reports, causing that information to be published with the National
Credit
Networks,
local
credit
bureau
affiliates,
and
other
entities. Id. The defendant, who subsequently recognized that the
contract was forged, assured the plaintiffs that it would correct
the situation, but failed to do so.
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Id.
Given these facts, it is
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understandable that the court would find that the plaintiffs’
damages for emotional distress could exceed the jurisdictional
limit.
Similar facts, however, are not present in this case.
Chase has shown only that $4,367.17, the amount of the royalty
checks, is recoverable under Count I, bringing the total amount of
damages to $51,367.17.
WVCCPA Damages:
Breach of contract:
Total:
$47,000.00
$4,367.17
$51,367.17
Even after considering such reasonable attorneys’ fees as
Riggans could collect, the Court must conclude that Chase has
failed to meet its burden of establishing, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that those attorneys’ fees would exceed $23,633.83,
the
amount
$75,001.00.
needed
to
meet
the
jurisdictional
requirement
See Dart Cherokee, 135 S.Ct. at 553.
of
Like the
situation in Jefferson, 2013 WL 3812099, at *2-3, Chase has failed
to bear its burden of demonstrating that the amount in controversy
exceeds the jurisdictional minimum.
The Court therefore GRANTS
Riggans’ motion to remand (Dkt. No. 6) and REMANDS the case to the
Circuit Court of Ohio County, West Virginia.
It is so ORDERED.
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to transmit copies of this Order
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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND [DKT. NO. 6]
to counsel of record and to the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Ohio
County, West Virginia.
It further DIRECTS the Clerk to enter a
separate judgment order and to remove this case from the active
docket of the Court.
DATED:
September 9, 2015.
/s/ Irene M. Keeley
IRENE M. KEELEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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