Figaniak et al v. Fraternal Order of Owl's Home Nest et al

Filing 287

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING 266 DEFENDANT TYLER JOHNSON'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, A NEW TRIAL, REMITTITUR, AND/OR AMENDMENT OF THE JUDGMENT. The amended judgment 279 entered on September 20, 2017 is final. Signed by Senior Judge Frederick P. Stamp, Jr. on 10/20/2017. (copy to counsel via CM/ECF) (nmm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
THOMAS G. FIGANIAK and
VALERIE A. FIGANIAK, as
Administrators of the
Estate of Kevin Figaniak,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Civil Action No. 5:15CV111
(STAMP)

FRATERNAL ORDER OF OWL’S HOME NEST,
LOYAL ORDER OF OWLS NEST LODGE 2558,
d/b/a THE OWLS NEST,
a West Virginia corporation,
YE OLDE ALPHA, INC.,
a West Virginia corporation,
CRAIG TYLER PEACOCK, individually,
JARRETT CHANDLER, individually,
and TYLER JOHNSON, individually,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING DEFENDANT TYLER JOHNSON’S
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW,
A NEW TRIAL, REMITTITUR,
AND/OR AMENDMENT OF THE JUDGMENT
Pursuant

to

Federal

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure

50(b),

59(a)(1)(A) and (e), and 60(b)(5) and (6), defendant Tyler Johnson
moves for judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, remittitur,
and/or amendment of the judgment.

ECF No. 266.

For the following

reasons, defendant’s post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of
law,

motion

for

a

new

trial,

motion

for

remittitur,

amendment of the judgment (ECF No. 266) is denied.

and/or

I.

Background

This is a wrongful death action arising out of an altercation
that occurred in Wheeling, West Virginia.

The incident involved

Kevin

Craig

Figaniak

(“Kevin”)

and

defendants

Tyler

Peacock,

Jarrett Chandler (“Chandler”), and Tyler Johnson (“Johnson”).
Kevin’s parents filed this civil action as administrators of his
estate, alleging negligence claims against the defendants.

This

civil action went to trial and the underlying facts are set forth
in this Court’s memorandum opinion and order denying defendant
Tyler Johnson’s motion for summary judgment.

ECF No. 175.

At the

conclusion of a five-day trial, the jury returned a verdict for
plaintiffs. ECF No. 246. This post-trial motion at issue (ECF No.
266) was filed by defendant Tyler Johnson following entry of the
clerk’s judgment (ECF No. 247) on the jury’s verdict (ECF No. 246).
This Court then entered an order of prejudgment interest and an
amended judgment (ECF No. 278), and the Clerk, accordingly, entered
an amended judgment (ECF No. 279).
II.
A.

Applicable Law

Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 permits a court to enter

judgment as a matter of law where “a party has been fully heard on
an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable
jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find
for the party on that issue.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1).

2

“Judgment

as a matter of law is properly granted if the nonmoving party
failed to make a showing on an essential element of his case with
respect to which he had the burden of proof.”
Collection

Servs.,

Inc.,

763

F.3d

(internal quotation marks omitted).

385,

Russell v. Absolute

391

(4th

Cir.

2014)

On a renewed motion for

judgment as a matter of law, the court considers whether the jury’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence.
Evans

Farms,

Inc.,

165

F.3d

275,

279

(4th

Konkel v. Bob

Cir.

1999).

In

entertaining a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court
should review all of the evidence in the record.

Reeves v.

Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).

In

reviewing the evidence, the court may not weigh the evidence or
make credibility determinations, but must view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Id.; Fontenot v.

Taser Int’l, Inc., 736 F.3d 318, 332 (4th Cir. 2013).
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b):
If the court does not grant a motion for judgment as
a matter of law made under Rule 50(a), the court is
considered to have submitted the action to the jury
subject to the court’s later deciding the legal questions
raised by the motion. No later than 28 days after the
entry of judgment—or if the motion addresses a jury issue
not decided by a verdict, no later than 28 days after the
jury was discharged—the movant may file a renewed motion
for judgment as a matter of law and may include an
alternative or joint request for a new trial under Rule
59. In ruling on the renewed motion, the court may: (1)
allow judgment on the verdict, if the jury returned a
verdict;(2) order a new trial; or (3) direct the entry of
judgment as a matter of law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
3

In considering a Rule 50(b) motion, th district court is to
determine whether a jury, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-movant, could have properly reached the
conclusion it did. Bryant v. Aiken Reg’l Med. Ctrs. Inc., 333 F.3d
536, 543 (4th Cir. 2003).
B.

New Trial, Remittitur, Amendment of the Judgment
Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides

courts with discretion, after a jury trial, to grant a new trial on
all or some of the issues “for any reason for which a new trial has
heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1).

A court may grant a new trial only if

the verdict: (1) is against the clear weight of the evidence; (2)
is based upon false evidence; or (3) “will result in a miscarriage
of justice, even though there may be substantial evidence which
would prevent the direction of a verdict.”

Atlas Food Sys. &

Servs., Inc. v. Crane Nat’l Vendors, Inc., 99 F.3d 587, 594 (4th
Cir. 1996).

The first two grounds for a new trial require the

court to make factual determinations, while the third ground
requires a policy analysis under which the “judge’s unique vantage
point and day-to-day experience with such matters lend expertise.”
Id.
The decision to grant or deny a new trial is within the sound
discretion of the district court, and the appellate court will
respect that determination absent an abuse of discretion.

4

Id.

“Under Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
court may order a new trial nisi remittitur if it “concludes that
a jury award of compensatory damages is excessive.”

Jones v.

Southpeak Interactive Corp. of Delaware, 777 F.3d 658, 672 (4th
Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A court should

order a new trial nisi remittitur if “the jury’s verdict is against
the weight of the evidence or based on evidence which is false.”
Sloane v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 510 F.3d 495, 502 (4th Cir.
2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Whether to grant such a

new trial is “entrusted to the sound discretion of the district
court.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
III.

Discussion

In support of his post-trial motion (ECF No. 266), defendant
Johnson cites several grounds for why he is entitled to relief:
1.

Pursuant to Rule 59(a)(1)(A) and (e) and Rule 60(b)(6),

defendant Johnson moves for judgment or a new trial asserting that
his mere words made during the fight did not, as a matter of law or
fact, render him liable to plaintiffs under the facts of this case;
2.

Pursuant to Rule 59(a)(1)(A), defendant Johnson moves for

a new trial asserting that the jury instructions were erroneous and
prejudicial;
3.

Pursuant to Rule 59(a)(1)(A), defendant Johnson moves for

a new trial, asserting that the jury’s apportionment of 75% of the

5

liability to Johnson was contrary to the weight of the evidence and
a miscarriage of justice;
4.

Pursuant to Rule 50(b), Rule 59(a)(1)(A) and (e) and Rule

60(b)(6), defendant Johnson moves for judgment as a matter of law,
a new trial, or a substantial remittitur asserting that the jury’s
award of punitive damages was unsupported by sufficient evidence,
contrary to the weight of the evidence, and manifestly excessive;
5.

Pursuant to Rule 59(a)(1)(A) and (e) and Rule 60(b)(6),

defendant Johnson moves for a new trial asserting that defendant
Chandler was improperly permitted to argue self-defense to reduce
his apportioned share of liability; and
6.
defendant

Pursuant
Johnson

to

Rule

moves

for

59(e)

and

Rule

alteration

and

60(b)(5)

and

amendment

of

(6),
the

judgment to reflect credits for plaintiffs’ settlements with two
defendants, Ye Olde Alpha, Inc. and the Loyal Order of Owls Nest
Lodge 2558.

ECF No. 266 at 1-2.

This Court notes that traditionally, decisions on “questions
of law” are “reviewable de novo,” decisions on “questions of fact”
are “reviewable for clear error,” and decisions on “matters of
discretion” are “reviewable for ‘abuse of discretion.’”

Highmark

Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1748
(2014) (citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988)).
In line with the parties’ briefing, and for organizational
purposes, this Court will address the contentions of defendant

6

Johnson in the same order the arguments and corresponding responses
have been presented to this Court.

For the reasons set forth

below, defendant’s post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of
law, a new trial, remittitur, and/or amendment of the judgment (ECF
No. 266) is denied.
A.

Defendant Johnson’s “Mere Words”
Pursuant to Rule 59(a)(1)(A) and (e) and Rule 60(b)(6),

defendant Johnson moves for judgment or a new trial asserting that
his mere words during the incident did not, as a matter of law or
fact, render him liable to plaintiffs under the facts of this case.
ECF No. 266-1 at 11.

Defendant Johnson asserts several arguments

in support of his contention that “this Court erred as a matter of
law in allowing the jury to decide that Johnson’s alleged pre-fight
words were negligent, which nullified his immunity for post-fight
conduct.”

ECF No. 266-1 at 17.

This Court finds no error in permitting the jury to hear
evidence

regarding

defendant

Johnson’s

1

“mere

words”1

as

they

The jury heard significant testimony as to Johnson’s comments
made when the parties met, after Kevin and Johnson left the bar at
the Ye Olde Alpha and defendants Peacock and Chandler left the bar
at the Owl’s Nest, which were claimed to have instigated the
physical confrontation and which preceded the fight. Defendant
Peacock testified that he heard Johnson make a statement about any
person not needing an “effing education” to be pipeliners and that
Johnson continued to utter what was described as “gibberish”, which
offended and provoked the other defendants. There was also
testimony that after the fight, Johnson attempted to drag Kevin
Figaniak, offered to pay Robert Hartley to help him get Kevin back
to campus rather than seek medical attention, and then ultimately
dropped Kevin, resulting in the back of Kevin’s head hitting the
7

exposed

Kevin

Figaniak

assaulted and battered.

to

a

foreseeably

high

risk

of

being

Defendant Johnson argues that his “mere

words” constituted free speech and should not render him liable to
the plaintiffs as negligence.

However, the jury heard significant

testimony that defendant Johnson engaged in affirmative conduct
which caused the verbal confrontation between the parties to
continue and escalate into a fight.

Considerable evidence was

presented at trial to show that defendant Johnson’s words and
conduct initiated and instigated the altercation.
Further, defendant Johnson’s actions go beyond “mere words.”
Defendant Johnson fails to address in his argument his actions
which occurred after he made the insulting comments to the other
defendants.

The jury heard testimony that defendant Johnson

engaged in numerous other actions such as moving Kevin Figaniak and
dropping him on his head on the sidewalk which could be viewed by
the jury as a proximate cause of Kevin Figaniak’s death, and thus,
be considered by the jury as the basis for his liability.
This Court finds that the credibility and weight given to
testimony is exclusively the province of the jury.

The jury was

free to conclude that defendant Johnson started and provoked this
altercation and his actions constituted more than uttering mere
words.

It was proper for the jury to consider the foreseeability

of the altercation after provocation by defendant Johnson and take

sidewalk which produced an audible thud.
8

into consideration the numerous other actions of defendant Johnson
that went beyond “mere words.”
Accordingly, this Court finds that defendant Tyler Johnson’s
contention that his mere words did not, as a matter of law or fact,
render him liable to plaintiffs under the facts of this case fails
and defendant’s motion for judgment or a new trial shall be denied.
B.

Jury Instructions
Pursuant to Rule 59(a)(1)(A), defendant Johnson moves for a

new trial asserting that the jury instructions were erroneous and
prejudicial.

Defendant Johnson argues that this Court erred in

permitting the jury to find Johnson liable on the theory that his
words caused the violence that led to Kevin Figaniak’s death.
No. 266-1 at 19.

ECF

Defendant asserts, “[l]ike the invalid theory

itself, the jury instructions that accompanied that theory were
erroneous.” ECF No. 266-1 at 19.

Defendant contends that “this

Court should have issued Johnson’s proposed jury instruction #14 or
an equivalent charge explaining that the jury could not find
Johnson negligent, or reduce the liability of other parties, based
on words alone.”

ECF No. 266-1 at 19.

Defendant also asserts that

“the jury was instructed that any pre-fight negligence nullified
Johnson’s post-fight immunity” and that this “allowed the jury to
nullify Johnson[’s] immunity on an invalid basis” and that the
giving of this instruction was prejudicial error. ECF No. 266-1 at
20.

9

Courts have “considerable discretion in choosing the specific
wording of [jury] instructions.”

Figg v. Schroeder, 312 F.3d 625,

640 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). A judgment
may be reversed for failure to “give an instruction proposed by a
party only when the requested instruction (1) was correct; (2) was
not substantially covered by the court’s charge to the jury; and
(3) dealt with some point in the trial so important, that failure
to give the requested instruction seriously impaired that party’s
ability to make its case.”

Noel v. Artson, 641 F.3d 580, 586-87

(4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Further, a

determination of whether an instruction, or failure to instruct,
was prejudicial is “based on a review of the record as a whole.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

“The test of adequacy of

instructions . . . is not one of technical accuracy in every
detail.”

Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1395 (4th Cir. 1987).

Rather, it is a practical examination of “whether the instructions
construed as a whole, and in light of the whole record, adequately
informed the jury of the controlling legal principles without
misleading or confusing the jury to the prejudice of the objecting
party.”

Id.

Specifically, this Court denied defendant’s proposed Jury
Instruction No. 14, “Words Are Not Enough,” which provided:
Mere words or threats unaccompanied by an overt act
do not constitute ground of justification or excuse of a
homicide, under the law of self-defense.
State v.
Snider, 94 S.E. 981 (W. Va. 1918).
10

This Court finds that defendant’s proposed Jury Instruction
No. 14 did not apply and was not necessary to convey the applicable
law to the jury.

This Court finds that when the jury instructions

are read as a whole, they fairly describe the applicable law, are
legally correct, and were not presented in such an abstract manner
as to confuse the jury.

Accordingly, this Court finds that

defendant Tyler Johnson’s assignment of error as to the jury’s
instructions fails, that the defendant was not prejudiced, and that
defendant’s motion for a new trial shall be denied.
C.

Jury’s Apportionment of Liability
Pursuant to Rule 59(a)(1)(A), defendant Johnson moves for a

new trial asserting that the jury’s apportionment of 75% of the
liability to Johnson was contrary to the weight of the evidence and
a miscarriage of justice.
This Court has conducted an extensive review of the record,
including a review of the considerable amount of evidence that the
jury heard regarding defendant Johnson’s conduct.

Based on the

record, this Court finds that the evidence supports the jury’s
apportionment of liability.

The record reveals that the jury’s

apportionment of 75% of the liability to Johnson was not contrary
to the weight of the evidence and was not a miscarriage of justice.
“Jury determinations of factual matters such as liability on a
cause of action, liability for compensatory and punitive damages,
and

the

amount

of

compensatory

11

damages

will

be

reviewed

by

determining whether the jury’s verdict is against the weight of the
evidence or based on evidence which is false.”

Atlas Food Sys. &

Servs., Inc. v. Crane Nat. Vendors, Inc., 99 F.3d 587, 594 (4th
Cir. 1996).
This Court finds that it was the jury’s obligation to assign
the proportion or degree of the total fault among the parties under
Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W. Va. 332, 342 (1979), and
that the jury was permitted to assess the comparative fault of all
the parties by properly considering all of the evidence.
Accordingly, this Court finds that defendant Tyler Johnson’s
assignment of error as to the jury’s apportionment of liability
fails, and defendant’s motion for a new trial shall be denied.
D.

Jury’s Award of Punitive Damages
Pursuant to Rule 50(b), Rule 59(a)(1)(A) and (e) and Rule

60(b)(6), defendant Johnson moves for judgment as a matter of law,
a new trial, or a substantial remittitur asserting that the jury’s
award of punitive damages was unsupported by sufficient evidence,
contrary to the weight of the evidence, and manifestly excessive.
West Virginia Code § 55-7-29(c), “Limitations on punitive
damages,” states:

“The amount of punitive damages that may be

awarded in a civil action may not exceed the greater of four times
the amount of compensatory damages or $500,000, whichever is
greater.”

12

In this civil action, the jury awarded $1,250,000.00 in
punitive damages.

ECF No. 246.

This amount does not exceed the

limitation set forth in West Virginia Code § 55-7-29(c).

This

Court finds that the evidence presented at trial supports the
jury’s finding of an award of punitive damages against defendant
Tyler Johnson in the amount of $1,250,000.00.

The jury had reason

to conclude that the plaintiffs established by clear and convincing
evidence that the damages suffered were the result of conduct that
was carried out by defendant Johnson with a conscious, reckless and
outrageous indifference to the health, safety, and welfare of Kevin
Figaniak, as required for a finding of punitive damages under West
Virginia Code § 55-7-29.

Thus, the jury’s award of punitive

damages is appropriate.
Accordingly, this Court finds that defendant Tyler Johnson’s
assignment of error as to the jury’s award of punitive damages
fails, and defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, a
new trial, or a substantial remittitur shall be denied.
E.

Defendant Chandler’s Self-Defense Argument
Pursuant to Rule 59(a)(1)(A) and (e) and Rule 60(b)(6),

defendant Johnson moves for a new trial asserting that defendant
Chandler was improperly permitted to argue self-defense to reduce
his apportioned share of liability.
This Court notes that counsel for defendant Johnson failed to
contest or make any objections to defendant Chandler’s self-defense

13

argument.

Plaintiffs’ counsel and counsel for defendant Chandler

agreed it was proper to argue self-defense for the purposes of the
apportionment of defendant Chandler’s fault, not a determination of
liability. Counsel for defendant Johnson never objected. In fact,
the verdict form box relating to defendant Chandler was prechecked, as a result of his involuntary manslaughter plea, and
submitted to the jury with no other issue to decide as to this
defendant other than his apportionment of liability.

Counsel for

defendant Johnson addressed this issue and did not object. Counsel
for

defendant

Johnson

also

failed

to

make

any

objection

to

defendant Chandler asserting a self-defense argument before the
charge was read to the jury or following closing argument.
This Court ruled that counsel for defendant Chandler was
permitted to advance a self-defense argument in order to advocate
for

his

apportionment

liability.

of

liability,

not

a

determination

of

This Court finds no error in permitting defendant

Chandler to advance self-defense arguments solely to be considered
by

the

jury

in

determining

the

reasonableness

of

defendant

Chandler’s actions in the circumstances as compared to all other
parties in apportioning liability.
Accordingly, this Court finds that defendant Tyler Johnson’s
assignment

of

error

as

to

defendant

Chandler’s

self-defense

argument fails, and defendant’s motion for a new trial shall be
denied.

14

F.

Amendment of the Judgment
Pursuant to Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b)(5) and (6), defendant

Johnson moves for alteration and amendment of the judgment to
reflect credit for plaintiffs’ settlements with two defendants, Ye
Olde Alpha, Inc. and the Loyal Order of Owls Nest Lodge 2558.
This Court entered an order of prejudgment interest and
amended judgment (ECF No. 278) which accounted for the agreed upon
settlement offset and reduction of the compensatory damages portion
of the judgment.

The Clerk then entered an amended judgment (ECF

No. 279) reflecting the prior-settlement offset.
Accordingly, defendant Johnson’s motion for alteration and
amendment of the judgment to reflect credits for plaintiffs’
settlements with two defendants is denied as moot.
IV.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, defendant Tyler Johnson’s posttrial motion for judgment as a matter of law, a new trial,
remittitur, and/or amendment of the judgment (ECF No. 266) is
DENIED.

The amended judgment (ECF No. 279) entered on September

20, 2017 is final.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to transmit a copy of this memorandum
opinion and order to counsel of record herein.

15

DATED:

October 20, 2017

/s/ Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.
FREDERICK P. STAMP, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

16