Maltese v. National Roofing Industry Penesion Plan
Filing
33
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING 25 PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING 23 DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. It is further ORDERED that this civil action be STRICKEN from the active docket of this Court. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment on this matter. Signed by Senior Judge Frederick P. Stamp, Jr. on 12/12/2016. (copy to counsel via CM/ECF) (nmm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
FRANCIS R. MALTESE, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 5:16CV11
(STAMP)
NATIONAL ROOFING INDUSTRY
PENSION PLAN,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This civil action was brought under the Employee Retirement
Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., to
challenge the suspension of the plaintiff’s retirement benefits.
The parties have filed cros-motions for summary judgment.
For the
following reasons, the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is
denied and the defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.
I.
Facts
The plaintiff, Francis R. Maltese, Jr. (“Maltese”), is a
beneficiary under the National Roofing Industry Pension Plan (“the
Plan”), a multi-employer pension plan subject to ERISA, through his
membership in the United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers, and
Allied
Workers.
Before
his
retirement,
Maltese
worked
for
Kalkreuth Roofing and Sheet Metal (“Kalkreuth”) as a roofer, a
foreman, a superintendent, and a project manager.
In July 2011,
Maltese informed the Plan that he intended to seek early retirement
benefits effective January 1, 2012 and applied for retirement
benefits.
Maltese then sent the Plan a letter in December 2011
stating that he intended to delay his retirement to May 1, 2012 and
that he intended to continue working for Kalkreuth as an estimator
beginning on that date.
Maltese’s application was approved and he
began receiving monthly retirement payments as of May 1, 2012.
On
that date, Maltese began working as an estimator. Then, on January
1, 2015, Maltese became the “WV Operations Manager” at the Kaley
Group, Inc. (“Kaley”), an entity related to Kalkreuth.
The Plan made monthly payments to Maltese from May 1, 2012
through March 2015. After learning of Maltese’s work with Kaley as
an Operations Manager, the Plan suspended Maltese’s benefits.
Maltese
appealed
procedure.
the
suspension
through
the
Plan’s
claims
The Plan’s Board of Trustees (“the Trustees”) denied
Maltese’s appeal, concluding that he had not actually retired on
May 1, 2012, that his benefits were properly suspended, and that he
must reimburse the Plan for all benefits he received since claiming
retirement.
Maltese then filed this civil action challenging the
Trustees’ decision and seeking unpaid benefits.
Maltese and the
Plan each filed motions for summary judgment, and the parties agree
that there is no genuine dispute of material fact.
II.
Applicable Law
“When faced with cross-motions for summary judgment, the court
must review each motion separately on its own merits to determine
2
whether either of the parties deserve judgment as a matter of law.”
Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56, this Court must grant a party’s motion for summary judgment if
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a).
A fact is “material” if it might affect the outcome of the
case.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
A
dispute of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence “is such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”
Id. If the non-moving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial,” summary judgment must be granted against that party.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
In reviewing
the supported underlying facts, all inferences must be viewed in
the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.
See
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587 (1986).
The parties agree that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact.
Thus, the only issue is which party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Where
a
plan
subject
to
ERISA
confers
discretion
to
a
fiduciary, the fiduciary’s “decision will not be disturbed if
reasonable, even if the court itself would have reached a differed
3
conclusion.”
Booth v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs. Health &
Welfare Plan, 201 F.3d 335, 341 (4th Cir. 2000). The parties agree
that the Plan provides the Trustees with discretion to make
determinations regarding a pensioner’s benefits.1
In determining
whether a fiduciary’s discretionary decision is reasonable, the
Fourth Circuit has provided a non-exclusive set of factors to be
considered, including:
(1) the language of the plan; (2) the purposes and goals
of the plan; (3) the adequacy of the materials considered
to make the decision and the degree to which they support
it; (4) whether the fiduciary’s interpretation was
consistent with other provisions in the plan and with
earlier interpretations of the plan; (5) whether the
decisionmaking process was reasoned and principled; (6)
whether the decision was consistent with the procedural
and substantive requirements of ERISA; (7) any external
standard relevant to the exercise of discretion; and (8)
1
Section 6.1 of the Plan provides that:
[a]ll questions or controversies whatsoever character
arising in any manner or between any parties or persons
in connection with this Plan or its operation, whether as
to any claim for benefits, as to the construction of the
language of this Plan or any rules and regulations
adopted by the Trustees, or as to any writing, decision,
instrument or account in connection with the operation of
the Plan or otherwise, shall be submitted to the Trustees
or their delegates for decision. In the event a claim
for benefits has been denied, no lawsuit or other action
against the Fund or its Trustees may be filed until the
matter has been submitted for review under the ERISAmandated review procedure set forth in Section 6.17. The
decision on review shall be binding upon all persons
dealing with the Plan or claiming any benefit hereunder,
except to the extent that such decision may be determined
to be arbitrary or capricious by a court or arbitrator
having jurisdiction over such matter.
ECF No. 20-1 at 165.
4
the fiduciary’s motives and any conflict of interest it
may have.
Id. at 342-43.
Maltese’s complaint implicates the first, second,
third, fourth, and fifth factors, and the parties do not address
the other factors.
III.
Discussion
Maltese challenges the Trustees’ decision as to two core
issues: (1) whether Maltese “retired” under the terms of the Plan;
and (2) whether Maltese’s work as an Operations Manager is “work in
the jurisdiction of the Plan” subject to a suspension of benefits.
A.
Early Retirement
Under § 5.4(A) of the Plan, “retirement” is defined as
“complete withdrawal from any further employment in work in the
jurisdiction of the Plan.
No Participant shall be considered
retired for purposes of the Plan until he has been withdrawn from
work in the jurisdiction of the Plan for a period of 30 days or
more.”
ECF No. 20-1 at 157.
The Trustees found that Maltese did
not “retire” under § 5.4(A) because his work as an estimator
starting on May 1, 2012 constituted work in the “jurisdiction of
the Plan” so that he did not cease work in the “jurisdiction of the
Plan” for thirty days or more.
Maltese argues that the Trustees
abused their discretion by unreasonably interpreting the term
“jurisdiction of the Plan” to include his work as an estimator and
that the Plan should be equitably estopped from denying that he
retired.
5
1.
“Jurisdiction of the Plan”
Maltese argues that the term “jurisdiction of the Plan” must
be interpreted as coextensive with the term “Covered Employment,”
and that “jurisdiction of the Plan” is at least ambiguous and
should be construed against the Plan.
The defendant argues that
these terms are not synonymous and that “jurisdiction of the Plan”
is unambiguous.
Section
5.4(A)
defines
“jurisdiction
of
the
Plan”
as
employment in:
(1) an industry in which employees covered by this Plan
were employed and accrued benefits under this Plan as a
result of such employment at the time of withdrawal, and
(2) a trade or craft in which the Employee was employed
at any time under the Plan, and
(3) the geographic area covered by the Plan at the time
of withdrawal.
ECF No. 20-1 at 157.
Section 1.2(a)(11) defines Covered Employment as:
any employment during which the Employee has been
employed by an Employer who makes or is required to make
Employer Contributions with respect to such employment to
the Fund under the terms of a[] [Collective Bargaining]
Agreement. . . .
Notwithstanding the foregoing,
reemployment of a Pensioner as an estimator shall not
constitute Covered Employment for purposes of Credited
Service and will not constitute work within the
jurisdiction of the Plan in regard to suspension of
benefits.
ECF No. 20-1 at 109 (emphasis added).
Maltese argues that estimator work is excluded from the
“jurisdiction
of
the
Plan”
under
6
the
second
sentence
of
§ 1.2(a)(11). The Trustees rejected this argument, concluding that
§
1.2(a)(11)
excludes
estimator
work
from
work
within
the
“jurisdiction of the Plan” as it deals with reemployment of a
“Pensioner,” which is defined as somebody “who retires and receives
a Pension under th[e] Plan.”
ECF No. 20-1 at 114.
Thus, the
Trustees concluded that § 1.2(a)(11)’s reemployment exception for
estimator work applies only to a person who has properly retired
under § 5.4(A) and resumes work as an estimator.
that
the
Trustees’
interpretation
and
This Court finds
application
of
these
provisions is reasonable.
First, the Trustees’ interpretation of the term “jurisdiction
of the Plan” is reasonable based on the unambiguous language of the
Plan.
The Plan defines “jurisdiction of the Plan” and “Covered
Employment” separately and distinctly.
While “Covered Employment”
cross-references “jurisdiction of the Plan,” it applies only to the
reemployment of pensioners who previously retired under § 5.4(A).
This cross-reference does not modify the stand-alone definition of
“jurisdiction of the Plan” or its usage in § 5.4(A)’s definition of
retirement.
Even in § 1.2(a)(11)’s reemployment exception for
estimator work, it refers to “Covered Employment” and work in the
“jurisdiction of the Plan” separately, reinforcing their separate
meanings. Further, the definition of “Covered Employment” uses the
term “Employee” when defining employment for which an employer must
provide
contributions,
while
using
7
the
term
“Pensioner”
when
excluding estimator work from work within the “jurisdiction of the
Plan” for reemployment purposes.
The definition of “jurisdiction
of the Plan” similarly uses the term “Employee,” indicating its
broader reach.
Thus, the Trustees’ reasonably concluded that
§ 1.2(a)(11)’s exclusion of estimator work from the “jurisdiction
of the Plan” unambiguously applies only to the reemployment of a
Pensioner.
Maltese argues that work as an estimator must be excluded from
the “jurisdiction of the Plan” because under the United Union of
Roofers, Waterproofers, and Allied Workers’s Collective Bargaining
Agreement, work as an estimator is not covered, and therefore not
entitled to employer contributions under the Plan.
He argues that
non-Covered
work
Employment
cannot
be
considered
in
the
“jurisdiction of the Plan” because it could not have been in a
“trade or craft in which the Employee was employed at any time
under the Plan” as required under the definition of “jurisdiction
of
the
Plan.”
ECF
No.
20-1
unambiguous
language
defines
broadly
include
work
to
Employment.”
at
157.
“jurisdiction
that
does
not
However,
of
the
§
5.4(A)’s
Plan”
constitute
more
“Covered
Thus, the coverage of work as an estimator under the
Collective Bargaining Agreement is irrelevant to whether the work
is within the “jurisdiction of the Plan.”
Second, the Trustees’ interpretation is consistent with the
Plan’s goal of retaining tax-exempt status under § 401(a) of the
8
Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. § 401) and applicable Treasury
Regulations. A pension plan does not qualify for tax-exempt status
under § 401(a) “if it permits distributions of the employer’s
contributions
or
increments
thereon
employment or termination of the plan.”
Ruling 71-437 (Jan. 1, 1971).
prior
to
severance
of
Internal Revenue Service
When it comes to early retirement,
whether an employee has actually separated from employment is
determined based on whether the facts and circumstances
indicate that the employer and employee reasonably
anticipated that no further services would be performed
after a certain date or that the level of bona fide
services . . . would permanently decrease to no more than
20 percent of the average level of bona fide service
performed . . . over the immediately preceding 36-month
period.
26 C.F.R. § 1.409A-1(h)(1)(ii) (emphasis added).
Further, the
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) has concluded in a nonbinding
private ruling letter that “an employee legitimately retires when
he stops performing service for the employer and there is not the
explicit understanding between the employer and employee that upon
retirement the employee will immediately return to service with the
employer.”
IRS Private Letter Ruling 201147038, 2011 WL 5893533,
4 (Nov. 25, 2011).
The IRS concluded that such an explicit
understanding does not constitute retirement because the employee
does “not actually separate from service and cease performing
services for the employer,” and thus “[s]uch ‘retirements’ will
violate section 401(a) of the Code and result in disqualification
of the Plan.”
Id.
While nonbinding, the IRS’s analysis and
9
interpretation
of
§
401(a)
and
its
relevant
regulations
is
persuasive.
Based on the applicable regulations and the IRS’s application
of § 401(a), the Trustees’ interpretation of “jurisdiction of the
Plan” is reasonably calculated to ensure that beneficiaries intend
to
actually
separate
from
employment
before
early
retirement
benefits are distributed, thus, retaining the Plan’s tax-exempt
status.
Maltese argues that this is not the case because the
thirty-day withdrawal requirement would still allow for explicit
understandings that a retiree will return to work after that
thirty-day period.
However, compliance with § 5.4(A)’s thirty-day
requirement is not sufficient for retirement, but is a necessary
condition for it.
Section 5.4(A) states that retirement is the
“complete withdrawal from any further employment in work within the
jurisdiction of the Plan” and that “[n]o participant shall be
considered retired . . . until he has been withdrawn from work in
the jurisdiction of the Plan for a period of 30 days or more.”
No. 20-1 at 157 (emphasis added).
ECF
Thus, to be considered retired
under § 5.4(A), an employee must both separate from employment
within the “jurisdiction of the Plan” for thirty days or more and
completely withdraw from employment within the “jurisdiction of the
Plan.”
Thus, the thirty-day requirement serves to bolster a
determination
that
“the
employer
and
employee
reasonably
anticipated that no further services would be performed after a
10
certain
date.”
26
C.F.R.
§
1.409A-1.
Thus,
the
Trustees’
interpretation of the definition of “jurisdiction of the Plan” in
the context of early retirement is reasonable and consistent with
the
goal
of
maintaining
the
Plan’s
tax-exempt
status
under
§ 401(a).
Third,
the
Trustees’
interpretation
does
not
present
an
opportunity for inconsistent application. Maltese does not present
any
other
determinations
under
the
Plan
that
reach
inconsistent with the Trustees’ decision in this case.
Maltese
argues
that
the
Trustees’
interpretation
results
Rather,
creates
the
possibility of inconsistent application of the Plan’s suspension
provision based on when an employee begins work as an estimator.
He argues that an employee would not be considered “retired” if he
immediately begins working as an estimator, while an employee who
“retired”
with
the
same
intention
of
continuing
work
as
an
estimator but simply delays this work for thirty days will not have
his benefits suspended.
However, the Trustees’ interpretation of
“jurisdiction of the Plan” ensures that only bona fide retirees
receive benefits and that subsequent reemployment in work outside
the “jurisdiction of the Plan” does not result in a suspension. As
discussed above, a beneficiary who “retires” for thirty days with
an express agreement with the employer that he will return to work
as an estimator after the thirty-day period cannot receive benefits
under the Plan if the Plan is to maintain its tax-exempt status.
11
Thus, Maltese’s hypothetical employee who attempts to game the
system by agreeing to wait thirty days before returning to work as
an estimator would also not have “retired” under § 5.4(A).
Thus,
the Trustees’ interpretation of the term “jurisdiction of the Plan”
does not create inconsistent results, and this Court finds that the
Trustees did not abuse their discretion in concluding that Maltese
did not “retire.”
2.
Equitable Estoppel
Maltese argues that the Plan should be equitably estopped from
claiming he did not retire.
He argues that by granting his
benefits, the Plan falsely misrepresented or concealed the fact
that he could not immediately begin work as an estimator and still
“retire” under the plan.
Maltese argues that he did not know his
retirement would not be effective and that he detrimentally relied
on the grant of benefits.
In the context of its application under ERISA, equitable
estoppel
is
§ 1132(a)(3).
a
matter
of
federal
common
law.
29
U.S.C.
The traditional requirements for equitable estoppel
are that:
(1) the party to be estopped knew the true facts; (2) the
party to be estopped intended for his conduct to be acted
upon or acted in such a way that the party asserting
estoppel had a right to believe that it was intended; (3)
the party claiming estoppel was ignorant of the true
facts; and (4) the misconduct was relied upon to the
detriment of the parties seeking estoppel.
Dawkins v. Witt, 318 F.3d 606, 611 n.6 (4th Cir. 2003).
12
Maltese knew or should have known that his plan to immediately
begin
work
as
an
estimator
upon
retirement
legitimate retirement under § 5.4(A).
Maltese
was
obligated
to
comply
with
would
not
be
a
As a party to the Plan,
its
responsibility to read and understand them.
terms
and
had
a
In signing his
application for early retirement benefits, Maltese certified that
he “underst[ood] that [his] benefit payments will not begin until
[he has] withdrawn from employment covered by the Plan for at least
30 consecutive days and any payment [he] receive[d] prior to a 30
day period will be deducted from [his] future payments.”
20-1 at 89.
ECF No.
While this portion of the application did not use the
exact terms of § 5.4(A), the page before the certification quotes
in full § 5.4(A)’s definition of retirement, including the thirtyday requirement and the definition of work in the “jurisdiction of
the Plan.” Id. at 88. Section 5.4(A)’s thirty-day requirement and
complete
withdrawal
requirement
are
clear
and
unequivocal.
Further, while Maltese may have believed work as an estimator did
not qualify as work within the “jurisdiction of the Plan,” he did
not seek clarification of that term from the Plan and was advised
by the Plan that he must comply with the thirty-day requirement.
When Maltese indicated his intent to retire and immediately begin
working as an estimator the Plan advised him by email that “you
will have to be gone for 30 days before your benefit will start,”
in clear reference to § 5.4(A).
ECF No. 20-1 at 95.
13
Accordingly,
the Plan is not equitably estopped from finding that Maltese did
not retire.
B.
Suspension of Benefits
Under § 5.4(C),
[t]he benefits of a Pensioner who has not yet attained
Normal Retirement Age may be suspended for each month in
which the Pensioner works at least 40 hours within the
jurisdiction of the Plan, provided that the first 300
hours worked in Covered Employment during a calendar year
shall be ignored in determining whether benefits are to
be suspended, and provided further that the suspension of
benefits satisfies the requirements of Department of
Labor Regulation 2530.203-3.
ECF No. 20-1 at 158. The Trustees concluded that, assuming Maltese
did “retire” under § 5.4(A), his benefits were properly suspended
because
his
work
as
an
Operations
Manager
is
within
the
“jurisdiction of the Plan,” triggering suspension under § 5.4(C).
The Trustees found that Maltese’s “Covered Employment” before
retirement was as a roofer, a foreman, a superintendent, and a
project manager, and that as a project manager Maltese assisted in
the development of Kalkreuth’s Lexington, Kentucky division.
Trustees
reasoned
that
Maltese’s
employment
as
an
The
Operations
Manager utilized the skills he learned throughout his career,
making it the same “trade or craft” as his prior work.
Section 5.4(C) affirmatively invokes the requirements of 29
C.F.R. § 2530.203-3 regarding the suspension of benefits after
reemployment.
Section 2530.203-3(c)(2) requires suspension in a
multiemployer plan if the employee completes work in (1) “[a]n
14
industry in which employees covered by the plan were employed and
accrued benefits under the plan”; (2) “[a] trade or craft in which
the employee was employed at any time under the plan”; and (3)
“[t]he geographic area covered by the plan at the time that the
payment of benefits commenced or would have commenced if the
employee had not remained in or returned to employment.” 29 C.F.R.
§ 2530.203-3(c)(2) (emphasis added).
This regulation is nearly
identical to § 5.4(A)’s definition of work within the “jurisdiction
of the Plan,” and Maltese does not contest that the definitions
should be read as coextensive in the context of reemployment based
on § 5.4(C)’s invocation of the regulation.
Maltese also does not
contest that his work as Operations Manager is in the industry
covered by the Plan or that it is in the geographic area covered by
the Plan.
Thus, the issue is whether Maltese’s work as an
Operations Manager is in the same “trade or craft” as his prior
“Covered Employment.”
The regulation defines “trade or craft” as
(A) a skill or skills, learned during a significant
period of training or practice, which is applicable in
occupations in some industry, (B) a skill or skills
relating to selling, retailing, managerial, clerical or
professional occupations, or (C) supervisory activities
relating to a skill or skills described in (A) or (B)
. . . . [T]he determination [of] whether a particular
job classification, job description or industrial
occupation constitutes or is included in a trade or craft
shall be based upon the facts and circumstances of each
case.
15
29 C.F.R. § 2530.203-3(c)(2)(ii). The regulation also provides the
following example:
Participation in a multiemployer plan is limited solely
to electricians. Electrician E retired and then became
reemployed as a foreman of electricians.
Because a
“trade or craft” includes related supervisory activities,
E remains within his trade or craft for purposes of this
section.
Id.
Maltese argues that his work as an Operations Manager is not
in the same “trade or craft” as his prior work because it requires
managerial skills and none of his prior employment involved the use
of managerial skills.
Maltese further argues that the Trustees
failed to consider all of the evidence regarding his pre- and postretirement
work;
specifically,
evidence
regarding
his
responsibilities as an Operations Manager that, he argues, show he
is not working in the same trade or craft.
Maltese further argues
that his Operations Manager position cannot be considered the same
trade or craft under the “supervisory activities” portion of the
definition because he did not learn or use managerial skills in his
prior work.
First, the record before the Trustees was adequate, and the
Trustees fully considered the material submitted to them by the
parties.
Specifically, the Trustees reviewed a newsletter from
Kalkreuth announcing Maltese’s new position as Operations Manager,
ECF No. 21-1, a letter from John L. Kalkreuth, President of
Kalkreuth, to Jim Hadel describing Maltese’s responsibilities as
16
Operations Manager,2 ECF No. 20-1 at 44, a letter from Maltese to
the Trustees regarding his work history, id. at 31-32, a letter
from
Mr.
Kalkreuth
to
the
Trustees
clarifying
Maltese’s
responsibilities as Operations Manager, ECF No. 20-1 at 29-30, and
a letter from Maltese’s counsel presenting factual and legal
arguments, ECF No. 20-1 at 23-28.
While the Trustees’ decision
does not specifically cite or refer to these materials when
discussing Maltese’s reemployment as Operations Manager, these
materials are consistent in describing his prior covered employment
and his general duties as Operations Manager, and the Trustees’
findings are consistent with these materials.
Thus, the record
before the Trustees was adequate and the Trustees fully considered
all relevant materials.
Second, the Trustees’ application of “trade or craft” is in
compliance with the terms of the Plan and the applicable Department
of Labor regulations.
Maltese’s past Covered Employment included
work as a roofer, a foreman, a superintendent, and a project
manager.
His
instrumental
in
work
as
a
developing
project
manager
Kalkreuth’s
2
was
described
Lexington,
as
Kentucky
This Court notes that in this letter, Mr. Kalkreuth, refers
to Maltese’s position “Estimating Coordinator.” ECF No. 20-1 at
44.
However, in a later letter to the Trustees, Mr. Kalkreuth
clarified
that
his
first
letter
described
Maltese’s
responsibilities as Operations Manager, that “the letter’s
description of the job duties is accurate,” and that “there was
some degree of flux in the job title” at that time. ECF No. 20-1
at 29-30.
17
division.
Although
Maltese
did
not
previously
work
as
an
Operations Manager, he surely developed management skills as a
foreman, superintendent, and project manager, as he “exercise[d]
executive, administrative, and supervisory direction” in these
positions.
Marriam-Webster,
Manage,
https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/manage (last accessed Dec. 7, 2016).
Further, Maltese’s work as Operations Manager constitutes
supervisory
work
Specifically,
in
areas
Maltese’s
where
duties
as
he
has
previously
Operations
Manager
worked.
include
“[p]erform[ing] estimating duties,” “[o]ffice coordination between
estimating and project management staff,” “[o]ffice coordination
between project management and engineering staff,” “[a]ssisting in
the development of junior Project Managers to full-time project
managers,” “[a]ssist[ing] project management staff in securing
vendor pricing,” “[s]erv[ing] as liaison between estimating staff
and corporate management and/or executive management personnel,”
“[p]articipat[ing] in manager meetings,” and “[a]ssist[ing] in
discussions of and the implementation of new corporate policy and
procedures.”
Trustees,
ECF No. 20-1 at 44.
Mr.
Kalkreuth
In Mr. Kalkreuth’s letter to the
clarifies
Maltese’s
job
duties
as
Operations manager and specifically states that he “rel[ies] on
[Maltese] to guide and train new estimators and project managers to
assist them in attaining the same level of performance and work
ethic as he.”
ECF No. 20-1 at 30.
18
Maltese exercised some level of
supervision over project managers and project management staff
through his office coordination, project manager development, and
mentorship activities.
Because Maltese previously worked as a
project manager, his supervision of project managers is in the same
“trade or craft” as his prior work.
Accordingly, the Trustees did
not abuse their discretion in concluding that Maltese’s benefits
were properly suspended.
IV.
Conclusion
This Court finds that the Trustees did not abuse their
discretion under the terms of the Plan.
motion
for
summary
judgment
(ECF
No.
Accordingly, Maltese’s
25)
is
DENIED
and
the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 23) is GRANTED.
It is further ORDERED that this civil action be STRICKEN from the
active docket of this Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to transmit a copy of this memorandum
opinion and order to counsel of record herein. Pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 58, the Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment
on this matter.3
DATED:
December 12, 2016
3
The Plan has not filed a counterclaim or otherwise sought a
judgment or declaration that it is entitled to repayment of all
benefits paid to Maltese. Regardless, this Court notes that it
would lack jurisdiction to grant such relief. See Great-West Life
& Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 210, 218 (2002).
19
/s/ Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.
FREDERICK P. STAMP, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
20
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